



Joint  
Advanced  
Warfighting  
Program

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Iraqi Perspectives Project  
Primary Source Materials for  
Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging  
Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents  
Volume 2 (Redacted)**

Kevin M. Woods, Project Leader

November 2007  
Approved for public release;  
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- This volume is a redacted version of *Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 2 (Revised 31 July 2007)* (IDA Paper P-4151).
- The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classifications.

**This work was conducted under contract DASW01-04-C-0003, Tasks AJ-8-2465 and AJ-8-2743, for the Director, Joint Center for Operational Analyses and Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.**

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Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

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Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging  
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Volume 2 (Redacted)**

Kevin M. Woods, Project Leader

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This report is a redacted version of the original *Iraqi Perspectives Project—Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 2*, dated January 2007.

This redacted version was prepared by the original authors following a classification review by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pursuant to a request by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

All redactions from the original are in accordance with the 15 September 2007 DIA Memorandum, Subject: Classification Review of Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) Report Saddam and Terrorism. As stated in said memorandum, the DIA “made every effort to balance national security concerns, requirements of law, and the needs of an informed democracy and focused the redactions to the necessary minimum.” Moreover, all redactions have been made pursuant to Executive Orders 12958 (as amended) and 12333, and US Code provisions 5 USC 552, 5 USC 552a, and 10 USC 424.

The classification markings within are original to the Iraqi documents  
and do not reflect current US classification.

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## Preface

IDA Paper P-4151 was prepared under the Iraqi Perspectives subtask of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) task order for the Director, Joint Center for Operational Analyses and Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). It helps address the subtask objective of “cueing beneficial paths of exploration for other parts of the national security community” by using interviews, oral histories, and captured Iraqi documents and media to place in temporal context the conversations and materials of senior Iraqi leaders (political and military).

IDA Paper P-4151 comprises five volumes published as part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II series. Volume 1 examines the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global context. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in Volume 1. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.

\* \* \* \* \*

JAWP was established at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to serve as a catalyst for stimulating innovation and breakthrough change. It is co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, USJFCOM. JAWP includes military personnel on joint assignments from each Service and civilian specialists from IDA. JAWP is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and includes an office in Norfolk, Virginia, to facilitate coordination with USJFCOM.

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of IDA or the sponsors of JAWP. Our intent is to stimulate ideas, discussion, and, ultimately, the discovery and innovation that must fuel successful transformation.

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## Notes

This collection of primary source materials supports the research contained in Volume 1. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in the paper. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.

Volumes 2 through 5 have an example of a generic metadata reference sheet (next page). Certain elements of the reference sheet have been highlighted to help explain the structure and contents of a Harmony document folder or a Harmony media file.

The contributors to the Harmony database have left the original Iraqi security markings intact for research purposes, but for classification purposes, the Iraqi security markings should be ignored.

Original Document Information			
1	Document #: ISGQ-2003-00136079	Classification:	5
	English Title: Transcript of Saddam Hussein's meeting with the Armed Forces General Command		
	Language: ARABIC		
2	Document Date: 19940223	Total Pages: 198	Inclusive Pages: 197
	Document Type: MEETING DOCUMENTATION	Format: PAPER ORIGINAL	
3	Agency: DIA	Project: IRAQI FREEDOM	
	Country of Information: IRAQ	Date Acquired: 20030818	
	Title:		
	Country Of Origin: Originators Classification: TOP SECRET		
Linked Documents			
4	Original Document	ISGQ-2003-00136079	
Related Document Numbers			
	Document Number Type	Document Number	
	Harmony Number;	ISGQ-2003-00136079	
Document Remarks			
	ISGQ-2003-00136079 This file contains the following information: Pages: 2-198; Contain a transcript of Saddam Hussein's meeting with the Armed Forces General Command, dated 12 Sep 1981 and in 2 Mar 1984. The meeting discusses operations and plans for various units.		
Batch Information			
	Batch Name: 3230-1	Boxes in Batch: 1	
	Capture Information ;;Capturing Unit:UNK ;;Date/Time of Capture:18XXXXAUG03 ;;		
	Coordinates:UNK ;;Identity of Source:UNK		
	Transmittal Information ;;Transporting Unit:UNK ;;Transmittal Number:UNK ;;Point of Contact:UNK		
	Comments: books about saddam and his high army commands Administrative Office of the Presidency Adm. And Finance Curret Central Bank of Iraq		

#### No. Description of Elements

- 1 **Document #:** A unique number used to identify each entry in Harmony database. May correspond to one or more documents in a folder.
- 2 **Document Date:** The approximate date that a document (or the document folder) was published. The documents within a folder may have different dates originally.
- 3 **Document Type:** Lists the different types of information that exist within a single folder, e.g., memoranda, handwritten notes, log books.
- 4 **Document Remarks:** The gist or summary of the document folder.
- 5 **Classification:** The current US government classification (by Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, other government organizations).
- 6 **Date Acquired:** The date that the document was captured.
- 7 **Originator's Classification:** The original Iraqi classification, used for research purposes only. See no. 5, **Classification**, for the official US government classification.

#### Metadata Reference Sheet – Example

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
<b>Volume 2: Primary Source Materials</b>			
1	CMPC-2003-00015083	2	Investigative reports by the Iraqi Intelligence Service about failed bombs intended to destroy the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Japanese Embassy and American Airlines in Philippines
2	CMPC-2003-00017015	2	Production and execution of a bomb within the (IIS)
3	CMPC-2003-000331	2	IIS reports collection plans, lists of agents and relationship with Russian opposition groups
4	CMPC-2003-005626	2	Report from the Iraqi Intelligence Service Regarding Projects of Manufacturing Explosives
5	CMPC-2003-005749	2	Iraqi Intelligence Service Comparison of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) for 2000/2001
6	CMPC-2003-016529	2	IIS's M8 Annual Special Report 2002
7	CMPC-2003-017029	2	Memos and correspondence within the Iraqi Intelligence Service about preparing and executing a mission related to blowing up a Turkish School in Northern Iraq
8	CMPC-2003-011229	2	List of 9 Ba'th Party Suicide Volunteers
<b>Volume 3: Primary Source Materials</b>			
9	CMPC-2004-002746	3	Memorandums Related to the Iraqi Intelligence Service Concerning Explosives
10	CMPC-2004-002801	3	Iraqi Intelligence Service file about making a remote-explosive bomb with instructions and photos of the process, dated 28 July to 20 August 2001
11	CMPC-2004-003446	3	Work orders to charge a car with explosives using the RDX and RE4A materials

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
12	CMPC-2004-004572	3	Volunteers for "Nusrat al-'Iraq" and "Ashbal Saddam" Courses
13	IISP-2003-00026588	3	Details on 'Far'ay Saddam and Muhammad al-Mahdi' Sector and Letters to the IIS
14	IISP-2003-00027192	3	Agreement between Iran and Hamas designating \$15 million dollars a month to form a new group called "Palestine Hizbulah"
15	IISP-2003-00027194	3	Information about the Palestinian internal situation.
16	IISP-2003-00029003	3	IIS Research Study on the rebellion of 1991 Refugee Camp and a volunteered Fedayeen Saddam member
17	IISP-2003-00042526	3	IIS Agent executed discussing a mission to assassinate two Swedish journalists
18	ISGP-2003-00010399	3	Inventories of the weapons within the Iraqi Embassies in several countries, such as Geneva, Brussels, Sweden, Athens, Austria, and Madrid
19	ISGP-2003-00022866	3	Correspondence issued from the Iraqi Intelligence Service concerning Political Status in Kuwait
20	ISGQ-2003-00003654	3	Letters pertaining to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat Office in relation to Martyrdom Operations
21	ISGQ-2003-00004439	3	Intelligence reports of the Fedayeen Saddam on the opposition parties in the autonomous ruling region
22	ISGQ-2003-00004467	3	Information about a mission carried out against the US and UK citizens by a Fedayeen Saddam Commando
23	ISGQ-2003-00004526	3	Memorandum from Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat concerns requests from Sudanese individuals and a Yemeni to join Fedayeen Saddam Forces
24	ISGQ-2003-00004790	3	Terrorist activities of Fedayeen Saddam in Kurdish cities by using explosive devices
25	ISGQ-2003-00005228	3	A plot to liquidate Ahmad al-Jalabi, one of the Iraqi opposition leaders in London

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
26	ISGQ-2003-00036893	3	Al-Quds Army Chief of Staff Correspondence
27	IISP-2003-00027918	3	Personal data of Abu al-'Abbas, terrorist leader out of Iraq
28	ISGP-2003-00010366	3	Lessons in "Secret Organization and Jihad Work" Against the Saudi Royal Family
29	ISGP-2003-00011487	3	Two Iraqi suicide bombers Sri Lankans, Mihindar Amanayak and Kaminah Wastawinkon
30	ISGP-2003-00300189	3	Iraqi Intelligence Service Memos regarding affiliations with terrorist groups [updated and with complete translation]
31	ISGQ-2003-00072355	3	Iraqi inmates volunteering for the Palestinian cause
32	ISGP-2003-00014100	3	IIS Correspondence, Memorandum, etc., from the Iraqi Embassy in the Philippines and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry
<b>Volume 4: Primary Source Materials</b>			
33	ISGQ-2003-M0003964	4	An undated meeting presided over by President Saddam Hussein and his Ba'th Party members regarding the attack on Iraq and the political reaction of some Arab countries and the United States of America
34	ISGQ-2003-M0006248	4	Video containing a recorded meeting that took place on 19 Apr 90 among President Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Cabinet, President Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian delegation
35	ISGQ-2003-M0006443	4	Saddam meets with Command Member to discuss the biological profile in relation to the Iran-Iraq War and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
36	ISGQ-2003-M0006960	4	Saddam Discusses Western Politics and America's Involvement in Somalia
37	ISGQ-2003-M0007419	4	Saddam Hussein meeting with his Ministers, Qusay Saddam and Abid al-Tikriti

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
38	ISGQ-2004-00102327	4	Memoranda within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) dated on 1992 concerning the agreement between the IIS and Abu al-Abbas, the General Secretariat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
39	ISGQ-2004-00102335	4	Letter from Abu al-Abbas, the Secretary of the Palestinian Liberation Front, to support Iraq
40	ISGQ-2004-00102336	4	Information on the Secretary of the Palestinian Liberation Front, Abu al-Abbas and his relations with the Iraqis
41	ISGQ-2004-00102338	4	Correspondence within Iraqi Presidency- Arab Liberal Movement Bureau and Palestinian Liberation Front regarding presenting passports to secretary- general of the Palestinian Liberation Front and supporting them with money
42	ISGQ-2005-00017130	4	Information About Groups Aimed to Attack American Interests in the Gulf Region dated between 1997 and 2002
43	ISGQ-2005-00044975	4	Granting of \$2,000 US Dollars to the "IIS Source" Major Mustafa Hama Khan, awarded for his "outstanding performance" in blasting the headquarters of the illegal British Organization (4RS) with five KGs of TNT
44	ISGQ-2005-00118681	4	Correspondence, dated 1998 and 1999, between the Iraqi Intelligence Services and the General Security Directorate on the activities of the Islamic Resistance Organization (HAMAS) of Iraq
45	ISGZ-2004-018948	4	Fedayeen Saddam Instructions on Planning and Preparing for Operations from 1999, steps that were to be carried out in selection of personnel, as well as mission planning and coordination steps, assassinations, bombings, etc.
46	ISGZ-2004-027795	4	Iraqi Intelligence Reports About An Egyptian-Swiss Citizen, Dr. Ibrahim Salah
47	ISGZ-2004-032673	4	Military Reorganization/ Training Sudanese Fighters

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
48	IZSP-2003-00301651	4	Correspondence between the Ministry of Defense and the General Military Intelligence Directorate regarding reports about the armed operations Against the Saboteurs and United Nations Representatives in the Northern area
49	ISGQ-2005-00028282	4	Correspondence from GMID regarding the Assignment of Major 'Imad al-Mansub to a Suicidal Operation against American and British Forces
50	ISGQ-2005-00037352	4	Memos of General Military Directorate Regarding Suicide Mission Volunteers During 2001
51	IZSP-2003-10107642	4	Conversation between Abu- al-Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front, and an Iraqi Governmental Representative
52	IZSP-2003-301499	4	IIS compliance in '93 killings by members of the National Defense Regiment of two Kurds, one Australian and one Belgian (UN relief workers)
<b>Volume 5: Primary Source Materials</b>			
53	CMPC-2003-007410	5	A letter, dated 2000, from the Director of the 1st Directorate of the IIS, addressed to the Director of the al-Ghafiqi Project, requesting to review the annual plan of the al-Ghafiqi for the year 2000
54	IISP-2003-00013214	5	Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) File on HULMI ZAIDAN KHALAF HAMZA AL QAISI
55	IISP-2003-00028159	5	Reports about the main targets, airports and air bases in Israel
56	ISGQ-2003-00003576	5	Presented reports by groups of sources concerning the activities of Badr Corps and Hezbollah Party
57	ISGQ-2003-00003598	5	Correspondence and Security Reports within the Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
58	ISGQ-2003-00046659	5	Correspondence, dated 24 Sep 2002, within the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), regarding a research study titled, "The Emergence of al-Wahabiyyah Movement and its Historical Roots"
59	ISGQ-2003-00047996	5	Jordanian Suicide Pilot dated between 8/13/1990 and 9/25/1990
60	ISGQ-2005-00017457	5	Tables of Various Activities of the Iraqi Directorates
61	ISGQ-2005-00017862	5	Information about the relation between Algeria and Iran
62	ISGQ-2005-00019580	5	Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) handwritten correspondence regarding information on the Islamic armed groups in Algeria and article subjected accusing Bin Laden on supporting the Salvias materialistic and logistic
63	ISGQ-2005-00034061	5	Scientific ideas prepared by Biologist Employee 'Uday Salim Mahdi raising producing viruses and germs for the purpose of polluting the water tanks for the US camps in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
64	ISGZ-2004-028580	5	Financial Support from IIS to Palestinian Organizations
65	ISGZ-2004-031727	5	Intelligence letters sent to Iraqi embassies in Washington D.C., Switzerland, Algeria, France, Jordan, and Iran regarding budget renewals and request for information on groups of people
66	ISGZ-2005-002023	5	Iraqi Intelligence Service to set relationship with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement
67	ISGZ-2005-002426	5	Intelligence Information on al-Qaeda activities in several countries to include where the US has its interests
68	ISGZ-2005-003407	5	Iraqi Army Intelligence receipts and invoices which payments to Sudanese fighters in Iraq
69	ISSO-2003-00008237	5	Correspondence belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a report on the visit of al-Shikh Ahmad Yasin and Khalid Mash'al, the leaders of HAMAS, a Palestinian Organization

Cited Documents

No.	Harmony Folder No.	Vol.	Title of Harmony Document Folder or Media File
70	ODP1-2005-000242	5	Arab volunteers who arrived in the country by way of Syria, total of 646 (report date 3/28/03)
71	ODP1-2005-003282	5	Province of al-Anbar reporting US Army attacks, on 31 March 2003 2,500 foreign fighters entered through Syria
72	ODP1-2005-007411	5	Security reports regarding Iranian leader Ramadan Zada who did secret visits to Lebanon and Jordan and met with Hamas and al-Jihad leaders to transport mortar rounds to Palestine through Lebanon and Jordan to be used on Israeli targets
73	ISGQ-2003-00002541	5	Fedayeen Saddam's Executions in 2000
74	ISGQ-2005-00016212	5	IIS Information about Ansar al-Islam Group (Political Affiliation)
75	ISGQ-2005-00019583	5	Report on sources of weapon and finance of the Muslim groups in Algeria

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**Harmony Document Folders  
and Media Files:**

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Next

Query returned 52 of 927504 total documents.

Displaying hit: 1

Request Upload

Request Translation

### Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-00015083

Classification: [REDACTED]

English Title: Investigative reports by the Iraqi Intelligence Service about failed bombs intended to destroy the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Japanese Embassy and American Airlines in Philippines [REDACTED]

Language: ARABIC

Document Date:	Total Pages: 71	Inclusive Pages: 70	Oversized Pages:
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Document Type: HANDWRITTEN NOTES/ NOTEBOOK, LETTER	Format: PAPER ORIGINAL
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Agency: DIA	Project: IRAQI FREEDOM
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Country Of Information: IRAQ
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Title:

Country Of Origin:	Originators Classification: TOP SECRET
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### Translation Information

Translation #	Classification	Status	Translating Agency
CMPC-2003-00015083-HT	[REDACTED]	PARTIAL <u>COMPLETED</u>	DIA

### Linked Documents

Original Document	CMPC-2003-00015083
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	CMPC-2003-00015083-HT (Multi-Part)
--	------------------------------------

Translation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><a href="#">cmpc-b/CMPC-2003-00015083-HT.pdf</a></li><li><a href="#">cmpc-m/CMPC-2003-00015083-HT.pdf</a></li></ul>
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### Related Document Numbers

Document Number	Type	Document Number
Harmony Number		CMPC-2003-00015083

### Keyword Categories

### Keywords

TERRORIST OPERATIONS
----------------------

Biographic Information

Name: 'ABD-AL-AZIZ, MAHFUZ 'ABD-AL-WAHAB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 34 and 57

Name: 'ABD-AL-HADI, TALIB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 9

Name: 'UBAYD, FARHAN HAMID

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4

Comments: Page 4

Name: AHMAD, SAMIR MAHMUD

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , 2ND DIVISION

Comments: Page 20

Name: BARAKAT, MUHSIN DHIYAB

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M1

Comments: Pages 4 and 45

Name: DAWUD, HAYDAR MUSLIM

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 10

Name: FAYYAD, KHALIL IBRAHIM

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 34

Name: HAMID, FARHAN

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)

Comments: Page 34 and 63

**Name: IBRAHIM, IBRAHIM KHALIL**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M 6**

**Comments: Page 4**

**Name: IBRAHIM, KHUDAYR ISMA'IL**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4**

**Comments: Page 34**

**Name: ISMA'IL, KHALID IBRAHIM**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)**

**Comments: Page 60**

**Name: JASIM, 'ABD-AL-WAHAB 'AMMAR**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4**

**Comments: Page 27**

**Name: JUM'AH, SAHIR SHAHADAH**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS), M14**

**Comments: Page 27**

**Name: MAHMUD, DIYA' 'ABDULLAH**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)**

**Comments: Page 62**

**Name: MAKI, AS'AD**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M4**

**Comments: Page 46**

**Name: MUSA, QADDURI 'ABD**

**Sex : Male**

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS)**

**Comments: Page 10**

Name: SALIH, TAHAA MAHDI

Sex : Male

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) , M16

Comments: Page 27

Document Remarks

[REDACTED] This 71 pages file contains reports within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), dated between 3 June 1992 and 10 May 1994, regarding an investigation made about the failures and premature exploded bombs, and other explosives. These bombs were intended and planed to destroy targets, including the residence of the US Ambassador in Jakarta, the Office of the American Airlines and Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, targets and installations in Iran and other undisclosed locations elsewhere. - Pages 4-40, 45-48, and 50-71: Minutes of an agenda dated 15 Feb 1994, by the investigative committee of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), headed by Muhsin Dhiyab, about inquiring and investigating reasons way some explosive devices (Bombs), manufactured by Directorate 16 were malfunctioned and failed to blast. The investigation had revealed the following failed explosion attempts and others that exploded prematurely before hitting its targets, which caused the death of a number of operatives: - A bomb exploded prematurely, caused the death of a collaborator inside Iran - A bomb planted inside fuel reservoirs in Iran, but the Iranian authorities have recovered before it explodes. - A bomb intended to destroy the American Ambassador's residence in Jakarta had failed - A bomb designed to destroy the office of the American Airlines and the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, has exploded prematurely and damaged the front entrance of the Office. This was resulted the death of an Officer, and wounded another. - One hundred bombs sent to different countries around the world, had get through successfully, except five bombs shipped to Egypt with five Fedayeen, whom were captured soon after they arrive at Cairo Airport. - Poisoning attempts failed in a number of occasions, against unidentified individuals. The file also mentioned what had went wrong, and the problems of premature explosions that caused the death of a number of officers, agents and collaborators. In addition, recommendations were made for quality assurance methods to tackle such problems, while stressed safety standards and evaluating the personnel and the techniques of assembling, handling, and transporting. -Pages 41-44: A handwritten report dated 25 Oct 1992, addressed the Technical Consultant, recommending a mine inspection schemes, while referring mines delivered to the Mujahidin Al-Khalaq Organization. The report includes mines technical specifications and mines that exploded prematurely and killed people. -Page 49: A memo dated 20 Apr 1993, within IIS related a presidential order of honoring martyrs who were killed by bombs while handling.

**Batch Information**

**Batch Number:** 3128-10

**Boxes in Batch:** 6

**Capture Information** Capturing Unit:DIA/CBIST Date/Time of Capture:24 APR 03 Country of Unit:UNITED STATES Place of Capture:AZMERLI RESIDENCE Coordinates:331929.5N 0441826.8E

**Transmittal Information** Transporting Unit:CBIST Date/Time of Arrival:8 MAY 03 Point of Contact: [REDACTED]

**Comments** [REDACTED] IIS OFFICER/CHEMICAL WEAPON SCIENTIST  
RESIDENCE DOCUMENTATION

**CMPC-2003-00015083**  
**Full Translation of Pages 1-71**

**Page 1**

(TC: This page is a triage cover page)

**Page 2**

(TC: This page is a triage cover page)

**Page 3**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Top Secret

Notification

Date: 10 May 1994  
Ref: M1/ 1/ 3/ 231

To/ the M2

In reference to your administrative order # 725, dated 7 March 1994, attached is the comment of the IIS director, dated 7 May 1994, regarding his supervision on the performance of Al-Ghafiqi Project, M16/ 2 (section level). We will take care of the rest of the orders mentioned in the comment. Please review and take the necessary action, with respect.



Chief of the Committee  
10 March 1994

Remarks:

The comments of the IIS director have been submitted to Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, the Director of Al-Ghafiqi project to deal with them directly.  
2 June 1994



**Top Secret and Confidential**

**Results of the Investigating Committee's Works**

**1- The Case:**

As the approval of IIS director was granted on 15 February 1994, and pursuant to administrative order # 725, dated 7 March 1994, an investigating committee was formed, chaired by M1Director, Muhsin Dhiyab and with the membership of:

- Mr. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, section director and M4 representative
- Mr. Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim- section director and M6 representative

This committee was formed to give explanations of the reasons behind the malfunction of some devices that were manufactured by M16, which led to failure of some missions as follows:

- a- A collaborator in Iran was killed by a device that exploded prematurely.
- b- A hand of another collaborator was severed for the same reason
- c- Another device, attached to a fuel container, did not explode in Iran, which led to detecting and disarming it by Iranian authorities – as stated in excerpt number (1).
- d- These incidents occurred several times. Our system became familiar with this phenomenon; malfunction of devices and uncontrolled explosions. However, these incidents have led to losing some of our sources along with disclosure of our operations, and causing political losses, as stated by the M10 general director. The study of the committee was presented before the director of the IIS on 26 November 1993, pursuant to administrative order number M1/2/1/1120, dated 26 April 1993 –as stated in excerpt number (2).

(1-13)

**Page 5**

**2- Previous Information:**

- a- When the First Gulf War broke out, a committee was held to carry out commando operations. This committee, equipped with explosive devices, aimed to attack some hostile targets throughout the world. Thus the following was concluded:

First: Four tasks were carried out; two were successfully completed as planned, the third was planned to blow up the residence of the American Ambassador in Jakarta but the explosive device misfired, and the fourth was targeted to blow up the American Airlines office in the Philippines but exploded during installation, killing an officer and wounding another. Both were affiliated with the IIS. The committee was unable to figure out the cause of this uncontrolled explosion.

Second: There was no difficulty in transporting more than one hundred explosive devices to different counties, except for five that were destined for Egypt by five commandos who were arrested immediately upon arrival at Cairo Airport.

Third: Part of these topics was the subject matter of the committee formed pursuant to administrative order number 120/1496, dated 26 April 1992. Representatives of M1, M4, M16, and M14 were members on the committee.

[REDACTED] This indicates a possible leak of information, which would be credited to the wide number of people who were informed, and the inadequacy of safety and security measures, as the M14 representative said, as stated in excerpt number (3).

**Page 6**

Fourth: According to notification number D4/ 2, dated 2 January 1992, the M4 thinks that the uncontrolled explosions were attributed to a defect in the timing devices, which were produced by the M16 –Technical Consultant Department, as stated in excerpt number (4).

- b- As the approval of the IIS director was granted on 21 February 1993, a fact-finding committee was formed to investigate the these defective devices occurring while carrying out special operations, as follows:

First: On 16 March 1993, an explosive devise burst while installing. This incident caused the death to a source.

Second: On 18 July 1993 a booby-trapped case was blown up by a source because, as it was believed, he tampered with it.

Third: On 27 December 1992 an explosive device blew up while a member of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization was installing it.

Fourth: On 14 January 1993, an explosive exploded, killing two of our sources while crossing in the south.

Fifth: 13 cases recognized, as well as a booby-trapped car, in which the explosive devices did not explode. Investigations revealed the reason of that was a defect in the detonator.

Sixth: There are unsuccessful tasks in which poisonous substances were used. A task targeting an individual who used a poisonous substance for two years did not perish. A duty of Ministry of Interior was to poison a target. Although he consumed the whole dose, he is still alive and in good condition, as stated in excerpt number (5).

**Page 7**

Seventh: The aforesaid committee was unable to hold someone directly responsible for that, but it came up with the following suggestions:

- Associate with the Secretariat of the System Al-Ghafiqi Project, M16/ 2, and Special Substances Section (toxics) in an attempt to avoid failures while carrying out special tasks. Reduce the number of people who access the information. The general director of M1 did not back this suggestion up, stating it would not stop these malfunctions and reduce losses. Then, on 26 October 1993, the Director of the Intelligence Service gave orders to start discussing the matter with the M16 Director, Technical Consultant. In the end, the intelligence director concurred with the committee on the recommendations, except to associating the project and the section with the Secretariat. Consequently, M16 was informed of the following, as per notification of M1/ 2/1 / 414, dated 1 February 1994:  
In coordination with the MIC, the devices are being rechecked by M16 them and reduce detonation failure. The concerned personnel of the technical department are fully responsible for any failure that may occur in future, as stated in excerpt number (5).

- c- On 25 October 1992, a detailed report was submitted to the technical consultant, Director of M16, concerning a field experiment conducted in the presence of representatives of M4 and Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, who had complained about the performance of the explosive device. The field experiment showed:

First: Four devices and a detonator, out of nine, exploded, representing 55%.  
Second: The fifth, which was timed to explode in six hours, blew up after an hour and a half of activation.

-4-

**Page 8**

Third: The sixth did not blow up because the wire connecting the battery was cut-off.

Fourth: The seventh, which was timed to explode after four hours, did not explode after more than six hours of activation:

Fifth: These devices were selected from a large number of devices that were sent back by the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. This organization said these devices were deficient. This experiment proved that the organization's allegations were correct, regardless of the justifications given by Al-Ghafiqi Project Manager and the Director of the Timers Section, the makers, as stated in excerpt number (6).

- d- Responding to the suggestion mentioned in intelligence service letter number 14/ D2/ 2/589, dated 20 March 1993, intending to honor the two martyrs mentioned under clause B, fourth article, the President commented "This would strengthen our ties with them. But has it come to the intelligence services' attention that the organization that delivered the explosives might have tampered with the explosive devices in order to hurt the installers?" as stated in excerpt number (7).
- e- On 23 March 1992, as per orders from the M1 former Operation Manager regarding conducting field visits to observe the performance of the technical teams, Chief Engineer Muhsin Dhiyab visited Al-Ghafiqi Project and the M16/2. The following notes were submitted to the Secretariat at that time:

First: The technical consultant assigns some affiliates to perform anonymous tasks without the knowledge of Al-Ghafiqi Project Manager and the competent section head. The assignees are not allowed to inform their bosses of targets and details of these tasks.

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## Page 9

Al-Ghafiqi Project Director and the competent section head upheld these kinds of duties when they were asked by members of our committee.

Second: The work site and the workshops are not arranged. Machinery, equipment, and other services are covered with dust and dirt, which look like old vocational workshops. Members on this committee came to this conclusion when they visited the project site on 24 March 1994.

Third: At that time, there were Palestinian employees working at the workshops without restrictions or precautionary security measures. They mingled freely with affiliates on that project.

Fourth: The affiliates have lots of problems.

Fifth: Conducting tasks takes the shape in a vocational way. There is no quality control or measuring of performance of the results.

Sixth: Labor procedures do not adopt safety, security, and professional measures.

Seventh: Workers are evaluated very well, but they lack capabilities and tendencies to become knowledgeable and courageous, as stated in excerpt number (8).

### 3- Committees Activities:

- a- The committee reviewed the background of the case and reviewed some of the paperwork of previous committees dealing with failures that occurred in previous assignments where explosive devices were used. The committee has visited the work site of Al-Ghafiqi Project, discussed the matter of the timers' manufacturing with the project director, the competent section head and the workers, and written down some explanations, as stated in excerpt number (9).
- b- Check the security backgrounds of some personnel working in the field of producing timers. They are:
- Engineer Talib 'Abd-al-Hadi

M6

- 6 -

## Page 10

- Technician Haydar Muslim Dawud
- Technician Qadduri 'Abd Musa

A member of the committee, who is an affiliate of the M6, declared that everything is correct.

- c- Testing six timers out of 19 reveals they are functioning effectively, except for one that exploded at the time of activation. This malfunction happened due to the fact that it required connection to electrical currency in two stages, which was agreed on. This raised doubt that the assignee may have committed a mistake or have not abided by instructions, and as a result, led to the explosion.
- d- Six timers were tested. The first exploded at the specified time, the second exploded 4 minutes before the specified time, the third, the fourth, and the fifth blew up 10 minutes before the time planned, and the sixth exploded 22 minutes after the set time, as stated in excerpt number (10).
- e- The committee has noticed that the workflow goes in a rudimentary way because there was no systematization or arrangement. The status of affairs was as mentioned in the visit report dated 23 March 1992, mentioned in (e), (2) above.
- f- The committee has noticed that the malfunction issue was not given enough concern by M16. However, they settled for notifying just the section head in order to take some measures. This was forwarded by notification of M1/3/1/414, dated 1 April 1994, which was mentioned in (B), (2) above, excerpt number (9).

- g- The Project Director and competent section head blamed the executive authorities in that they committed technical and procedural mistakes while assembling the explosive devices and connecting them to batteries. As a result, this would lead to uncontrolled explosions or failure to explode.

In such cases, there should be safety precautions built into the product.

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### Page 11

The committee has consulted the Project director and competent section head on the issue in order to come up with an acceptable conclusion and disregard blaming the executive authorities. On the other hand, the executive authorities blame the manufacturing authorities. The committee was surprised as the two parties, executive and manufacturing, submitted the enclosed report, excerpt number (11), which summarizes the following:

First: Before 1986, the work and the results were better than now. There were no malfunctions. Earlier failure resulted from being connected to Technical Consultant and to the Palestinians. They requested their affiliation be to the leadership of the IIS. They claimed to reconsider the project structure and change it to be a directorate instead of a section.

Second: The leadership of M16, Technical Consultant, was busy laying down plans and conducting researches not feasible to their work field and discarded what was useful to their job.

Third: The Technical Consultant limits their work, deprives them of their authorities, and treats them as workers, causing this result, but they declined to write that down in the report.

Fourth: Personnel of the project have different specialties. The specialty and will to work were not taken into consideration while choosing to work in this project. Most of them are transferred from other departments (punished). The project has not been provided with cadres having the required specialties. They said that the affiliates need encouragement and enlightenment.

Fifth: Some devices, substances and detonators existed before the First Gulf War. Their efficiency and quality were affected due to not being stored under good conditions.

*\* They are right concerning Palestinian members. If they have the possibility to transfer them, why do they not do that and utilize them in different places.*

*Present names and general ideas.*

- 8 -

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- Sixth: The recognized conditions forced us to resort to local markets and purchase devices and low-level substances not suitable for this kind of work.
- Seventh: They are not provided with proper precautionary measures suitable for their kind of dangerous work conditions.
- This is true, but they are responsible for any failure
- What are the reasons?
- Ninth: The project faces the problem of issuing allowances for housing and food to affiliates traveling to governorates. This problem burdens affiliates and creates discouragement among them.
- Eighth: They are not evaluated despite the fact they make the explosive devices and support the assignees' success. Affiliates of M4 and M14 are evaluated but M16/ 2 are not.
- Tenth: Because of the embargo, they lack devices and substances needed for the manufacturing process.
- Eleventh: They demand:
- To be granted more freedom to work and be free from so many restrictions.
  - To be given privileges granted to intelligence teams.
  - To be housed in suitable dwellings.
  - Reconsider the structure, the cadres, and the association to the Technical Consultant.
  - Reconsider the cadres of the project and provide it with qualified personnel
  - ..Etc.
- They present the proposed freedoms for studying
- Present the needed location
- To be looked into it
- Submit names of unqualified personnel and nominate qualified personnel

### Page 13

#### 4- Reasons behind the failure to complete tasks:

In light of what was stated above, we have reached the conclusion that reasons leading to the failure of completing tasks lie in the following:

- a- Low quality manufacturing, especially timers and igniters, which are made of cheap and bad-quality components prone to lose some of their characteristics while exposed to factors such as heat, humidity, vibration, low battery, and resistance to shock. Consequently, producing explosive devices require high accuracy and advanced care during transportation, storage, installation, and activation. The assignees and sources should be highly qualified and given a high level of training. This mechanism, prepared by technical consultant, M16, showed failure and irrelevance to circumstances, conditions of the work, and assignees executing the tasks.
- b- Although the former committee announced its recommendations indicating that M16 should reinspect the manufactured substances, develop their technical status, reduce failures, and hold itself completely responsible for any failure of any task that may occur, as stated in excerpt number (5), the committee has not observed that the technical consultant and his personnel were not highly concerned about such a case. At this time they will be responsible for failure occurring in most tasks.
- c- There is conviction indicating that the failure of tasks....

- 10 -

### Page 14

....is accounted for by the sources themselves. Take into consideration that this would be in very limited cases because it is inconceivable that the source would deliberately risk his life. But it happened due to lack of knowledge or being out of their control, especially when we know that some of people who died are:

- An officer assigned to special operations in the IIS
- Some sources affiliated with Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
- Some sources affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party

What was known about these people is that they were well-qualified to carry out such duties.

#### 5- Suggestions:

In light of the dangerous status of this issue, the heavy losses in the arena of politics, intelligence, and finance, the difficulty to convince sources to use these explosives because they have killed a lot of people using them and some have not exploded, to avoid atrocities like Lockerby, and the former committee recommendations did not positively improve the status, which require making decisive decisions regarding the seriousness of the matter, the committee believe and stress that the following suggestions are better means for achieving the goal in this field.

- 11 -

### Page 15

What is the requested process?

What are the measures?

**Page 16**

- a. The question of the Service Director to the technical consultant regarding the repetition of failures and flops, and not taking the appropriate actions according to the previous recommendations of the investigation committee, especially that mentioned in paragraph 2. The recommendations were sent to the Technical Consultant Division according to notification of Directorate 1/2/1 number 414 on 1 Feb 1994.
- b. Studying the subject of reorganizing Al-Ghafiqi Section by a committee to be formed in the Service, according to a suggestion of the section's head and Division's head /slip of paper No 12 / (*we did not find it*)
- c. Adopting new work procedures to suit the duties and missions, after the failure of the previous duties.
- d. Carrying out duties and missions in a way that enables us to identify problems, disclaim responsibility, and relinquish the state of "floating" the responsibility (*we did not understand the paragraph*)
- e. Providing good devices, parts and equipment to manufacture reliable and good products that can resist weather, chemical, and electrical conditions that may appear during the mission, taking into consideration the qualifications and conditions of the sources.
- f. Adopting a program to qualify and train the sources and those who work on special duties to decrease catastrophes and failures.
- g. Adopting new work procedures regarding vocational safety, security and quality control. These procedures should be mandatory for all sections and divisions.

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**Page 17**

- h. Having a file for failed missions to review and study the file to benefit from it in setting future plans to avoid such failures later.
- i. Evaluating the affiliates continuously and excluding the unqualified individuals in term of educational, technical, security and personal level.
- j. Supporting work, scientifically and technically, with qualified individuals from the other divisions of the Service or from national organizations
- k. Reconsidering the subject of the qualified individuals from the Penal Section and Al-Ghafiqi Section who work in other sections and in positions that do not suit their specializations. Most of the aforementioned individuals have high degrees and were replaced with less qualified individuals.

With appreciation



Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim  
Committee member  
Section's Head-  
representative of M6



Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd  
Committee Member  
Section's Head-  
representative of M4



Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat  
Head of Committee  
Representative of M 10  
24 Apr 1994

13

14

Page 18

Opinion and Decision



To write to Directorate 2  
19 Feb



Director of the Service  
15 Apr 1994

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Director of the Service

Mr. Director of Directorate 4  
Kindly



16 February

Kindly review...and we agree with the suggestion to form an investigation council to look into the reasons that led to these incidents  
With appreciation


Deputy Director  
14 Feb 1994

Secret and Personal

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Deputy Director

Kindly review... What has been mentioned regarding the "timers" given by our Service is a dangerous thing and we should know its real reasons. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion to form an investigation council from Directorates 1, 4 and 6 to look into the matter...with appreciation



14 Feb 1994

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr. General Director of Directorate 4  
Subject: Timers

1. We received the approval of the Service Director on 12 Jul 1993 to supply the Kurdistan Democratic Party with (30) timers, manufactured by Directorate 16, to carry out operations against Iranian establishments.
2. In order not to reveal the methods of our service in using the new devices, second-hand timers, according to a request of the concerned directorate, were manufactured, because the beneficiary party is one of the collaborating parties with our service and it is not one of the trusted Service sources.
3. The representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran informed us of the following information when we met him on 12 Feb 1994:
  - a. One of their members was killed by a bomb carrying one of the timers mentioned above. The battery and the operating wires were connected, but the timers did not work.
  - b. A bomb exploded in one of their member's hand, which led to its amputation. The battery and the operating wires were connected, but the timer exploded prematurely. The timer was supposed to explode after four hours.
  - c. The party laid a bomb on a fuel tank in the Kharishah area, but the timer did not work. Iranian authorities were able to discover the bomb and disassemble it that day.
  - d. The party tested the rest of the timers, and found that some of them are not working and some of them do not work if...

(1-2)

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Information form 11

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr  
Subject:

...they were moved after connecting the battery. Some of the timers are not accurate.

- e. The party sent back the 19 timers that were given to them
- f. The same problem happened to the timers given to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization. The problem was discussed with comrade Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad, head of the section, during his meeting with the organization on 28 May 1993.
- g. These accidents became obvious and repetitive due to the increase in accidents that our sources suffer from. This will make the sources lose their trust in the devices we give them and will make us lose our sources.

Kindly, review...and we suggest forming an investigation council to find out the delinquent party and to avoid such failures and problems in the future...with appreciation

As'ad  
13 February

Signature  
Munir Mahmud Ahmad  
Director of the Third International Division  
13 February

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Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service  
Notification

Secret and Personal

*Information form 4*

Date: 20 Feb 1994  
Ref: M4/74

To / Directorate 4 /7

We got the approval of the service director to form an investigation committee from Directorates 1, 4, and 6 to know the real reasons for breakdown of some devices manufactured by Directorate 16 that led to failure of some special duties. The representative of Directorate 4 is Mr. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, head of Division 2/2.

Kindly review and take the necessary action...with appreciation

Enclosures  
Copy of the approval



Directorate 4 / MD 2

(1-1)  
Secret and Personal

**Page 22**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Mr / Director of the Intelligence Service

1. The following is the minutes of the committee assigned to find the reasons of the repetitive failures of Directorate 16, in order to know the weaknesses that led to losing some sources, aborting some operations, and suffering some political losses.
2. The representative of Directorate 16 did not clarify and explain some paragraphs mentioned in the investigation, and this was mentioned in the attached memorandum
3. The committee did not pay attention to the technical aspects and did not (Illegible) the representative or discuss his notes before giving the final decision and presenting the recommendations. The suggestion to connect the two sections with the secretariat will not stop the failures or decrease the losses. We have to know the real reasons of the concerned division by asking that division to present a report in which they illustrate the reasons of failures and their suggestions to deal with the problems before approving the recommendations of the committee.

Kindly, review...with appreciation

26 Oct 1993

Top Secret

A committee's report

---

Referring to administrative order number 120/1496 on 26 Apr 1992 regarding forming a committee to study the issue of the explosive devices dispensed by Directorate 16 to Directorates 4 and 14.

The following actions have been taken:

1. Introduction

Direktorat 16 dispensed explosive devices to Directorates 4 and 14 to be used in Umm Al-Ma'arik. During the conference of Directorate 16, the Director of the Intelligence Service issued his directions as follows:

- a. Showing how and for what purpose the 139 explosive devices were dispensed
- b. Results of use, accuracy of impact, and destruction force
- c. Any other remarks that can be useful in developing the explosive devices in the future
- d. Technical evaluation for the reason why the explosive device used by Directorate 4 in the Philippines detonated prematurely

In light of what has been mentioned, Directorate 1 addressed Directorates 4, 14 and 16 through 8 official letters. They reached no result. This is what led to forming the above-mentioned committee.

2. The committee held many meetings, and after the investigations, the committee reached the following:

A. The number of dispensed devices was:

- Directorate 4            31 explosive devices
- Directorate 14          75 explosive devices

This means that the total is 106 explosive devices, not 193 as mentioned in the correspondence.

Representative of Directorate 16 pointed out that 87 of the 193 explosive devices ...

(1-5)

Top Secret

...that were produced according to the request to Directorates 4 and 14 were not received because the operations finished. Directorate 16 secured the explosive devices for future use.

B. Directorates 4 and 14 dispensed the explosive devices they had, as clarified in attachments 1 and 2 that show:

- Name of the party that received the explosive devices
- Date of receiving
- Results of usage

C. Summary of usage / attachment 3

1- Directorate 14 returned 16 explosive devices and Directorate 4 returned 9 explosive devices to Directorate 16. The total was 25 explosive devices.

2- Directorate 4 dispensed the following:

A. 15 explosive devices to Abu-al-'Abbas and Abu al-Tayyib Group/ The devices have not been used yet.

B. 7 explosive devices to the Egyptian Fedayeen (Commandoes) / they were arrested along with the devices by the Egyptian Police at Cairo Airport.

3- Directorate 14 dispensed the following:

A. 15 explosive devices to Abu Dawud, Abu Al-'Abbas, and Abu Al-Tayyib Groups / The devices have not been used yet.

B- 5 explosive devices to the representative of the Arab Liberation Front / The results are not known yet.

C. 4 explosive devices to Ibrahim Qlaylat/ The results are not known yet

4- 10 explosive devices were used by Directorate 4 to bomb 2 headquarters, 4 vehicles, and 6 Iranian individuals. The accuracy of impact and destructive force were very good, and everything went according to the plan.

**Page 25**

**5-** 3 explosive devices were used by Directorate 4 to burn the Japanese embassy and the American Airline office in Manila (Philippines). The accuracy of impact and destructive force were very good, and everything went according to plan.

**6-** 1 explosive device was used by Directorate 4 to destroy the residence of the American ambassador in Jakarta, but the device did not work and the reasons are unknown.

**7-** 12 explosive devices were destroyed by Directorate 14.

**8-** An explosive device exploded prematurely, led to death of a first lieutenant, injured an employee belonging to the service, and destroyed the front side of the American Airlines office (the target) in the Philippines. Directorate 14 made the device and Directorate 16 made the timer.

3. The representative of Directorate 16 presented the attached report that includes some negative remarks about work procedures that affect the results, and he suggested:

- a) Parties benefit from explosive devices and when executing the mission should let the bomb manufacturers in Directorate 16 be involved in planning and give them enough information before they manufacture the devices.
  - b) No mediators (third party) should be allowed to request the devices. Customarily, Directorate 4 asks Directorate 14 to provide it with explosive devices to be used by members of Directorate 4, and then Directorate 14 requests the devices from Directorate 17.
4. In its letter number 1 on 8 Jan 1992, Directorate 14 pointed out that the technical evaluation for one of the devices exploding prematurely (item 8 paragraph 2) is...

(3)

**Page 26**

... the timer did not work correctly because:

- either a mistake was made by the executors
- or there was a technical fault in the timer

In spite of that, the investigation committee formed for this purpose was unable to determine the real reason.

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This means that there is an indirect leak of information, and the reason might be the large number of individuals who knows about the explosive devices or a deficiency in security procedures.

**6. Recommendations**

In the light of what has been mentioned, the committee recommends the following:

- a. Asking Directorates 4 and 14 to contact the groups that were given explosive devices (Abu Al-Tayyib, Abu Dawud, Abu Al-'Abbas, and representative of the Arab Liberation Front) to find out the results of using these devices and to find out what happened to the devices they still have. The directorates should also inquire about the possibility of retrieving the devices that have not been used in order to give Directorate 16 a chance to deal with the problem to guarantee that the secret of these devices will not be revealed in the future.
- b. The parties that use the devices are to supply Directorate 16 with detailed technical information about the target, and to discuss the information related to the design of the explosive device to insure it suits the target in order to get the best results.
- c. Directorate 16 is to improve the executors' efficiency, especially affiliates of Directorate 14, by ....

...increasing mandatory rehabilitative and training courses

- d. Increasing procedures of security safety of its three aspects (establishment security, individual security, and documents security) to keep secrets and decrease the number of those who communicate with Directorates 4, 14 and 16 regarding designing and manufacturing the devices.
- e. Directorates 4 and 14 are to supply Directorate 16 with the technical results of using the devices for the goal of developing the manufacture of the devices.
- f. The beneficiary parties, especially Directorate 4, should request the devices directly from Directorate 16 without mediating with Directorate 14, unless there are members from Directorate 14 participating in the mission.



Member  
Taha Mahdi Salih  
Head of Division/Directorate 16  
3 Jun 1992



Member  
'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Ammar Jasim  
Head of Division/Directorate 14  
3 Jun 1992



Member  
Sahir Shuhadah Jum'ah  
Head of Section/ Directorate 14



Head of committee  
Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat  
Directorate 6/ 2  
3 Jun 1992

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Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service  
Notification

Date: 2 Jan 1992  
Ref: M4/D4/2

Secret and Personal

Mr. / General Director of the Secretariat

Your secret and personal notification 5260 on 31 Dec 1991

We have no negative remarks regarding the bombs, except one accident, which is the explosion of the ninth bomb that was sent to the Philippines. The explosion led to the death of one of the fighters and the injuring of another. We think that the reason for the explosion was the timer, taking into consideration that Directorate 14 has the accurate evaluation for the accident.

Kindly review...with appreciation



The acting General Director of Directorate 4  
1 Jan 1992

*To ask directorate 16*

*Signature*

*2 Jan 1992*

(1-1)  
Secret and Personal

Executing the order of the Intelligence Service Director on 21 Apr 1993, an investigation committee was formed to find out the reasons for some special operations' abortions due to the explosion of some devices prematurely, the explosion failure of devices or the failure to use poisonous substances. The committee held many meetings to discuss the subject and some specialized officers were asked to attend. The committee also sent one of the committee members to Intelligence Systems of the Northern and Eastern Zones to take a field look on the reason for failures and the way to deal with such cases. The committee came to the following:

**1. Failures in using all types of explosive devices:**

Types:

- a. On 16 Mar 1993, a plastic ground explosive detonated while the source, 'Ismat Husayn Hajji Al-Dawsaki, was connecting the fuse, and led to his death.

The reason for the failure might be:

- 1- A technical fault in the mine's manufacture and connecting methods

(1-8)

**Page 30**

2- Misuse of the source using the mine and not dealing with it as he was trained

In both cases, it is hard to find the real reasons because the source died and we have no decisive indications.

- b. On 14 May 1992, the source was supplied with a booby-trapped case, and on 18 Jul 1992, the case exploded while he was tampering with it. We found out that the case exploded while the source and his cousin were tampering with it, which means that the reason for failure is misuse of the case.
- c. On 27 Dec 1992, a time bomb exploded inside a hotel while one of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization members was setting the timer. The reason for the failure might be:
  - 1- Technical fault in the bomb
  - 2- Because the bomb was transferred to Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization by a mediator, who was not trained in using the bomb
- d. On 4 Jan 1993, two of our sources died, while crossing a marsh to carry out a duty, when a time bomb exploded.

2

**Page 31**

By reviewing the report of the investigation council, formed according to administrative order number 37, dated 23 Jan 93, we could not confirm any intended act that was conducted to detonate the bombs. Therefore, the incidents can be attributed to the following reasons: First: Technical failure, caused by the Technical Consultant Department as a result of not preparing it perfectly. A technical defect can occur during severe conditions and crossing rivers, causing a blast resulting in human and material losses, along with the political cost by uncovering our sources and activities inside Iran.

Second: It is possible that the bombs were affected by shock, due to the long trip and rainy weather, along with not transporting them correctly according to the given instructions.

-3-

**Page 32**

In addition, the carelessness of the executing elements regarding the correct way to handle these bombs by not complying with the instructions and training given by the officers and technicians of the Technical Consultant Department have caused many similar incidents previously.

**2. Blasts incidents out of the specified times:**

It is credited to two reasons:

- A) A technical failure of the bomb
- B) The most probable reason is the inaccuracy of the tracking officer, who provided the source a bomb with a two-hour timer instead of a bomb with a four-hour timer.

**3. Blast failures:**

Thirteen blast failure incidents were identified, along with the failure of a booby-trapped vehicle.

-4-

**Page 33**

The failures were ascribed to M 16, but the real reason is the failure of the battery and fuse, which are not by the IIS.

**Poisons:**

It was clear to the committee that individuals who were targeted using toxic materials haven't died, although some of them were targeted for two years. Furthermore, there are several failures that led to the uncovering of resources and arrests made on them because the targets felt physical symptoms. For example, when we assigned M 16 to make a poisoned food in order to poison several targets, we were informed later that they were vomiting and did not die

-5-

(TC: Pages 34-36 are not scanned in sequence. They are arranged according to the original sequence)

**Page 36**

Recommendations:

The committee sent in their report to the Technical Consultant Department as to the cause for the failures. The committee also discussed the matter with them. The department stated that it was the mistake of the source or the officer who misused these bombs or materials, although they were previously instructed on the correct measures to be taken. The committee could build a clear picture about the matter due to the death of several sources. But the committee recommended insuring the following procedures to avoid such failures in the future:

- A) The materials or equipment should be delivered to the concerned person by the staff of M 16, along with training him on using them precisely and in detail.
- B) Checking the materials and equipment, manufactured by M 16 with the coordination of the MIC in order to improve its technical level and avoid failures. The M 16 is developing equipment with the coordination of the MIC to deterdevice ....

-6-

**Page 35**

the capability of measuring and testing batteries and fuses to ensure their efficiency in order to achieve a high rate of success. The concerned personnel in M 16 will be responsible for any failure occurring in the future.

- C) Limit these duties to the specialized personnel in M 16 and specialized committees in the IIS. They should check equipment validity and prepare forms before handing it over to the concerned individuals. The forms should be destroyed after executing the mission.
- D) Reevaluate the Head of the Poisons Preparation Section by the Secretariat and M 6.
- E) Although the Chemical Preparation and Explosives Divisions are subordinate to the Technical Consultant Department they fell under the M 16 administratively.

-7-

**Page 34**

Therefore, the committee suggests making it part of the IIS Secretariat in order to control the operation of the two divisions, keep their confidentiality, and provide them with the required support due to the sensitive nature of their duties.

F) The M 16 should stop giving excuses after failures.

Please execute and order  
Regards

(Signature)  
Farhan Hamid  
Member (M 4)

(Signature)  
Khudayr Isma'il Ibrahim  
Head of the Committee (M 1)

(Signature)  
Safi Bahr Hazza'  
Member (M 5)

(Signature)  
Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad  
Member (M 16)

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(Crests of the Republic and the IIS)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)  
Office of the IIS Director

Top Secret and Confidential

Ref No M 1/2/1/4014

Date: 1 Feb 94

To: Director of M 16

The approval of the IIS Director was obtained based on the recommendations of the committee, headed by the Head of the Intelligence Section in M 1, with the membership of the Head of the Northern Section, the Head of the Opposition Section in M 4 and the Director of the Operations Department in Al-Khafiqi Project. The committee was formed to discuss the failures occurring in explosives and chemical materials used in executing some special duties. The approved recommendations are as follows:

1- The materials or equipment should be delivered to the concerned person by the staff of M 16, along with training him on using them precisely and in detail.

-1-

**Page 38**

- B) Checking the materials and equipment manufactured by M 16 in coordination with the MIC in order to improve its technical level and avoid its failures. The M 16 is developing equipment, with the coordination of the MIC, with the capability of measuring and testing batteries and fuses to ensure their sufficiency in order to achieve a high rate of success. The concerned personnel in M 16 will be responsible for any failure that occurs in the future.  
C) Limit these duties with the specialized personnel in M 16 and specialized committees in the IIS, where they should check the equipment's validity and prepare forms about it before handing it over to the concerned individuals.

-2-

**Page 39**

The forms should be destroyed after executing the mission.

4. Issuing a form to follow up on the stages of the mission, including the duty requirements and training procedures. The form has to be signed by the officer affiliated to the beneficiary and the technician, affiliated to M 16. After performing the mission, another form should be completed regarding the success rate of the mission, along with the failures and mistakes without mentioning any information...

-3-

**Page 40**

about the target, in order to avoid such failures by M 16 in future by concentrating on technical issues written in detail.

Please exadvice and take the required procedures.  
Regards

(Signature)  
For M 1 Operations Director  
29 Jan 94

*Muhammad*  
29 Jan 94

*Khudayr*  
29 Jan 94

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**Page 41**

Top Secret and Confidential

Ref. No. 13/27/10

Date: 25 Oct 92

To the Technical Consultant  
Subject: Checking bombs

The Mujahidin-e-Khalq was provided with several sticking and normal devices in various batches. The devices were delivered by As'ad Makki, the representative of the Special Work Team. The organization stated that one of the devices blew up accidentally and led to the death of one of their members while he was connecting it to a battery.

In reference to your orders according to the letter, we met with their representatives in the attendance of Farhan Hamid, the Head of Iran Section and As'ad Makki. We suggested testing the bombs in the field, and the representatives of the organization agreed on the suggestion. Therefore, we headed at 0930 on 24 Oct 92 to Al-Khalis Camp, which belongs to the organization, and met the Security and Technical Supervisor of the camp. We agreed on testing randomly-selected devices. Some were tested by them and did not blow up. We moved to the test field, 15 km away from the camp. We selected 8 devices with different timers; two types of each timer. The selection was also random and included the devices that were tested by them and did not blow up. We connected each device with 20 m long blast cables and adjusted the timers. The blast times were as follows:

A) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 6 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1435 hrs

Blast Time: 2040 (it exploded at the specific time)

-1-

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B) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 2 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them. It was tested by them and did not blast.

Operating Time: 1446 hrs

Blast Time: 1648 (it exploded at the specific time)

C) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 2 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1449 hrs

Blast Time: 1645 (it exploded at the specific time)

D) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 3 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1448 hrs

Blast Time: 1746 (it exploded at the specific time)

E) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 3 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them.

Operating Time: 1449 hrs

Blast Time: 1727 (it exploded at the specific time)

F) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 6 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to them.

Operating Time: 1440 hrs

Blast Time: 1605 (it exploded before the specific time; 90 minutes after the operating time)

-2-

**Page 43**

G) Sticking magnetic device: It is timed at 4 hours and connected to a battery, belonging to us.

Operating Time: 1430 hrs

Blast Time: It did not explode due to a cut in the battery cable caused by the blast of the close devices.

H) Four-hour timer of the same type that they provided it with. It was connected to a battery, belonging to us and an electric detonator.

Operating Time: 1327 hrs

Blast Time: 1727 (it exploded within the specific time)

Based on the conducted test, none of the devices exploded directly after connecting them to batteries. In addition, all timers were operational and adjusted, except for two cases. After testing the unexploded device, mentioned in clause (G), it was found that its cables were affected by the blast of the close devices. While the device, mentioned in clause (H), did not explode due to two probabilities. The first is the invalidity of the electric detonator and the decay of its chemical components, where a similar detonator was opened before the representatives of the organization and found wet. The second probability is the failure of the timer and this will be specified later after testing it.

-3-

**Page 44**

Here are three probabilities regarding the case mentioned in clause (F). They are as follows:

First Probability: Placing a 90 minute timer by mistake during manufacture.

Second Probability: Programming the timer mistakenly. Although the programming process is conducted while transporting the bombs and equipment from place to place quickly, due to a lack of time and urgent orders from various parties, along with the difficulty of these operations, it is a weak probability because it is done by two individuals. The first individual is responsible for programming the timer and the second individual is assigned to recheck the programming.

Third Probability: It is possible that the beneficiary misused them in some way and that led to the killing of one of their members because no such case occurred in the test, conducted under our supervision.

Based on the field tests and what was mentioned before, the bombs are operational if used and stored correctly according to the instructions.

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Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

To: M 4 Operation Director  
Subject: Investigational Committee

In reference to the approval of the IIS Director, dated 15 Feb 94, regarding administrative order number 527, dated 7 Mar 94. We are attaching the conclusions of the investigational committee concerning the discussed topic.

Please exadevice

Regards

Enclosures:

Report of the committee (13-page)  
Primary documents (5-page)

(Signature)

Head of the Committee

Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat

Representative of M 1

7 May 94

**Page 46**

4. To prevent this type of situation from happening again, we made a suggestion to the organization's representatives. This was to leave the timer's wires and the electrical detonator hanging out, and not tied to the explosive charge, so the party using this charge, to test the preset time for detonation. This was accomplished by tying a light bulb to the wires coming out from the timer and operating it by connecting it to the battery. When the light lit up after the preset time, the technician using the device would disconnect the battery and discharge any possible current available, then connect the detonator wires with the timer wires, and prepare it for use, after inspecting the preset time,
5. We said before that we took back the devices that did not explode and removed the hardened explosives from the device, even though it is a dangerous procedure, to extract the timers and detonators. We did this to test and find the reason why the devices did not explode and to find the real cause of this situation.

Please read. Regards

As'ad Maki  
Special Team Representative  
Directorate 4  
25 Oct 1992

Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab Al-Shaykh  
Senior Engineer  
Directorate 16/2  
  
Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad  
Engineer illegible Chemists  
Directorate 16/2  
25 Oct 1992

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Opinion and Decision

I have read, and noted the remarks  
I directly supervise the activities of this section

Iraqi Intelligence Director  
7 May 1994

Top Secret

To the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director

Kindly read the recommendations of the committee which was formed to investigate why some of the devices manufactured by Directorate 16 malfunctioned, which effected the outcome of some of the special team tasks.

We solicit your directions to approve recommendations of the committee

Regards,

Comrade Muhsin Dhiyab

Please study



Director General of directorate 4

7 May 1994

To the Chairman of the investigation

Addressed to the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director's notes

**In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service  
IRIS



Number 725  
Date 7 Mar 1994

**Administrative Order**

Acting upon the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director's approval, and upon the powers vested in me per Administrative Order Number 7422, dated 30 July 1986.

I sanction forming a committee headed by Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat (SATTs M1), in addition to the individuals mentioned below, as members of this committee.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat".

On behalf of the Director  
Iraqi Intelligence Service  
6 Mar 1994

Name:

1. Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd, Section Director, Directorate 4
2. Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim, Section Director, Directorate 6

Copy to:

The chairman and members of the committee  
Directorate M4/7, your letter number 702, dated 2 Mar 1994, for reference

# In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
The Secretary



((Top Secret and Confidential))  
Number \\\3\91\2548\k  
Date 30 April 1993

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service  
Service Director Office  
Number: 508  
Date: 1 May 1993

To Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service  
Subject: Honoring Martyrs

President Saddam's orders regarding the recommendations mentioned in letter number 140\2\2\589, dated 20 Mar 1993, the following:

((This could expose our connection with them. Did it occur to the Intelligence Service that the party who delivered the explosives might have tampered with it so that it will explode in the affiliates of the IIS instead!?))

Take the necessary actions, with regards

The Secretary of the President of the Republic  
30 April 1993

(SATTs H\29\4)

To the Secretariat  
Review, and give your comments  
after you coordinate with  
Directorate 4

1 May 1993

**Page 50**

Secretariat  
Intelligence Service  
Follow-up (tracking) directorate – Section 2  
Technical Division

Form Number MF\2

**Field Visit Report**

1. Visit Number: 1
2. Time and date of visit: 10:45, 23 Mar, 30 Mar 1992.
3. Location visited \ directorate: Directorate 16/2, Al-Ghafiqi Project
  - a. section: Al-Ghafiqi Project
  - b. division: four divisions were visited
4. Name of visitor and his designation: Chief Engineer Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat
5. Details of the visit, matter checked and identified:

**Evaluation and notes**

- a. Attendance roster: used
- b. skeleton crew attendance roster: used
- c. daily activities and tasks logbook: used
- d. a log book for recording the value of services rendered to recipient parties: not used
- e. unsuccessful missions log book: not used
- f. a logbook for recording major malfunctions and problems that are used as examples to be learned from in future cases: not used
- g. monthly minutes of meetings and conventions: not used
- h. comments and methods of evaluating performance: not used
- k. Plan, budget, annual secret report: not used

Note: The person conducting this visit should read the visitors directives guide (form number MF1\...)

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- a. The annual inventory and the methods for increasing the stock balance: no inventory is available and there are no standard procedures. There is no set time for conducting the annual inventory.
- b. Record of names of companies and parties dealt with for business purposes: Not available
- c. A file of all the training and development lectures given to the affiliates of the party visited and the affiliates of other parties (leaflet announcing the training lecture and the contents of the training): Not available. There is no plan for training or lectures
- d. Policies and rules for conducting import work: Not available and never used before
- e. Forms showing the steps to be taken for protecting security.
- f. Forms showing the procedures to provide safety for workers (industrial safety procedures manual book).
- g. Procedures and plans for development and modernization of work.
- h. Schedules and methods used to manage cadre promotions and transfers between governorates and other formations.
- i. Sheets showing technical and commercial specifications for equipment and devices, in addition to installation, operation, and maintenance procedures.
- j. Inspect selected areas of operation for the divisions, and sections in detail to make sure that performance is up to standards.

**Problems and obstacles standing in the path of work and workers:**

a. **Problems facing work** (Give a brief description. Details will be attached to the visit's report if the need calls for it): The areas of the carpentry and smithery workshops are inadequate. All divisions are understaffed. The section director and the technical advisor assign affiliates work without informing the division's director, which causes negative repercussions

b. Negative and Positive Comments (Give a brief description. Include details in the visit's report):

First: Work areas and workshops are untidy. Machinery, equipment and other installations (utilities) are covered with dust and dirt. It looks like an ancient private workshop.

Second: Palestinian individuals are working in the workshops freely without any control, or security procedures, or precautions. They are also mixing and mingling (interacting) with the directorate's affiliates in every aspect.

c. Employees personal problems and work related problems: (Give a brief description. Include the details in the visit's report):

First: Some employees are living in remote areas. They have transportation problems.

Second: Some employees work in hazardous conditions. They are not being compensated like other government and security services employee working in hazardous conditions

Third: A group of the institute's graduates are in custody of workhouse materials they don't want to handle

Fourth: Personal needs (the most important are):

Employee 'Abd-al-Sattar Madi Mutwih is suffering from an illness and his son is deaf. He can't treat h

is son in Iraq. He is asking to be nominated to work in an embassy as a guard.


Chief physicist 'Abd-al-Kazim Muhammad Nayif has a civil service record of 24 years. He has held the position of section director, division director, and now is working as a technical officer. His company's car has been taken away from him and he is asking to be given a company car again.

**7. The Visit's findings:**

- a. Carrying out duties and tasks: Work is being carried out literally, exactly according to instructions. No quality control, measurement of the product's competence, and production
- b. Course and Procedures of Work: The standard course of action. Work standard procedures are not being followed or applied. In spite of its importance, security, professional, and quality control standard procedures are not being complied with.
- c. Evaluating Employee's Performance: Good. There is a lot of potential but needs encouraging and incentives
- e. Administrative Units: Division directors complain that the section director and the technical advisor assign jobs to their employees without their knowledge, causing a communications gap and an administrative problem, and making it difficult to control employee actions
- f. Others: None

**8. Recommendations and Suggestions:**

Direct the project to adopt the attached standard procedures as applicable, and adjust (alter) it to suit their scope (field) of work. Give more attention to security, and professional (industrial) safety procedures. Standardize time (set certain periods of time to carry out certain jobs), adopt quality control, and set up standards and goals to measure and evaluate performance, production and products. In other words, adopt the concepts of modern industrial management.



30 Mar 1992

Name and signature of the person who conducted the visit  
Muhsin Dhiyab Barakat  
Chief Engineer

The above information is not final. Better results can be achieved by apply experience to reach the desired results.

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Answers given by Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, Director, Directorate 16/2

1. Was the committee's recommendations, mentioned in letter number M1\2\1\414, dated 1 Feb 1994, forwarded?
2. What did the Director of Directorate 16 order you to do in light of the committee's recommendations, which are referred to above? What were his orders in this regard?
3. What did you do to stop sources and collaborators from being unable to use explosive charges correctly?
4. Are there any reasons that prevent adopting a process or suitable steps to stop failures in charges, and avoid charges exploding in the face of sources and collaborators?
5. Do you have other issues you want address that will help the committee's mission, explained in administrative order number 725, and dated 7 Mar 1992 which may help the committee find out the real reasons why certain special missions that depend on explosive charges manufactured by your department have failed.

**Answers**

1. Yes, I have been informed of the committee's recommendations mentioned above.
2. After the recommendations were issued, the Director of Directorate 16 summoned me to his office and briefed me on the recommendations and gave me the following instructions to carry out accordingly:
  - a. To reconsider methods adopted in examining the explosive charges. These are testing the timer, batteries, detonators, and explosives.
  - b. To adopt a new form for the missions
  - c. To deliver the explosive charges directly to the sources and collaborators, train them how to use it, and take part in planning attacks to strike targets with parties executing the mission.

I would like to point out that some of what is mentioned in the committee's recommendations blames our directorate for the failures we did not take part in like the battery malfunction or the electrical detonator. I don't accept these accusations.

(1-3)



**Answer 3:**

After some charges failed, we conducted a series of actions to determine the cause of failure. Some of the charges delivered by us to the party who wanted to use them stored the charges for a long period of time under bad conditions, which was contrary to the instructions given to them. This caused the basic components of the detonators to become unusable. That is why the explosive charge did not blow up.

We proved this by testing some explosive charges we delivered to Directorate 5/7. The experiment was videotaped and the detonators worked perfectly. We coordinated our efforts with Al-Qa'qa' General Establishment and managed to overcome a case of electrical detonator malfunctioning. Not one case was recorded. Batteries, on the other hand, remain a problem because good quality batteries are not available due to current circumstances. The technical consultant managed to secure a limited number of batteries used in missions. Some of these batteries have a zero current.

The batteries are subjected to visual tests only. We don't subject the batteries to tests with special devices. It is known that the electrical detonators were tested with Ivometer, which is a standard test. We cannot find an alternate in the army, security or intelligence.

**Answer number 4:** We don't have any answers because our work procedures are correct, even though we are understaffed. The bigger responsibility falls on the people who used these explosives. They did not cooperate with us. These charges should be used as quickly as possible. Also, when we prepare such charges, they are kept with us under lame excuses. For example; the source is not available to collect the charges or it's not the right time to carry out the mission. Also, we are not informed when our charges have served their purpose. We are only blamed if they don't work. As of now, no party has answered our inquiries and we have a signed copy by the party who received the charges, acknowledging being informed ..



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...to reply based on the recommendations and directives of the committee

Answer 5: A detailed report has been submitted to the Investigation Committee Chairman about what we think might contribute to developing our work.

This is my statement and accordingly I sign it.



Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad  
Director, Directorate 16/2  
5 April 1994

(3-3)

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Replies given by Engineer Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab, Director of Timers Division  
M16/2

1. Was the committee's recommendations mentioned in letter number M1\2\1\414, dated 1 Feb 1994, forwarded?
2. What did the Director of Directorate 16 order you to do in light of the committee's recommendations, which are referred to above? What were his orders in this regard?
3. What did you do to stop sources and collaborators from being unable to use explosive charges correctly?
4. Were there any reasons that prevented adopting a method or suitable steps to stop failures in using charges, and avoid charges exploding in the face of sources and collaborators?
5. Do you have other issues you want to address that will help the committee's mission, explained in administrative order number 725, dated 7 Mar 1992, which may help the committee find out the real reasons why certain special missions that depend on explosive charges manufactured by your department have failed.

**Answer 1:** I did not read the recommendations. The section director briefed me about some of its paragraphs verbally

**Answer 2:** I was not given any specific instructions. I was only ordered to notify the party who used the charges about the specifications of the charges, and how to use it. This was thru the section director. I followed the instructions of the Section Head.

**Answer 3:** We stressed to the parties who wanted to use the charges to follow the correct procedures, in transporting, and planting, and the operation.

**Answer 4:** We had no knowledge of the sources and collaborators mission, or the conditions they are using it in. We can't know what might have been the reasons of failure because we delivered the charges functional.

**Answer 5:** It was detailed in an attached report.



**Senior Engineer Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Abd-al-'Aziz**  
**Explosives Electronic Preparation Division, Director**  
**M16/2**  
**Al-Ghafiqi project**

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Directorate:

Section:

To the Chairman of the Investigation Board

Subject: Conducting an Experiment

Please be advised, that we have conducted a field experiment. We tested six timers, just like the ones given to the Kurdish Democratic Party. These timers tested were selected by Mister As'ad Maki randomly. We set the timers to go off at different timings.

1. We used Iraqi-made detonators in the field test, the same type used by Iraqi Intelligence. We set them up to blow up at different timings. The experiment was a success, which meant that the timers work perfectly and are not defective.
2. We don't have the proper conditions (set up) to carry out a full scale test (a live explosion), because there are citizens living in the area used.
3. In spite of the instructions that recommend not testing the timers more than 3 times, we have tested the timers more than 10 times, greatly exceeding the allowed limits. This is a cause for failure of some or all of the devices, which does not reflect the real efficiency of the timers. In spite of this, the timers have worked in a normal manner.
4. It is a known fact that if the timers work correctly the electrical detonator will explode and cause the explosives to blow up regardless of its type, which is proof that our explosives works perfectly.

1-2

**Secret and Confidential**

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5. We request forming a committee made of technical specialists, capable of giving a technical opinion in this regard, if this work is not accepted. It is only fair to ask, what are the motives for destroying the timers during the experiment, especially if the timers were not the cause of damage that took place? We are going through difficult times because of the sanctions. We badly need any electronic board that can be part of a weapon to use to fight our enemies with.
6. The explosion that killed one of the Kurdish Democratic Party members when he tried to use our explosives, cannot be used as example of our work' quality because the timers passed many tests. That proved they are functional and accurate.
7. We have concrete evidence that the individuals who carried out the mission caused the bomb to explode before the scheduled time, as explained in our attached letter, which was issued by one of our specialist officers who met Source (Ghandur) during training. He said, "The battery broke down because Ghandur reversed the battery's current, which caused the premature explosion".

Please read. Regards,

A copy to:  
The technical consultant

Attachments:  
A report from Chemist Khalid Ibrahim



Khalil Ibrahim Fayyad  
Director  
Directorate 16/2  
4 April 1994

-2-

(TC: Pages 60 and 61 are scanned in reverse order)

Page 61

Information Form/  
11

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Directorate  
Section

Director of the Technical Workshop  
Subject: Report

We present a detailed report dated 3 April 1994 on my meeting with the source "Ghafur", who is affiliated with the Iranian-Kurdistani Democratic Party, that timers were examined after they were connected to detonators. After talking to him for an hour, we discussed several incidents that occurred while connecting the previous munitions and the reasons which led to some of the munitions failing. Of the issues which were emphasized was how to store and transfer the bombs to a certain spot for detonation. Were protection and punctuality taken into consideration?

Of the issues which "Ghafur" spoke of was that he examined the timers after connecting the battery's poles with the circuit's poles while using a small lamp to check the process. After using a "9" volt battery, he noticed that the lamp blazed. He conducted the same experiment on the rest of the timers. He himself regularly connected the lamps into the circuit and placed the battery in a non-reciprocal position. The result was a continuous blaze. Placing the battery poles reciprocally, in accordance with my opinion, with the circuit's poles would directly damage or burn the timers, leading the lamp to blaze and as a result it would be useless or unsafe and this would lead to failure when performing missions.

In addition, there is another problem. This is the circuit's poles are bigger in size than that of the battery. That is why these poles impose pressure several times on the battery leading to two cases: Either cutting one of the poles' wires or creating a (short) circuit within the timer. He was instructed not to use this case and it would be preferred to impose pressure all at once. If it was big, we could use adhesive tape to fix it.

Also, his attention was drawn to certain technical issues which would prevent executing the mission like safety conditions and accuracy while performing the mission.

-Continued-

Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Directorate:

Section:

To: **Technical Workshop Director**  
Subject: **Report**

We cautioned him about the possibilities of malfunction if he did not place the charges accurately before completing the wiring of the electrical circuit and to be precise in connecting the detonators and the wires.

He told me that after he completed a test with a light that he told his comrades to execute only after making sure it worked.

One of many other important things he repeatedly asked was what type of material was used in sealing the timer, if it could be opened, what was inside the timer (components of the timer), and if it could be opened. We wanted to have the material and its components, and if it is available on the local market. We did not answer any of his questions.

He also wanted to know the chemical material used to stick the RDX powder. He mixed benzene with cork and got a gluey mixture and used this to stick the RDX. It took a long time to dry, and affected the power of blast. He insisted on knowing what was that material and if it available in the market, or if we had a large amount of this material could we give him some of it. We did not give him a reply.

For your attention  
Regards



Khalid Ibrahim 'Ismail  
4 April 1994

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Directorate  
Section

Director of the Oppositional Section  
Subject: Examining Timers

On 3 April 1994, six timers were tested in cooperation with Directorate 16<sup>th</sup> and in presence of Ghafur Mahdi Zawah the Deputy of Special Operations Official of the Kurdish Democratic Party. The examining results were as the following:

- A two-hour timer exploded four minutes early.
- A four-hour timer exploded ten minutes early.
- A four-hour timer exploded ten minutes early.
- A five-hour timer exploded fifteen minutes early.
- A seven-hour timer exploded after 22 minutes.
- An eight-hour timer exploded on time.

Please review... With respect

(Signature)  
Diya' 'Abdallah Mahmud  
Post Officer- Special Work Team  
4 April 1994

Respectable Chief of the Council:

*Please review the results of examining six timers during different times...  
With respect*

(Signature)  
Farhan Hamid 'Ubayd  
4<sup>th</sup> Directorate 2<sup>nd</sup> Department/ 2  
4 April 1994

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Top Secret and Confidential

Information Form/  
11

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Directorate  
Section

Respectable Chief of the Investigational Committee  
Subject: Report

The technical work of producing explosive munitions started in 1980, or even earlier in the Special Operations Directorate. Back then, supplying the Technical Equipment with explosives, whether this equipment were timers or wireless transmission devices, depended on what was manufactured in the Technical Research Center, or the wireless explosive devices which were imported from foreign establishments.

Since then and up to 1986, work was organized and flowing in a good pattern with no obstacles or failures. Mr. Farhan Hamid knows that because he was one of the officers who cooperated with us in this domain.

When the Technical Section was cancelled in the Special Operations Directorate and the cadre was transferred to the 16<sup>th</sup> Directorate, they cooperated with the Palestine Cadre, which worked for the benefit of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The question which would be raised was; is it right for a person who works outside the Intelligence Community or those who travel abroad with no restrictions or control be exposed to Intelligence duties whether that enveloped researches or executive work? If the answer was no, then how did it happen? Who knows the reasons behind this cooperation? This incident took place without considering what has been exposed of present and future Intelligence plans. Recently, the Command of the 16<sup>th</sup> Directorate approved research plans; seasonally and annually, concerning this issue.

Certain researches satisfied the work requirements but the majority of the researches might not benefit the work because the consumed time goes in vain.

It is known by us that the sources, who are affiliated with the Intelligence System, do not have technical abilities which allow them to establish executive researches for different duties, yet most of the sources depend on the easy and classic pattern of work.

(1-9)

Top Secret and Confidential

Top Secret and Confidential

Information Form/  
11

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Directorate  
Section

Mr.: -----  
Subject: -----

To include our work within a pattern that serves the work of our Department in a way that meets the requirements of the Intelligence Command, we hereby present what we went through in the past to the present in order to be able to solve the problems, serving our work and overcoming anything that might cause failure in our work in the future.

1. Specialized Cadre:

Work in preparing explosive munitions was never conducted on a professional level by a specialized cadre in the Service. It was only done by a few sources which we are on top of it. At the outbreak of the crisis with Iran in 1979, or earlier, even in the General Security Directorate, the cadre was simple and depended on us in most cases. After time, a better cadre to control sabotage actions was found. As for the Service, more experience was available in the defense and attack fields while work carried on depending on the original cadre. It is known that work in this field is required but one has to have the motive and the passion for work. Yet, who wants to live expecting his death at any moment? There are rare cases. When we look at the history of the sources who are working now, we find that only a few of them are interested in such work. Most of them were transferred to the project because their formations wanted to get rid of them, those who were recently nominated by the Service with no experience or practice, extra individuals in the directorates and those who were transferred for other reasons. What is happening will not lead to developing sabotage missions.

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Directorate  
Section

Mr.: -----  
Subject: -----

Work requirements:

As we previously mentioned, we have been depending for a long time on what has been provided by the Technical Research Center concerning the timers and some electronic equipment. This equipment was kept under bad conditions, especially during the testing period. We found out that some devices were completely damaged because of the storage conditions and we also believe that the validity of certain materials and electronic equipment were negatively affected by the conditions and by the long period of manufacture. In additions, the other part of the issue includes consuming most of the basic components of the special timers.

In order for the missions to not stop, attention has been stirred in the local market and it is known that the local market has items of various manufacture origins which have less efficiency than the original ones in terms of their accuracy and their resistance to certain conditions. We believe that such a thing will affect the accuracy of the planned missions directly or indirectly.

Duties performed by the Project:

The project conducts many duties such as:

- A. Completely plan seasonal and annual work plans.
- B. Complete work for munitions in all forms.
- C. Complete electronic and mechanic protection means.
- D. Track planning duties; train officers and sources.
- E. Unveil and defuse explosives.

If we were to examine these duties, we would find that these duties do not form the duties of a section, but in fact exceed the duties of a directorate.

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Project Site:

The project was functioning at Al-Rashad area in one of Baghdad far suburbs. It had been forced to move to another location, which is Abu-Ghurayb, due to the flood at that time. It is a location outside Baghdad. The condition of this location does not suit the nature and the importance of the project. It also was not given enough attention, despite the instructions of the Intelligence Leaders who are concerned with this work. When a source is assigned by the department whether from a technical or administrative aspect, he would do whatever was possible to reject the order because he knows the work's nature, the center's distance and the responsible individual of the project. It has been referred to as Project "Exile".

Because the project's locations are scattered within the areas of Al-Rashad, Al-Waziriyah, Al-Kazimiyyah and Abu-Ghurayb, efforts are also scattered and time is lost because of transportation. Adding to that, the presence of the International Inspection teams which led us to evacuate equipment and devices outside Baghdad are going through bad storage conditions. In addition to the administrative difficulties that we are going through because we are a formation within the section, our duties are expanding and the administrative duties are assigned to us in accordance with this formation.

Dealing with other Formations:

We are suffering greatly dealing with the beneficiary formations because of the misunderstanding of the technical aspect of this work and because there is no clear image for the officials responsible of these formations in terms of work or even ignoring this work. We have heard from some of them that...

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Subject: -----

... what we do is just fill items and such thing would come out of individuals who do not understand the nature of the work assigned to us. They believe that their formations are essential. Truth be told, their role is nothing but an average role and that the technical aspect is essential.

How can an individual be innovative when the benefit goes for the one who is playing a minor role? The essential individual who is the technical specialist is not mentioned? Is this not unfair?

Another example is that most of the formations dealing with us do not reply when we ask them, in accordance with a central order issued by the Intelligence Director to inform us of the successful exploding devices, which we provide them with and the reason is clear.

When there are failed cases or what they claim to be failed cases, we would be dragged into investigational committees accusing us of murdering so many.

Authorities:

In accordance with the valid order which requires sending explosive devices and train sources on how to use these devices in the field, such an order requires our sources travel to governorates and because of the high living standards requires staying in hotels. That would impose high expenses on the sources. This would be a reasonable claim for the sources not to perform the duties assigned to them while on the other hand we see that the allocations are reasonable for most of the other formations. This case negatively affects the workflow and the accomplishment of the duty.

Presidency of the Republic  
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Subject: -----

Specialties:

According to what we believe, we might not be right from the viewpoint of the department. We have been treated like the other formations. We believe that what is urgently required is to gain support in all aspects, whether that was ordering materials by local or foreign currency in order to satisfy the public interest, or direct purchase.

When there are many efforts made to make a certain duty successful, a controversial issue might take place. For example, a battery causes an electronic device to fail. We greatly suffer because of this and no one to solve it. We might be asked if we brought the issue to the attention of the Intelligence director. We would answer saying, "Direct officials have an idea of the problem and we continuously complained to them".

A technical and scientific fact implies that we should always prepare our product to perform under actual mission requirements. We test the electronic timer function with a "9" volt battery. It functions with a "9" volt battery. By testing it with a "9" volt battery we would create an improper condition for the actual mission. We would do such a thing urgently because the required battery is not available due to financial circumstances. The truth be told, this should not exist at all because we lose a lot for the sake of a few.

Suggestions:

In order for the work to progress in accordance with the requirements of the Intelligence Command, we list certain suggestions:

Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

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Section

Mr.: -----  
Subject: -----

1. The formation of the project would be at a similar level with that of the directorate, which consists of the following Sections and the Divisions:

A. The Electronic Section, which consists of three divisions:

First: The Development Division.  
Second: The Production Division.  
Third: The Executive Department.

B. The Chemical Section, which consists of the following divisions:

First: The Development Division.  
Second: The Production Division.  
Third: The Executive Department.

C. The Mechanical Section, which consists of the following divisions:

First: Detection Division.  
Second: Processing Division.  
Third: Maintenance Division.

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The Intelligence Service

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Section

Mr.: -----  
Subject: -----

2. Increase the number of the specialized cadres working on the project in order to satisfy the actual requirement using sources who participated in different aspects such as the electronic, chemical and mechanical aspects.
3. Give us the chance to get the important electronic items and materials from original countries of manufacture in order to benefit from better standards. To completely coordinate with Al-Salam Factory and with specialists working there to benefit from their experience and developed technical capabilities in the field of manufacturing timers and to use their important sources so as to benefit from their experience, especially, those who manufactured the timers currently used by us.
4. To give special attention to those who work in the project so as to uplift their morale by improving transportation and grant those who have vehicles, under their responsibility, similar services granted to their colleagues working in the intelligence formations, considering those who work in the project as field workers, in that they manufacture and send explosives which also need vehicles of high efficiency.
5. Because the buildings of the project are scattered in different locations such as Abu-Ghurayb and Al-Kazimiyyah, it would be difficult to control all that is related to work which might lead to administrative or technical imbalances. A good and secured location would guarantee overcoming several negatives that might occur in the future, especially for such a duty that differs from other duties because of its importance and secrecy.

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Section

Mr.: -----  
Subject: -----

6. Give priority to the administrative services of the work because these services are either few or absent.
7. We suggest that such special duty would be tied to the decision maker (the Intelligence Service Director) or his respectable Deputy or the General Director of the Secretariat because such work is so confidential and its duties are tied with Higher Command decisions which are related to the country's security.
8. Revise the presence of the technical sources in the project and choose the best ones who represent the core for the future of the work.

Please review... With respect

(Signature)  
Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab 'Abd-al-'Aziz  
Senior Engineer  
Chief of the Electronic Preparation Department  
4 April 1994

(Signature)  
Khalil Ibrahim Fayad  
Deputy Chief of the Chemists  
Director of the 16<sup>th</sup> Directorate/ 2  
14 April 1994

### Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-00017015	Classification:
English Title: Production and execution bomb within the (IIS)	
Language: ARABIC	
Document Date: 20010626	Total Pages: 21
Inclusive Pages: 20	Oversized Pages:
Document Type: LETTER	Format: PAPER ORIGINAL
Agency: DIA	Project: IRAQI FREEDOM
Country Of Information: IRAQ	

Title:

Country Of Origin: **Originators Classification: TOP SECRET**

### Translation Information

Translation #	Classification	Status	Translating Agency
CMPC-2003-00017015-HT	[REDACTED]	PARTIAL COMPLETED	DIA

### Linked Documents

Original Document	CMPC-2003-00017015
	CMPC-2003-00017015-HT (Multi-Part)
Translation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">cmpc-b/CMPC-2003-00017015-HT.pdf</a></li><li>• <a href="#">cmpc-m/CMPC-2003-00017015-HT.pdf</a></li></ul>

### Related Document Numbers

Document Number	Type	Document Number
Harmony Number		CMPC-2003-00017015

### Keyword Categories

#### Keywords

TERRORISM; PLANS

### Biographic Information

Name: 'ANFUS, 'ALA' HASHIM

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : Officer

Name: HAMMADI, WALID 'ALLAWI

Photograph Available

Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : Officer

**Name:** HAYDAR MUSLIM, DAWUD

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : Officer**

**Name:** KHALID 'IKAB, HASSUN

**Name:** MUHAMMAD, WISAM

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : MILITARY RANK : Officer**

**Name:** QADDURI 'ABD, MUSA

**Photograph Available**

**Other Attribute : ORGANIZATION : Officer**

**Document Remarks**

[REDACTED] This is a Full Translation of CMPC-2003-00017015, pages 2-21. Please see attached file dated 11-15-2005 in the file hitlist. This 21 pages file contains production and execution bomb within the (IIS). Pages 2-21 dated 2001, within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) concerning the production of a bomb that would serve as booby-trap within coats. This was intended to target the Highest Council of Islamic Revolution and Al-Da'wah Party in Qum and Tehran. The file also includes the bomb's construction and execution methods, objectives, tests, explanations, inquiries, and names of participants in the operation.

**Batch Information**

**Batch Number:** 3232-1

**Boxes in Batch:** 42

**Capture Information** Date/Time of Capture:20030806 Identity of Source:IISbuilding

**Transmittal Information** Date/Time of Arrival:20030820

**Comments** ([REDACTED]) Media shipped to Qatar, Pallet #74, 28 Aug 2003. Pallet #76, 03 Sep 03. media sent to qatar # 88. 24oct03. pallet 111 13 Jan 03

CMPC-2003-00017015  
Full Translation of pages 2-21

Page 2

Secret and Confidential

Material Delivery Voucher

- 1- Beneficiary Party: M 40\ 5
- 2- Task Number: 16\ 2001\ 00, dated 11 March 2001
- 3- Delivered Materials: --

Serial	Item	Quantity	Remarks
1	Booby-trapped Vest weighing 1.3 kg.	1	electronic timer operated
2	Duracell Battery	4	Valid until 2003

- 4- Authorized Use: One vest set for the task and three more vests will be set aside for later use.
  - a- Validity of the vest: The vest is valid for one month from date of delivery.
  - b- Battery condition and its validity: Very good, expiry date 2003.
  - c- Conditions of vest activation: The vest could be set off for activation on a specific time; one-hour timer.
- 5- Name of the trainee: Khalid 'Akab, M4 representative, underwent training. He would in turn train the source.
- 6- Notes: The vest activates one hour after inserting batteries, (TC: Transliteration (Snap) probably meaning a wire).

(Signature)  
Representative of beneficiary party  
Khalid 'Akab Hassun  
28 April 2001

(Signature)  
M 16 representative  
Walid 'Allawi Hammadi  
28 April 2001

Page 3

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate  
Secret and Confidential

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

To: Section Director  
Subject: Task number 16\ 2001\ 001

- 1- Beneficiary Party: M 40\ 5
- 2- Notification Ref. Number: Secret Notification number 117, dated 28 February 2001
- 3- Task Number: 16\ 2001\ 001
- 4- Task description: Booby-trap cloth vest with plastic explosives, electric and regular detonators, and Cortex fuses.  
Explosive device detonates one-hour after activating electronic-timer.
- 5- Required materials: cloth vest with lining provided by the beneficiary party.
- 6- Explosives activation description: Explosives activate one hour after inserting battery in its proper place (Snap), concealed in the inner pocket of the vest.

M 19 representative  
Khalid 'Akab Hassun  
28 March 2001

(Signature)  
M 16 representative  
Walid 'Allawi Haddadi  
11 March 2001

Page 4

(IIS Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

16\2001\001  
11 March 2001

Date: 28 February 2001  
Ref. Number 117

Notification  
M 40\5

To\ Sect. 27

Director of Intelligence Service has granted approval to conceal an explosive device weighing 3 kg of RDX material. The device's components comprise of a fuse and plastic layers operated by a 1-hour timed detonator all are set for task use.  
Kindly be advised, regards.



*To: 2<sup>nd</sup> Sect Director, carry instructions*

  
*11 March*

On behalf of\ M 40 director  
28 February 2001

(1-1)  
Secret

Teamwork:

- 1- Walid 'Allawi
- 2- 'Ala' Hashim
- 3- Wisam Muhammad
- 4- Qadduri 'Abd Musa
- 5- Haydar Muslim

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

To: Director of Intelligence Service  
Subject: Task Execution

As per your approval to the booby-trap cloth vest by stuffing it with explosives, we have worked diligently to accomplish the task of inconspicuously lading the vest with 1300 grams of high explosive material and paraphernalia such as detonating fuses, regular and electric igniters set by a concealed electronic timer (photo album). This vest has been dispatched to Officer Khalid 'Akab Hassun, M40 representative, as per the attached voucher (excerpt 1).

The work team consists of two groups of officers:

1- Executive Group:

Section Director Engineer Walid 'Allawi Hammadi, Engineer Wisam Muhammad Majid, and 'Ala' Hashim 'Anfus

2- Supporting Group:

Haydar Muslim Dawud, Qadduri 'Abd Musa

Please examine, awaiting your instructions, regards.

To be discussed in your presence and that of M 4

Director  
3 July

Director of M 16  
2 July 2001

Page 7

Ref. Number: 79

Date: 2 July 2001

Page 8

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate  
Top Secret

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr. Director of Sect. 2  
Subject: Task Execution

Based on Intelligence Service Director's approval as per M40/ 5 Secret notification number 117, dated 28 February 2001, and in execution of M16 Director's instructions, the task number 16\ 2001\ 001, dated 11 March 2001, was completed as follows:

- 1- A cloth vest with a zipper-attached cloth lining was booby-trapped with two plastic explosive sticks; planted in upper and lower parts of the lining. The upper part weighs 550 grams, whereas the lower part weighs 750 grams. Both upper and lower parts of the lining were connected together by Cortex fuse and regular detonators distributed evenly between the two plastic sticks. Each plastic stick has two detonators and a fuse placed on either side. A total of 50 grams of PGAA-paste booster is added to both regular and electric detonators. (TC: as found in English (PGAA))
- 2- A detonating device that consists of a one-hour-set-electronic timer along with an electric detonator and a PGAA-paste Booster weighing 10 grams were inserted and concealed in the upper part of the vest lining
- 3- The detonating device will go into an activation mode once a battery is inserted in its location (Snap), which inconspicuously links the detonating device found in the upper part of the vest to the padding pockets found in the vest lining.
- 4- The detonating device was tested before and after molding (Epoxy was poured over the device) then the molded detonating device was connected to an electric detonator.

(1-2)  
Top Secret

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Top Secret

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:

- 5- A stick of a plastic explosive weighing 20 grams, an integral component of explosive devices, underwent field-test. This procedure was carried out to check the plastic explosives' worthiness in real task situations. The plastic underwent underground detonation and the entire procedure was photographed.
- 6- All stages of the controlled detonation of the booby-trapped vest were photographed.
- 7- Field-test on the 20-g plastic stick the same as those used in a real task was conducted in the presence of beneficiary party representative Comrade Khalid 'Akab Hassun and M 40\ 5 Division Director.
- 8- During field-testing, a briefing on proper transporting, rules of delivering, safe-handling and understanding plastic explosives' dynamics was explained. Subsequently, an explosive device was handed over along with an operational manual and details of the task.

Please examine, with appreciation

Enclosures:  
All task details

  
Senior Engineer Walid 'Allawi Hammadi  
29 March 2001

Very well, log in all details upon delivery and once you know of task results.



30 March 2001  
Director of Sect. 2

(2-2)  
Top Secret

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Top Secret and Confidential

Mr.: Director of Intelligence Service

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(TC: The page starts and ends with number 2 as shown hereunder; numbers (1 and 3) appear to be canopied with sheets of paper stuck onto this page with pins)

1-

2- Operation Procedure: The properly concealed explosive devise –in the form of plastic explosive sticks- is stuffed in the shoulder pads of a Persian-made fur-vest. The vest is then taken into his lecturing the hall (TC: The person's name is not mentioned). This task is assigned to Directorate 16\ 2.

3-

From our side

(1-2)

Top Secret and Confidential

Page 11

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate


Top Secret and Confidential

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:


4- Suggestions:

a- First: Deploy the performer of this task to Iran in order to gather one last surveillance information on the target, in addition to other collaborating targets in Tehran and Qum; "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, Al-Da'wah Party".



*Khalid 19 February*

20 February



Director-deputy of the Intelligence  
Service  
19 February 2001



*Verified  
'Abdal-Hadi  
19 February*

*'Isam  
19 February*

(2-2)  
Top Secret and Confidential

*21 February*

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Sect. 2

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service  
Notification M 16


(IIS Logo)

Top Secret

Date: 26 May 2001  
Ref. Number: 1121

To\ M 13

Kindly develop a film that belongs to one of the tasks as soon as possible.  
Regards



Director of M 16  
26 May 2001

*Assign an officer to do what is required*



Sect. 2 director  
26 May 2000

Page 13  
In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Top Secret

To: M-16 Director  
Subject: Task Execution

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

A task has been carried out as per instructions of M40. Explosives were concealed inside a vest by a work team specifically assembled to carry out this task. The work team reflected a creativity of their mind and exerted a meticulous effort in concealing an explosive device, consisting of explosive materials and accessories of Cortex fuses, detonators, and regular and electric igniters inside a vest rendering it undetectable neither at checkpoints nor to enemy explosives-detection personnel. This led to safe delivery of the booby-trapped vest and ultimately the success of this task, carried out of the country, inflicting the enemy with heavy casualties. We recommend presenting the details of this successful task to the Intelligence Service Director. Shown hereunder, is a name list of work team members appearing in order of importance of effort contributed.

Teamwork

1- Walid 'Allawi Hammadi	, Sect. director	}	a
2- 'Ala' Hashim 'Anfus	, Officer		
3- Wisam Muhammad Majid	, Officer		
4- Haydar Muslim Dawud	, Officer		
5- 'Qadduri 'Abd Musa	, Officer	}	b

Suggestions:

1- Extend appreciation award on behalf of Intelligence Service Director.  
2- Value their efforts exerted in performing an outstanding and successful job.

Attachments:

- ❖ All information details along with a photo album illustrating all stages of assembling and concealing of the booby-trapped vest.



Sect. 2 director  
26 June 2001

Page 14

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Top Secret

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.: Section Director  
Subject: Developing a camera film

Kindly grant permission to obtain M16 Director's approval to request M13 to develop a film roll that pertains to tasks and development projects run by our section.

With appreciation

(Signature)  
Walid 'Allawi Hammadi  
Director of Div. 2  
24 May 2001

*Mr. M 16 director,  
Please examine and assign what is necessary, with appreciation*




*Sect. 2 director  
24 May 2001*

### The Task of Booby-trapping a Vest

A work team was specifically established to carry out a task that required booby-trapping a vest in a way that would make it nearly impossible for enemy specialists to detect it. The chosen vest, designed to suit field conditions, consisted of two parts; the outer part made of cloth, whereas the insider part made of glass wool lining wrapped around both ends, the lining is attached to the vest with a zipper. The lining of the vest is booby-trapped with highly explosive materials and connected to igniters, fuses and an electronic detonating device as illustrated in the attached photos. The task was successfully conducted outside Iraq.

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(TC: A comment written in English that reads (possible 16/2001/001) as shown hereunder)



Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Rearview of a properly concealed vest laden with high explosive materials, worn by an officer

Side view of the vest left hanging inconspicuously on a cloth hanger.

A view of a vest hanging on cloth hanger, which shows vest lining completely concealed.

The inner side of the vest, lining, should be set properly in order to conceal explosives in booby-trapped vest.

The vest lining should be pulled from the inside out in order to facilitate drawing the best designs to fit the explosives in the insides of the vest.

A prototype made out of cardboard box assimilating exact surface area of the vest lining dimensions, in order to use as pocket padding.

Page 19

Explosive materials are cut according to certain measurements in order to help conceal explosives and accessories of igniters and Cortex fuses .

Connect the explosives to fuses and igniters to guarantee all material will explode at the same time.

Insert explosives in carved out pocket padding and fasten the electronic detonating device.

Stitch the "prepared-padding" and fasten it all together into the lining of the vest.

Dressing-tryout was made after fastening the lining to the vest by a zipper in a way to conceal all parts of booby-trapping.

Field test was conducted to detonate 20-g of explosives, the same of which is used in booby-trapped vests. Noting that booby-trapped vest will carry explosives weighing a total amount of 1.3 kg.

The vest, clad by an officer, is ready for task use, noting that this officer has successfully conducted the task assigned to him out of the country.

DHA Search **HARMONY SEARCH TOOL**

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**Document 1**

**Query found 1 matches out of 980665 documents.**

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### Original Document Information

**Document #:** CMPC-2003-000331

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

**English Title:** IIS reports collection plans, lists of agents and relationship with Russian opposition groups [REDACTED]

**Language:** ARABIC

<b>Document Date:</b> 20010822	<b>Total Pages:</b> 239	<b>Inclusive Pages:</b>	<b>Oversized Pages:</b>
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<b>Document Type:</b>	<b>Format:</b>
-----------------------	----------------

<b>Agency:</b> DIA	<b>Project:</b> IRAQI FREEDOM, IZ MEDIA RELEASE PROJECT
--------------------	---

<b>Country of Information:</b> IRAQ	<b>Date Acquired:</b>
-------------------------------------	-----------------------

<b>Title:</b>	<b>Country Of Origin:</b> IRAQ	<b>Originators Classification:</b> CONFIDENTIAL
---------------	--------------------------------	---

### Translation Information

<b>Translation #</b>	<b>Classification</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Translating Agency</b>
CMPC-2003-000331-HT	[REDACTED]	PARTIAL COMPLETED	DIA

### Linked Documents

<b>Original Document</b>	<a href="#">CMPC-2003-000331</a>
<b>Translation</b>	<a href="#">CMPC-2003-000331-HT - View Highlighted</a>

**Exploitation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

**Translation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

### Related Document Numbers

<b>Document Number Type</b>	<b>Document Number</b>
Harmony Number;	<a href="#">CMPC-2003-000331</a>

### Keyword Categories

#### Keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE; CORRESPONDENCE; SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES; IIS - IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; BACKGROUND INFORMATION

### Document Remarks

THE ORIGINAL MEDIA AND TITLE TO THIS RECORD HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE INTERNET Page 3 is a suspension of an Iraqi citizen overseas, possibly related to Osama Bin Laden's movement. Page 6 is a publication of "Al-Tadamon ", a magazine in Iraq which is issued by Salim Ahmed Al-Hussein, a Jordanian lawyer. Page 6 is on employing individuals to work in the intelligence fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. There is a report about a Lebanese citizen who happened to be a businessman. Page 81 is an intelligence plan on collecting information throughout the world. Page 107 is on increasing ties to Islamic centers in London and to Al-Najafi in Syria. Page 150 lists names of Iraqi agents in other countries, such as Turkey and Iran. Page 159 is on the cooperation of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) with the Iranian organization "Al-Kholeq" to assassinate prominent individuals in Iran. The special operations team is responsible for the assassinations. Page 172 contains the memoirs of a British citizen traveling in Iraq called "Hamfer Memoirs". The British traveler carried a book titled "How to destroy Islam". Page 207 is on the Establishment of relationships with the Russian opposition.

### Batch Information

**Batch Name:** 3115-1

**Boxes in Batch:** 30

**Capture Information** ;;Capturing Unit:FBI ;;Date/Time of Capture:24XXXXAPR03 ;;  
Country of Unit:UNITED STATES ;;Place of Capture:IIS FACILITY IN BAGHDAD ;;  
Coordinates:38S MB 4498 828550 ;;Identity of Source:UNK

**Transmittal Information** ;;Transporting Unit:FBI ;;Transmittal Number:UNK ;;Point of Contact: [REDACTED]

**Comments** [REDACTED] NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

CMPG-2003-000331

Page 1

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(Translator Comment (TC): Logo of the IIS)  
Secret and immediate

Notification M4/9

Date: 27 November 2001  
Reference: 26

To: D4/4

1- Find attached hereunder the comment of the Intelligence Service Director dated 24 November 2001 affixed to a text that contained news about your work field.

2- The General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate requested your urgent information report about the information stated in the news.

Please acknowledge and inform us of your input accordingly. Best regards.

Attachment:

Copy of the comment

(TC: signature)  
Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate /9  
27 November 2001  
Basim  
27 November

(TC: A handwritten note at the bottom of the page that reads, "*Necessary actions were taken by the Field Operating Base Department as per the order of the General Director concerning their information*")

(TC: signature)

(1-1)  
Secret and immediate

**Page 2**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(Translator Comment TC: IIS Logo)  
Secret and personal

Notification: (SATTS M1/ H X)

Date: 27 November 2001

Reference: 26

To: The General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate

Find attached hereunder the comment of the Intelligence Service Director dated 24 November 2001.

Please acknowledge and discuss any issue with his Excellency. Best regards.

**Attachments:**

Copy of the comment of the Intelligence Service Director

(TC: signature)  
Press and Communication Organization Director  
25 November 2001

The General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate/9  
We request information urgently  
(TC: Signature)

1041  
27/11

**Page 3**

The Middle East 24/11

A Philippine Military spokesperson declared that an Iraqi Director at a Qurani Teaching School in Philippine was arrested yesterday in the south of the country. He was suspected of contacts with Osama Bin-Laden network. The Iraqi was arrested in his house in Mindanao Island as declared by the Commandant Khulitu Andu. Manila court released an arrest warrant for him for suspecting his relation with Osama Bin-Laden. The spokesperson added that the Iraqi citizen has been living in Philippine since 1998, where he runs a religious Children School. In Manila, a Jordanian was arrested for claims of carrying out terrorist activities. A source from the Philippine Judicial Authority of the Anti-Terrorism Fighting Department stated that a mobile phone, a gun and explosives primer were found in his possession, the source stated that the arrested person confirmed his Jordanian nationality.

(TC: Handwritten note that reads, "*Discuss with the General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate*")

(Sheet 4)

**Page 4**

The Middle East Newspaper – "Illegible" – News  
International Arab Newspaper

"Illegible"  
First page  
News  
Last page  
Economy  
Sports  
Science  
Religion  
Opinion  
Books  
"Illegible"

Arrest of an Iraqi and a Jordanian in Philippine for suspicion of connection with  
Osama Bin-Laden and the Terrorism

Manila, AFB: A Philippine Military spokesperson declared that an Iraqi Director at a Qurani Teaching School in Philippine was arrested, yesterday in the south of the country because he was suspected for contacts with Osama Bin-Laden network. The Iraqi was arrested in his house in Mindanao Island as declared by the Commandant Khulitu Andu. Manila court released an arrest warrant for him for suspecting his relation with Osama Bin-Laden. The spokesperson added that the Iraqi citizen has been living in Philippine since 1998, where he runs a religious Children School. In Manila, a Jordanian was arrested for claims of carrying out terrorist activities. A source from the Philippine Judicial Authority of the Anti-Terrorism Fighting Department stated that a mobile phone, a gun and explosives primer were found in his possession, the source stated that the arrested person confirmed his Jordanian nationality.

It is worth mentioning that the Philippine President, Gloria Arroyo, promised to terminate every Terrorist Organization in her country as in support of the International Anti-Terrorist Campaign led by the United States since September 11. Arroyo, who arrived, yesterday, to her country from her visit to Washington, assured that she got the American administration support against the Islamic Kidnappers and insurgencies in South of Philippine.

"Illegible "

<http://www.asharqalawsat.com/podaily/24-11-2001/news/18.html>

Page 2

**Page 5**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(TC: IIS Logo)  
**Secret and Personal**

Notification: M4/ 7 /3

Date: 08 September 2001

Reference: 6631

To: The Director of the first Directorate

Find attached a copy of the report written by the Jordanian Lawyer, Salim Ahmad Muhsin, regarding the issue of Al-Tadamun Magazine, which was previously discussed with you in the presence of Comrade Akram 'Umar.

Please acknowledge. Best regards.

**Attachments:**

Copy of a two-page report  
Copy of Al-Tadamun Magazine

(TC: Signature)  
General Director of the Directorate  
06 September 2001

(1-1)  
**Secret and personal**

**Page 6**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(Translator Comment TC: Logo)  
Secret and Personal

Notification:

Date: 23 August 2001  
Reference: (SATTS M1/2/4125)

To: The General Director of the 4th Directorate

Find hereunder a copy of letter of the Intelligence Service representative in Amman No. 127 dated 13 August 2001 and its attachment the report written by the Jordanian Lawyer, Salim Ahmad Al-Mihaysin regarding the issue of publishing in Al-Tadamun Magazine.

Please acknowledge. Best regards.

**Attachments:**

Copy of the representative's letter  
Report + Al-Tadamun Magazine

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the Directorate  
22 August 2001

(TC: A handwritten note that reads, "*Head of Division to follow up  
I never came across this subject  
I am remembering with comrade Akram 'Umar*  
(TC: signature)  
23 August")

665  
25/8

Page 7

127  
8/18

Republic of Iraq Embassy  
Amman (TC: Crest of the Republic)

Reference: 127  
Date: 17 August 2001

Secret and Personal

Salutations,

Find hereunder the report of the Jordanian Lawyer, Salim Ahmad Mihaysin, with whom we have some relations. The report discusses the publishing of Al-Tadamun magazine. The issue was previously discussed with Doctor Hassan in the presence of Comrade Akram 'Umar.

Please acknowledge and refer the issue to the General Director. Best regards

(TC: Signature)  
Diya' Ghannawi  
13 August 2001

Attachments:

- 1- Report
- 2- A copy of Al-Tadamun magazine

Illegible  
(TC: Signature)

Page 8

The magazine is printed in Lebanon, Comrade 'Abd-al-Majid Al-Rafi was the liaison officer with concerned individuals and entities. The issue was discussed with Doctor Hassan and Comrade Akram. You presented the idea of partnership in bearing the costs, printing, distribution and the administrative offices to support the magazine. The ideas were approved. We agreed to discuss the procedures and technical details later on in order to meet all work requirements. The objectives are to serve Iraq, present its historical role and confront all enemies offended by any news about Iraq. The meeting was planned to be held in Amman, to face their hostile media that broadcast their lies in order to deform the facts about our dear country and its historical leadership.

I present this matter to our concerned comrades requesting a direct meeting with them and the publishers, to revive and approve the matter. My regards to you and to all comrades, to the Arab President Saddam, protector of the Nation and its freemen against the western and foreign oppressions, Knight of the Immortal Nation Saddam Husayn, May God protect him!

Comrade  
Salim Ahmad Al-Mihaysin  
'Amman- 13 August 2001  
(TC: Signature)

**Page 9**

In The Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

To: Comrade Diya'

Salutation,

The issue of publishing Al-Tadamun magazine was already discussed. The magazine would talk about the role of the great Iraq, its abilities and the consequences of the embargo. If the plans come true, it will reflect the status of the Iraqi leadership and people. It will reflect the history of the great Iraqi people including their victory, support and the historical role of Iraq in the Arab Nation and Palestine cause. The magazine will contain new issues about Arab Solidarity; Iraq on top of it. Knowing that Al-Tadamun Company / Cyprus issue this magazine, the publisher is the Lebanese Muna Mahmud Shatila. It should be taken in consideration the fact that I have presented a detailed report of the publisher, the magazine owner Muna Mahmud Shatila. I also sent some copies to President Saddam Husayn, may God protect him. I also sent an article signed by an alias name about the cultural embargo, which was published in different issues; the article was received from comrade Akram. This project intends to make and publish President Saddam Husayn's biography, may God protect him.

1-2

**Page 10**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(TC: IIS Logo)

Secret

Notification: M4/ 7 /3

Date: 02 September 2001

Reference: 6462

To: The Field Operating Bases Directors

The Intelligence Service Director referred in his small cadre meeting on 27 August 2001 to the following:

We should seriously think about developing the work methods, whenever the involved formation Director thinks that an idea is suitable for a session opening, he should present it, or he thinks that it is appropriate to refer the matter to the 11<sup>th</sup> Directorate to deal with the issue in a way that would serve the educational operation.

Please acknowledge, take the necessary actions ... with regards

Khalid

2/9

(TC: Signature)

7<sup>th</sup> Directorate Director

02 September 2001

**Page 11**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(Translator Comment TC: Logo)

Secret

Notification:

Date: 01 September 2001

Reference: 4277

To: The General and Senior Directors of M4

The Intelligence Service Director decided, in his small cadre meeting on 27 August 2001, the following:

We should seriously think about developing the work methods, whenever the involved formation Director thinks that an idea is suitable for a session opening, he should present it, or he thinks that it is appropriate to refer the matter to the 11<sup>th</sup> Directorate to deal with the issue in a way that would serve the educational operation.

Please take the necessary actions ... with regards

(TC: Signature)  
1<sup>st</sup> Directorate Director  
30 August 2001

- 1- Please inform the Directors to take action accordingly
- 2- Please follow up

(TC: Signature)  
1/9

695  
9/1

**Page 12**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(Translator Comment TC: Logo)  
Secret and immediate

Notification: M4/7/3

Date: 25 August 2001

Reference: 6179

To: The Director of the 1st Directorate

Reference to your secret letter No. 3915 dated 12 August 2001; find hereunder the proposed ideas and topics to activate the Intelligence work:

- 1- Hold a specialized conference after every experiment or incident, to mark the methods and concerns of the Intelligence and to benefit from the results.
- 2- Strengthen the course of dedicating the Intelligence Officer to the intelligence work purposes only without occupying him with dealing with information in order to give him the space for dealing with his sources and opportunities.
- 3- Establish units and sources, known in the intelligence concept as the "Sleeping" units and sources in order to employ them in the appropriate time considering the circumstances surrounding Iraq and the constant threatening elements against the National Security.
- 4- Transform the investment of negative phenomenon and cases into an intelligence principle; include this principle in an educational field in order to make the intelligence officer familiar with employing such cases to our advantage in an appropriate mental framework; the negative phenomena include cases of escapee and refugee and the political and cultural opposition.
- 5- Nominate officers to work outside the country, each according to his field in order to let them be informed in details of the work plan and its execution, also the following up priorities and the prompt answers.
- 6- Give flexibility for the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate moves in specifying the facilitations that could be presented to

(1-2)

**Page 13**

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

(Translator Comment TC: Logo)

Secret

Notification:

Date:

Reference:

... the sources by interviewing the Ministers through the Relation Department in the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate; to talk with the Presidency about the presented facilitations to the opposite parties and the shadow personalities, to lodge the foreign sources in the hotels according to formula of the Iraqi Dinar payments

7. Exclude the important stations especially the ones working in the neighboring countries from the Humanitarian help principle while nominating officers to work and to restrict the humanitarian aids in the delegations to the state departments.
8. Expand the experience of planting some officers in the important Ministries in order to include other Ministries such as the Ministry of oil
9. Increase the sections staff and the service departments in the branches of those by those who have knowledge about the concerned field.
10. Control the nomination mechanism rules in the Department in order to support the system with security cadre and quality that serves its job. It is necessary to give a principle role to the preparation and training institute in personifying and sorting the elements that are not qualified in the Intelligence work, however the good and qualified elements will be assigned to the intelligence groups according to the regulations.
11. The 2<sup>nd</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Directorates will prepare a study about preparing Intelligence Officers, the necessary requirements to preparing experts, the languages needed in our system due to the necessity of acquiring languages for information collecting through relations. The study would cover also source nomination in addition to the secrecy needed in our system work; therefore, we should give it priority while nominating them in the important fields.

Please acknowledge ... with regards

Ahmad

23/8

Salim

23/8

(TC: Signature)  
General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
09 August 2001

(2-2)  
Secret and Personal

**Page 14**

(SATTS N.M)

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)

Secret and personal  
Urgent

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification

Date: 21 August 2001

Number: 455

To: Mr. Directorate 4/7 Director

Reference is made to your secret, personal and urgent notification, number 5483 dated 4 August 2001, find hereunder the suggestions, which aim to enhance intelligence activities, to be discussed in the staff meting:

1. Recently, the amount of correspondence is starting to be a burden on Directorate 4, which included statements on delegations of the State's departments, granting commercial agencies, granting authorization for selling manifests, dealing with Arabic and foreign commercial companies, real estate registration, etc. These administrative letters are becoming a heavy administrative burden on the specialized intelligence divisions, and it occupies a lot of the intelligence allocated time taking under consideration the shortage of officers at the branches. The purpose of this suggestion is reducing the administrative tasks and dedicating the officers to intelligence tasks, in addition to saving the allocated stationary. We suggest that the Delegations Division in Directorate 4 in coordination with Directorate 3/4 is to handle the correspondence after adding five administrative employees to its staff. Copies of these letters, however, are to be sent to the concerned section and before taking the necessary measures, that is to review the included information, if the concerned section had information or a consideration; they need to reply the Delegations Division within three days, and if there was no answer, this means...

(1-2)

Secret, personal and urgent

**Page 15**

(SATTS N.M)

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate  
(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)

Secret and personal

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification

Date:

Number:

... It does not have any information, and at the same time, the concerned section would be aware of the issue to utilize it in intelligence work.

2. Mr. President (May God keep him safe) had already assured on the issue of perfecting the recruiting procedures in the department, also it is useful to prepare a study on that issue and on the current procedure and suggestions to improve the system with qualified personnel who will serve the operation. And it could be useful to utilize the Training and Preparation Institution in analyzing and classifying the members whom are not suitable in intelligence tasking and to end their services before appointing them to the directorates. As for the qualified members, they should be appointed to the intelligence directorates according to their qualifications and capabilities.
3. Prepare a study by Directorates 11 and 2 about the current preparation for the intelligence officers, and the necessary suggestions to prepare the specialists in the fields required by the Intelligence Service.

For your review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Department 1 Director  
20 August 2001

(2-2)

Secret, personal and urgent

**Page 16**

(SATTS N.M)

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate  
(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)

Secret and personal  
Urgent

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification

Date: 9 August 2001

Number: Directorate 4, Department 2/ 242

To: Directorate 4/7

In reference to your notification No. 5483 dated 4 August 2001, consider the following:

1. Work on nominating officers to work abroad each with his/her specialty, to be fully aware of the work plan, in addition to the follow-up priorities and quick replies.
2. The language factor has huge importance in obtaining information, establishing relations, nominating sources and adding the secrecy, which is necessary in the Service's work, so language should get priority when nominating to important fields.
3. Grant flexibility to Directorate 4 to move within the State through facilities which could be provided to sources by:
  - a. Facilitate interviews with the ministries through the Relations Division in Directorate 5, as worked by with the sources of Directorate 5.
  - b. Address the Presidency about the facilities granted to the opposing parties and the expected prominent opposition characters with the reasons behind that.

(1-2)

Secret and personal

**Page 17**

(SATTS N.M)

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate  
(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)

Secret and personal

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification

Date:

Number:

- c. Facilitate the hosting process of foreign sources in hotels according to policy of paying with the Iraqi Dinar.
- 4. Disregard important stations when nominating officers to work in them, especially the neighboring countries based on human aids, for they directly threaten the national security, in addition to limiting, the human aids in with the State's periodic and long-term delegations.
- 5. Iraq got economical relations in multiple fields with several countries and these relations and among the specialty of several ministries such as (Oil), which requires finding a mechanism to place a number of officers to operate under this cover.
- 6. Raise the staff of the sections to be able to accomplish their wide missions, especially the ones who are skilled in the targeted country's language. In addition to covering the service divisions at the branches to complete the missions in a better manner, which makes the Center capable of many intelligence activities that serve the work field.

For your review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Department 2 Director  
9 August 2001

(2-2)

Secret and personal

Page 18

(IIS logo)

(SATTS N.M)/ 4

Division 3

6051

11 August

Republic of Iraq

Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)

Ref: 373

Date: 11 July 2001

Notification

Directorate 4 Department 3/ (SATTS Q J)

To: Directorate 4/7

Reference to your Notification No. 5483 on 4 August 2001, find hereunder ideas and subjects, we have suggested to enhance the operation:

1. A conference shall be held after every attempt or any incident occurs concerning the intelligence methods and interests since almost all advanced intelligence services hold such conferences to extract suitable lessons.
2. Keep the Intelligence Officer of Directorate 4 focused on the intelligence work and not busy with information, in order to broaden his thinking to deal with his sources and prospective sources.
3. Establish units or sources known, within the intelligence concept, as (sleeping cells) in order to invest it in the right time due to the situation of Iraq whose national security is continuously threatened.
4. Changing phenomena investment and negative conditions into intelligence concept in order to force the intelligence officer to get used to think about investing such conditions in our interests, such as escaping and asylum phenomena and cultural and political situations.
5. Renewing, modernity and the future are universal phenomena affecting our Arabic societies, and almost all advanced services deal with it within a certain structure or special pursuing for the purpose of narrowing the unknown's margin and acknowledging renewing methods or spread it in terms of what is known as the imperialism of cultural statements.

Kindly acknowledge...with regards

(TC: Signature)  
Head of Department 3  
9 August 2001

**Page 19**

(SATTS N.M)

(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification  
Directorate 4 / Department 4

Date: 15 August 2001  
Ref: 404

To: Directorate 4/7/3

Your notification number 5483 dated 4 August 2001,  
In regards to ideas and plans that could enhance the operation; we would like to state  
the following:

1. At the mean time, there are neither thoughts nor issues that could be suggested to enhance the operation, whereas the Department took the responsibility for raising the administrative and professional status of the intelligence officers, which could effectively enhance the operation, and there are talks with the higher references in that regards.
2. We will present several thoughts during the staff meeting.

For your review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Department 4 Director  
14 August 2001

**Page 20**

(Iraqi Intelligence Service logo)  
Secret, personal and urgent

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Notification

Date: 04 August 2001

Number: 5483

To: Directors of Field Operating Bases

1. The Intelligence service Director issued his order to present ideas and subjects, which enhance the operation; this is to be discussed during the staff meetings.
2. The Director of Directorate 4 notified us with the ideas and subjects that you suggested.

Kindly acknowledge and state your ideas as soon as possible so we can combine them with the others and refer them to the requesting side...with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4/7 Director  
04 August 2001

(TC: Signature)  
4 August

(1-1)  
Secret, Personal and Urgent

Page 21

(TC: Crest of Intelligence Service)

(SATTS N.M/4)

Secret and personal

Ref No.: 3735

Date: 2 August 2001

Correspondence

Mr. Honorable General and Main Directors  
(Mr. Honorable Director of Directorate 4 Operations

Mr. Honorable Director of the Intelligence Service has assigned to present the ideas and the affairs that would activate the work and which you would discuss in the staff meetings.

Kindly, take the necessary procedure and provide us with those affairs and ideas in order to be presented for His Excellence.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Directorate 1  
1 August 2001

(TC: a handwritten note on the bottom of the page as follows;  
*The Directors shall view this in order to present the affairs, and then notify me.*  
(Signature)  
2 August)

Page 22

Ahmad Rashid  
(TC: Crest of Intelligence Service)  
Secret

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of Republic  
Intelligence Service

Correspondence

Ref No.: 107

Date: 22 august (Illegible)

Mr. Honorable Director of Directorate 4 Operations

Mr. Honorable Director of Directorate 10

In reference to our correspondence number 3538 on 23 July 2001, kindly inform us  
the taken procedure in regards to the correspondence.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Directorate 1  
22 August 2001

(TC: a handwritten note on the bottom of the page as follows;

Very Urgent

*This shall be due to regarded concerns.*

*(Signature))*

(TC: a handwritten note on the bottom of the page as follows;

*We had answered by our correspondence number 60 on 22 August 2001*

*859/ 23 August)*

Page 23

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Mr. Honorable Directors of the International Affairs' Sections

The aside is Directorate 1 secret correspondence- number 3606 on 26 July 2001- that includes the assignment of Mr. Director of Intelligence Service about formatting a committee specialized in the fields of countering the conspiracy and espionage. Still, Mr. Director of Directorate 4 Operations assigned to view the correspondence.

Khalid  
28 July

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Directorate 4/7  
28 July 2001

Mr. Director of Department 1	(TC: Signature) I viewed it. Regards
Mr. Director of Department 2	(TC: Signature) I viewed it. Regards
Mr. Director of Department 3	(TC: Signature) 29 July/ I viewed it. Regards
Mr. Director of Department 4	(TC: Signature) 30 July/ I viewed it. Regards

Page 24

(TC: Crest of Intelligence Service)

(SATTS N.M/4)

Top Secret and Urgent

Ref No.: 1072

Date: 2 May 2000

Correspondence  
Directorate 4/ Department 1

Mr. Honorable Director of Directorate 4/7

In reference to your correspondence 2467 on 30 April 2000;

1. The Direction of Mr. Director of Intelligence Service was included within the work plan of our international affairs' sections for the year 2000. The movement should be towards Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because those two fields are special. Furthermore, our letter number (SATTS D1/3/4/23) on 19 January 2000 was circulated for all of our operating bases in Jakarta, Kuala lumbar, Bangkok, Vietnam, China, Tokyo, Islamabad, and New Delhi in order to find reliable sources from the eastern countries of Asia as well from the Arab countries. Those found reliable sources should be sent to Saudi and Kuwait.
2. As implementation for the directions of Mr. President, our field operations bases were directed to attract Iraqis who work in concerned places to take advantage. The number of the Iraqis targets is 44 individuals who shown good capabilities during 1999.

Kindly, acknowledge!

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Department 1  
2 May 2000

(1-1)  
Top Secret

Page 25

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

(TC: Crest of Republic of Iraq)

(TC: Crest of Intelligence Service)

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of Republic  
Intelligence Service

Ref No.: (SATTS M1/5/1985)

Date: 27 April 2000

Mr. Director of Directorate 4 Operations

Kindly, inform us with taken procedure in regards to the direction of Mr. Honorable Director of Intelligence Service sent to you by our correspondence number 5757 on 26 December 1999.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Directorate 1  
26 April 2000

(TC: a handwritten note on the bottom of the page as follows;

Urgent  
*Directorate 4/ (illegible)*  
*27 April*)

(TC: a handwritten note on the bottom of the page as follows;

Mr. Jawad  
*Kindly, take the necessary procedure*  
*(Signature)*

**Page 26**

Respected Field Operating Bases directors


Find attached the Directorate 1 notification numbered 5757 dated 26 December 1999, which includes the Service Director instruction concerning the preparation of the annual plan for year 2000.

Please Acknowledge. The General Director of Directorate 4 decided acknowledgment to work accordingly... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4/7 Director  
27 December 1999

Department 1 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 28 December
Department 2 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 28 December
Department 3 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 29 December
Department 4 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 2 January 2000

Page 27



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)

Top secret

Date/ 26 December 1999

Reference/ 5757

General Director of Directorate 4

Notification

The Intelligence Service Director decided to take the preparation of the annual plan for year 2000 into consideration and as follows:-

1. Activate specialized advanced work in important fields where the IIS work is difficult.
2. Use Iraqis who work in foreign countries to act as additional observers that serve our plans in the fields, where they serve.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)

Directorate 1 Director

25 December 1999

*1- Acknowledgement of the respected directors to work accordingly and present it in the directors meeting.*

(TC: Signature)

26 December

A copy to

*(SATTS: A=)/ please Acknowledge... with appreciation*

*Mr. Juwad Baha'*

*1- It is to be circulated according to the director's comment*

*2- It is to be photocopied and a copy of the circulation is to be*

*Sent to me in order to apply the above-mentioned Clause (2)*

(TC: Signature)

26 December

1024 Follow-up

26 December

Page 28



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTs N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)  
Secret

Date/ 3  
February 2000

Reference/ 613

Notification

Directorate 4/7/3

Directorate 1 General Director

Your notification numbered 4/287 ON 20 January 2000

1. Find hereunder the names of the respected Field Operating Bases directors who are authorized to sign the telegrams that are issued to the stations in foreign countries.

- A. Khudayr Isma'il Al-Mashhadani
- B. Samir Mahmud Al-Karawi
- C. Manhal Muhammad Fadil
- D. Ghalib 'Umar Al-Duri

2. In case one of the authorized individuals is absent for any reason, the telegrams are to be exclusively signed by us.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation.

*(TC: Signature)*  
General Director of Directorate 4  
2 February 2000

*Ziyad*  
3 February

*(1-1)*  
Secret

**Page 29**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Mr. *General Director of Directorate 4*  
Subject: Authorization


1. Find attached the Directorate 1 notification concerning the names of the individuals who are authorized to sign the telegrams in order for the Cipher Division to rely on.
2. The former IIS Director had already decided that the validity of the signatures on the telegrams that are issued to stations in foreign countries is exclusively at the level of Field Operating Bases director. This decision is issued to us in the Directorate 1 notification, which is attached (Note1).
3. In the light of what has been reported, we suggest the notification of Directorate 1 concerning the validity of signing the telegrams is exclusive to the respected Field Operating Bases directors and that in case one of them was absent for any reason, you would sign them solely.

Please Acknowledge and assign... with appreciation

Directorate 4/7  
2 February

Mr. Taha  
A notification is to be prepared under the signature of the  
Director  
General Director and addressed to Directorate 1.  
(TC: Signature) 2000  
*2 February*

Page 30



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTs N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)  
(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 1 Director

13 January 1999

Thamir

13 January

1999

*The letter has been presented to the  
linguistic auditor (Illegible)  
(TC: Signature)  
(Illegible)  
23 January*

level

of an *Field Operating Base* director

Some telegrams that are issued from (Directorate 4) Center are still reported as signed by unauthorized individuals especially when the international stations directors are on leave or traveling. Please fix this issue and the Cipher Division will apologize for the circulation of telegram that does not comply with the instructions... with appreciation

**Page 31**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Mr. General Director of Directorate 4  
Subject: Evaluation

We would like to inform you of the following:-

1. Directorate 1 requested in its attached notification (Note 2) the evaluation of the intelligence opportunities that was reported to our directorate during year 1999 as well as the indication of the number of the mobilization cases that occurred and was reported to us from Directorate 18.
2. The Field Operating Bases had been notified in our notification numbered 1 on 2 January 2000 to reveal the number of the cases that was reported to it from Directorate 18 (Note 2).
3. The Field Operating Bases replied as follows:-
  - A. 1<sup>st</sup> Field Operating Base: Directorate 18 did not provide it with any opportunity in 1999.
  - B. 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Operating Base: Three cases:
    - 1<sup>st</sup>. Two Iranian female prisoners and it appears that there are no intelligence spies to benefit from.
    - 2<sup>nd</sup>. A Turkish individual that was forced to be mobilized
  - C. Third Field Operating Base: Three cases were closed, as they were useless.
  - D. Fourth Field Operating Base: Directorate 18 did not provide it with any opportunity in 1999.

Please Acknowledge and we suggest the circulation of the attached notification to Directorate 1... You command... with appreciation

(TC:

Directorate

Juwad

Signature)

17 January

4/7 Director

17 January 2000

Page 32



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTs N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)  
*Secret and immediate*

Directorate 4/7/3  
Date/ 17 January 2000  
Reference/ 4/3/2

Notification

66


To: Directorate 4/7

Reference to your notification numbered 1 on 2 January 2000, the cases that we received from Directorate 18 were only three, two of them were saved because their benefit was limited and the third was reported to Department 1 since it is associated to their field of work.

With appreciation  
(TC: Signature)  
16 January 2000

(1-1)  
*Secret and immediate*

Page 33



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret and immediate

Notification

Directorate 4/ Department 4

Date/ 16 January 2000

Reference/ 2011

To: Directorate 4/7/3

Your notification numbered 1 on 2 January 2000. Directorate 18 did not report to us any intelligence opportunities in 1999.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

(TC: *Signature*)

*Department 2 Director*

*15 January 2000*

Page 34

Section 2

140  
12 January

  
Republic of Iraq  
(SATTs N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Notification Directorate 4 Department 2

Directorate 4/7/3  
Date/ 11 January 2000

Reference/ 111

To: Directorate 4/7

Your notification numbered 4/7/1 on 2 January 2000

Directorate 18 forwarded the following to us:-

1- Two Iranian female prisoners married to Iraqi men who escaped Iran. After meeting the prisoners, it appeared that we could not benefit from them for our intelligence work.

2- The Turkish individual Muhammad Kuzal Mansur: accused of prostitution and his mobilization was forced.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)

Department 2 Director

11 January 2000

(1-1)  
Secret

Page 35

Section 3

8453  
(Illegible)



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Notification

Date/ 28 December 1999  
Reference/ (SATTS M) 1/5/5833  
Respected General Director of Directorate 4  
Respected Directorate 5 General Director

Please inform us of your evaluation of the intelligence opportunities that were reported to you from Directorate 18 in 1999 since it was indicated in its (Directorate 18) annual report that it reported 187 mobilization opportunity concerning work associated with Directorate 4 and Directorate 5, in addition to the number of mobilization cases that occurred as a result of these opportunities.

With appreciation  
(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 1 Director

27 December 1999

Directorate 4 Director (Illegible), please

29 January  
Mr. Juwad Baha'  
It is to be circulated on the Field Operating Bases in order to reveal the mobilization cases and to be reported to Directorate 1  
With appreciation  
(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4/7 Director

30 December

Follow-up

1031  
29 December

Respected Field Operating Bases directors

Find attached the Directorate 1 notification numbered 5758 on 26 December 1999 which includes the Intelligence Service Director's instruction concerning benefiting from the retired personnel in intelligence works in accordance to the fields.

Please Acknowledge and General Director of Directorate 4 decided to work accordingly... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4/7 Director  
27 December 1999

Department 1 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 27 December
Department 2 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 28 December
Department 3 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 29 December
Department 4 Director	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 2 January 2000

Page 37

(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Top secret

Date/ 26  
*December 1999*  
Reference/ 5758  
General Director of Directorate 4  
Directorate 5 General Director  
Directorate 4 Director

Republic of Iraq

Notification

The respected Intelligence Service Director decided the following:-

1. Using the IIS delegates in intelligence works and assigning them with determined missions. The delegate is asked to submit a delegation report upon his arrival.
2. Benefiting from the retired personnel in our work according to the field in coordination with the Retired Strugglers Care Commission.

To take necessary actions... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 1 Director  
25 December 1999

*1- Acknowledgement of the respected directors to work accordingly*

*2- It is to be presented in the directors meeting*

*Please*

*(TC: Signature)*  
*26 December*

A copy to

*(SATTS: A=) Please Acknowledge... with appreciation*

*Mr. Juwad Baha'*

- 1- Take necessary actions about Clause (2) of the General Director's comment*
- 2- It is to be photocopied and recorded*

*(TC: Signature)*  
*26 December*  
1026 Follow-up  
*26 December*

Page 38



In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate  
Republic of Iraq  
Presidency

Intelligence Service (IIS)



of the Republic

Reference/

Top-secret

Iraqi

Date/ 12

140/7/3/5220

Intelligence Service

December 1999

IRIS

Respected Minister of Foreign Affairs

Subject/ Using the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Club

Your secret and personal letter numbered (SATTS M O)/26/1421 on 26 October 1999.

We do not support the opening of the club in the mean time because of security threats.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

Ziyad

Hasan

7 December

7 December

(TC: Signature)

Intelligence

Service Director

8 December 1999

Khalil

8 December

(1-1)

Secret and personal

Page 39

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

2778

Presidency of the republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Mr. IIS Operations Deputy Director  
Subject: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Club

The IIS Director comment in the attached Ministry of Foreign Affairs letter, we would like to reveal the following:-

1. We do not support that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the club fore the following reasons in spite of the justifications that were mentioned:

A. The organized association of the Arab and foreign diplomatic commissions with the United Nations employees forms a beneficial platform for the exchange of intelligence and security information that threats our national security.

B. It will be a security place for intelligence meetings between the diplomatic missions practiced in the country.

C. The association of the diplomatic commissions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees will have a negative effect since the employees will be information sources for diplomats whether they knew or not, especially that some of the Ministry's employees do not have security immunity.

*Directorate 4*

*Please*

*(1-2)  
8 December*

*(TC: Signature)*

**Page 40**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)

Mr.:

Subject:

D. The association process between the diplomatic commissions themselves and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees will create an additional effort on us in our intelligence work.

E. We believe that this project will achieve the economical profit for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but at the same time will cause a huge intelligence loss to our national security.

2. In the light of the afore-mentioned, we suggest that we inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with our rejection concerning the opening of the mentioned club because of the security threats that will result.

Please Acknowledge and take decision accordingly... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 5 General Director  
Directorate 4  
2 December 1999

(TC: Signature)  
General Director of  
2 December 1999

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4 Director  
2 December 1999

*to be reported to the Ministry  
we do not approve  
(TC: Signature)  
5 December  
(TC: Signature)  
15 December  
(2-2)*

*Respected IIS Director  
- Please acknowledge  
our opinion , decide...with  
appreciation*

*(Illegible)  
7 December*

Page 41

Reference: (SATTS M



Republic of Iraq

O)1/26/1421

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Date: 26 November 1999

Minister's Office

(Secret and personal)

*28 July*

2054

Respected IIS Director

Subject/ Using the Ministry of Foreign Affairs club

Best regards

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' club located on the Tigris River bank in a nice location in Baghdad has been closed for many years because of the financial state of the Ministry and the possible siege conditions.

We have an idea about investing this club in such a way that will achieve several benefits such as making the club an investment that will generate a financial income for the Ministry and opening its membership to the Arab and Foreign Diplomatic Body and to the United Nations employees who are deployed in the country. There is no doubt that opening the membership for those personnel will achieve several purposes. The 1<sup>st</sup> purpose is providing a comfortable club in which all those personnel meet for entertainment, the 2<sup>nd</sup> purpose is that the club will be a place for us to achieve more organized association with the Arab and foreign diplomatic commissions and the United Nations employees and the 3<sup>rd</sup> purpose is that we will acquire a significant financial income that might be in foreign currency if it is agreed upon with them.

Because this project will not be successful, from our point of view, unless the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IIS collectively preplan it, I kindly ask your opinion and consultation.

Please Acknowledge and inform me of your opinion... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)

Muhammad Sa'id

Al-Sahhaf

Minister of

Foreign Affairs

26 October 1999

(TC: Signature)

*28 October*

*General Director of Directorate 4*

*Direktorate 5 General Director*

*Direktorate 4 Director*

*Consultation, please*

*Mr. Deputy*

*For Acknowledgement and discussion of the idea  
with the specialized comrades (Illegible) and if  
the opinion is chosen, we will have to technically  
activate before its opening.*

(TC: Signature)

*27 October 7*

**Page 42**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

2826

Republic

Presidency of the

Intelligence

Service (IIS)

Mr.: Respected IIS Deputy Director

Subject: Training the sources

In reference to the IIS Director comment on 1 November 1999 in the Directorate 16 letter concerning training the sources in foreign countries, we would like to clarify the following:-

1. Training of the sources is carried out by specialists from Directorate 16, where many of its employees were assigned missions; nevertheless, there are some circumstances where the employees were not assigned any missions for the following reasons:-
  - a. Minimize the expenses by training the sources by the follow-up officer after their method training in the specialized directorate (Directorate 16).
  - b. The security necessities sometimes require, for secrecy or personal security of the source, that only one person is to meet the source. There are also important sources that work on directing strategic goals that are not supposed to be revealed in front of many officers.
  - c. The intelligence procedure sometimes requires training the source on more than one method. This means delegating more than one specialist for this purpose, which contradicts with

(1-2)

**Page 43**

The secrecy concept. Thus, it is preferable to train the officers on all these methods, where a course is to be carried out to train the source.

2. In the light of the afore-mentioned, we are working according to the contents of the Directorate 16 memorandum while adhering to complete the intelligence operation in an accurate and measured way without leaking information.

Please Acknowledge and take decision accordingly... with appreciation

*(Illegible) and important*

*(TC: Signature)*

*9 December*

*Signature)*

*Ziyad*

*Directorate 4*

*7 December*

*December 1999*

*(TC:*

*General Director of*

*7*

*Respected IIS Director*

*Please Acknowledge... with appreciation*

*(TC: Signature)*

*8 December*

*(TC: Signature)*

*11 December*

*Directorate 4*

*Please*

*(TC: Signature)*

*11 December*

*(2-2)*

**Page 44**

Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)



Top Secret and personal

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/4/5/  
December 1999  
Reference/ 1261  
To/ Directorate 4/7/3

Date/ 1

Your top secret and personal letter numbered 6512 on 20 November 1999.  
We support the Directorate 16 opinion with the exception of training the important  
sources, as for their protection, which work on strategic goals... with appreciation  
(TC: Signature)

General Director of Directorate 4  
1 December 1999

(1-1)  
Top Secret and personal

Page 45

Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
6702  
Presidency of the Republic



*Section 3*

*28 November*

Intelligence Service (IIS)

*Top Secret and personal*

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/4/5/  
1999

Date/ *28 November*

Reference/ (*SATTS M*) 4 (*SATTS D*) 2  
3187

To/ Directorate 4/7


Your letter numbered 6512 on 20 November 1999.

We support the Criminology Directorate suggestions about training the sources by specialists. At the same time, we see that our officers should be informed of the IIS technical capabilities in all fields since it is important for their work.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Department 2 Director  
28 November 1999

Page 46



Top Secret and personal

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/7/3

Date/ 20

November 1999

Reference/ 6512

Respected Field Operating Bases directors

Attached is a copy of the Criminology Directorate notification and its accompaniments. The General Director decided that the opinion is to be revealed and informed to us.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation

Attachments

Notification copy


Memorandum copy

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4/7 Director  
20 November 1999

(1-1)

Top Secret and personal

Page 47



Top Secret and personal

Notification

Date/ 13  
November 1999  
Reference/ (SATTS M) 16/1589  
Respected General Director of Directorate 4

Attached is the respected IIS Director comment stating that the training and equipping of the sources on secret writing is to be carried out by specialists from our directorate.

Please Acknowledge... with appreciation  
*What is the opinion of the Field Operating  
Bases directors?*  
Please  
(TC: Signature)  
18 November  
Attachments  
Respected IIS Director Comment

(TC: Signature)  
Criminology Director  
13 November  
*Mr. Ahmad Nasir Baha'*  
*Circulation on the Field*  
*Operating Bases directors and*  
*discussion*  
(TC: Signature)  
20 November

932  
18 November

Top Secret and personal

**Page 48**

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(SATTS M)

(SATTS :)

Mr.:-

Subject:-

the training procedure or before it such as the ruining of the ink where has alternatives in his head that are to be used especially when he is in a foreign country and especially after acquiring medicines and home requirements that might contribute or from which a secret ink with a high security degree can be prepared.

Suggestions:

The sources' training is to be by specialists from our directorate. In exceptional cases, we might discuss with the involved personnel in the Secret Service Directorate.

This mission will provide us with 2 sides:

- a. Guaranteeing the success of the training
- b. Moral and materialistic support for the workers in this field.

Please Acknowledge and take decision accordingly... with appreciation

*Approved*

(TC:

Signature)

*Why did not this happen before?*

*(TC: Signature)*

Criminology Director

30 October

1999

*1 November*

**Page 49**

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Mr.: General Director of Directorate 4  
Subject: - Training sources

The IIS Director comment on 1 November 1999 in the Directorate 16 memorandum, which is attached in the top secret and personal letter, numbered 1589 on 13 November 1999:

1. It was circulated on the Field Operating Bases Directors to reveal their opinion about the subject. The Field Operating Bases supported the contribution of specialists from directorate 16 to train the sources. In case that was impracticable, the issue will require training an intelligence officer on the method that he will then train the source.
2. We suggest replying Directorate 16 that Directorate 4 carries out their suggestions but the current circumstances require, in some times, the minimization of expenses. Thus, the sources' training only applies to our officers in foreign countries after training them on the method in Directorate (Illegible) and sometimes secrecy might require not contributing more than one officer to meet the sources, especially the strategic ones. The materialistic support to their officers, on the other hand, is on the appraisal of Directorate 16.

Please Acknowledge and take decision accordingly... with appreciation

(TC:

Mr. Ahmad Baha'

Signature)

Directorate

It was discussed with the General

4/7

4

Director and he instructed the preparation


December 1999

of a detailed memorandum in order to be  
presented to the IIS Director.

(TC: Signature)

5 December

Page 50



Republic of Iraq  
(SATTS N.M)/4  
Presidency of the Republic

Intelligence Service (IIS)

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Secret

Notification

Date/ 20

January 2000

Reference/ (SATTS M) 1/4/287

To/ Directorate 4

Subsidiary to our letter numbered (124) on 14 January 1999, and with respect to the changes that occurred with the names of the individuals who were entrusted with the telegrams signature and the fact that some Section Directors has signed the telegrams under the pretense that the entrusted individual is not present or has traveled, we kindly ask to inform us with the names of the entrusted individuals in order for the Cipher Division to work accordingly... with appreciation.

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 1 Director  
19 January 2000

A copy to

Directorate 40- please Acknowledge for the same above purpose...

With appreciation

((Secret))

**Page 51**

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidential Diwan**



**2279**

**23/11**

No.: (SATTS Q)/8369  
Date: 20 November 1999

Secret

(Translator Comment (TC):  
handwritten number that  
reads, "4.3.1  
5428  
21 November 1999")

To: Intelligence Service  
Subject: Travel ban

Reference to your correspondence No. 1578, dated on 17 October 1999, due to what is reported in our correspondence No. 34867 dated on 25 October 1999, it is ordered to apply the currently approved rules concerning traveling of your affiliates. If the retired or independent individual completed the specified period specified by the travel ban, the travel ban will be automatically cancelled, as long as he did not have a military rank. The rules and regulations of the officers will be applied, if the individual is a military officer or a graduate from any military college.  
Kindly take the necessary procedures and best regards...

(TC: Signature)  
Ahmad Hassan  
Chief of the Presidential Diwan  
21 November 1999

Page 52

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



(SATTS N. M)/4

Top Secret and Urgent

Date: 10 November 1999  
No.: 6332

Notification (SATTS M4/7/3)

To: Directors of the International Stations

On 7 November 1999, the Director of the Intelligence Service ordered to use the attached copy of the family tree form, for the targeted individual, especially the Iraqi individuals, in order to be registered in their files.

Kindly acknowledge, the Director of the M4 ordered to take the necessary procedures as soon as possible.

Attachments:

- Form

(TC: signature that reads, "Juwad, 10 November")

(TC: signature of)  
Director of M4  
10 November 1999

(1-1)  
Top Secret and Urgent

Page 53

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



(SATTS N. M)/4

Top Secret

Date: 09 November 1999  
No.: 4972

Notification

To: General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
General Director of the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate

On 7 November 1999, the Director of the Intelligence Service ordered to use the attached copy of the family tree form, for the targeted individual, especially the Iraqi individuals, in order to be registered in their files. Kindly, inform us once it is completed and best regards.

Attachments:

- Form

(TC: signature)  
Director of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate  
08 November 1999

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Directors of the International Stations, kindly, take the necessary procedures as soon as possible")

Cc:

- Military Intelligence Section / kindly acknowledge and best regards
- (SATTS : A =) / for the above-mentioned purpose regarding the areas directorates and best regards

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Mr. Juwad, please take the necessary procedures", "06 October")

(1-1)  
Top secret

**Page 54**

**Relationships**

**First Degree:**

Parents, son, daughter, in addition to their grandsons

**Second Degree:**

Grandfather, Grandmother, brothers and sisters whether they are from the same parents or not, in addition to, the niece and nephew.

**Third Degree:**

Parental and maternal uncles and aunts

**Fourth Degree:**

Parental and maternal cousins

**Fifth Degree:**

Sons of the parental and maternal cousins

**Sixth Degree:**

Grandsons of the parental and maternal cousins

**Page 55**

To: Directors of the Field operation Base

Find herein attached the correspondence of (SATTS :AM) No. 2436, dated on 07 November 1999, along with a copy of the comments of the Intelligence Service Director, concerned with not approaching Tarbil Intelligence Center about facilitating the sources mission. Kindly acknowledge. The General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate ordered to work accordingly.

Best regards


(TC: signature that reads, "Juwad", "09 November")

(TC: Signature of the Director of the 4/7 Directorate)  
09 November 1999

Director of 1 <sup>st</sup> Directorate	Acknowledged (TC: signature) 09 November
Director of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Directorate	Currently delegated , acknowledged and we will inform the Directors Sections (TC: Signature) 11 November
Director of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Directorate	Acknowledged as well as the Directors of the section (TC: Signature) 11 November
Director of the 4 <sup>th</sup> Directorate	Acknowledged (TC: Signature) 14 November

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



Date: 07 November 1999  
No.: 2436

Notification

To: General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
General Director of the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate

On 7 November 1999, the Director of the Intelligence Service ordered to use the attached copy of the family tree form, for the targeted individual, especially the Iraqi individuals, in order to be registered in their files. Kindly acknowledge and best regards.

(TC: Signature)  
(SATTS M: A M)  
Cc:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate/ Kindly acknowledge and best regards
- Public affairs Directorate / Kindly acknowledge and best regards
- Security Directors / Kindly acknowledge

(TC: A handwritten note that reads, "*Director of the International Stations, kindly acknowledge, in order to take the necessary procedures to work accordance to it*")  
(TC: Signature) 08 November

Mr. Juwad, to take the necessary procedures  
08 November

Page 57

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



Secret

Date: 14 November 1999

No.: 3029

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Illegible, approval,")

Notifications / 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate, 2<sup>nd</sup> Department

To: Directorate 7/4

Reference to your circulation NO. M4/ 7/3/6332, dated on 10 November 1999, the circulation was acknowledged by the affiliates of the international stations and they will take the necessary procedures according to what is mentioned in the afore-mentioned circulation.

Kindly acknowledge and best regards...

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate Director  
14 November 1999

Secret

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "*Tree*")

Page 58

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Comrade Juwad, kindly acknowledge") (SATTS N.M/4)

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



Top Secret and Urgent

Date: 17 March 1999

No.: 882

Notification

To: The Directors of the 1, 2, 3 and 4 Field Operation Base

The Intelligence Service Director ordered to start discussing the annual plans with him at the beginning of the next month.

Kindly acknowledge and take the necessary procedures for the discussion and best regards...

(TC: Signature)  
Director of 7/4 Directorate  
17 March 1999

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Ziyad, 17 March")

(1-1)  
Top Secret

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "follow up  $\frac{178}{16/3}$ ")

Page 59

(SATTS N.M/4)

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



Top Secret and Urgent

Date: 13 March 1999

No.: 946

Notification    155  
                    14/3

To: Military Intelligence Section

The Intelligence Service Director ordered to start discussing the annual plans of the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 40<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Directorates and areas Directorates, at the beginning of the next month during meetings that will be held for that purpose.  
Kindly take the necessary procedures and best regards...

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 1st Directorate  
13 March 1999

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Operation Deputy, kindly acknowledge and best regards")

(TC: signature, 14 March)

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Office" "signatures", 14 March)

**Page 60**


**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic**

**Top Secret**

Date: 15 April 1997  
No.: (SATTs M) 1/5/1233

(SATTs N.M/4)

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



**Top Secret and Urgent**

Date: 05 April 1999  
No.: 1141

Notification  
(SATTs M) 4/7/3

To: Director of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate

Reference is made to your top-secret and urgent notification No. 946, dated 13 March 1999; find attached the annual plans of 1999. Kindly acknowledge and best regards.

**Attachments**

- Annual Plans

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate General Director  
05 March 1999

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Ziyad, 05 April")

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Copy, (SATTs M) 4/7, 27 "illegible")

**Cc:**

- Military Intelligence Section / reference to your notification on 15 March 1999, herein find attached a copy of the annual plans and best regards

**(1-1)**  
**Top Secret**

**Page 61**

**Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

Date: // 19

No.:

...20 years, the plan may be expressed in few single focused words better than other many useless words. I know that the database of the Intelligence Service is wealthy, so, do not disturb your officers in the stations and centers by unimportant issues that we might not need, as it takes time and effort, and it might already exist in the database, where the officer, himself, did not care to search.

5. The accurate work of the intelligence means recruitment, but the important recruitment is the quality one not the number of the recruited individuals. Therefore, we should discuss and reconsider our plans and sources, to make them quality sources. We assure, meanwhile, that what is important for us is how to create genuine trusted sources, as not all those who show sympathy towards the Iraqi should be considered opportunity or Intelligence source.
6. The president (May God protect him) in a former meeting addressed the Iraqi individuals abroad, especially those who have scientific certificate in Jordan, Sudan, Libya, Tunis, Algeria and Yemen. He said that we as Intelligence are not angry from those abroad, regardless if his government department, Ministry, Minister, Directorate, or Ambassador or else are angry because they forged passports and illegally left the country. Thus, due to the instructions of the President (May God protect him) the external stations should get close to those individuals, in order to win their friendship and show them trust and give them self-confidence. On the other hand, facilitate to them as much as applicable by the state laws, or if such facilitations are inapplicable by law, ...

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



(SATTs N.M/4)

Top Secret and Urgent

Date: // 19

No.:

Notification

...address the center to obtain the approval and point out the violation, thus, the center will take the responsibility of handling it. The afore-mentioned individuals are considered very important opportunity, as some of them work in the field of energy and oil, and colleges; therefore, they are considered good sources of information to our work.

7. The Plan Inspection Committee should mention the advantages also, in order to treat fairly the planners.
8. The aim from holding the annual conference is to direct the works flow, thus, after discussing the Directorate work plans, the plan should be modified due to the instructions and committee remarks.
9. It is important to move our stations inside the Arabic countries, to recruit individuals and collect information about Kuwait and Saudia; both countries lead conspiracies against us. Meanwhile, we need to approach and penetrate the opposition parties in Bahrain, in order to know if Iran leads and moves them. The same thing should be applied on Saudia opposition parties, it is true that we have relation with them, but our relation is very narrow. We just only met them and nothing new. On the other hands, the stations did not make any progress in that direction and we did not receive any information or make any contact with them. Ask the Stations' officials in the Arabic countries to work towards Saudia and Kuwait, especially in the filed of searching for sources as well as establishing relationships that service our work.
10. Study the proposal submitted by our ambassador in Qatar with the station about the possibility of participating in...

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(TC: blank form)

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**



(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: / / 19

No.:

Notification

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 20 July 2001  
No.: 5351



Secret

Notification

To: Directors of the Filed Operating Bases

The Intelligence Service Director ordered the following:

1. Refer the Officer to 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, once the case he follows up is referred to the afore-mentioned Directorate and the concerned individuals are arrested. Meanwhile, his activities should be under the instruction of the Director of the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, whereas, in case of any delay, the concerned Director shall hold the responsibility.
2. Summon the sources as soon as possible to the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, due to the need of the investigation, as they considered witnesses, in order to interrogate them to serve the case and in order not to delay the accomplishment of any case.

Kindly acknowledge, take the necessary procedures and best regards

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
20 July 2001


(TC: Signature, Salman, 30 July)  
(TC: signature, 30 July)

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 28 July 2001  
No.: 3641



Secret

Notification

To: General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
General Director of the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of the 6<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of the 40<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Directorate

The Intelligence Service Director ordered the following:

3. Refer the Officer to 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, once the case he follows up is referred to the afore-mentioned Directorate and the concerned individuals are arrested. Meanwhile, his activities should be under the instruction of the Director of the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, whereas, in case of any delay, the concerned Director shall hold the responsibility.
4. Summon the sources as soon as possible to the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate, due to the need of the investigation, as they considered witnesses, in order to interrogate them to serve the case and in order not to delay the accomplishment of any case.

Kindly acknowledge, take the necessary procedures and best regards

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Directors, kindly acknowledge and abide it and follow up")

Cc:

- Military Intelligence Service / for the same purpose, regarding the areas Directorates and best regards
- Director of the 7<sup>th</sup> Directorate and best regards

574  
30/7

**Page 66**

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 25 July 2001  
No.: 5252



Secret

Notification  
(SATTS M 4/7/3)

To: Field Operating Bases Directors

Find attached a copy of the secret correspondence of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate No. 3560,  
dated 24 July 2001.

Kindly acknowledge and work according to it and best regards.

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Jasim, 25 July")

**Attachments:**

- Copy of the correspondence

(TC: illegible signature, 25 July)  
(TC: Signature)  
Director of 4/7 Directorate  
25 July 2001

(1-1)  
Secret

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 24 July 2001

No.: 3560



Secret

**Notification**

To: General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
General Director of the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate  
Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate

The Intelligence Service Director noticed the delay of your Directorates in reporting the important incidents that have political nature as well as other important incidents that took place inside and outside the country. Thus, he ordered to report him immediately about any incident related to that issue.

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate  
23 July 2001

**Cc:**

- Military Intelligence Section / Kindly acknowledge
- (TC: handwritten note that reads,  
-Acknowledge the Directors of the Fields Operating Bases, in order to notice that in accuracy and inform the Office of the Intelligence Director as well as the office of his deputy, in case of his absence.
- Kindly, Follow up should notice

(TC: signature, 24 July)

551  
25/7

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)



Date: 09 July 2001  
No.: 4900

Top Secret and Personal

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/7/3

To: Directors of the Fields Operating Bases

Find attached a copy of the 1<sup>st</sup> Directorate top-secret correspondence No. 3236, dated 08 July 2001.

Kindly acknowledge, take the necessary procedures and best regards.

Attachments:

- A copy of the correspondence

(TC: signature)  
Director of the 4/7 Directorate  
09 July 2001

(TC: illegible signature, 09 July)

(1-1)

Top Secret and Personal

(Secret and Personal)  
(TC: illegible, 11 June 2001)

**Page 69**

**Coded Letter Form**

From: Doha Station  
To: 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate, 1/3 Department  
4/1 Directorate

No.: 107  
Date: 10 June 2001

Your correspondence No. 35, dated on 28 May

Reference to your correspondence No. 106, dated on 08 June (.) the subject under discussion visited the Embassy during midday (.) He met all the embassy staff (.) He stated that he was in Jordan, as he made an operation to excise tumor in the stomach and he took off his clothes in front of us, in order to show the marks of the operation (.) No. 7B told him that some individuals indicated that he was in Saudia, thus, he was confused and claimed that they are just a rumors. He added that Saudia would not grant him the permission of entering the country, if they just knew his name. He stated that rumors are always hunting him, wherein part of these rumors stated that he is married to another wife while others point to his execution (.) He also talked about Saqr Quraysh, confirming that he will remain the hero and man of men (.) he brought with him the passport of the Iraqi Fa'izah Shafiq 'Ubayd, who is married to the Saudi Fahad 'Abdallah Al-Dusari, in order to renew it, he also asked them to issue a passport for the Iraqi Sabah Sayyah "Illegible" Al-Shamri, who lived in Saudia, stating that he contact him through some friends (.) He affirmed that he would leave the region within the next two days (.) Upon asking him about his destination, he replied after hesitation that he will go to Jordan and he will return to Iraq within the next month (.) Opinion: information about the presence of this individual in ...

(TC: unspecified seal)

(1-2)

Receiving Date:

**Page 70**

**Coded Letter Form**

From: Bakin Station  
To: Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate

No.: 75  
Date: 10 June 2001

Reference to your correspondence No. 49, dated on 09 June (.) the delegation left today 10 June, Shakir headed to Malaysia then to your region (.) whereas the other individuals were headed to Hong Kong (.) A letter for Tala was sent by Shakir (.) the letter sums up the following (.) it contains the details of sending your delegation to us, worth mentioning that the delegation resided in the Presidential housing of the Country (.) It is agreed with the so-called President adviser who met the delegation, and introduced himself as Tabkir Liyangh with Richard Wangh , who will receive the message of the afore-mentioned individual. He was told by them that Tabkir's father is the Secretary General of the Parliament (.) as they agreed on the following 1(.) directing invitation from the Embassy to the President Office, including invitation to the President to visit the region, as there is a personal envoy from Saqr Qurish will carry a letter regarding that issue 2(.) Include the Embassy memo, name of the personal envoy of Saqr Qurish as well as the accompanied delegation and the issues he wanted to discuss, during his meeting with the Chinese President, wherein, it is preferable to discuss the economic issues and the future of the economic relationships 3 (.) a letter should be sent today 15 June, in accordance with what is agreed upon...

(1-2)

Receiving Date:

**Page 71**

...With the delegation 4(.) The embassy's memo is handed to Richard, who attended the meeting, in order to deliver it to the President Office 5(.) after few days from handing the letter, Talal, Shakir and his friend will meet the Deputy of the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Director of the Organization Department in the Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, due to the meeting, a meeting will be hold with the Iraqi Envoy and the Chinese President. 6(.) the Chinese side confirmed the necessity on the secrecy of the subject. 7(.) your instructions regarding preparing a letter from the Embassy, including directing invitation for him. Kindly, provide us with the name of envoy and the accompanied delegation, in order to write their names among the Embassy letter 8(.) as reported by the Chinese side, do not issue the visa of the envoy and the accompanied delegation through you 9(.) It was decided to meet a delegation from the Chinese Foreign Minister in the first day, but it did not happen. We believe that the operation is managed under the supervision of Intelligence entity and the afore-mentioned names are just nicknames. (. ) Your recommendations (. ) end

(2-2)

Receiving Date: 15:00  
(TC: Signature)

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Coded Letter Form

From: Doha Station  
To:

No.: (Continue) 107  
Date:

... many sources and friends in Saudia confirmed that to us (.) he returned to the Qatar, in order to renew his residence and secure his situation before us as well as to deny his presence in Saudia. (.) We believe that he would not come back to Iraq in the near future, as he said that to us every time we meet him since year. (.) End

(2-2)

Receiving Date: 23:15  
(TC: Signature)

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 11 November 2000  
No.: 2741



Secret

Notification  
4<sup>th</sup> Directorate, Department 3 (SATTS M)/9

To: 4/7/3 Directorate

Reference to your circulation No. 6686, dated on 04 November 2000, we support the idea of reducing the fees of the renewing and extending of the Iraqi passports for the individuals who live abroad, due to its positive influence.

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Department  
09 November 2000

(1-1)  
Secret

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 06 November 2000  
No.: 2475



Secret

Notification  
4<sup>th</sup> Directorate, 4<sup>th</sup> Department

To: 4/7/3 Directorate

Reference to your circulation No. 6686, dated on 04 November 2000, we support the idea of reducing the fees of renewing and extending the Iraqi passports for the individuals who live abroad, due to its positive influence.

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Department  
05 November 2000

(1-1)  
Secret

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)**

7239  
6/9

(SATTS N.M/4)

Date: 05 November 2000  
No.: 2173



Secret

Notification  
4<sup>th</sup> Directorate, 2/3 Department

To: 4/7 Directorate

Reference to your correspondence No. 6686, dated 04 November 2000:

1. We support reducing the fees of extending the Iraqi passports for the individuals who live abroad, in order not be an obstacle between the resident and his embassy.
2. Find hereunder some ideas and suggestions regarding the fees:
  - a. Approve on starting to obtain the fees of the passports and documents due to the profession of the individual passport and the documents nature, in other word, if the passport carrier is a merchant, the fees will be more than the rest of the passports.
  - b. The fees will be collected in the following cases:  
First: Employees in the Foreign Organizations  
Second: Delegated individuals abroad like employees, professors, and teachers  
Third: Iraqi individuals in the foreign companies
  - c. The Director of the delegations or the triple delegation Committee is responsible of discharging and excluding some cases, due to the delegation estimation, and due to the circumstances of every Iraqi lived abroad.

(TC: handwritten note that reads, "Comrade Juwad, Kindly, with the official documents" 06 November)

Secret  
(1-2)

**Pages 76**

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)


(TC IIS logo)

Date  
Ref

Notification

3. Considering, that many embassies rely on the documents fees according to the embassies self-financing principle, it is possible to reduce the passports' fees by adding some small fees on the commercial documents the certificate of origins for instance.
4. The Ministry of Foreigner Affairs could study the issue of imposing fees on the visa granted for foreigners to enter to Iraq rather than applying the reciprocity principle. Since this is more useful to us given the fact that there are fewer passengers arriving in current time and most of those, are businessmen who could afford these fees, in addition a large number of foreigners visit the country this means adding good financial profits.

Regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be in Arabic script, is written over a faint background of text that is mostly illegible due to the signature's thickness.

Director of D2  
15 November 2000

Secret  
(2-2)

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(TC IIS logo)

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Date 4 November 2000  
Ref/ 6686

Notification M4/317

To/ Directors of the Field Operating Bases  
Herewith a copy of the M1 notification # 5376 in 2 November 2000, concerning a study about the possibility of reducing the passports renewal and extended validity fees for the Iraqi citizens living abroad.  
For your information. Inform us with your opinion as soon as possible, to answer the requesting parties.  
Regards

Enclosures

A copy of the notification

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name or title, possibly "Ministry of Interior".

Director of M4/7  
4 November 2000

*Jawad*  
*4 November*  
*Illegible*  
*4 November*

Secret  
(1-1)

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(TC IIS logo)

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Date 2 November 2000

Ref/ 5376

Notification

To/ General Director of M4/ Deputy Director of M4

The director of the IIS instructed studying the possibility of reducing the passports renewal and extended validity fees for the Iraqi citizens living abroad since it has a positive affect on making them feel more connected with their country. Some embassies noticed that the high cost of the aforementioned fees had led the Iraqi citizens to refrain from dealing with these embassies consequently, they become in violation of the passports and traveling law.

For your information and to keep us informed.  
Regards

  
Director of M1  
2 November 2000

*To the Director of M4/7  
Collecting the opinions of the Field Operating Bases*

  
2 November

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The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS) (TC IIS logo)

Secret

Date 7 October 2000  
Ref/ 5994

Notification M4/7/3

To/ Directors of the Field Operating Bases


Herewith a copy of the director of the IIS annotation concerning the correspondences with the Presidency.

For your information and to operate according to it.

Regards

**Enclosures**

A copy of the margin



Director of M4/7  
7 October 2000

*Jawad 7 October*  
*Illegible 7 October*

Secret  
(1-1)

**Page 80**

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS) (TC logo)

Secret

Date

Ref


5. The Lebanese Rustum Yasin held a press conference in Beirut, in which he invited the Lebanese government to resume its diplomatic relationships with Iraq at ambassadorial level as well as the opening of a commercial attache in both countries. The Lebanese newspapers had published the events of this conference.

6. our information about the Lebanese Rustum Muhammad Shakir Yasin:

- a. Date of birth 1950/ Muslim (Sunni).
- b. Married to Mrs. Hasannah Dimashqiyah and have a daughter and son.
- c. The secretary-general of Beirut merchants association.
- d. The founder and the general manger of (SATTS MANILWKS) company for trading and industrial supplying.
- e. A stockholder in number of industrial and commercial companies.
- f. He is attempting to hold an assembly, which will take an interest in the fields of media, culture, and health between Iran and Lebanon.
- g. Have a special relation with Rafiq Al-Hariri.

For your information. The subject is still under observation form our part.

Regards



Director of the IIS

5 October 2000

*In the future, this type of correspondences should be in handwriting and I believe there is circulation in this respect from the Presidency.*

*Khudayr 3 October*

*'Abd-illegible 2 October 2000*

*Ibrahim 2 October*

Secret

(2-2)

Page 81

**The Fourth Field Operating Base**

1. The compound work technique was adopted toward the fourth field operating base working fields as follows:

a. Western Europe field:

Firstly, we adopted the compound work technique toward the British field through our sources on both the Irish and Spanish fields. (2) cases.

Secondly, one of our friends in Switzerland was connected to gather information about the United States and Nederland. (1) case.

Thirdly, we used some of the sources working in the Greek field to move toward the American field in order to try to know what the American intentions are.

b. South and North America: a number of sources working in Cuba, Mexico, and Canada fields were recruited and been pushed toward working in the American field. (3) cases

c. Eastern Europe field:

Firstly, there was a recruiting attempt of a Russian individual toward the

(18-24)

Page 82

.....Iranian and Israeli fields. (1) case.

Secondly, there was a recruiting attempt of a Croatian individual toward the Slovenian field. (1) case.

Thirdly, there was a move toward pushing number of sources from different nationalities toward the Rumanian field. (3) Case.

- d. The field of non-Arab Asia and Africa countries: a number of sources from different nationalities were pushed toward the fields of (Iran, Israel, Afghanistan, Africa, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gulf) to work according to the compounding work technique. (11) cases.
- e. The scientific intelligence section: a number of sources from different nationalities were pushed toward some of the scientific organizations, the UN in addition to the special committee to obtain all types of scientific and technical advance information as well as transporting technology to the country. (10) cases.

2. We still working on putting this order into effect within the specialty and the accumulated experience; in addition, we requested for several of officers who used to work in the divisions and on the fields in order to benefit form these officers' experiences. Taking into account that most of the workers currently working in the base are equally specialized and experienced.

(19-24)

**Page 83**

3. We perform regular evaluations of our working posts among the base's fields through sending notes and situations by telegrams or official letters as well as delivering guidelines. The evaluation is been carried based on the performance of each member of the post's personnel.
4. We could point out any shortage in our work's requirements for instance (enough copying machines, stationery, and enough recording machines for documentation purposes...etc).
5. The issue of the delegations on the working fields of the fourth base was not taken into consideration throughout the past period especially in the fields, which do not have working pots as they are carried out through a delegations committee without prior consulting with involved divisions.
6. Regarding the field of searching for quality sources, we indicate to the following:
  - a. In the light of the IIS director instructions, we are working on finding and sorting the quality sources in the base's operating fields who are working as mush as possible on the targets that are within our interests and close to the information sources. Indeed the recruiting of some of these quality sources was achieve (they marked at the field operating base sections).
  - b. There are plans prepared annually for each section to examine and check the sources

(20-24)

Page 84

... of each section both inside and outside, and to included later within the base's annual report.

- c. Following the escaping some of the IIS personnel we performed an investigating procedure in our working fields for the sources, which as a result might be exposed, and we had to freeze the relation with them. The relation we restored partially and gradually as the investigating and the examinations procedures continued.

7. This subject is followed by special committees.

8. In respect with the illegal posts:

- a. We talked with some of the sources and friends to reach for ideas about the suitable coverings to be used as illegal posts, and the results of these discussions will be submitted.
- b. We have at present in some of the base's working fields some working illegal posts or in the establishing stage. We are working on developed these posts in the direction which we could be benefit from it utmost.
- c. We would like to point out that the working according to the director of IIS directions to establish illegal posts will require great financial possibilities and other requirements before we begin to establish these posts.

9. regarding the Iraqi community, we could indicate to the following:

(21-24)

**Page 85**

Firstly, we are trying to benefit from a number of the Iraqi community's member whether they were residents or emigrants through using the post and the center. Taking into account their qualities according to their specialties, as well as the positions they hold in the targeted countries

Secondly, we notify our working posts in the base's working fields to take interest in the community and to strengthen the closeness situation with them in addition to understanding the difficulties which preventing them from communicating with Iraq.

Thirdly, we are working on finding an organizational framework for our community in abroad through forming an association, gathering, or a union.

Fourthly, we took advantage of the emigrants' sixth convention, which was held recently in Baghdad, to carry out the IIS director orders to contact as possible of the community's members. We lay out work plans for the convention and these plans were executed throughout the convention. A detailed report about this subject will be present to his Excellency later on.

- b. Regarding the businesspersons, we build relationships with a number of Iraqi businessmen living abroad and inside the country for the benefit of our work so they can provide us with information, and transport technology through their commercial business. We also have other situations, which we are currently working on developing which could be useful in other fields.

(22-24)

Page 86

10. The working is still ongoing according to the procedures of the information processing and confidants managing system.
11. This subject is left to be handle by the individuals specialized in the technical field.
12. This order was put into action and a number of the officers, which are needed for them in the fourth field-operating base, were requested.
13. This subject is out of the fourth operating base jurisdiction.
14. We notified M10 with the researches, which could be useful of our base's work.
15. The work is ongoing to sort the individuals who benefited of the case after 1990, there is an actual sorting for this type of cases, and we will submit the stations concerning these cases.
16. The work is still ongoing in coordination with the correspondent formations in M5 for the best interest of the issue of the tracking unit. Taking into account the prediction of the incidents in all the assignments and work plans, we also sorted cases in the base where we predicted specific futuristic events, which have actually occurred. These cases will be presented to the Presidency.

(23-24)

**Page 87**

17. the work was done according to the following:

- a. The fourth base has relationships and friends in most of its working fields, which are moved in the required directions to influence continually the decision makers in the targeted country. These efforts led to a number of our working fields were able to carry Iraq's voice to influence in the internal public opinion and political decision for those countries.
- b. A number of none-government organizations were contacted in some of the fields, and through these organizations, we were able to contact some of the parliamentarians and government personnel to raise their voices with Iraq and against the blockade, the same as what took place recently on the American field.

(24-24)

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The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS) (TC IIS logo)  
Personal and Secret

Date 1 March 2000

Ref/ 1219

Notification M4/7/3

To/ Directors of the Field Operating Bases

In reference to our Secret and personal notification, # 6746 dated 4 December 1999.

1. Herewith the IIS director's instructions and directions during his Excellency meeting with bases of our directorate.
2. The general director of M4 instructed that these instructions are to be use as work guidelines and that the necessary actions are taking to put them into practice.

For your information and to operate according to it...Regards

Enclosures:

4-pages of directions.



Director of M4/7  
1 March 1999

*Illegible*  
1 March

(1-1)  
Personal and Secret

**Page 89**

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(TC IIS logo)

Secret

Date 12 November 2000  
Ref/ 705

Notification M4/D1

To/ M4/7

In reference to your circulation, # 3/6689 dated 4 November 1999.

We confirm its content regarding the refrain of Iraqi citizens from dealing to our embassies aboard. In this respect, we recommend that the passports' renewal and extending validity fees be reduced in return for the collection of nominal fees.

For your information...Regards



The Director of D1  
November 2000

(1-1)  
Secret

Page 90

IIS Director

1. We are currently in a struggling period.
2. In this meeting, I don not want to give notes on how to achieve a quality jump in the work.
3. When the penetration took place within us... is the other party needs this information- is it for the purpose of confusion- and what about the frozen (sources).

What are the real reasons behind their escape? What did we do about this?

4. The frozen (sources) need to be investigated  
The search for the escapees – a meeting with 'Isam and Safi
5. The Isalmic Center and Husayniyat (TC: Big Shiite mosque) Al-Najaf in Syria

**Page 91**

The administration internally and externally

6. The work on the illegal bases/ each bases present what it's illegal bases
7. Working from inside, who becomes a destination for delegations. I will be uncomfortable...the service's officer- illegible- about everything- he is a Staff Officer
8. I want the service to be commended
9. to benefit from delegations as much as possible- to varied in the subject of the delegations
10. The contact with The Iraqi community abroad should be activated... and reputation
11. Some emigrants, which are not contacted yet....
12. Which are the difficulties which prevent the Iraqi citizen of communicating with us

**Page 92**

If it was rare how we could increase and what are you offering? If it was more frequent, how do we benefit from this?

13. What is required is the quality work... we waste our work in insignificant issues... the potentials will be available in the quality work. What is required is the quality jump... to focus on quality work and to activate the illegal bases.
14. We advise you to be prepared for any closed or opened post... from the very illegible individuals. The field-operating base should be prepared for the closed or opened posts.
15. the quality recruitment- is the basic
16. examining the sources
17. the personnel relationships

Page 93

18. Examining the merchants as follows:

The resident merchant contributing in supplying commodities to Iraq directly and indirectly each of them has his interests... and they are obligated to present information...or they requested for recruiting... this relationship should be approached carefully.

19. What is required form the field-operating base is the intelligence work not the political working.
20. the emphasizing on creating lobby projects
21. America's sections should be searching for elements with an influence and without clinging with this person or that

**Page 94**

**Each**

Emigrants:

1. the right to possess
2. inheritance
3. investment
4. dual-citizenship

Fronts in France, Russia, Italy

Page 95

27 December 1999

**The Instructions of the IIS Director in his meeting with D3**

1. All the objectives, which the field-operating bases track, are subjected to change according to the political circumstances of the international relationships... whereas the Israeli targets remains always fixed.
2. Be cautious when dealing with the Palestinian elements.
3. Israel is an historical and strategical enemy.
4. The field-operating bases officers should have a strong faith in the necessity of fighting Israel.
5. We should form a real conception of the MUSAD however without exaggerating in its abilities.
6. The Iraqi element could penetrate the intelligence service.
7. You should search for the quality sources- not based on information he presents... he should be tested and investigated... and even the quality sources should be suspected.
8. The variables and the Arabic rushing to illegible with Israel, what is it motives...our plans should be also changeable.

**Page 96**

Illegible.... Should be on disk to be circulated to all bases.

1. The work on transferring mails through the floppy disk
2. Contacting Palestinian students should take place according to a wider plan.
3. Penetrating Hizballah in Lebanon.
4. Contacting Jordanian clans
5. The Israeli female element
6. Any idea if system was not put to activate it then this idea will be born dead.

Page 97

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(TC IIS logo)

Personal and Secret

Date 18 January 2000  
Ref/ M1/5/248

Notification

To/ General Director of M4


Following our notifications # 5364 in 1 December 1999, #27 in 3 January 2000 and #133 in 12 January 2000.

Herewith the main directions, which was drawn out for the most part from the IIS director meetings with field-operating bases in your directorate.

For your information... to take the necessary actions.  
Regards

Enclosures:

4-pages of directions.



The Director of M1  
17 January 2000

*To/ Director of M4/7  
For deliberation 18 January*

*We deliberated with the General Director and his Excellency instructed to be circulated on the bases.*

*Illegible  
22 January*

248  
18January

**In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate**

1. The concentrations on the unfamiliar qualitative compound work and on giving precedents to this works; by unusual we mean working on fields we did not work before such the Shi'ah sectary in the Saudia Arabia as well as activating the minds to it utmost under the current circumstances to open new ways for our intelligence work. We should also have a complete vision of new ways and techniques which through it we could breach our closed walls.
2. The emphasizing on the specialty on the experience and on the experience and its accumulation, for example who works in Iranian field should be updated with the Iranian events and who working in Turkey should be updated with the events in the Turkish field. In addition, when an experienced officer is been punished we do not do that by transferring him, but only when we failed to reform him then we transfer him to outside the IIS.
3. We should not deprive an officer of the opportunity of doing something special when he is cover is revealed instead we transfer him to close fields. The post, which does not operate, we should restore it by sending someone who is able to work. We could also assign the representative with targets, whoever could not achieve these targets is return back, and we send who could achieve those targets.
4. Write to us directly if the technical section was not able to provide with your requirements so we can faced, find out the reasons, and lay down the right solution.
5. The delegations should be according to the specialty, we should also balance as much as possible between our intelligence tasks our affiliates participating in those delegations. In addition, we should not send one of our officers to a particular county while there is another officer with another delegation delegated to that same county.

Page 99

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(TC IIS logo)

Personal and Secret

Date 4 December 1999

Ref/ 6746

Notification M4/7/3


To/ Directors of the Field-Operating Bases

1. Herewith the orders and the instructions issued by the IIS director during his Excellency meeting with the directors and the heads divisions and sections of the first and second bases on 23 November 1999.
2. The general director of M4 instructed that these orders and instructions should be used as working guidelines. The necessary actions should be taken to operate according to it and follow-up will be performed every three months to demonstrate what was achieved out if these guidelines.

For your information and to operate according to it...Regards

Enclosures:

4-pages of directions.



Director of M4/7  
4 December 1999

*4 December*

(1-1)

Personal and Secret

**Page 100**

The Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

(TC IIS logo)

Personal and Secret

Date 1 December 1999  
Ref/ M1/5364


To/ General Director of M4

Herewith the orders and the instructions issued by the IIS director during his Excellency meeting with the personnel of the first and second bases on 23 November 1999.

Please take the necessary action ...Regards

Enclosures:

4-pages of directions



Director of M1  
1 December 1999

*To/ Director of M4/7*

1. *These instructions are sorted and sent to the bases; some instructions are general so they can be sent to all the bases, while others concerning particular bases, which are sent strictly to these bases.*
2. *The bases should continue to implement these instructions... a reviewing would be perform every three months.*

*1 December 1999*

**Page 101**

*Follow-up*

91/9

4December

**In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful**

**The Directions of the Intelligence Service Director during his meeting with the First and Second Field Operation Bases in M4 on 23 Nov 1999**

- 1- We have to step to a quality work to be at the level of the challenges imposed upon us.
- 2- Mr. President is conferring a special significance to the Intelligence Service officers; this is evident from his directions during his meetings with them.
- 3- The concentration should be on the qualitative compound and unusual activity and on giving precedents to those works; by unusual, we mean that we should work on fields that we did not approach before such as Al-Shi'at Groups in Saudi Arabia.
- 4- Practicing pressure on the Iraqi characters and using them in preparing the issues that are useful in the intelligence work and in getting the most accurate studies. This should serve us in the scientific sectors. It is also important to make a statistic count of these individuals.
- 5- The assurance on specialty and accumulating experience and the person who is working on the Iranian task must be updated with the events in Iran as well as the person working in Turkey must be updated with the events in Turkey.

(1-4)

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

**Page 102**

When we punish experienced employee we do not transfer him to a different location except for the uncorrectable employee that we have to transfer him out of the Service.

- 6- Looking for unusual methods to make our work better.
- 7- When the cover of an officer performing a remarkable work is revealed, the officer should not be deprived from the opportunity, but he rather should be transferred to close fields especially for employees working on the Iranian task.
- 8- You should have a strategic insight and the technical work should be multidimensional. The significance of your work is in the Intelligence Penetration to collect information that could be used to have significant impact on the State (Target) we should be able to influence a number of officials to serve our causes.
- 9- There should be a sorting in the data base for the persons who benefited from the situation after the year 1990, because there are some individuals who are fighting for not lifting the sanctions for personal reasons.
- 10- Activate our minds to the maximum in the current situation to open windows of opportunities for our Intelligence work and to have comprehensive look on the methods of penetrations through which we can penetrate the solid walls.

(2-4)

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

**Page 103**

- 11- The assurance of examining the sources continuously, as there are traditional sources and other pushed sources toward us. Some of them have enormous financial abilities that we must deal with in cautions to protect our officers, and when finding any suspicious notes on our officers he must be notified so that when do not have to lose him.
- 12- Making expectations considering the future field tasks
- 13- Working on the illegal stations using suitable covers, the number of the illegal stations should be double the number of the legal ones.
- 14- Inactive bases should be returned and replaced with others who are able to work, we could even assign some targets to base officers, and who cannot succeed will be returned and replaced with another one.
- 15- You are too late working on Iran, the east and south bases should work in ways that are more effective because there are many methods to penetrate Iran.

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

**Page 104**

There is a religious tourism with Iran also there is Iraqis who want to serve their country especially after they been surprised with what they call the Islamic Republic and we must have a presence in Qum, Mashed, Asfahan and Tehran.

- 16- Write to us directly when the technical party cannot furnish the needs so we could face it and find solutions for it.
- 17- Mujahidin Khalq have not yet been used as expected until now and you should know that 90% of the betrayers that come from Iran are because of the Iranian Mujahidin Khalq and you should strengthen this fact in their minds so we could pass our goals through them to get the needed intelligence information.
- 18- Concentrating on the Military presence in the gulf and we should know where it is and how to affect the present forces.
- 19- Working on the Tracking Unit especially in the correspondent formations

**Page 105**



**Republic of Iraq**

**Secret and Personal**

**(SATTS N M)**

**/4**

**Presidency Office  
Intelligence Service**

Date: 05 Jan 2000

Number: 61

Notification number M4/7/3

Respectful M4 Director

Enclosed are the important directions by the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director during the meeting with your employees, dated 16 Dec 1999.

To work by it with respect.

Attached: Directions from one page

Signature of  
M4 General Manager  
04 Jan 2000

Attached to:

Mr. Director. D 01


Mr. Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service attributed in meeting to establish relations with (Husayniyyah Al-Najafi) in Syria. For further action, with respect

(TC: Signatures in the right and left of the page)

(1-1)

Secret and Personal

**Page 106**



**Republic of Iraq**

**Secret and Personal**

**(SATTS N M) /4  
Presidency Office  
Intelligence Service**

Date: 03 Jan 2000

Number: M 01/05/27

Notification

Respectful M4 General Director

Enclosed are the important directions by the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director during meeting with the Fourth International employees on 16 Dec 1999.

To acknowledge and take necessary actions with respect

Attachments

Directions from page 01

Mr. Director of M4/ 7

With my signature I direct M4 to move on the Husayniyyah Al-Najafi please

Signature

Manager of M01

03 Jan 2000

(TC: Signatures in the right and left of the page)

(1-1)  
**Secret and Personal**

**Page 107**

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

**The Directions of the Intelligence Service Director during his meeting with the  
Fourth Field Operation Base in M4 on 23 Nov 1999**

- 1- The International should concentrate in its work on the Intelligence side, with giving a marginal importance to the political side according to our Intelligence inquiry.
- 2- The purpose of establishing companies should be for the Intelligence purposes and not for the financial gain.
- 3- Establishing the relations with the Islamic Center in London and (Husayniyyah Al-Najafi) in Syria.
- 4- The United States section should be directed towards influential individuals to enhance the relations with it because the majority of the recent relations are dominated by a business nature.
- 5- To provide detailed report about the emigrants and their problems with suggestions.

**Page 108**

**The Respectful Directors of Internationals**

Subject: Circulation

Enclosed is the notification numbered M 02 / 01/ 3022 on 05 Sep 2000 accompanied by its attachment, the Recommendations of the Committee adopted by the Presidency of the Republic – the Secretary.

Be advised, the directives of the Intelligence Service Director regarding the articles (2, 3) attached.

With Respect

Jawad  
5 / 9  
04/ 7


Signature  
Director of M  
05 Sep 2000

(TC: Signature in the middle of the page)

Director M 01	Signature I was acknowledged 05 Sep
Director M 02 The Committee Chief of Delegacy	Signature Acknowledged and we will carry out the part that belong to us about the participation of our officers in the delegations 06 Sep
Director M 03	Signature Acknowledged On behalf of Director number 03
Director M 04	Signature Acknowledged 09 Sep

**Page 109**

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful



**"Top Secret"**  
**Presidency Office**

Number: M 02 /01/3022  
Date: 05 Sep 2000

Mr. General Director of M 04  
Mr. General Director of M 05  
Mr. Director of M 06  
Mr. Director of M 40

Subject: Circulation

The Intelligence Service Director has instructed to follow up the articles (02, 03) of the Recommendations of the Committee adopted by the Presidency of the Republic – the Secretary

To acknowledge with respect

Signature  
General Director of M 02  
04 Sep 2000  
Yes ... to be tracked

To be circulated among the directors of the Field Operation Bases Directors and to be discussed with the General Director upon his return

(1-1)  
**Top Secret**

**Page 110**

In the Name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency Office  
Secretary**



**"Top Secret and Personal"**

Number: 4353 / (SATTS K)  
Date: 06 Jul 2000

Respectful Chief of the Presidency Diwan

- 2- The approval of the Presidential Diwan for the travel of state employees abroad is restricted for those who finished the courses of security immunity which is decided upon by the National Security Council, providing that an intelligence officer should accompany the delegation.
- 3- Directing all state departments of not dealing commercially with any employee who left work for any reason, for further action with respect.

- Attachments: Report copy

Khattab  
President

Signature  
Lieutenant General  
Dr. 'Abd Hamid Al-

Secretariat of the  
06 Jul 2000

**Page 111**

(SATTS N M)/4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Date: 3 September 2000

Reference: 5226

Notification

(SATTS M)4/7/3

To: Directorate 1

Your secret and immediate letter numbered 4165 on 28 August 2000

We have no information about the Iraqi Salih 'Ali Ka'ud Al-Ta'i in the mean time.

Please examine... with appreciation

(TC:

Jawad

Signature)

On behalf of Directorate 4

3 September

General Director

3 September 2000

(1-1)  
Secret

**Page 112**

(SATTS N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

**Secret and Immediate**

Date: 2 September 2000

Reference: 538

Notification

(SATTS M)4/(SATTS D)1

To: Directorate 4/7

Your letter numbered 3/5135 on 29 August 2000

We have no information about the Iraqi Salih 'Ali Ka'ud Al-Ta'i in the mean time.

Please examine... with appreciation

(TC:

Signature)

Department 1 Director

2 September 2000

(1-1)  
**Secret and Immediate**

Page 113

(SATTs N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Date: 31 August 2000

Reference: 2062

Notification

Div 3            (SATTs M) 4/3/(Illegible)

To: Directorate 4/7/3

Your notifications numbered (512, 5135) on 28 August 2000 and 29 August 2000.  
We have no information about the subject individuals.

... With appreciation

(TC:


Signature)

On behalf of Department 2 Director

30 August 2000

Page 114

(SATTS N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Date: 31 August 2000

Reference: 4869

Notification

(SATTS M) 4/(SATTS D)2

To: Directorate 4/7

Your notification numbered (SATTS M) 4/7/3/5135 on 29 August 2000.

We have no information about the Iraqi Salih 'Ali Ka'ud Al-Ta'i in the mean time.

Please examine... with appreciation

(TC:

Signature)

Department 2 Director

30 August 2000

Secret

**Page 115**

(SATTS N M) /4

*Section 3*

5147 Republic  
29 August Service (IIS)

Secret and immediate

Date: 29 August 2000

Reference: 2338



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the  
Intelligence

Notification

(SATTS M) 4/ (SATTS D) 4

To: Directorate 4/7/3

Your notification numbered 5135 on 29 August 2000.

We have no information about the subject individual in the mean time. With  
appreciation

(TC:

Signature)

Department 4 Director

29 August 2000

**Page 116**

(SATTS N M/4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret and Immediate  
Date: 29 August 2000  
Reference: 5135

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/7/3

Respected Field Operating Base Directors:

Please provide us, as fast as possible, with the available information on the Iraqi (Salih 'Ali Ka'ud Al-Ta'i) who used to work in the Diplomatic Body.

... With appreciation

(TC:

Signature)

Directorate 4/7 Director

Jawad

29 August 2000


29 August

(1-1)

Secret and Immediate

**Page 117**

(SATTS N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Immediate

Date: 28 August 2000

Reference: 4165

Notification

(SATTS M) 1

To: Directorate 4

Please provide us, as fast as possible, with the available information on the Iraqi (Salih 'Ali Ka'ud Al-Ta'i) who used to work in the Diplomatic Body... with appreciation

(TC:

Signature)

Directorate 1 Director

28 August 2000

*Section 2*

552

*28 August*

(1-1)

Secret

Immediate

**Page 118**

(SATTS N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Secret

Date: 1 August 2000

Reference: 4526

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/7/3

Respected Field Operating Base Directors:

Attached are the instructions and remarks that were given by the IIS Director during his meeting with the employees of the Al-Anbar Intelligence Directorate on 27 July 2000.

Please examine; the General Director of the Fourth Directorate decided to work according to the instructions, taking into considerations working in accordance with Paragraph (12) when carrying out the annual evaluation of every officer... with appreciation

Attachments

A copy of the instruction (4 pages)

Jawad

1 August

(TC: Signature)

Directorate 4/7 Director

1 August 2000

(Illegible)

1 August

(1-1)

Secret

**Page 119**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republic



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the  
Intelligence Service (IIS)



Iraqi Intelligence  
Service  
IRIS  
Reference/ (SATTs M) 2/6/ 2542  
Date/ 30 July 2000

Secret

To: The Respected Field Operating Base Directors  
Subject: IIS Director instructions

Attached are the instructions and remarks that were given by the IIS Director during his meeting with the employees of the Al-Anbar Intelligence Directorate on 27 July 2000.

Please examine and work accordingly... with appreciation

**Attachments**

A copy of the instructions (4 pages)

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 2 General Director  
30 July 2000

*Inform the respected directors... in order to  
Work accordingly and add (12) of it for the  
evaluations of each officer*

**A copy to**

Directorate 4 General Director

Directorate 5 General Director

Please examine... with appreciation

Directorate 1 Director

Directorate 40 Director

Directorate 13 Director

(TC: Signature)

30 July

(1-1)

Secret

**Page 120**

**IIS Director Instructions during his meeting with the  
Al-Anbar Intelligence Directorate on  
27 July 2000**

**1. Knowledge of the Governorate's privacy**

An Intelligence Officer should have knowledge about the Governorate's privacy in terms of the social structure, geographic field, tribal extensions of the governorate into Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, split families, common traditions... etc.

**2. Approach**

An officer in Al-Anbar who is not originally from the governorate should be aware of the traditions of the people living in it and of how to deal with the people and sources in order to be able to approach them to serve the intelligence work. Approaching is by itself an art and philosophy. In this regard, we have a model that we follow in approaching the people in a generous, kind, and fair way; this model is the Commander President (God save him). Approaching people should be real, conceptual, non-beneficial and for the benefit of the country. This approach leads, in its essence, the citizen to inform about any sign that might affect the country's security. Actually, the citizen informs because he has a relation with the officer or the IIS and he trusts the officer and the IIS when providing the news.

**3. The Basics in the Work of the Source Officer**

A truth that should be understood is that no matter what the officer's number in the directorate was, they would remain far away from the information, unless they got it from the sources. This is why it is important to choose the source, approach him and orient this relationship toward serving the work away from personal benefits.

(1-4)

**Page 121**

**4. Culture**

Work is developing, science is developing and humans are evolving and so is the mind. Thus, I advise you to continuously read and peruse the general and specific culture. The officer should also be acquainted with all issues in relation to his missions and work field.

**5. Working under Difficult Conditions**

Working in difficult circumstances is a special experience because the officer sees his efforts and skills. If we provide the officer with everything, he becomes a machine and will not be able to see his efforts, skills and qualifications. The officer and the formation should make up for the shortage in the requirements through innovative methods, new connections...etc.

**6. Patience and Persistence**

Patience and persistence are required and the most important thing is belief in the cause and Jihad. We should educate this.

**7. Officer's Characteristics**

Every human being has positives and negatives. The commanding chains are required to develop the positives of the officer, treating his negativities as an aim to release his energies and creativities and modifying his personality and mentality in order to surpass his negativities.

**8. The Commanding Responsibility**

The section directors and divisions heads should practice their commanding role in directing, educating and evaluating the officer. This is because the destiny and the cause are one and it is important to educate him right.

(2-4)

## Page 122

### 9. The Basic Thing is the IIS Missions

I advise you to devote yourselves to the main missions of your service but not to the secondary work. The officer should not devote himself to secondary cases such as smuggling, leaving behind his main work in the intelligence side. Our main mission is the intelligence activity while the other missions are additional secondary missions.

### 10. Basis of the Organizational Work

We have no shortage neither in the efficiency nor in the loyalty, but the shortage is in the organizational process. The intelligence work is based on organizing the effort, time, requirements...etc; the organized work is straight and yields good results.

### 11. Justice

Achieving justice is a main aspect in the intelligence work. The absence of justice may lead to the disablement of capabilities and an intelligence officer is required to inform his supervisor if he finds any unacceptable or incorrect issues. The supervisor, in turn, should not be upset from the honest and constructive presentation that serves the work.

### 12. Gossip

Gossip is a dangerous aspect in the intelligence work and will definitely lead to the failure of work since we are not allowed to talk about the department's issues outside and in front of friends and acquaintances. We will never tolerate this and the commanding chains are to place this clause in the officer's evaluation.

(3-4)

## Page 123

### 13. Language

The officer's knowledge of a foreign language is a main element in increasing his efficiency and expertise and you should benefit from the languages faculty in order to learn foreign languages.

### 14. We want you to be models

I want you to be models in work and you have all our support until we attain that in order to achieve your ambitions. You should not be desperate at work because an intelligence officer is always seeking solutions and never surrenders. I don't want the Service to employ for personal purposes for we help the one in need. The intelligence officer remains an idol and a model in front of people and sources.

### 15. Specialization

The absence of specialization in the intelligence officer's work will deprive him from the accumulation of expertise and experience and we should consider that in assigning and transferring the officer between the center and regions and between the center and station. This is adopted in most of the intelligence services.

16. Teamwork

Cooperation between an intelligence officer and the technical officer is required. The intelligence officer should report the success and failure at the end of any technical operation which should not end without an evaluation. We should also avoid wasting tape and listening to them outside the work headquarters such as the car and take care of the technical archive in an accurate way.

(4-4)

Page 124

(SATTS N M) /4



Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service (IIS)

Top Secret

Date: 2 July 2000

Reference: 3866

Notification  
(SATTS M) 4/7/3

Respected Directorate 1 Director

Subsidiary to our top-secret letter numbered (SATTS M) 4/7/3/2972 on 22 May 2000.  
We attach a report that includes the directorate's general activities concerning the IIS  
Director instruction to activate the formulated work and using the Iraqis in foreign  
countries.

Please examine... with appreciation

Attachments

A 9-page report

(TC: Signature)  
Directorate 4 General  
Director  
2 July 2000

(Illegible)

1 July

*Jawad*  
*1 July*

(1-1)  
Top Secret

**Page 125**

In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

The respected IIS Director

Subject: Disbursing the bases' allocations for year 2001

1- The needs of the bases in foreign countries were determined in hard currency in the estimated budget for year 2001, which amounts to (1,714,000 USD); in accordance to the attached statement of account, that shows the estimated amount for every base.

2- The work plans for year 2001 as well as the increase in the number of bases in comparison to year 2000 were taken into consideration when determining the abovementioned amount.

3- The Accounting Director was counseled and it was decided that the amounts are to be disbursed to the stations, in the form of different payments after deducting the circulated account from year 2000 to year 2001, according to the allocations of year 2000 when the 2001 budget is confirmed.

Please examine and approve... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)

Operations IIS Deputy Director

2 January 2001

Yes

*Hasan*

(TC: Signature)

*1) (Illegible)*

*in the light of the next year's activity*

*2) The activity of the stations for year 2000 is to be  
presented as well as what has been disbursed to them.*

*(Illegible)*

**Page 126**

(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N. M / 4)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret and Confidential

Notification

Date: 30 January 2001

Reference: 547

To: M4 / 7

Reference to your circular number M4 / 7 / 220, 10 January 2001.

Please find enclosed a table illustrating the activities of the field operating bases for the year 2000 and the disbursed amounts of money.

Kindly acknowledge.

Regards,

Enclosures

Table

Illegible

(TC: Signature)

Director of Department 2

30 January 2001

(Page 1 of 1)

**Page 127**

(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N. M / 4)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

**Secret, Confidential and Urgent**

Date: 23 January 2001

Reference: 42

Notification Department 4

To: M4 / 7 / 3

Reference to your circular number 220, dated 10 January 2001.

Please find enclosed a table illustrating the financial allocations for the year 2000, as well as disbursed amounts and the intelligence evaluation for the activities of the field operating bases.

Kindly acknowledge.

Regards,

**Enclosures**

Table + Evaluation

(TC: Signature)

Director of Department 4

January 2001

(Page 1 of 1)

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(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N. M) / 4

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret, Confidential and Urgent

Notification Department 3 / 1 / 2

Date: 14 January 2001  
Reference: (SATTS :) 1 / 56

To: M4 / 7

Reference to your secret, confidential and urgent notification number M4 / 7 / 3 / 220,  
dated 10 January 2001.

In regards to article 2, the concerned field operating bases were informed about  
amounts of money disbursed for our intelligence work, and according to the arenas  
these amounts were disbursed while stating the intelligence value.

Kindly acknowledge.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Department 3  
13 January 2001

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret, Confidential and Urgent

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(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N. M) / 4

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret, Confidential and Urgent

Notification M4 / 7 / 3

Date: 10 January 2001

Reference: 220

To: Directors of Field Operating Bases

The Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service approved the ratification of the balance sheet of the field operating bases working abroad Iraq for the year 2001. He instructed the following:

1. The determined amounts should be released on installments and in the light of the actual activity of each field operating base
2. A presentation for the activities of the field operating bases for the year 2000 should be presented, showing the allocated amounts and whether these amounts are worth the intelligence production, and the benefits from it.

Kindly acknowledge and inform us within one week.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4 / 7  
10 January 2001

Illegible  
19 January

Mr. Ahmad Illegible Illegible  
Follow-up with the Field Operating Bases  
(TC: Signature)  
10 / 10

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret, Confidential and Urgent

**Page 130**

In the Name of God, All Merciful, All Compassionate

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Reference: M2 / 6 / 1003  
Date: 18 February 2001

"Keep people's secrets and do not reveal them to others or use a friend's secret against him", quoted by President Saddam Hussein

To: General and Senior Directors  
Subject: Circular of the General Director of M4

The Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service ordered the support of the company of a secret and trustworthy source through the purchase department.

Please acknowledge and instruct the purchase committees to act in accordance with the abovementioned, and coordinate with the Director of M1 Mr. Ni'mah 'Ali.

Regards,

Illegible Text  
(TC: Signature)  
19 March

(TC: Signature)  
General Director of M2  
17 March 2001

CC:  
M1 / Please acknowledge and Regards  
(SATTS : A =) / Referring to your notification number 328, dated 14 March 2001.  
Regards,

Mr. Ahmad Illegible  
Please take the necessary action  
(TC: Signature)  
20 March

Was Circulated to All in  
20 March  
(TC: Signature)

162  
20 /3

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*Q3*  
3691  
5 / 19

(TC: Logo)

(SATTs N.M) / 4

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret and Confidential

Notification M4 / Department 4

Date: 17 May 2001

Reference: 237

To: M4 / 7 / 3

Reference to your circular number 3016, dated 02 May 2001

The guidelines of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service stated in your abovementioned notification were acknowledged and will be taken into consideration during the tasks taking place within the secret houses. We do not have any comment in this regard.

Please acknowledge,

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of the Department 4  
16 May 2001

Meetings in the secret houses

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(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N.M) / 4

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification M4 / Department 1

Date: 13 May

Reference: 243

To: M4 / 7

Reference to your circular number 3 / 3016, dated 02 May 2001.

The secret house assigned to the First Field Operating Base needs to be entirely furnished in compliance with the cover of a trading company, as well as turning it into a descent place - suitable for meeting important sources. This requires the following:

1. Fully furnishing the house
2. Computer and printer
3. Fax machine
4. Telex machine
5. Extra phone line for secretary
6. Equip one of the rooms with audiovisual surveillance devices to record important meeting
7. Trading posters
8. Hire a waiter to take care of the reception

Please acknowledge.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Department 1  
13 May 2001

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret

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(SATTS N.M) Illegible

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Top Secret

Notification

Date: 30 April 2001

Reference: 1919

To: General Director of M4  
Director of M5  
Director of M4

The Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service instructed the following regarding the duties taking place in the secret houses belonging to your directorate, and planted with audiovisual surveillance devices

1. If you are informed by the sources that the under surveillance target had noticed or had the impression that the planted house is not actually occupied in terms of furniture or any other suspicious aspects, you should handle these flaws to eliminate suspicion.
2. Do not execute any tasks with the same target in more than one house - as this exposes all the secret houses

Please take the necessary actions.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M1

For the kind review of the field operations base directors - in order to comply and comment

(TC: Signature)  
30 April

Mr. Jawad Illegible  
Please take the necessary actions with the Illegible  
(TC: Signature)  
02 May

282  
5f2

(SATTS F)

Page 134

314  
1/14

(TC: Logo)

(SATTS N.M) / 4

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret and Urgent

Notification

Date: 14 January 2001  
Reference: 187

To: M4

The Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service ordered to complete the statement of opinion letters regarding the delegations from the ministries and departments within one week. The concerned field operating base will be held responsible for any delay.

Please take the necessary actions.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M1  
13 January 2001

Dear General Director of M4

Please acknowledge and instruct the circulation of the aforementioned to the directors of the field operating bases in order to comply with it.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
25 January 2001

Yes

(TC: Signature)  
15 January

30

16 January 2001

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(SATTS N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification M4 / 7 / 3

Date: 20 January 2001

Reference: 452

To: Directors of Field Operating Bases

1. Please refer to our notification number 2665, dated 09 May 2000, regarding the guidelines of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, issued during Saddam Hussein's birthday ceremony
2. The General Director of M4 was instructed to provide us with detailed records of work-related delegations (meeting with sources) and the achieved results.

Please acknowledge and notify us.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4 / 7  
20 January 2001

Jawad  
20 January

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret

**Page 136**

In the Name of God, All Merciful, All Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

To: General Director of M4  
Subject: Guidelines

1. Enclosed are the guidelines of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service during Saddam Hussein's birthday ceremony
2. The guidelines were immediately disseminated to the field operating bases by our notification number 2665, dated 09 May 2000, in order to proceed in accordance and present the work mechanism of each field operating base.
3. On the third page of the guidelines, it was mentioned: "Now, I have more than one name of individuals sent as delegates for a task that does not require delegation. Therefore, the concerned director should analyze each delegation and its necessity. At the end of each year, the directorate will be evaluated based on tangible achievements, not documents" (Slip Number 1)
4. Based on the aforementioned and as a precautionary measure for bringing up this issue, we suggest circulating the guidelines to the field operation bases in order to inform us about the work related delegations that took place (meetings with sources) in order to find out what was accomplished.

Please acknowledge and issue your orders.

Regards  
(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4 / 7  
15 January 2001

Yes  
(TC: Signature)  
20 January

Jawad  
15 January

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(SATTS N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification

Date: 09 May 2000

Reference: 2665

To: Directors of Field Operating Bases

1. Find enclosed the guidelines that the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Directorate issued during Saddam Hussein's birthday ceremony.
2. The General Director instructed the review of the guidelines and their implementation. The work mechanism for implementing the guidelines of each field operating base should be presented.

Please take the necessary action.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4 / 7  
09 May 2000

Illegible 09 May

Ahmad 09 May

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret

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*Q3*

3296  
6 / 4

(SATTS N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification M4 / Department 1

Date: 03 June 2000

Reference: 308

To: M4 / 7

Referring to your notification number 2665, dated 09 May 2000

Below is the work mechanism of our field-operating base for implementing the guidance of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director:

1. The sections of our field operating base have restored its connections with some sources and friends. These connections were abandoned due to the practical situation circumstances of these sources and the base. We are about to set up an integral plan for restoring dead connections with other sources.
2. The sections of our field operation base adopted new work approaches that are compatible with the current practical situation in its work arena, especially concerning the collection of information and screening of the sources.
3. The sections of our field operation base proceeded in drawing the family trees of the targets - and collecting the smallest details on them.
4. The sections of our field operation base briefed M10 about its needs of researches and studies that are used to provide the subject directorate with information, reports and researches utilized in preparing the above studies.
5. Pre-selection of candidates to work at the field operating bases - provided that the approvals of the candidates are issued six months earlier so they are able to integrate and become familiar with the target arena.
6. Avail the delegations from the government department to the arenas targeted by our field operating bases in order to hold meetings or establish connections with our sources and place the collected information under the disposal of the presidency.
7. The increase of the information supported by document and reported to the Presidency during the first semester of year 2000, is an indicator for the improvement of work and approaches of information collection.

8. The Lebanon-Syrian section of our field operating base implemented the complex work concept in the Syrian-Lebanese arena, as well as improved this concept to correspond to our logistic goals in the aforementioned arenas.

(1 of 2)

Secret

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(SATTs N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification

Date:

Reference:

9. Necessity of founding an administrative unit in each section to organize and coordinate its mail
10. Work on expanding the usage of computers in our work to save and recall files and data in order to decrease manual administrative work
11. Enhance the intelligence culture of the officers by learning about innovations in intelligence science in order to keep pace with new developments in the world
12. Enhance the competence of officers by learning active and non-active languages that ensures the improvement of intelligence work
13. Sources were found to follow-up, observe and document the foreign military existence in the Arabian Gulf and provide the Presidency with accurate and periodic details of this concern
14. Work on using the modern devices for writing

Suggestions

1. Consider experience and specialization while assigning officers in any positions within their section
2. Adopt new approaches for inspecting and studying targets, especially in our directorate - and taking advantage of the M5 and new methods.
3. Provide M10 with copies of our correspondence addressed to the Presidency, especially those reporting the status and recent information in the arena of our field operating base, in order to inform M10 about the new variations and events in the arena
4. Nominating officers from the section of our field operating base to be guards in our work arenas, and support our comrades in the field operating bases - as they are specialized and experienced officers

5. Forming a work team to discuss recent development in the Arab arena and inform them about the practical status with the intention of exchanging opinions and finding suitable grounds for improving work
6. Work on restoring work in the administrative section in order to decrease the administrative efforts of the officers, and increase the intelligence.

Please acknowledge.

Regards  
(TC: Signature)  
Director of Department 1  
03 June 2000

**Page 140**

**Work Mechanism of the Second Field Operating Base**

**Improvement of Language Skills**

1. Two training courses for the Turkish and Farsi Languages were opened for the affiliates of our field operating base under supervision of the officers certified as translators.
2. Officers will be enrolled in the training courses held in the Military Intelligence School after coordination with the aforesaid school in terms of the courses' schedule
3. Currently, two officers are pursuing Turkish Language studies for 9 months.

**Motivating and Stimulating Dead Sources**

1. Work was initiated towards animating and stimulating sources connected to us by holding talks with the field operating bases. We saved no efforts to reestablish connections, despite many sources changed their residences.
2. The Scientific Intelligence section of our field operating base established a connection with two sources. One of them was disconnected since 1998 and the other since 1991.

**The Genealogical Family Tree for Targets**

The sections included in the information forms that were adopted as an indicator for future recruitment when approaching targets. Work is in progress with the Secret Service Section and our field operating bases abroad - since the target under surveillance or candidate for recruitment has relatives in Iraq.

**Researches and Studies**

Some topics of research and study related to our work arenas were determined in order to ...

(Page 1 of 2)  
Continued

**Page 141**

... be prepared by M10.

**Nomination for Field Operating Bases**

Officers are put to test in order to select nominees to work in the field operating bases, while considering the adopted requirements.

**Gossip**

The secrecy of work and avoidance of gossip is always stressed to our affiliates.

**Delegations**

No officers were delegated abroad to Iraq for issues that do not require delegation, but only for work related issues. Delegations of governmental department were availed to accomplish intelligence tasks with these departments.

(Page 2 of 2)

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Illegible

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraq Intelligence Service

Notification

Date: 06 May 2000  
M1 / 5 / 2128

To: General and Senior Directors

Find the enclosed guidelines by the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Directorate, issued during Saddam Hussein's birthday ceremony.

Please take the necessary action.

Regards,

Enclosures:  
Guidelines (Page 1 to Page 5)

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M1  
04 May 2000

Dear Director of Field Operating Bases  
Please acknowledge and implement  
The work mechanism of each Field Operation Base should be presented  
(TC: Signature)  
07 May

Illegible  
292  
\_\_\_\_\_  
08 May 2000

Mr. Ahmad Nasir Illegible  
Please take the necessary actions  
(TC: Signature)  
07 May

(Page 1 of 1)  
Secret

**Page 143**

In the Name of God, All Merciful, All Compassionate

((And say: Work (righteousness): soon will Allah observe your work, and his messenger, and the believers)) God is All Truthful

My fellow comrades,

Our meeting today coincides with a day we shall never forget, a day for which history remains as evidence. The day holds the virtues of ancestors, bliss of society, dignity of the country and enduring in the course of time as a landmark for the generations to come - and lasts as a field of bravery. This day witnessed the birth of the sword of Iraq and the flag of the nation; President Saddam Hussein (May God Protect his Soul).

The best way to celebrate this occasion is with good words and valid deeds. The best of words is truth and the best of deeds is quality work in a short time and at low expense in order to grant the homeland the chance of development and defend its entity from the conspiracies of the enemy - with the support of the arms and brains of its own sons.

You are the strugglers of choice and there is no doubt that you are aware of your responsibility and understand your mission. You realize how valuable your organization is to the President. Therefore, make sure you reflect a bright image. We should remind ourselves of the commands of our beloved leader when he met the Iraqi Intelligence staff on two occasions. His commands are considered a clear course and a wise agenda that surpasses the moment to reach to the future and bring it into the focus of work.

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Comrades:

During the past six month since I have assumed my position here, I lived with the organization, and I perceived the bright side - but not the ambitious. Thus, I must say:

1. I noticed that the work is monotonous as if time does not advance and Iraq's enemies are politically inactive. Therefore, the intelligence agent should adopt new approaches to thinking.
2. The subjects of my speeches are written down here with me. I review it from one time to another only to realize that a part of what I said was unheard. Therefore, in the future, we will track the discussed issues quoted by the leader, "It is not enough for the official to tell the truth but he should make sure that the objective is achieved. It is also not enough to point out the error, but the solutions should be set and followed up to make sure that it is applied".

For example, I talked a lot about the language and its importance, and I talked about re-contacting inactive sources and reactivating them. I also talked about the advanced choices for the work in the stations. I talked about genealogical tree of the targets and how we have to work through that...

**Page 145**

Not only to draw the family tree, but I spoke also about researches and how the concerned directorate should determine its needs for a particular subject, so that M1 can inspect it. In addition, I talked about gossip and its dangers. There is not enough time to bring up all that I talked about.

The question that is raised is, where do we stand from these instructions, did they reach the objectives?

A week ago, I was in a meeting with a few numbers of the staff to discuss creating a gap in one of the paths. One of the attendees was in charge of the arena in question, and asked me, "Sir, do you think that we can create this gap based on that given theory? I said, "It is just an attempt. However, I want to ask you at the same time, do you have a better approach - since you are in charge of this arena?" He did not answer because he did not look for or determine the axis of penetration, and objected because he did not take enough interest in this issue. Therefore, each one of you, whether he is the head of a section or a director, should think of new approaches. In one of the conferences, I said, "avoid the decorated work". In this sense, I have many examples of individuals who were delegated for unworthy tasks. I am not saying all who were delegated but some of them - and I am ready to discuss it. However, I was myself convinced to let things go simultaneously, but now I am convinced that each director should review the necessity of each delegation. By the end of the year, we will hold the directory responsible for all its deeds - but not submitted words

**Page 146**

... done not just written.

3. The individual who performs quality work will be appreciated. Appreciation would be an incentive to the said individual to give more and encourage others to develop themselves. Appreciation would avoid treating the lazy the way you treat the active skilled individual. In this way, the hard workers would not be frustrated and degeneration in competence would not occur.
4. Avoid nominating undistinguished elements to share the distinguished staff in honoring.
5. Get away from anything that is irrelevant to our well-known work.
6. Avoid mediating to get a chance to work abroad.
7. In the first Qadisiyyah War, when your grandfathers wanted to attack the Persians, the command, at that time, was an order to classify fighters into groups; the classification was based on the tribe and clan. So, in case of defeat, each group would be ashamed of retreating, and so does its best and fight well. I tell you - compete each within his directorate.
8. 'Umar Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz said, "Whoever seeks our company, should take five actions: report to us the needs of those who cannot meet us, do his best to assist us to do good, guide us to the good that we are unaware of, do not backbite others and do not talk about things that do not concern you".
9. Concentrate on fulfilling justice. Justice is ...

**Page 147**

... the way to please God, the Sublime. Justice comforts the conscience, satisfies the staff and creates the sense of legal competition. An individual would be distinguished based on competence and efficiency - not personal relationships, neglect of duty or courtesy. Justice means that everyone would get his chance and the right man would be for the right place.

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service**

(TC: IIS Crest)  
Secret

Date: 18 June 2000

Ref.: 3240

Notification (SATTS M4D2)

To: M4/7

According to the instructions of the Director of the IIS during the ceremony held on the birthday of the President, God save him, please find attached the work mechanism of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Field Operating Base.

Kindly acknowledge. Best regards.

**Attachments:**  
Work mechanism

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D2  
18 June 2000

Secret

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service**

(TC: IIS Crest)  
Top Secret

Date: 11 June 2000  
Ref.: 2226

Notification (SATTS M4D2)

To: M4/7/3

Reference is made to your top secret notification No. 2958, dated 22 May 2000, find attached the report of the 4<sup>th</sup> Field Operating Base concerning the instructions of the Director of the IIS to activate secret work and invest Iraqis abroad.

Kindly acknowledge. Best regards.

**Attachments:**

Report (1-4) pages

(TC: Signature)  
On behalf of the Director of D4  
11 June 2000

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(SATTS N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Top Secret

Notification Department 3 / 1 / 2

Date: 28 May 2000

Reference: 1515

To: M4 / 7

Referring to your Top Secret notification number 2958, dated 22 May 2000.

What was mentioned in our notification number 1005, dated 03 May 2000, and is relevant to the activities of the field operating base for the year 2000, but not for previous years. According to the guidelines of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, it is considered a work priority and of exceptional importance in terms of follow-up.

Please acknowledge.

Regards,

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Department 3  
28 May 2000

(Page 1 of 1)  
Top Secret

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6 / 1

(SATTS N.M) / 4

(TC: Logo)

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification M4 / Department 2

Date: 31 May 2000

Reference: 2872

To: M4 / 7

Referring to your circular number M4 / 7 / 3 / 2958, dated 22 May 2000

Below is what was implemented in terms of guidelines by the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service:

Iran Section

There are no complex work cases within the stated period.

Turkey Section

1. The guidelines of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service were incorporated within the annual plan of the section for the year 2000. The field operating base and the sections in the regions were informed about the guidelines in order to implement and consider them as priority for follow-up.
2. The following were achieved in terms of complex work:
  - A. Approaching the Jordanian Qaftan Al-Tarwnah, Director of the Jordanian Airlines in Turkey by Ankara Field Operating Bases
  - B. The field operating base established a relationship with Sudanese 'Asim Mansur
3. The following Iraqis were approached:
  - A. Layla Faysal working at the Qatari Embassy in Turkey
  - B. Athir 'Isa resident in Turkey
  - C. Doctor Fikri Wahbi

(Page 1 of 2)

Secret

(TC: Many Superposed Pages)

(Page 1 of 1)

Top Secret

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5001/4

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.: General Director of M4  
Subject: Directive

1. In reference to your Excellency's marginal note on 27/ 4/ 2000, the International Stations were informed to notify us about what was done concerning the directives of Mr. Head of Intelligence Service. The directives of Mr. Head of Intelligence Service was submitted to us by the notification of M1, no. 5757 on 26 December 1999 in order to take into consideration, while preparing the annual plan of the year 2000, our intelligence operations in countries that we have interests in as well as recruiting Iraqis, who work abroad.
2. The International Stations mentioned in its answer the operations, which are considered active and important. After auditing the information, it was figured out that these operations were carried out in the past years.
3. According to what was mentioned before, we suggest the following:-
  - A. Answering M1 that the directives of Mr. Head of Intelligence Service were added to the annual plan of the year 2000 in order to be implemented through headquarters and stations.
  - B. Notify the stations that the word "Directives" means what was done through the year 2000 as well as to follow up the important subjects.

Please review ... with appreciation

*Jawad*

20 May

(TC: Signature)

*21 May*

On behalf of the Director of the Follow-up Section

20 May 2000

**Page 152**

Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Date/ 8 May 2000

Announcement  
(SATTS M) 4/ 7/ 7

Reference/ 2617

Mr. Director D2

Please inform us of what was achieved after following up the subject  
mentioned in our notification no. 1914 on 6 April 2000 regarding the activities  
, which aim to cancel the sanctions imposed on our country.

... with appreciation

Ahmad Rashid  
7 May

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4/7  
8 May 2000

*Salman*  
*7 May*

A copy to:

D4/ According to your notification 4/ 3/ 514 on 2 April 2000, for the same above-mentioned purpose, notify us... with appreciation

**Page 153**

Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification:  
M4/7/3

Date/ 6 April 2000  
Reference/ 1914

To/ Mr. Directors of D1 and D2

Attached is the notification of D4/4/514 on 2 April 2000, regarding the follow-up of stations activities that aim to cancel the sanctions imposed on our country.  
Please review ... you are kindly request to read the marginal note of the Director of M4 ... with appreciation

Attachments

- Notification
- Marginal note of the Director of M4

*Ahmad Rashid  
6 April*

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4/7  
6 April 2000

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In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate  
Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Reference: (SATTS M) 4/4/3/514  
Date: 2 April 2000

To/ D4/1

Attached is the marginal note of the Director of M4 on 28 March 2000 regarding the follow-up the activities of stations as well as support the activities that aim to cancel the sanctions imposed on our country. In addition, to unite the activities and efforts, which were achieved since 1997 until today.

Please review ... to take the necessary actions... with appreciation

Attachments:

- Telegrams
- The marginal note of the Director of M4

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D4/4

A copy to/  
D4/2 }  
D4/3 }

For the same above-mentioned purpose... with appreciation

M4/7

To take the necessary actions regarding the article (3) of the marginal note of the Director of M4

*Mr. Ahmad Rashid, please take  
the necessary actions and coordinate  
with D1 and D2*  
(TC: Signature)  
6 April

*Mr. Head of Div. 3  
To do the necessary actions  
according to the marginal  
note of Mr. Director  
(TC: Signature)  
6 April*

**Page 155**

To follow up the activities of stations ... please review ... regards

- The activities should be united by all sections along with activities, which were achieved since June 1997 until now... it should be ready upon demand

Director of D4

(TC: Signature)

28 March 2000

- D1 and D2 should follow up the subject and prepare a report about that .

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret and personal

Notification  
M4/7/3

Date: 14 May 2000  
Reference/ 2747

Mr. Director of M1

According to your secret and personal notification no. 5/248 on 18 January 2000, attached is a report of the actions, which were taken to implement the orders and directives of Mr. Head of the Intelligence Service during the meeting was held with our Directorate's stations.

Please review... with appreciation

Attachments:  
15-page report

(TC: Signature)  
14 May 2000  
On behalf of the Director of M4

(1 - 1)  
Secret and personal

Page 157

Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification

Date/ 26 April 2000  
Reference/ 2307

To/ M4/ 7

According to your memorandum no. 2267 on 23 April 2000, we are enclosing you the actions, which were taken to implement the orders and instructions of the Head of Intelligence Service during the meeting held with our stations.

Please review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D2  
26 April 2000

**Page 158**

Iran Section  
Directorate 4/ 2/ 1

Below are the adopted procedures for implementing the orders and directives of the Head of Intelligence Service during the meeting held with our station on 23 November 1999. The adopted procedures are:

- 1- Recruiting a number of Iraqi merchants, who are dealing with the Iranian merchants through the Kurdish mediators exist in the Autonomous Ruling Region and have business in Baghdad or through other Iraqi merchants, who are traveling to the Gulf countries.
- 2- Recruiting an Iraqi in order to send him to Iran (Arak Governorate) as well as benefiting from his relations and his spouse's relatives.
- 3- Making an inventory of the separated families, which are living in the eastern areas, southern areas and other regions as a first step to let them work for our intelligence service against Iran.
- 4- Benefiting from the Iranian delegations, who are coming to our country in order to be recruited and sent on missions to collect information on Iran.
- 5- Preparing inventory on people living in Iraqi Al-Ahwaz area. The inventory includes their locations, ages and relations with Iran. Currently, we are training sources to be sent to Iran.
- 6- Coordinating with M8 to support the mission of the Arabic Front for liberating Al-Ahwaz in order to serve our intelligence operations.
- 7- Forming a permanent committee, from the units that collecting information on Iran, to follow up the intelligence operations inside Iran. In addition, to coordination with the Iran Section in M5.
- 8- To follow up and inventory the separated families that are living within Al-Ta'mim Sector as well as benefiting from the chances, which serve our intelligence activities inside Iran.

(1 - 3)

**Page 159**

... the Special Team

According to the memorandum of M4/7/3/2269 on 23 April 2000, we would like to explain the following:

In cooperation with Mujahidin Khalq Organization and assisted by its agents, the Special Team was able to execute (24) special operations in Iranian cities, in addition to target agents' headquarters in Iran and the northern region. These operations include the assassination of prominent Iranian officials in addition to bombard and blast a number of Iranian Intelligence headquarters.

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Iranian Opposition Section

According to the memorandum of M4/7/7646 on 4 December 1999, the following was carried out:

- 1- We adhered to the directives and orders, which were issued by Mr. Head of Intelligence Service.
- 2- Our work mainly focuses on running the Iranian opposition groups, fulfilling their needs and directing them in a way that serve our missions in Iran and the northern region.
- 3- We provide the international stations and other Intelligence formations with the information sent to us.
- 4- Illegal stations and the recruitment of Iraq individuals living and working abroad do not fall under our responsibilities.
- 5- The evaluation of division's sources and representatives of opposition groups are under process and done periodically.
- 6- We are currently searching for good agents in order to let them conduct operations or collect information on Iran.

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret, Person and Urgent

Notification:  
Directorate 4, Department 4

Date/ 10 May 2000  
Reference/ 2166

To/ M4/7/3

According to your secret, personal and urgent memorandum no. 2267 and dated 23 April 2000, we are enclosing you actions, which were taken to implement orders and directives of the Head of Intelligence Service during the meeting held with our station.

Please review ... with appreciation

Attachments

-A report includes (1-7) pages

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D4  
9 May 2000

(1 - 1)

*The USA:*

*A group of agent, who are working in Cuba, Mexico and Canada, were recruited to work in the USA*

*(3) Cases*

*C. Eastern European Field:*

*First: Recruiting a Russian person to work in ...*

(1 - 7)

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret, Personal and Urgent

Notification  
Directorate 4/ 7/ 3

Date/ 10 June 2000  
Reference/ 3358

Directors of Stations ( )

According to your memorandums no. D/ 215, D2/ 2307, D3/ 954 and D4/ 2166 on 3 May 2000, 26 April 2000, 26 April 2000 and 10 May 2000 respectively:

M1 requested for a briefing on the procedures, which were taken to implement the orders and directives of the Head of Intelligence Service during the meeting held with our directorate's stations and in accordance to the attached form.

It should include the actions, which were carried out according to the general directives and special actions of every International Station. They should be written in order.

Please review and inform us ... with appreciation

Attachments:  
Chart

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4/7  
10 June 2000

(1 - 1)  
Secret and personal

**Page 163**

**The Orders and Directives of the Head of Intelligence Service**

Serial	Order and its date	Receiving Party	Implementation procedures

**Page 164**

Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret, Personal and Urgent

Notification  
M4/D1

Date/ 21 June 2000  
Reference/ 352

To/ M4/7

According to your notification number 3/3358 on 10 June 2000, we are returning you  
the enclosures of your previous memorandums after taking the necessary actions.  
Please review ... with appreciation

Attachments  
(9) Forms

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D1  
21 June 2000

(1 - 1)  
Secret, personal and urgent

**Page 165**

Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification  
M4/ D2

Date/ 25 June 2000  
Reference/ 3361

To/ M4/7

According to the memorandum of M4/3/3358 on 10 June 2000, attached is the report, which includes the actions, which were taken to implement the orders and directives of the Head of Intelligence Service. Please review ... with appreciation

Attachments  
-Report

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D2  
25 June 2000

Secret

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

**Secret, Personal and Urgent**

Notification

Date/ 12 June 2000

Reference/ 1334

To/M4/7

According to your secret, personal and urgent notification no. 3358 on 10 June 2000, attached are the reports, which include the actions that were taken to implement the orders and directives of the Head of Intelligence Service during the meeting held with our stations on 27 December 1999.

Please review... with appreciation.

**Attachments**  
6-page report

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D3  
11 June 2000

(1 - 1)  
**Secret and Personal**

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Notification  
M4/ D4

Date/ 25 June 2000  
Reference/ 2245

To/M4/7/3

According to your memorandum no. 3358 on 10 June 2000, attached is the answers of our station's sections regarding the abovementioned subject, which was mentioned in your previous memorandum.

Please review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
On behalf of Director of D4  
25 June 2000

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In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.: Director of M4  
Subject: Reducing the renewal and extension fees of passports  
of Iraqis residing outside the country

We would like to inform you about the following:

- 1- M1 requested in its notification, which is attached, your opinion regarding the abovementioned subject.
- 2- The stations were requested to inform us about their opinions according to the notification no. 6686 on 4 November 2000.
- 3- The stations answered in their notifications, which are attached, that they have approved reducing the charge of renewing the passports of Iraqis, who are residing outside Iraq.
- 4- M2 suggested the following:
  - A. The fees pf passports should be based on passport holder's profession and the type of documents.
  - B. Authorizing the head of the committee or delegation to exempt or exclude some Iraqis from paying the fees. This should be done in the light of conditions of every Iraqi living outside Iraq.
  - C. Charges are imposed on:  
First: Workers in International Organizations  
Second: Employees, professors and teachers  
Third: Iraqis working in foreign companies

(1 – 2)

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In the Name of God Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:

Fourth: Adding simple charges on commercial documents such as  
(certificate of origin ... etc)

Fifth: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had restudied the subject of  
imposing charges on foreigners' entry visas and decided not to adopt  
this principle in the time being.

- 5- The comments of the second station, which was mentioned in article (4), are used in embassies since long time ago. Instructions were issued to organize this subject but they are not related to the subject of reducing the charges of renewing and extending the passport validity of Iraqis, who are residing outside their country.

Please review, we suggest answering M1 and circulating our attached notification...  
with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4/7  
23 November 2000

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification  
M4/7/3

Date/ 25 November 2000  
Reference/ 8149

To/Director of M1

According to your secret notification number 5376 on 2 November 2000, we suggest reducing the charges of issuing and renewing passports of Iraqis, who are residing outside their country. This will enhance the relationship between the Embassy and Iraqis residing outside Iraq.

Please review... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4  
23 November 2000

(1 - 1)  
Secret

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification  
M4/ D2

Date/ 7 May 2001  
Reference/ 105

To/M4/7

According to the memorandum of M2/7/3/3016 on 2 May 2001, we do not have any comments on the subject.  
Please review ... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Director of D2  
7 May 2001

Secret

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Republic of Iraqi  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service

Secret

Notification:  
M4/7/ 3

Date/ 2 May 2001  
Reference/ 3016

Stations' Directors

Attached is a copy of the top-secret notification of M1 no. (SATTS B)/ 1919 on 30 April 2001, which includes the directives of the Head of Intelligence Service regarding the duties that are carried in the secret stations.

Please review ... Mr. Director of M4 ordered to implement these directives and informed us with your feedback... with appreciation

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4/7  
2 May 2001

(1 - 1)  
Secret

The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification.

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Himfir diary

(TC: The name "Himfir" is written according to the IC standards)

**Page 173**

Since along time ago, Great Britain is considering to stay great as it is now, that the sun rises and sets on its seas. Therefore, our country was small in comparison to the large colonies we were controlling in India, China, the Middle East and others. It is true that we did not completely control the large territories of these countries because it was under the locals' control. However, our policy was successful and efficient because we were about to completely control them, so we had to think twice about the following:

- 1- Once to keep controlling what we already seized
- 2- And another time to seize what was not actually under our control (Properties and colonies)

The Ministry of colonies assigned special committees for every part of these courtiers to study this mission and luckily, I was among those who were trusted by the Minister. Since we entered this Ministry and granted the assignment of running the Eastern India Company, which had a commercial front, but its actual mission was to control India and its roads that lead to the large area of the semi continent.

The Government did not fear India because it includes different nationalisms, religious, language and contradicting interests. In addition, the government did not fear China because the majority of population was Buddhism and Confucianism and those two sects are old religions that care about spirituality, nor for materialism. As a result, it was unlikely that those two regions have patriotism to resist occupation.

Therefore, the Government of Great Britain did not worry about these two regions. (Yes) ...we were not neglecting the possibility of future development plans, so we were preparing long-term plans to control the apartheid, ignorance, poverty and some times diseases over these countries. It was not hard to deceive these people by showing our good intentions, which are the opposite in facts. We were likened the old Buddhist saying (Let the patient asks for medicine even it is sour) was What we worried about were the Islamic countries, even we signed with the Sick Man\* many treaties, which was in favor of our benefit. The evaluation of the experts of Colonies Ministry ...

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\*The Sick Man: the Othman Empire

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...to raise doubts about me (I was wearing Islamic dress and ... (TC: Illegible).  
2. Once upon a time, Islam was a religion of life and control. It is difficult to say to the masters, "you are slaves". The superiority tendency of human beings always drives him to be arrogant, no matter how weak he is right now. We could never fake the Islamic history in order to make Muslims feel that the sovereignty they attained was due to certain circumstances, which have gone forever.  
3. We were afraid that consciousness might arise in the souls of (Al Othman) and the rulers of (Persia), in a way that ruin our plans, which aim to control these countries. Although both governments were too weak as we mentioned before, but the presence of a central government supported by people, money and weapons will make us unsafe.  
4. We were too worried about the Muslim Scholars; for instance, the scholars of Al-Azhar, Iraq and Persia were a huge obstacle in front of our hopes. They were uneducated about the modern life style, their goal was (The paradise promised by Quran). They were unready to give up a little bit of their principles or to deny any of them. People followed them and the Sultan (Ruler) was afraid of them the same as the mouse is afraid from the cat. It is true that the Sunni people do not follow their scholars with the same strength; actually, they are loyal toward Sultan and the Scholars (Shaykh Al-Islam). Meanwhile, the Shiites were strongly loyal to their scholars only. They do not give the Sultan enough attention. However, this difference did not minimize the fears of the Ministry of Colonies but also all the rulers of Great Britain.  
We held many conferences seeking for solutions to these problems; unfortunately, we always faced a blocked way. The reports submitted to us regularly by the agents and the spies were so disappointing, and all the recommendations of the conferences were zero or subzero. Even though, we never lost hope. Actually, we got used to long term and endless patience.  
We once, as I remember, held a meeting that the Minister himself and bishop attended as well as a number of experts. The total number of attendants was 20. The discussion extended for more than three hours and at the end we reached nothing. However, the bishop said, "Don't be upset, Jesus didn't dominate until he and his followers had passed through three hundred years of oppression, torturing and killing ". May Jesus have a look at us from ....

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... then I sailed towards Istanbul (the center of the Islamic Khilafah). I was assigned two missions. I learned many languages through my trips like English (from London), the Turkish, the Arabic (the language of Quran) and the Parisian language. I was supposed to continue my education of the Turkish language (the language of the Muslims) there. What I figured out that the learning of language is something different from becoming skilled in language as it is spoken in its country. Furthermore, learning other languages might take few years, but my language takes the double of that time. Therefore, I had to learn it perfectly in order to not be suspected!

However, I was not worry about this because the Muslims have magnanimity and favorable judgment, in a similar way to what they learned from their prophet Muhammad. Thus, they rarely have the suspicious intendency like us. Moreover, the Turkish government was not very capable to reveal the spies and agents because of its weakness. This was a good advantage for us.

After a long trip to Istanbul, I arrived and named myself "Muhammad". In a while, I started to prepare the mosque (The place of the Muslims' meeting). In fact, I liked their regime, order, cleanliness, and obedience and I said to myself, "Why we should fight those people? Why we are working to destroy them and steal their fortunes? Did Jesus order this? Back to my mind, I ignored this devil thinking and intended to drink.

Later on, I met an old scholar named "Ahmad Afandim", who was very generous and kind. This Sheikh was always trying to imitate Prophet Muhammad, who was the higher example for him. Each time Prophet Muhammad was mentioned, the Sheikh started to cry. Fortunately, he never asked me about who I am and to whom I belong to, but he was very sympathetic when he knew that I am a foreigner who came to work under the order of the Sultan (who represents the prophet Muhammad). This was my claim that I used.

Once I said to the Sheikh, "I am a young man, who had no parents or brothers or ...

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Sometimes, it hurts the mouth and blood comes out, but I was forced to do this because it is an affirmed Sunna for them, their prophet Muhammad ordered it and they mentioned many benefits of it.

When I was living in (Istanbul), I used to sleep at the room of the mosque servant in return for money. He was a nervous man named (Marwan Afandi) and this name was the name of a Companion of Prophet Muhammad. The servant was very proud of this blessed name and he used to tell me that: if you blessed with a child, you should name him (Marwan) because he was one of the great Mujahidin in Islam.

I used to have dinner with the servant, and he used to prepare the food for me.

On Fridays (Muslims' Holy day), I do not go to work but on other days I used to work for a carpenter for a weekly insignificant pay. Since my work was only in the morning, he was paying me the half salary of his workers. The carpenter's name was (Khalid) and he used to chatter in his free time about the morals of the great Islamic conqueror (Khalid Ibn-Al-Walid), who accompanied Prophet Muhammad and showed extreme courage in Islam, but he was sad because when the Commander 'Umar Ibn-Al-Khattab took over the caliphate, he dismissed Khalid.

Khalid the owner of the shop had a bad reputation but he was trusting from me for unknown reason or maybe because I was an obedient listener and I did not discuss his religious affairs or his shop's affairs. When we were, alone he asks to have sex with me (Sodomy) and that was one of the most restricted things for them, – as Sheikh Ahmad told me - but Khalid from inside was not following the Islamic law as he pretended among his friends. He used to attend the Friday's pray but on other days, I do not know if he prays or not. I used to refuse his desires, and I think he used to do it with some other workers. There was a beautiful young worker from (Salanik), who was a Jewish and converted to Islam, both of them used to go behind the shop, which was a wood store, and they pretended that they are going to fix it, but I knew that they went there to have sex. I used to have lunch in the shop, then, I go to pray in the mosque and stay there until...

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... remember me, if you returned to this country and I was dead, and we will meet the messenger of God (God's blessing and peace be upon him) in resurrection. Actually, I was touched and I cried but the duty was more important than emotions.

The other nine companions received the ministry's orders to come back to London, including mw, but unfortunately, only six came back.

One of the other four became a Muslim and stayed in Egypt – as the secretary has told us- but the secretary showed his calmness because he did not reveal the secret. In addition, another one from Russian origin joined Russia but the secretary showed extreme worry about him not because he affiliated to his homeland but because the secretary was thinking that this man was a Russian spy in the Ministry of Colonies, and when he finished his mission, he went back to his country. The third person died in ('Amarah) a town out of Baghdad because of an epidemic hit the country as the secretary has told us. However, nobody knows about the fourth one, at that time the Ministry observed him until he reached (SANAA) in (Yemen) one of the Arab states, and there were a periodical reports sent to the ministry for a year but it stopped later. Whenever the ministry tried to get information about him, he got nothing. The ministry considered losing four of ten a disaster. We are a small nation with big tasks, and losing each person of that type is a disaster for us.

When the secretary listened to my reports summary, he sent me to a conference held in order to see our reports – the reports of the six of us-. A big gather from the Colonies Ministry were met, headed by the minister to listen to our reports. My colleagues presented their summary about their missions. I presented my report, which pleased the minister, secretary and some of the audience. I noticed that I was the third because (George Bilkud) and (Henry Fans) were at the first and the second level in work.

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They were mixed from two Islamic sects, Sunni and Shiite; they are also from Arab and Persian and included a few of Christians.

For the first time in my life, I met Shiite and Persian. It does not matter to mention something about Shiite and Sunnah, the Shiite associated to 'Ali Ibn-Abu-Talib, who is the prophet's cousin and in the same time his son-in-law (Fatima's husband). The Shiite says that their prophet Muhammad appointed 'Ali as a caliph after him and said that 'Ali and his eleven sons are caliph after caliph.

I think that the Shiite is right about (the caliphate of 'Ali, Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn), because it is established in the Islamic history -According to my reading- that 'Ali was characterized by high psychological features, which qualified him for leadership. In addition, I do not set aside that Prophet (Muhammad) said that Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn are also Imams, and Sunni do not deny that. However, in the same time I have doubt that prophet (Muhammad) has appointed the 9 sons of Al-Husayn as caliphs after him, because how (Muhammad) could knew the future, because he died when Al-Husayn was a kid, so how he could know that Al-Husayn will have 9 sons. (Yes) if (Muhammad) was really a prophet, then he could know everything by God's guidance as the Christ used to tell the future, but as Christians, we doubt the prophecy of Prophet Muhammad.

The Muslims says that Quran is the evidence of Muhammad's prophecy, but I read the Holy Quran and I did not found a proof.

Undoubtedly, it is a high-level book; it is even higher than Torah and Bible. Because it includes regulations, laws, morals and more, but is this enough to prove Muhammad's sincerity.

I am so confused about the issue of (Muhammad), a Bedouin man, who cannot read or write, how he could come with this high-level book? In addition, he has morals that educated Arabs do not have them; just imagine a Bedouin who cannot read and write, can have this book. However, is that enough to prove his prophecy!

I was always aspire to know this truth, once I put forward this issue with a priest in London, but he did not come with a convincing answer, but he was stubborn and fundamentalist. I also discussed this issue with Sheikh Ahmad in Turkey but he did not come up with a convincing answer for me, but...

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I have to say the truth that I could not talk with the Shaykh freely because I was afraid of uncovering myself or to be suspected.

Anyway, I highly appreciated (Muhammad); undoubtedly, he was from the prophets' type we are reading about in books, but until now, I am not convinced with his prophecy. If we assume that he was not a prophet, but it is impossible, also, for the conscientious human to believe that he is like other geniuses, undoubtedly he was above the genius people and higher than brilliants.

However, the Sunnis say that the Muslims thought after the death of the Prophet that Abu-Bakr then 'Umar were more suitable than 'Ali was, and because of that they left the order of Prophet (Muhammad) and inducted those as the prophet's caliphs.

This kind of disputation exists in every religion, especially in Christianity, but I do not know the reason behind this disagreement, 'Ali and 'Umar died, and the Muslims – (if they are reasonable) - should think about today not about the old times.

Once, in the ministry, I told some of my thoughts about the argument between the Sunnis and Shiites and I said, "If they understand life, they should forget the disagreement and unite their word", but the chief chided me and said, "You have to increase the disunity instead of trying to unify the Muslim's word."

In this connection, on one of the meetings with the secretary before I went to (Iraq), he told me that: "For your knowledge, Himfir, there are natural conflicts between human beings since God created (Abel and Canon), and they will remain until the return of the Christ:

- 1- Color
- 2- Tribal
- 3- Regional
- 4- National
- 5- Religious

Your mission, in this journey, is to find out about these disputations between Muslims, to spot the volcano ready to explode and provide the ministry with accurate information about it and if you could explode ...

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As a worker with a small pay however my food and drinks are on him. Before the end of the month, I left the inn to stay in the (carpenter) shop; he was an honest and gallant man treated me as one of his sons, his name was ('Abd-al-Rida). He was a Persian Shiite from (Kharisan). I seized the opportunity of staying with him to learn the Farsi language. The non-Arab Shiites used to meet at his shop on the afternoon and talk about everything including politics and economics. They used to satirize their government and the Caliph in (Turkey), but if an unknown (customer) came, they immediately stop their conversation and start talking about their personal issues. I do not know how they trusted me like this, but finally I knew that they thought I am from (Azerbaijan) because of my knowledge for the Turkish language and my white color, which is the prevalent color between (Azerbaijan) people.

Here I met a youth who used to come to the shop frequently. The youth's name was (Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab, he knew the three languages Turkish, Farsi and Arabic, and he was wearing the uniform of the religion science students. He was a very ambitious and nervous youth, indignant on the Ottoman government and did not care about the Persian Government. The reason behind his friendship with the owner of the shop ('Abd-al-Rida) was that they both were indignant on the caliph, but I did not know from where he learned the Farsi language although he was Sunni, and how he managed to make a friendship with ('Abd-al-Rida the Shiite)? Nevertheless, both of those matters were not weird, because in Basrah the Sunnis and Shiites meet, as they are brothers, also many of the people who living in Al-Basrah know both languages Farsi and Arabic and many of them know the Turkish language as well.

(Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab) was a real liberal youth in the full sense of the word. He never become fanatic against Shiites –as the prevalent case of Sunnis who fanatic against the Shiites, even a group of the Sunnah clerics says that Shiites are not Muslims and atheists - He also didn't give any importance to following the four widespread schools between the Sunnis and said, "For which Allah hath sent down no authority"

The story of the four schools is that: the Muslims Sunna after more than a century from the death of their prophet... arise

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(God's book and 'Ali Ibn-Abi-Talib)? (Al-Qammi Said) he said as the messenger, peace be upon him, said (God's book and the members of my family) (Bu-'Ali), the master of the family. Thus, (Muhammad) denied that the prophet said this, but (Sheikh Al-Qammi) came out with convincing proofs and (Muhammad) could not speak or answer. However, (Muhammad) objected and said, if the prophet said (God's book and the members of my family) so where is the Sunnah (TC: the prophet's line of conduct). (Al-Qammi) replied the Sunnah is the explanation for God's book. Therefore, when the prophet said (God's book and my family members) he meant (God's book along with its explanation that is Al-Sunnah). (Muhammad said) Are not the words of the prophet's family members also an explanation for God's book? So, what is the need for them? (Al-Qammi) said when the prophet died the nation needed an explanation for the Qur'an that can meet the needs of time. Thus, the prophet referred the nation to the Book as an origin and to his family members as annotators for it to keep with the time needs.

I liked this discussion, and I saw (Muhammad), the youth, in front of (Al-Qammi), the old man, just like the bird in the hunter's hand.

I found in (Muhammad Al-Wahab) my goal of persistent, his liberty, ambition, his complains from his era's Sheikhs, his independent opinion. This had made him ignoring the opinions of the four Imams when disagreed with what he understood from Quran and Sunnah. The above-mentioned characters were the best weak point that I was using to go through his soul.

What a big difference between this vain youth and the Turkish Sheikh who was my teacher in Turkey, the Sheikh was an example for the ideal ancestor Muslims like the mountain nothing could move him. Before mentioning Abu-Hanifah's name – (he was from Abu-Hanifah's sect), he first performs the ritual ablution, then he can mention his name. If he wanted to hold Al-Bukhari's book, which is a great book for Sunnis, he go for ablution then he hold the book.

However (Sheikh Muhammad Al-Wahab) was despising Abu-Hanifah and he used to say about himself, "(I understand more than Abu-Hanifah)" and said (half of Al-Bukhari's book is not true).

I made a strong relation and connection between (Muhammad) and myself, I used to puff him up and to keep telling him that he is more talented than ('Ali and 'Umar) and if the prophet was present, he will choose him as Caliph. I also used to tell him that (I hope you could renew the Islam, because you are the only savior who can raise Islam from this fall).

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... the Islamic law under the cover of interpretation, the independent opinions and freedom. In the third day of (pleasure), I talked with Muhammad about (not prohibiting the alcohols) and each time he concluded a proof from the Qurani verses and Hadith I distorting them. Finally, I told him that it is confirmed that Mu'awiyah, Yazid, all Umayyad caliphs and all 'Abbasid caliphs were drinking alcohol, is it possible all those were stray and you are right, for sure they understood God's book and the prophet Sunnah more than you. This proves that they did not consider the prohibition decision but they rather considered alcohols as disliked or undesirable matters. The Christians and Jewish holy Genesis allowed liquor, is it possible that the liquor is prohibited in a religion and permitted in another while all the religions came from one God? In addition, the narrators said that 'Umar drank liquor until the verses (will ye not then abstain?) and if the liquor was prohibited why the prophet didn't punish him, so not punishing him is a proof for the allowance.

Muhammad was listening carefully, then he sighed and said, "It is proven that 'Umar was mixing the liquor with water and drinking it, and said it is prohibited if it get you drunk and not prohibited if not". Then, the Sheikh said ('Umar understood it well) because the Quran says, "(Satan's plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer)". If you are not drunk, you will never do the above-mentioned, so the liquor is not prohibited unless it makes you drunk.

I told (Safiyah) about what happened, and I stressed on giving the Sheikh strong liquor and she did. After that, she told me that the Sheikh drank until he got drunk and he had sex with her several times on that night. I saw the weakness and emaciation signs on him that night. By this, Safiyah and I seized the Sheikh totally. Oh, how it was amazing that golden word of the Minister of Colonies that he said to me before I leave, "We took back Spain from atheism (he meant the Muslims) by liquor and prostitution, so let's try to take back all our countries by those two great powers)"

One day I talked with the Sheikh about (Fasting), I told him that Quran says (And it is better for you that ye fast) and it does not say you have to, so fasting in Islam is optional and not a must. But he resisted the idea and said

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I reaped the fruits I wasted my youth growing.

I used to send the results to the Ministry once a month, as I used to do since I left London. I used to receive the encouraging answers. Muhammad and I were walking fast on our designated passage. I never separated from him; my mission was to raise the spirit of liberty, independence and skepticism inside him. I used to predict for him great future and praise his ambitious bright spirit. One day, I made up a dream and I said to him, "Yesterday, I saw the Prophet in my dream; I described the prophet as I heard him described by the mosque preachers. The prophet was sitting on a chair and surrounded with a group of scholars, I could not recognize anyone of them. Then, I saw you coming with a bright face, the prophet stand up with respect for you, kissed you between your eyes and told you "Muhammad, we have the same name, you are the heir of my knowledge and you are in my place in ruling the religious and life affairs. You replied, "Oh, Prophet of God, I am afraid to show my knowledge to people." The Prophet said to you "Do not be afraid you are the highest"."

When Muhammad heard the dream, he became overjoyed and asked me many times if I told the truth. Whenever he asked, I used to answer in the affirmative until he believed me. I think he decided to show himself since that day.

In these days, I received the orders from London to go to the desired place of Shiites and their science and spirituality center (Karbala') and (Al-Najaf), these two cities have a long story.

The story of (Al-Najaf) started when ('Ali) the fourth of the orthodox Caliphs for Sunnis and the first Caliph for Shiites were buried. Al-Kufah used to be the capital of Caliphate and it is at a distance of one hour walking from (Al-Najaf). When 'Ali was killed, his two sons (Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn) buried him outside Al-Kufah in the place now called (Al-Najaf). By time, Al-Najaf was growing up, while Al-Kufah was going down. Many of the Shiite scholars were gathering in Al-Najaf, by time, they built houses, schools and markets; now it became the center of the Shiite scholars and the Caliph in Istanbul grants them ...

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The agriculture in Iraq depends on those two rivers.

After I returned to London, I suggested on the Ministry of Colonies to lay hands on the estuary of those two rivers, to be able to subjugate Iraq in the emergency case, because if the water stopped the people will subdue to the Ministry demands.

I went from (Al-Hillah) to (Al-Najaf) wearing the clothes of Azerbaijani tradesmen, I mixed with the scholars and attended their lessons. I had a high opinion of them, because of their pure souls, wide knowledge and fear of God, but they do not think about renewing themselves.

1- Even though they hate the authority in Turkey, they never think about fighting or getting rid of it. (Not because they are Shiites and the authority is Sunnis but because the authority was exerting a huge pressure on them)

2- They also bounded themselves in the religion and almost left the world science as our priests did during on the era "illegible".

3- They do not think about what is happening in the world around them.

I said to myself "what poor people, they are sleeping while the whole world is awake; one day, the flood will sweep them away. I tried repeatedly to raise them up to fight the Caliphate but I could not find any listener, some of them used to laugh at me when I said such things as if I were asking them to destroy the universe. They were looking to the Caliphate as a giant and they cannot be strong with out the Holy Leader (God speed his relieve).

The Holy Leader for them is the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam from the Prophet's progeny; he disappeared on 255 Hijri, which is 255 years after the prophet, and he is still alive until now, then he will appear to return the justice.

I wonder how virtuous people could believe in such a superstitious religion; it is like the religion of the fabulist Christians who believed that the Christ would return from heaven to fill the life with justice.

I told one of them, "Is not the duty is to alter injustice as the prophet of Islam did? (He said) The prophet was depending on God that is why he could. (I said) God said in Quran "If ye will help (the cause of) Allah, he will help you", so God will support you also if you fight the tyrant caliph with sword. (He said) you are a tradesman and this...

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In addition, the economy collapsed, and people will live in a strong poverty and need  
(illegible)

The system is not stable, and disorder is everywhere (illegible)

There is no cooperation between the government and people because they are looking  
to each other with doubt, and the scholars are busy with the religion affairs and  
abstain from life (illegible)

In addition, the most of the deserts are devastated without any agriculture, the two  
rivers Tigris and Euphrates are passing through their lands as guests until they reach  
the sea (illegible)

Moreover, other things besides the bad and corrupted status that waits for rescue  
(illegible)

I stayed in Karbala' and Al-Najaf for four months, in Al-Najaf I had a serious disease  
until I lost hope, I been sick for three weeks and I consulted a Doctor was there and he  
gave me some medicines made my health better. It was a very hot summer. During  
my sickness, I used to seclude myself in a place under the ground called the cellar and  
the owner of the house I was rent used to prepare food and medicine for me in return  
of a little amount of money. The owner used to consider serving me as the best way  
to approach God, because he is serving a visitor of (Commander of the Faithful). My  
food in the first days was just (Chicken soup) then the Doctor allowed me to eat meat,  
in the third week, I was allowed to eat rice with chicken. After, I was healed from my  
sickness, I went to Baghdad and wrote a report about my observation in Najaf,  
Karbala', Al-Hilah and Baghdad. The report includes 100 pages. I handed the report  
to the representative of the ministry in Baghdad. I stayed at the ministry waiting for  
an answer whether I have to stay in Iraq or go back to London.

I was so excited to go back to London, because I was suffering from homesickness  
and missing my family, especially my son "Rasputin", who was born after I left  
London. Therefore, I requested the ministry in my report to go back to London even  
for a short time only in order to narrate them my impressions orally as well as to relax  
and enjoy my time because I spent 3 years in Iraq far away from my country.

The representative of the ministry in Baghdad told me not to hesitate to contact him  
and to rent a room in one of the motels look on ...

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... so both go to Al-Basrah; and if someone returned and did not find his companion, then he leave a letter with 'Abd-al-Rida informing about his companion Khalid ... (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible). (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible) (Illegible). (Illegible) ... after a while of living in Baghdad, I received orders to move to London immediately. Thus, I went there where I met the secretary and some personnel of the ministry and I told them about what I saw during my long trip. In fact, they became happy because of my information about Iraq and they were satisfied. Before I arrived, they have got my report about the trip details and I knew after a while that (illegible)- wife of Sheikh Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab- had wrote to them from Al-Basrah a report similar to mine. Also, I figured out that the ministry was observing me in all of my trips and that the observers wrote many satisfying reports about me which enhance what wrote in my reports and what I said to the secretary.

Afterwards, the secretary prepared a meeting for me with the same minister. When I visited the minister in his office, he gladly welcomed me better than the last time when I returned from Al-Asatanah to London. So, I discovered that he cares about me and appreciate my work. The minister was really satisfied about controlling Muhammad. He claimed that Muhammad was the target of the ministry and said the if I did not reach (Al-Shaykh), then nothing of my efforts would be worthy.

Nonetheless, I was worry about him after leaving him, but the minister confirmed to me that the Al-Shaykh still having the same opinions and ideas by stating that the agents in Asfahan informed him that Al-Shaykh still as before. However, I asked myself "How Al-Shaykh would inform about his willingness to them?", but I did not dare to ask the minister this. Henceforth, I remembered when I met Al-Shaykh and when 'Abd-al-Karim called me in Asfahan saying that he is a brother for Shaykh Muhammad (he means me!) and gave secret details about Shaykh Muhammad. By saying this, I figured out that he became a trusted person. Also, I remember when he said that "Safiyyah" has followed him in Asfahan and (illegible) for two months ...

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... therefore, I said to him: neither me because cleanliness is next to godliness; so why I saw the dirty of Al-Sahan Al-Sharif (T.C: the holy shrine) and the streets. I saw even the schools were dirty, but what we can do with the water shortage and the government carelessness.

The surprise was in the answers of the "alternative" which was the same of the answers of the "Reference Scholar" in Al-Najaf. The addition was in his "the government cleanliness carelessness" statement at which I was chocked with this similarity. However, the Reference in Al-Najm answered me (illeigible), I asked him with these questions Parisian, and he answered in a same way.

The secretary said to me; if you talked with the alternatives, you would find that their answers are the same of the originals. So I claimed that I know the way of thinking of Shaykh Al-Islam because my teacher is Shaykh Ahmad Afandam, and I said: "would you like to give an example about him? The secretary said yes and talk to the alternative about him.

Consequently, I moved towards the alternative and said; "do you prefer obeying Al-Khalifah, Afandam?" He said: "Yes, my son. It is the same of obeying the God and his Messenger!" I asked; "proof it". He said; "have you heard the God's Saying (Obey Allah and the Messenger in addition to the in charge of you)". I asked; "if Al-Khalifah was in charge of us, how the God would order us to obey "Yazid" who invaded Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah and killed Al-Hussayn (Grandson of the Messenger)? And how to obey Al-Walid who used to drink alcohol?". He said; "O' my son, Yazid was the Khalifah who was charged by the God, and he repented because of killing Al-Hussayn. Also, invading Al-Madinah was right because they denied the obedience. Regarding Al-Walid, he used to drink Alcohol mixed with water which is something permitted in the Islam."

However, my Shaykh "Ahmad Afandam" asked me those questions, and that is why I repeated the same questions to show that his answers are the same with small differences.

After this interview, I said to the secretary; what is the benefit of this sketch? He said: we know how the Sultans and the Muslims' scholars think whether they were Sunnah or Shi'i and that is how we put the right solutions in order to opposed them in the matters.

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...and replacing it with the weakness factors.

1. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the disagreement between the Sunna and Shiites, the disagreement between the rulers and the peoples, the disagreement between the governments of the (Turks and Persians), the disagreement between the clans and the disagreement between the scholars and the government.
2. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the ignorance and illiteracy that are almost spread all over the Muslims.
3. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the dormancy of spirit, the disintegrated knowledge and lack of inspiration.
4. The followings are some of their weakness factors: completely abandoning the life in this world and being devoted to the other life and working only for it.
5. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the dictatorship of the rulers and the extensive tyranny.
6. The followings are some of their weakness factors: unsafe roads and the interrupted communications except in few cases.
7. The followings are some of their weakness factors: declining of the public health. Plague and microbial diseases are occupying the country in a continuous manner; each time and killing tens of thousands of people on each time.
8. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the destruction of the country, the spreading of the deserts, the blockage of the rivers and the scarce of farms.
9. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the disorder in all the administrative affairs. There are no system, no standards, no references and no laws. Even though they are proud of Koran, but they are not adhering to its instructions.
10. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the deterioration of the economics in a shameful way, poverty is everywhere.
11. The followings are some of their weakness factors: lack of real regular armies, insufficient weapons and the low level of the available weapons.
12. The followings are some of their weakness factors: women contempt and ignoring the women rights.
13. The followings are some of their weakness factors: the dirtiness and griminess in the markets, streets, bodies and everywhere.

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- 5- They necessitate Al-Jihad.
- 6- The Shiites believe that the non-Muslim people are unclean, whatever his belief was.
- 7- They also believe that Islam is superior and nothing that can be superior to it.
- 8- The Shiites believe building churches is forbidden and illegal in the Islam Land.
- 9- Most Muslims believe of taking out the Jews and Christians from the Arab Island.
10. They extensively practice and worship (praying, fasting, performing Hajj) and so on.
- 11- The Shiites believe that the one fifth should be paid to their scholars.
12. They are strongly adhered to the Islamic belief.
13. They raise their children in strictly as the traditional way of their fathers and ancestors in order to impossible to distinguish between the sons and the fathers.
14. Women are covered with a strong hijab (TC: Scarf and other supplementary clothes used to cover the hair, face and neck of the woman)
15. They are considering the collective prayers many times a day.
16. They consider the tombs of the prophet, his family and the good people as centers for their gathering and movement starting.
17. Among them, many individuals are affiliated to the prophet (his sons) to remind about the prophet and make the prophet alive in their thoughts.
18. The people of Shiites also consider (Al-Husayniyat) (TC: large mosques) where they gather in the special occasions and meet their instructors who will strengthen the belief in their souls and motivate them to do well.
19. They consider enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong.
20. They consider marriage, multi-children families and polygyny.
21. They consider that guiding somebody to Islam is better than the life in this world with all its temptations.
22. They consider that the one who is the first to do something good will rewarded for it and for everybody who will follow his line of conduct.
23. They highly evaluate Koran and the speeches of Muhammad, the prophet. They also consider that following them will be rewarded. The book then recommended expanding the weakness factors and hiding the strength factors. In doing so, the book listed sufficient proofs.

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Neither Muhammad nor any of his successors has ministers, regimes, administrations or laws.

10. The deterioration of the economics is an expected result for the above-mentioned deteriorations and it can be worse by burning the crops, sinking the commercial ships, burning the markets, damaging the bridges, taking hold of water, farms and the whole country and poisoning the public drinking water.

11. The rulers can be distracted by corruption, alcohols, gambling and by spending the money in their personal affairs so that no enough money would be left for weapons and army rations.

12. It could be spread that Islam has despised women; is not stated in Koran that (Men are the protectors and maintainers of women) and not stated in Sunna that (The woman is completely evil).

13. The dirtiness and griminess are a result for the scarce of water. It is necessary to avoid increasing the water in the country, what ever the reason was.

Regarding the recommendations of the book to efface the strength points, the recommendations are:

- 1- The necessity to restore the national and regional feud as well as the linguistic and color fanaticism and others among Muslims. It also recommended to pay the attention of Muslims to their past civilizations and pre-Islamic heroes such as the revival of pharaohism in Egypt, the (illegible) in Persia and the Babylonism in Iraq (to the end of the long list that was set by the book)
- 2- The four following issues should be widely spread: alcohols, gambling, prostitution and eating pork secretly and explicitly. The book then recommended to strongly cooperating with the Jewish, Christians, Magian and the non-Muslims living in the Islamic countries to renew the above callings. The book recommended to allot (salaries) from the treasury of the (Ministry of Colonies) for the employees who are spreading the callings among the Muslims. He claimed to assign rewards and temptations for each who is trying to enlarge the circles of the four above issues more and more... The book also recommended protecting the representatives of the Great Britain Government explicitly and implicitly. The book recommends to do exert every effort to rescue any one among those who are spreading the four above calls and falls under the punishment of the Muslims... The book also recommended to spread (usury) in all its forms. In addition to destroying the national economy, usury encourages Muslims to cross the laws of Koran. Any who breaks a law

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Two religions should be gathered in the Arab Island (TC: Possibly, there is a missing word "No"). If it were correct, the wife of the prophet would be neither a Jew nor a Christian. The same applied to the prophet's companion (Talha) whose wife was a Jew. Moreover, the prophet did not negotiate the Christians of Najran.

10. It is necessary to distract the Muslims away from worships and to make them doubt about their significance. Allah stands not in need of any of people obedience. Hajj and any other meeting of Muslims such as (the collective praying) and attending Al-Husayn meetings should be strongly prohibited. Also prohibited should be the sad march, building mosques, tombs, Al-Ka'bah (Sacred Mosque), Al-Husayniyat (TC: Shiite mosques) and schools.

11. They must suspect the one-fifth portion and that it is restricted only to the gains of war but not in including other profits. The duty is to grant the one fifth to the prophet himself or to the Al-Imam but not to the Scholars. Moreover, the Scholars are buying with the people money houses, palaces, sumpters and gardens. Therefore, it is not allowed by religion to pay them the one fifth.

12. It is necessary to weaken the relation between Muslims and Islam by making them in doubt about the Belief and by accusing Islam of being a religion that calls for backwardness and disorder. Therefore, the Islamic countries lagged behind and became full of disturbances and thefts.

13. It is necessary to separate between the fathers and their sons so that the sons will be out of their parents' control. At that time, we will raise their sons to make them separate from their fathers and consequently detach from their belief, religious guidance and scholars.

14. It is necessary to seduce (women) be making them abandon Al-'Aba'ah (TC: the Islamic clothes or cloak) claiming that Al-'Aba'ah is the custom clothes of Bani Al-'Abbas rulers but not an original Islamic custom. Therefore, people used to see the prophet's wives and the woman used to participate in all affairs. After getting women out of Al-'Aba'ah, they will be used to seduce the young men so that they will be corrupted. It is necessary to get first the non-Muslim women from the Al-'Aba'ah to make them an example for the Muslim women.

15. The Collective Praying should be stopped claiming that the Al-Imam is corrupted. Al-Imam disadvantages should be announced and made public to initiate grievance, by all means, between Al-Imam and his followers.

16. The graves and tombs should be destroyed claiming that they were built after the prophet and it is Heresy. It is necessary to distract people from visiting the tombs by making people in doubt about whether those tombs belong to the prophet and the Imams...

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**In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate**  
Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Mr.: General Director of M4

Subject: Humphrey's Memoirs

Below is a summary of the most important parts included within the memoirs:-

1. Details about his trip to Iraq to implement the goals of the English policy, which are maintaining the controlled part under its authority, and to control the remaining part. Also, the special committees that were formed by the British Ministry of Colonies to achieve its goals.
2. Britain was worry about the Islam issue and the Islamic countries; in this sense, his task was assigned to look for the weakness points in Muslims, to be acknowledged about the disputes among them, and to provide the Ministry of Colonies with accurate information.
3. Details of his knowledge about a person called (Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab) and his assessment for the weakness and strength points as well as detailed information about the character of (Muhammad). This is because Humphrey found in him his ideal model through which he can achieve his task. In addition, a detailed description for the social life in Iraq comprising the sectarian, religious and tribal disputes was included.
4. He submitted a suggestion to the Ministry of Colonies regarding the necessity to set plans to enable them to control the mouth of Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to make Iraq subjugated.
5. His task in Iraq took three years during which he was submitting monthly reports to the Ministry of Colonies. The Ministry expressed its satisfaction regarding the submitted reports, especially the issue of (Muhammad).

(1-3)

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**In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate**  
Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:

6. He described the situation that exposed to him when they made him enter a room in which there were 10 people representing the original people of the Otmani Sultan and Sunna and Shiite Muslim Scholars. He provided the above-mentioned with the information coming from their sources to know how Muslim Sultans and Scholars think to set the proper solutions for judging concerning the political and religious issues. After forwarding questions to the above-mentioned, he was surprised by their answers that were 70% identical to the answers of the original people.
7. He was given a 1000-sheet book titled "How to destroy Islam" that includes the weakness and the strength points in Muslims and how to eliminate the strength points. The recommendations of the book were to maintain each weakness point, amid them:-
  - a. Restoration of the sectarian, national, regional and linguistic disputes
  - b. Spreading the four issues (alcohols, gambling, prostitution and pork) as well as cooperating with the Jews, Christians, Magian and the non-Muslims living in Islamic countries. Allocate salaried to the employees who work on spreading these four issues.
  - c. Accusing the Scholars with different accusations and making some of their collaborators join the scholars. Making people doubt about the speeches of the prophet, distributing a faked Koran and distract people from worshipping and make them doubt about its significance.
  - d. Spreading usury, seducing the women, destroying the tombs... etc
8. The thinking of the leaders in the British government was directed to destroy Islam and Muslims internally through an accurate, well-set and long-term plan that lasts for a century.

(2-3)

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**In the Name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate**  
Presidency of the Republic  
The Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:

9. The information included within the memoirs can be utilized to set the annual plans, especially the plans related to the neighboring countries and the Arabian countries (the Gulf countries).

For your information

Regards

Signature  
Jawad Kazim Muhammad  
Tracking Department  
18 January 2001

*Comrade Abu-Muhammad  
I was acknowledged, thanks*


*Kindly, send messages to the directors of the Field Operating Bases. We already sent copy of the memoirs to them. Please get their suggestions on how to utilize the memoirs in the annual plans of M1 and M2.*

*Signature  
18 / I*

(3-3)

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**



(SATTS N.M) / 4

Notification  
M4/2/1/3

Date: 30 / 11 / 200 (illegible)

Ref/ 519

**To/ M4/7**

In reference to your secret letter number M4/7/451 on 20/1/2001, we would like to inform you that our Field operating Bases have considered the content of the memoirs (Humper) regarding the strategic planting.

For your information

Regards


Signature

M2 Director  
29/1

(1-1)  
Secret

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Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service



(SATTS N.M) / 4

Notification  
M4/7/3

Date: 20 / 1 / 2001

Ref/ 415

**To: the Directors of the Field operating Bases ( )**

Mr. General Director of M4 has instructed to know your opinion about the possibility to utilize (Humper's Memoirs), a copy of which was referred to you, in preparing the annual plans, specially the plans of the first and second Field operating Bases.

For your information and provide your opinion

Signature  
Director of M4/7  
20 January 2001

*Juwad 20/1*

(1-1)  
Secret

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In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate (SATTS J)  
54/12/1

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service**



**Secret and Confidential**

Ref.: 118  
Date / / 14 H  
10 / 1 / 2001

**To: Mr. General Director of M4**

Mr. Director of the Intelligence Service has instructed not to nominate for work in our Field Operating Bases any who does not know the language of the country where the base is located or any of the active languages that will enable him to act in that country in the future.

Kindly, to arrange for the necessary actions  
..... Appreciation

Signature  
Director of M1  
10 January 2001

*Kindly, inform their Excellences the Directors of the Field Operating Bases and inform the general director of M5 and the director of M4 when requesting to nominate somebody.*

*Signature*  
10 / 1

17  
11/1

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In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Top Secret and Urgent

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service**

Ref 323  
Date 3/6/2000

Notification

**Mr. Director of M4**

Kindly review the content of our confirmation letter number 2617 on 8 May 2000.  
Kindly, reply urgently.

Regards


Signature  
Director of the M4/7  
3 June 2000

*Ahmad Rashid*  
3/6

*Illegible*  
3/6

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Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Intelligence Service



(SATTS N.M) / 4

Notification  
M4/ (SATTS D")

Date/ / 14 H  
25 / 6 / 2001 / 19  
Ref/ 2244

To / M4/7/3

Reference to your circulated letter number 2665 on 9 May 2000, please find attached the mechanism of action (the action plan) of our Field Operating Base to implement the instructions of the System Director.


For your information

Regards

Signature  
For / the Director of the M4  
25 July 2000

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**Republic of Iraq**  
**Presidency of the Republic**  
**Intelligence Service**



(SATTS N.M) / 4

**Secret**

Notification  
M4/ D1

Date/ / 14 H  
29 / 1 / 2001 /  
Ref/ 76

**Mr. Director of M4/7**

Reference to your circulated letter numbered secret 3/451 on 20/1/2001.  
We can utilize Humphreys' memoirs in preparing the annual plans of the First Field Operating Base in the following fields:

1. The necessity to collecting the detailed information including the traditions and the customs about the targeted country; In addition, necessary is speaking fluently the language or the dialect of that country before planting the resources or the officers.
2. Emphasizing on the spiritual and psychological aspects in studying the problems and the sectarian conflicts in the targeted country to utilize them in implementing the intelligence tasks
3. Having a good cover and preparing it before going to the directed country.
4. Spreading rumors and misleading information that will weaken the country.
5. Setting an accurate plan to check and verify the resources and watching their movements and attitudes within the targeted country.
6. Adopting the long-term plans in tracking and reevaluating the intelligence process from time to time to avoid the weakness points, to deepen, enhance and develop the positive aspects.

For your information

Regards

Signature  
Director of M1  
29 January 2001

(1-1)

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In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate  
**Secret**

**Presidency of the Republic**  
**Iraqi Intelligence Service**  
M4/5

**To: Director of M4**

**Subject: Instructions of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director**

Referring to the circular of the M4/7, numbered 2665 and dated 09 May 2000, below the achievements:

1. Routine and bureaucracy in the work:

The following actions were taken to overcome the routine and bureaucracy in the work:

- A. The advantage use for the Iraqis who reside outside Iraq through the immigrant conference and their relatives inside Iraq
- B. Manage the sources from inside
- C. Achieve some of the complicated work
- D. Communications with the foreign intelligence officers
- E. Recruit specific foreign sources from different nationalities for the first time
- F. Work on the scientists, researchers and who infected with the depleted uranium, bring them to Iraq to expose the American and British crimes of the prohibited weapons usage and its affect on the health and the environment in Iraq
- G. Patience in following up
- H. Provide the advanced military technological experience for the concerned governmental departments
- I. Check the source periodically
- J. Use the genealogical relations of the target in tracking him

**Secret**  
(1-3)

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In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

Secret

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

To:

Subject:

2. Contact the inactive sources:

Re-contacting seven sources was done and still working on other sources

3. The Section requirements from the M10 researches:

Four researches were requested from the M10 researches that concern the section objectives and interests according to our notification that numbered 1212, dated 20 November 1999 and addressed to M4/7. We did not receive it from the 10<sup>th</sup> Directorate until now.

4. Utilizing the delegations:

The section is working on this direction by charging their delegates with the governmental departments to meet the sources and follow up some of the objectives and interests, in addition to discuss some of the work plan details with the posts. The results depend on the capacity and ability of the delegated officer and the nature of the delegation work.

5. Evaluate the officers' effort:

The work is taking place according to this principle. The Director of the Intelligence Service honored some of the Section officers, thanked and appreciated their special efforts in addition to notice some of the weak points in some officers. The Director of the Intelligence Service was informed about that.

6. The work is going on in this direction in spite of the troubles and difficulties that we face.

7. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the instructions are taking place in the section and we always direct the officers.

(2-3)

**Page 203**

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate  
**Secret**

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

To:

Subject:

8. Recommendation to find foreign employment opportunities:  
We always instruct and educate the section officer on that principle.

9. Achieve Justice:

This principle is taking place in the section as long as it is our concern. We work on carrying it out accurately and according to the retribution fair and accurate principle, because we believe that this principle has the main part in developing the work and fighting the groove.

Kindly acknowledge, with appreciation.

(TC: Signature)  
Director of Section 5  
12 June 2000

(3)

**Page 204**

In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate  
**Secret**

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

**To: Director of the M4  
Subject: Instructions of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Director**

Referring to the attached circular of M4/7, numbered 2665, dated 09 May 2000 and including the instructions of the Intelligence Service Director and execution machinery, we would like to indicate the following:

1. Execution procedures:
  - A. About the inactive sources, a comprehensive study was done for the active and inactive sources records to active the working sources and finds the solutions to active the inactive sources whether through the posts or the center.
  - B. About defining the section requirements from the researches, the necessary action was taken with the M10.
  - C. Delegations: The section did not delegate any delegation for a certain assignment. After the instructions of the Intelligence Service Director, the delegations of the sections were within the membership of governmental delegation.
  - D. About the other instructions of the Intelligence Service Director, educating the section affiliates is carrying out whether through meetings or the daily mail.

(1-2)

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In The Name Of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

To:  
Subject:

**2. Implementation Mechanism:**

- A. At the end of each year, perform an inventory for the inactive sources that was activated or the taken actions to execute that after an annual preview for the sources records.
- B. Define the yearly need for the delegations that concern the section activities by the end of the year inventory to be executed at the next year, in addition to another inventory for the executed delegations with the occurred results.
- C. At the end of each year, prepare a list that includes the section need of the researches to notify M10.

Kindly acknowledge, with appreciation


(TC: Signature)  
Director of M4  
22 June 2000

*Muhammad*  
*22 June*

(2-2)

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**



Secret

Date: 30 December 2000

Notification

Reference: 6352

To: General Director of M4  
General Director of M5  
Deputy of the M4 Director

We attached five copies of the Hamfar memorandums, the Iraqi Intelligence Service order to let the Directors of the International and Political Sections to view them, with appreciation.

(TC: Signature)  
Director of M1  
26 December 2000

*Follow up*  
*1) Distribute*  
*2) Memorandum*

(TC: Signature)  
*01 January*

**Page 207**

...the relation with it and including number (1562, 6768, Sulayman Nayif, 3<sup>rd</sup> Division 3). A work plan was prepared to activate them was sent to the stations.

**3. The Section needs from the researches with M10:**

The section with the coordination with M10 defined the nature of the researches that serve the concerned departments such as preparing researches about the Iraqi's contributions to the Opposition Russian parties through allotting oil and its effect on the Russian political decision, which can support raising the blockade issue.

In addition, request studies about the presidential elections in Boland and Hungary and the intelligence services in them to update the database.

**4. Utilizing the delegations:**

We would like to indicate that although the section delegations are limited, it is invested for the benefit of the work. The section charges the delegate to meet...

(2-4)

**Page 208**

... one of the working source in the field, passing instructions to the station or studying the field that delegated to and providing us with a report including notes about the political, economical, social and the intelligence situation in the field.

**5. Evaluate the officers' effort:**

The sections and departments directors perform an educational part in evaluating the officers' quality effort and demand the rewards on any special effort including the thankful, appreciation and honoring.


**6. The two paragraphs (4 and 5) of the instructions** are taking place in the section accurately and there is no notice on the contrary of that.

**7. Recommendations to find foreign employment opportunities:**

The Directors of the Section and departments instruct the officers to avoid the recommendations. Nominate the officers to be delegated outside according to their abilities, specialization and performance evaluation.

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**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**



*3<sup>rd</sup> Division*  
2644  
10/5

Secret

Date: 10 May 2000

Notification

Reference: 2510

To: M4/7

Reference to your circulation 2467, dated 30 April 2000, here below what is requested in the above circulation.


1. Tehran Station is directed to benefit from the complicated work on the Iranian field because of difficulties that the embassy employees face from the Iranian Intelligence. In the issue we have to cases, the first one is about code name (Barq) that is an Iranian citizen and was recruited under a Jordanian cover and after two years he was officially informed that he is working for Iraq. The second case is the code name (Al-Tariq), Iranian citizen and he is working under the UAE cover until now.
2. About using the Iraqis who work in Iran, there is no one in Iran except the deported Iranian from Iraq and the fugitives who are dependent under the parties and the traitor forces to Iran. Those are controlled by Iranian Intelligence. However, the station worked on benefiting from number of them. Now it has several chances to be recruited. Some of them are working for the 40<sup>th</sup> Directorate; some of them are the Iraqi fugitive to Iran 'Imad Al-Sudani and the code name 99.
3. We will ensure on Tehran station to execute the instructions of the Director of the Intelligence Service.

(1-4)  
Secret

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In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

**Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**



Secret

Date: 03 July 2000

Reference: 1512

Notification  
(SATTs M4/3/A/2)

**To: M4/7/3**

Referring to your circulation, numbered 665, dated 09 May 2000 and attaching a copy of our memorandum about the mechanism of the Field operating Base work, which is your above-mentioned circulation subject matter. With appreciation

(Translator Comments: Signature)

Director of the M3

03 July 2000

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In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

**To:**

**Subject:**

7. Classify some cases through the objectives chart and follow up in order to benefit it.
8. Tracking and following up the Israeli penetration in Jordan by the established companies and purchased lands.
9. Identify the Israel attempts to recruit some individuals of the Arabic nationalities against our establishments inside and outside Iraq.
10. Use a new system in enquiring the information about the Palestinians who visit and reside in Iraq by a computer and design a special program that verify the daily incoming deferent information, compare and update it.
11. Use the internet in seeking the deferent information about the strategic targets in the Israeli and Palestinian fields for the Computer and Information Room in away that cannot be discovered.
12. Create an information room concern Israel and Palestine, define the strategic targets on it and update the information continually.
13. Reconnect the communication with three sources of a group of twelve inactive sources and a plan was done to ...

(2-3)

**Page 212**

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate

**Presidency of the Republic  
Iraqi Intelligence Service**

**To:**

**Subject:**

... work on them according to the stations capability that are available for them to find out whether to keep up the relation or cut it if the communications are not available.

14. Coordinate with the M10 to prepare two researches on Israel and the peaceful progress.

16. Prepare a study about the unusual Israeli operations against Iraq and our counter operations.

Kindly acknowledge, your order, with appreciation.

(TC: Signature)

Director of M3

20 May 2000

*Riyad  
20 May*

*I became aware, and we are  
looking for the results of  
this mechanism*

(TC: Signature)  
*22 May*

*To be presented in the meeting with Head of the Divisions*

(TC: Signature)

*22 May*

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**To: Director of M4**

**Subject: Instructions of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in his speech on Christmas celebrations**

**1. Avoiding typical and routine system work**

West Europe Section worked on that instruction by:

- A. Controlling the sources from inside
- B. Using the internet network to seek the information
- C. Checking the sources when they arrive Iraq
- D. Using the Iraqis who visit Iraq
- E. Communicate with the foreigners who visit Iraq and use who have interests or contracts
- F. The active coordination with the comparable divisions of the 5<sup>th</sup> Directorate and the other Directorates to settle out the pending issues and make plans for the new issues
- G. Inviting the political, party and parliament delegations to take a look on the situations and participate in raising the blockade
- H. Sending the delegations to the section work fields through moving and meeting the sources

(1-4)

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**2. Contact the inactive sources**

Re-contact the inactive sources through holding the conferences inside Iraq, delegations or making plans for the stations actions to re-contact them.

**3. The Sections needs from the researches with 10<sup>th</sup> Directorate:**

The 10<sup>th</sup> Directorate was notified efficiently about the researches that the Section need in its work, defined its nature, axis. The most important researches that concerns the hostile (Indayt) British Organizations that was carrying on propaganda for judging the command in Iraq, the reports about the United States and Israel pressures on Germany and Spain and reports about the European Union and the NATO with its security agreements and its extensions in the middle east.

**4. Investing delegations:**

Delegations of the sections were invested for the section works that...

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... the delegate is charged to meet some of sources who work on the field especially in the fields that do not include active stations, or passing the center instructions to the station to active its work and settle down the pending issues. Some of the delegated officers was honored and appreciated by the Intelligence Service Director on executing an important mission during his delegation. He was honored and appreciated by the General Director of the 4<sup>th</sup> Directorate for the same issue. In spite of that, the section complains from the shortage on delegations because the delegations committee relegated most of the delegations of the ministries to other directorates.

**5. Evaluating the Officers efforts:**

Work on evaluating the officer qualitative efforts and demand the honor for them on any special work.

6. About the paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, they are accurately in progress and the section is working on instructing the officers to avoid the recommendations that concern delegations.

(3-4)

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7. Work is in progress to execute paragraph (9), hopping to achieve justice and avoiding complements or personal relations.

For your information

Regards

(TC: signature)  
Branch 1 Director  
25 June 2000

(4 - 4)

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Centralism is getting stronger and stronger everyday, and if a sudden disaster does not occur; then the good seed will grow and grow until it fruits the desired results achieved.

2 January 1973

**Page 218**

...the countries in which he will be able in, by the name of Allah, heathenism and Infidelity, and they undervalue, according to the space available, the character of Prophet Muhammad, his successors, and the Muslim men.

5- Spreading chaos and terrorism in the country according to what can be done.

6- Publishing an edited Koran that proves what has been added and deleted from the Prophetic tradition (Hadith).

This huge program does, not intimidate the secretary told me after he revealed the mentioned program, our duty is to let the seed fruit, and then the upcoming generations will continue the resume. The government of Great Britain is used to being patient, and going step by step, Prophet Muhammad is just one man who managed to make this amazing overthrown, so let (Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab) be like his Prophet Muhammad so he can do this potential overthrown.

Days later, I excused the Minister and the Secretary, said good-bye to my family and friends, and just when I wanted to leave; my young said "come back quickly daddy", tears were in my eyes and I couldn't hide them from my wife, we kissed each other passionately then I left heading to Basrah. After a tiring trip, I reached Basrah at night time then went to ('Abd-al-Rida)'s house and he was asleep. When 'Abd-al-Rida saw me, he received me and gave me a warm welcome, so I slept there until the morning. He told me that Sheikh Muhammad had returned to Basrah then traveled, and mentioned that he left a book for me; I read in the book that the sheikh was telling me that he had traveled to Najd, and he wrote his address there. Therefore, I traveled in the morning heading to Najd and I got there after a very hard trip to find Sheikh Muhammad in his house. Weakness signs were obvious so see in him but I did not say anything about it, but it turned to be later that he had got married and he is using all his strength with his wife. I advised to him to stop whatever he was doing, so he took my advice and we came up with the decision to pretend that I am his slave that he bought from the market, and that this slave has just returned from a trip that his master ordered him to take, and so he told his friends this story and the people started knowing me as his slave. I stayed with him for two years where we did the necessary arrangements to spread the call. In the year (1143) Hijri he gained more strength and managed to gather some allies, they were not bad. He introduced the call in vague words, (Illegible), then he went off spreading out the call. I gathered a tough gang around him, used to give them money, and whenever I felt that they are weakening, I would make them pull their strings together by giving them more money and I was inspiring them whenever they feel weaken in order

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9- Prevent using the Arabic language as much as possible, and expanding the use of other languages such as; (Sanskrit), (Farsi), (Kurdish), and (Pashto), and reviving the common languages in the Arabic countries, and expanding the local accents which is branched from the Arabic language in order to prevent the Arabs from using the formal Arabic language which is the language of the Holy Koran and the Sunna.

10- Planting agents around the leaders and their families to reach ranks like consultants, in order for the ministry to reach those leaders through the consultants, the best way to do that is by male and female slaves with very high potentials. The slaves must be trained in the ministry then sold on the slaves market to the close ones of the leaders like their sons and daughters, wives and the people the leaders listen to, so they can gradually get closer to the leaders and be their mothers and consultants and around them like the bracelet around the wrist.

11- Expanding the preaching call by entering the preachers in all the specialties especially the accountants, doctors, engineers and all the ones related to them, also building churches, hospitals, libraries and charitable institutions, right in the center of the Islamic countries. Moreover, spreading millions of free Christianity books between the Muslims and be aware to put the Christian history side by side with the Islamic history. Planting spies and agents in the monasteries and the mosques as monks and nuns who their job will be to make the communications easy with the Christian groups, and to scout the Muslims movements and status (quantity), and an intensive group of scholars must be gathered in order for them to distort the Islamic history and falsify their books after taking full awareness on their situation and status.

12- Spoiling the Muslim youth, boys and girls, make them have doubts about their religion and corrupting their manners by schools, books, clubs, brochures and non Muslim friends who will open the way for this, it is important to establish secret institutions from young Christians and Jews and others so they can be the trap which will catch the Muslim youth all over Iraq.

13- Inflaming the domestic wars revolution, border conflicts between the Muslims and the non Muslims and between the Muslims themselves forever, so it can exhaust their power and get their thinking off prosperity, unifying the target and to exhausting their mental energy and financial resources and vanishing their youth

**Page 220**

and the intelligence, as they worked on the same plan that we decided. They penetrated within the Muhammads; by opening schools to raise their children, established churches between them, spread liquor, gambling and prostitution between them, made the Muslim youth doubt their own religion, created conflicts between their governments and created disorder here and there. They filled the Muslims' houses with beautiful Christian girls, who made them weak, and they became less attached to their religion, less united and not close, then the great ones declared military wars on them to make Islam vanish in these countries.

The Secretary revealed to me the second secret, which he promised, I was anxious to know it especially after I tasted the first one, but the second one was a 50 page document that stated the plans which aimed to destroy Islam and the Muslims in one century, so that Islam will be only news to tell later on. The document was addressed to the General Chiefs of the Ministry for that reason, it consisted of 14 articles and it warned from exposing this document to anybody and emphasized on total discretion so that the Muslims will not discover it and take opposition plan. The bottom line of this document was:

- 1- The definite cooperation with the Russian Czars (Creasers) to take over the Islamic area from Bukhari, Tajikistan and Armenia to Kharisan and what's around them, in order to occupy the sides of the Turk countries that surround Russia.
- 2- The definite cooperation with France and Russia to put a plan to destroy the Islamic world from the inside and the outside.
- 3- Creating big differences and clashes between the two countries; Turkey and Farsi, enriching the sectarianism between the mentioned parties, lighting up clashes between all the tribes and Islamic people and countries that are neighbors, reviving all the creeds even the old ones and creating conflicts between them.
- 4- First: Giving pieces of Islamic lands to non-Muslims people; firstly: (Yathrib) (TC: Al-Medina city in Saudi Arabia) to the Jews and (secondly)

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...and the good ones, the Prophet was buried next to his mother, Abu Bakir and ‘Umar were buried in Al-Baqi’, ‘Uthman is buried in an unknown place, ‘Ali was buried in Basrah, Al-Mughirah Ibn Shu’bah was buried in Najaf, Al-Husayn’s head was buried in Khananu and his body is buried in an unknown place, and the Al-Alfayn graves are in Al-Kazimiyyah not Al-Kazim and Al-Juwad (from the Prophet’s family), Maroon’s grave is in Tus not Al-Rida’s grave from the family of the Prophet, and in Samirra’ the grave of Bani ‘Abbas is there not the graves of Al-Hadi, Al-‘Askari and Al-Mahdi from the family of the Prophet. Al-Baqi’ must be leveled to the ground and all the graves and domes of the Muslims must be destroyed in all their countries.

17- Concerning the family of the Prophet, annulling their lineage is a must, and also doubting their relation to the Prophet then claiming others who are not the family of the Prophet also wore the black and green turban, so the people will get confused and misjudge the family of the Prophet and their lineage, also the gentlemen and the religious men must take their turbans off in order for them not to receive any respect from the people.

18- Al-Husayniyyat must be destroyed and accused that it is a heresy and delusional, and that it was never there at the Prophet and his friends’ time, and all the ways must be used to prevent people from visiting it, also the number of preachers must be reduced and special taxes must be imposed which the preacher and the owner of Al-Husayniyyah must pay.

19- Feeding freedom to the Muslims is a must, so each person can do whatever he wants and there is no such thing as ordering to do good acts and forbidding the abominable, neither teaching the guides of Islam, also teaching the Muslims that Jesus has a religion and Moses has a religion, and that nobody sleeps in anybody’s grave and forbidding the abominable is strictly to the Sultan not the public.

20- There is no such thing as birth control, and the man cannot marry more than one woman, also canceling all the restrictions on marriage such as, no Arabic can marry a Persian woman, vise versa, and that no Turkish man can marry an Arabic woman and vise versa.

21- Completely preventing and forbidding preaching or leading to Islam is necessary, and that Islam is a nationalism religion and that’s why it is said in the Holy Koran “The (Quran) is indeed a reminder for thee and for thy people).

22- The good Sunna acts must be narrowed down, and make it controlled by the government, and even prevent anybody from building a mosque, a school, an orphanage or any of the good Sunna acts and charity.

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It is easy on him to break into the rest of the rules... and the book explained that it is necessary to show the Muslims that the forbidden is (the doubled usury). The Koran said “devour not usury, doubled and multiplied” and not all the usury in all its ways.  
3-4- Also the relations between the Muslims and their scholars must be weaken, and that is by charging the scholars with crimes and planting agents as if they are scholars, then let them commit crimes in order to make the Muslims doubt every scholar whether he is an agent or a scholar. It is definite that these kinds of scholars must be planted in Al-Azhar, Al-Astana, Najaf and Karbala. Some of the ways to weaken the relations between the Muslims and their scholars is open up a school through the ministry’s agents, to teach the Muslim kids how to hate Islam, hate the scholars, hate the caliphs, mention his bad characters, and that he is busy being pleasured, and wasting the people’s money on luxury and corruption, and that he nothing like the Prophet.

5- Doubting the matter of Al-Jihad, and that it was only temporary and ended when that time past.

6- We must get the idea of Impurity (Infidels) out of Al-Shi’ah’s minds, and show tem that Allah said in the Koran “is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them”, and that the Prophet had a Jewish wife (Safiyah) and a Christian wife (Maria), and that the Prophet’s wife can never be impure.

7- The Muslims must think that what the Prophet meant by Islam is (Religion) whether it is Jewish or Christianity not (The Muhammudiyyah), in fact the Koran called every religious person a Muslim; in the Koran Prophet Yusif said “Take thou my soul (at death) as one submitting to thy will (as a Muslim)”, Ibrahim and Isma’il said “Our Lord! Make of us Muslims, bowing to thy (will), and of our progeny a people Muslim”, and Prophet Ya’qub said to his son “Then die not except in the state of submission (to me)”.

8- Respect the churches, since the Prophet and his successors didn’t destroy them, in fact they respected them, and in the Koran “Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues”, the churches are for the Christians, monasteries are for Jews and the synagogues are for Magians, so Islam respects praying places and doesn’t destroy them and prevent entries to them.

9- Doubting the Hadith (Get the Jews out of the Arabs Island) is necessary and the Hadith (Don not

**Page 223**

The book states what necessary action for expanding the weakness points:

1- The differences could be concentrated through increasing mistrust between the quarreling parties, and release books that defame this party or that, and spending money for the sake of destruction and discrimination.

2- Ignorance should be maintained through lack of opening schools, publishing books as well as burning books as much as can be done, forbid people from entering their children to religious school by fabricating accusations against religious men.

3- 4- They could be kept in the state of unconsciousness by gracing paradise in front of them and that they are not responsible for life, widening the Sufi ceremonies, promote books that order abstention like (Restoration of Sciences) book for Al-Ghazali, (Al-Muthnnawi) series, and (Ibn Al-'Arabi) Books.

5- The Dictatorship of rulers may be strengthened by making them believe that they are the shadow of God on the Earth, and that Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali and Bani Umayyah and Bani Al-'Abbas all became rulers by the force of the sword and ruled individually. (Abu Bakr) became ruler by the sword of 'Umar, his terrorism and by burning down houses that did not surrender to his will like the house of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad. ('Umar) became ruler by recommendation from Abi Bakr, 'Uthman became ruler by the order of 'Umar, 'Ali became ruler because the revolutionaries voted for him, Mu'awiyah Became ruler by sword, then Banu Umayyah inherited the rule, Al-Saffah (TC: The Butcher) became ruler by sword, then Banu Al-'Abbas inherited the rule. This indicates that the rule in the Islamic Countries is dictatorial.

6- The countries insecurity could be kept by distracting rulers from punishing the thieves, strengthening them through giving weapons, and seducing them to continuously work through stealing and cheating.

7- Their non-healthy situation could be kept by spreading the (Fate) belief in them, convincing them that this is all from God, and that curing is none useful if not mentioned in Al-Koran, that (Who gives me food and drink \* and when I am ill, it is He who cures me). and didn't He say that (Who will cause me to die, and then to live (again)). Curing is in the hand of God and death is in the hand of God, so there is no way one can be cured without His will, and death is un-avoidable because it is the will of God.

8- Keeping destruction could be existed as mentioned in the third and fourth parts.

9- Keeping the anarchy by clarifying the Islam is a worshipping religion with no system, thus

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The book used to mention after each weakness point that the Islam Law is reversal. Muslims should be kept in ignorance so that they never notice the truth about their religion. The book mentioned that the Islam:

- 1- Order them to unify, intimate and phase out differences. In the Koran (And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves.
- 2- Order them to seek knowledge (Seeking knowledge is necessary for every male and female Muslim)
- 3- Order them to graze. In the Koran (Travel through the earth)
- 4- Order them to request the world. In the Koran (And there are men who say Our Lord! give us good in this world and good in the hereafter).
- 5- Order them to consult. In Al-Quran (conduct their affairs by mutual consultation).
- 6- Order them to provide ways. In the Koran (So traverse ye through its tracts)
- 7- Order them to take care of their bodies and health. (Sciences are four: Jurisprudence to learn religions, Medicine to preserve bodies, Grammar to preserve the tongue and Astrology to preserve eras.
- 8- Order them to build. In the Koran, (It is He who hath created for you all things that are on earth)
- 9- Order them to organize. In the Koran (And produced therein all kinds of things in due balance)
- 10- Order them to strengthen the Economy. In the Koran (Who does not have a source of living, does not have any refugee)
- 11- Order them to strengthen the Army. In the Koran (Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power)
- 12- Order them to respect Women. In the Koran (And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable)
- 13- Order them to stay clean. In the Koran (Cleanliness is next to Godliness)

As for the strong points mentioned by the book and order to destroy is that:

- 1- Never consider national concerns, territories, languages, colors, and countries past.
- 2- Forbid monopoly, prostitution, alcoholic drinks, and pork.
- 3- They are deeply attached to their scientists.
- 4- Attract a big sect of the Muslim Sunni (Al-Khalifah) and consider him an example for the Prophet that should be obeyed as God and the Prophet are obeyed.

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The Political and Religious: (Like) If you new that your enemy will come from the east, put your soldiers in that way to confront him, but if you not new the direction of your enemy, then you should spread your soldiers in all directions. The same for the Muslim because if you new the way he approaches his religion then you should be able to know all the answers of how to defend him back. These answers shall be enough to disjoint the Muslim belief.

Then the secretary handed me a one thousand pages huge book that contains the debates and plans results that happen between those five originals and the five substitutes regarding the military, financial, economic, and religious affairs. I took the book back home and read it all in my three weeks vacation. He ordered me to return the book after reading it, but when I read it, I was astonished about its content from accuracy of debates as if it was real. The answers were seventy percent right regarding my information even if the secretary told me earlier that the right answers of the play were around seventy percent.

The trust in my government's ability grew, where I new that the 'Uthman Empire is approaching its termination in less than a century according to what the book estimated.

The secretary told me: There is another rooms have similar play in respect of the other colonized countries by us, or the countries that our government intend to colonize.

I asked the secretary: From where do you obtain such accurate and estimated substitutes? He said that the scientists in all the country provide us with enough information continuously and our substitutes are specialists in these circumstances. It is natural that if you receive enough information especially if given by substitutes, then your thoughts and conclusions will be similar to his thoughts and conclusions, thus a true copy of him.

The secretary replied: This is the first secret that the Minister ordered me to tell you. As for the second secret, I will tell you about after one month when you finish the book (He means the one thousand pages book that he pointed earlier).

I read the book accurately from the beginning to end where new horizons of knowledge appeared concerning the (illegible) (TC: possibly AL-Muhammadiyyin or the followers of Prophet Muhammad) conditions and their way of thinking also appeared and how they are backward? What are their weak points? The Muslim strong points appeared to me also and what action required for destroy

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He told me: The minister ordered me, and the special committee of the colony affairs authorized me to disclose two very important secrets that you can use in the future, few trustable people know these secrets.

Therefore, he took my hand and entered one of the Ministry rooms, where I was surprised, as found a round table with ten men, wherein one of them was wearing the costume of Ottoman Sultan and speaking English and Turkish. The second one was wearing the costume of Istanbul Shaykh, he also speaks Turkish and English, whereas, the third was wearing the costume of Persian King. The forth was wearing the costume of Shiite Court. The fifth was wearing the traditional costume of the Shiites of Al-Najaf and the afore-mentioned three individuals spoke Persian and English, in addition, each one of them had a writer responsible of recording their conversations. Moreover, he is (Illegible) for one of the five individuals in order to provide him with the information gathered by the agents regarding those five individuals from (Istanbul, Persia and Al-Najaf).

The Secretary said, "Those five individuals represent the origin individuals, we made those just like them, in order to know their way of thinking. On the other hand, we provided those individuals with the information we obtain from Istanbul, Tehran and Al-Najaf. They compare themselves to the original characters then they have to answer our questions. We have noticed that the thinking pattern of those five individuals matches that of the original characters by 70 percent.

The secretary told me to try it for myself, so I met with the Al-Najaf scholar and agreed to ask him about some matters regarding the reference for a tradition in Al-Najaf. I moved towards the substitute individual and asked him, "My Lord, is it permissible that us Shiites would fight the Government because it is a radical and fanatic Sunni government? The substitute paused for a moment and said, "We are not permitted to fight them, as they are Sunnis, meanwhile, all Muslims are brothers, but we are allowed to fight them because they persecute the nation and that is known as enjoying what is right and forbidding? What is wrong? whenever they seize their persecution, then we will let them be. I asked him, "My Lord, what do you think of the impurity of Jews and Christians, are they impure or not? The substitute individual answered, "Yes, they are impure people that we ought to stay away from them. I said, "Why? He answered, "We treat them likewise, they see us as infidels and denies our Prophet Mohammad, Peace be upon him.

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We meet them at the Tigris River so that there would be any suspicions around me. The representative told me that he would tell me the answer, when the mail arrives from London. I had seen during my residency in Baghdad the vast difference between the Caliphate Capital and Baghdad, and how the Turkish intended to humiliate the Iraqi people because they are deceitful Arabs.

While my traveling from Basrah to Karbala' and Najaf, I was very worried about Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahab, where I was not sure that he would not deviate from the path I drew to him. He was mercurial and edgy; actually, I was scared that all my hopes about him would be in vain.

The day I wanted to leave, he wanted to go to Istanbul to check it up, but I strictly prevented him. I told him that I am scared that you may say something that turns you to infidel and thus they killed you. Nevertheless, I had another thing in mind, for I was afraid that he would meet some scholars there that would turn him back to the Sunna path and all my efforts would be in vain.

Moreover, when Shaykh Muhammad did not want to live in Basrah, I suggested that he would go to Asfahan and Shiraz, as they are beautiful and its residents are Shiites, and it is unlikely that the Shiite sect would influence the Shaykh, thus I would have secured him from deviation.

On the other hand, when I was bidding the Shaykh farewell I asked him, "Do you believe in clandestinely? He said yes, as one of the Prophet's Companions, I believe his name was Miqdad, showed his infidelity when the infidels persecuted him and killed his parents, the trap was exposed and the Prophet (Peace be upon Him) aided him.

I told him, "Then beware from the Shiites and do not reveal to them that you are a Sunni to avoid their ravage, meanwhile, enjoy their lands and scientists, get acquainted to their habits and traditions, as it will benefit you in the future.

Before farewell, I provided him with a sum of money for Al-Zakah (TC: alms tax) an Islamic tax that is paid for the sake of the Muslim's interests. I had also purchased a donkey for him to ride and I departed.

Since I left, I knew nothing about his fate and I was extremely worried about that. We differed

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...in subjects that you cannot grasp.

As for the Muslims Imam Shrine- as it is known- it is a beautifully garnished shrine with an attractive sanctuary, along with large gold value and two golden landmarks. Shiites visit it daily in groups to pray and kiss his tomb. Each individual approaches the threshold and kisses it then greets the Imam asking him for permission to enter. Meanwhile, the Shrine surrounds with many rooms, which are dwells for the clergymen and visitors. In Karbala', there are two sanctuaries; the first resemble the 'Ali Sanctuary whereas, the second is for Husayn and 'Abbas sanctuary, the later is Husayn's brother who was killed along with him in Karbala'. The Shiites in Karbala' act as the Shiites in Al-Najaf. Karbala' has a better atmosphere where surrounded with pastures and rivers.

In my travel to Iraq, I discovered a matter that delighted me. The general and private atmosphere shed light to the near end of the regime. The Governor designated by Istanbul was an ignorant and tyrant man, who rules the area as he wishes, as if people were his slaves and the public was not pleased. The Government suppressed Shiites' freedoms; it did not show any interest in them, whereas the Sunnis refused to be ruled by a Turkish individual. They include the noblemen and gentlemen from the Prophet's descendants who believe that they have the right to rule it instead of the Turkish Governor. Furthermore, the country was in a condition of chaos and people were living in poverty and devastation.

Roads were not safe; bandits ambushed the convoys and attacked them if they do not escorted by a police patrol. Thus, convoys would not move unless after being escorted by the Government's armed police.

Conflicts between tribes were still present, where not a day passes by without one of the tribes attack another for killing and robbing.

The ignorance and illiteracy were spread stunningly in a pattern that reminds me with the days the Church took over our countries. For except for the clergymen's class in Al-Najaf and Karbala' and another small group that is attached to them, you can only find one reader or writer in a thousand being.

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...their side is respected for various reasons:

- 1- The Shiite Government in Persia supported them and if the Caliph would harm them, then the relations between the two countries would be tenuous and may sometimes reach war.
- 2- Many armed clans around Najaf support the scholars, and even though their weapons might not be on a high level and their organization is the clan organization, but the Caliph's fight with the clans would mean for these clans to enter in bloody conflicts, and because there is no necessity for repressing the scholars, the government left them.

3- All those scholars are the religious authority for all the poor Shiite in the world, from India, Africa and other countries, if the Government would harm them, it would harm all the Shiites in the world.

About Karbala' story, it begins in the murder of Al-Husayn Bin-'Ali and the son of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet. The people of Karbala' called Al-Husayn to come from Al-Madinah, Al-Hijaz in order to recognize him as a Caliph. Yet when he and his family members reached Karbala'- that is twelve league away from Al-Kufah, the Iraqis revolted against him and went to fight him under the orders of Yazid Bin-Mu'awiyah, the Umayyad Caliph who lives in Syria. Husayn Bin-'Ali and his family bravely fought the massive Umayyad Army until he was killed along with his family members. The Umayyad Army fought with meanness and cruelty. Since that time Shiites have considered this place to be a spiritual center where they visit from all around in numbers that we seldom see in our Christian spiritual (Illegible).

Karbala' is also a Shiite city that includes the Shiite scholars and schools. Both Karbala' and Al-Najaf support each other.

When I had received the orders to go to those two cities, I crossed Basrah to Baghdad, the location of the Governor who was assigned by the Istanbul Caliph. From there I went to Al-Hillah, a city by the Euphrates.

The Euphrates and Tigris are large rivers that cross Iraq from Turkey and flow into the sea.

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Oh Muhammad, do you want me to turn me away from my religion. I told him, "Oh Wahab, religion is the purity of the heart, solitude of the soul and peacefulness against others, did not the Prophet say: (religion is love), and did not Allah tell us in the Qur'an (Serve your Allah until you can see)? If humans were to believe Allah and the afterlife, and he has a pure heart and work, he would be the best of people, yet he has shaken his head in denial and disagreement".

On another time I told him, "Prayer is not compulsory", he asked, "How" I said, "because in the Qur'an, Allah says (complete the prayer for the message of remembrance), the meaning of prayer is mentioning Allah Al-mighty. That is if you mention the name of Allah instead of prayer". Wahab said, "Yes I heard that some scholars did mention the name of Allah during prayer times rather than perform the prayer and I was delighted to hear that for I knew I had gained his trust. After that I found out that he does not care much about the prayer, he prays occasionally, sometimes he does not, especially in the morning, he used to frequently leave prayer where I used to go out with him until after midnight, and he would be exhausted in the morning and can't pray".

That is how I started to decrease the level of faith in the heart of the Shaykh. One time I wanted to discuss a subject about the Prophet, yet he blocked me immediately and said, "If you say anymore thing about this subject I will break any ties with you and I was afraid that everything I worked for might collapse and that is why I seized talking about the Prophet".

I started to enrich his soul, that there might be a third choice other than Sunnis and Shiites, he used to respond to such suggestions that used to fulfill his eagerness and linearization.

Because of Safiyyah, whose relationship with her stayed for a week also in the (new pleasures) we the Shaykh command.

One time I said to the Shaykh, "Is it true that the Prophet fraternize with among his followers?". He said, "Yes, so I said are the rules of Islam temporary or permanent? He said permanent because the Prophet says (Muhammad's laws are the authoritative laws until the Day of Resurrection, and his taboo are the same until the Day of Judgment)". I said, "Then let us both be brothers and at the time I used to follow him every where to and I was interested that...

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I decided to discuss the explanations of the Qur'an with Muhammad on light of our own ideas not that of the Companions of the Prophet, sects or scholars. Thus we used to read the Qur'an and talk about certain points- my intentions was to trick Muhammad- and he always used to indulge in accepting my views to show that he is open-minded and would win my trust.

I told him once, "Jihad is not a compulsory", he asked, "How that is possible and Allah said (Fight infidels)? I said, "Allah says (Fight infidels and hypocrites), if Jihad was a compulsory, then why the Prophet did not fight the hypocrites?" He said, "the Prophet fought them with speech, I said then fighting the infidels is a compulsory in speech". He said, "But the Prophet fought infidels". I replied that his war was self-defense where the infidels wanted to kill the Prophet so he fought them. Muhammad shook his head in approval. I told him once, (the pleasure of woman is permitted). He said no, and then I said Allah says, "Give them their dowry for the enjoyment you have of them as a duty". He said 'Umar deprived pleasure by saying (two pleasures were present at the time of the Prophet, I have forbidden them and punished their violators. I told him: you said that you are more knowledgeable than 'Umar, then why do you follow his. Then if 'Umar says that he has forbidden them and the Prophet did not, then why aren't you taking into consideration the views of the Prophet and the Qur'an and taking that of 'Umar. He was silent, and when I noticed that his silence was for approval and he was influenced by the sexual instinct (he did not have a wife), and I said why don't you and me liberate ourselves and take on a pleasure that we both enjoy?. He shook his head in approval and took full advantage of that situation and decided to bring him a woman that he would be very pleased of. My concern was to soothe his fear from opposing the community, but he stipulated a condition that it should be a secret between the two of us and the woman should not know his name. I immediately went to some Christian women that were recruited by the Ministry of colony to spoil the Muslim youth. I told her the whole issue and gave her the name Safiyyah, and on the designated date, I took the Shaykh to her house where she was alone in the house. The Shaykh signed a one-week-contract and he endowed her gold, and I started along with Safiyyah to guide Shaykh Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-Wahhab. Later Safiyyah gave Muhammad every pleasure and he tasted the delight of violation.

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There are four scholars, Abu-Hanifah, Ahmad Bin-Hanbal, Malik and Muhammad Bin-Idris, so some caliphs forced them to imitate some one that is one of the four and he is not a scholar to work in jurisprudence in the fields of the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. He in fact was worried about grasping their meaning and that ban for explaining the jurisprudence consolidates the stillness in Islam. Shiites took advantage of this opportunity to spread their religion on a wide range, even when the Shiite population was only one tenth that of the Sunnis, they started to increase until they had the same numbers as the Sunnis. The result was natural jurisprudence is an evolution in the explanation of Islam and a renewal of the way the Qur'an and Sunna are grasped regarding the needs of life such as advanced weapons contrary to the limitation of the sect in a certain method and shutting any attempt to grasp or listen to the requirements of the ages. It is compared to an outdated weapon, and if your weapon is outdated and that of your enemy is new, then you will inevitably lose the battle, sooner or later. (I believe that the day will come when the rational thinkers of the Sunnis will open the path to jurisprudence, or else, I would advice the Sunnis that it before the end of the century, the Sunnis will become a minority and the Shiites a majority.

The ambitious young man Muhammad was copying the understanding of himself with that of the Qur'an and the Sunna, not giving any attention or care for the scholars, and not only the scholars of his own time or the time of the four sects but also the opinions of Abi Bakr and 'Umar. Thus he understood the book in a different way than they did, he used to say: The Prophet says that he has left behind the Book and Sunna, he did not say the Book, the Sunna, the Companions of the Prophet, and sects, thus its our duty to follow the Book and the Sunna no matter what the views of the Sahabah and the scholars differed.

Muhammad had an intense discussion with one of the Persian scholars called Shaykh Juwad Qammi, a Shiite religious man, when we were guests at the house of 'Abd-al-Rida where some of the host's friends were there too. I could not remember the whole discussion but I can remember some points.

Al-Qammi asked him: If you were liberal and a jurisperudent as you claim, then why you do not follow 'Ali as the Shiites do? Muhammad said, "Because 'Ali, like 'Umar and the others, their speech is not the source, the source is only the Book and the Sunna". Then Al-Qammi asked, "Did the Prophet say (I am the city of enlightenment and 'Ali is its gate), so he separated between 'Ali and the Companions of the Prophet, then Muhammad said, "if 'Ali's speech was a proof, then why didn't the Prophet say....

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...for the morning prayer, and I had to follow him, thus I used to wake up and pray the morning prayer, then he would demand that I read the Qur'an until the sun rises, and when I told him that reading the Qur'an wasn't a compulsory. He said that whoever sleeps during this time causes hardship and misfortune for the inn and the people in this inn. I could not reply to his answer for he threatened to evict me if I did not do as he says, so I was obliged to pray upon the call to prayer and then read the Qur'an for more than an hour of each day.

The problem did not end there, the inn owner, called (Murshid Afandim)- came to me one day and said to me: ever since you rented this room from me I am facing problems from you. I thought about this and the only reason I could find is that you are single, and being single is either a general misfortune, so you get married or you evict this inn. I replied that I do not have the money to get married (I was afraid to tell him that I was impotent for I was not sure he would not ask me to prove it, should I believe or not? If I had used this excuse, Murshid Afandim was of that type.

Afandim told me that I had a weak faith. Did you read the words of Allah Al-mighty (If they were poor, Allah would enrich them from His excess). I was in terrible, what should I do? What should I answer him? Finally, I said, "very well, how can I marry without any money? Are you willing to lend me the money I need or bring me a woman that does not want a dowry?

The Afandim thought about it a little and then lifted his head up and said: I do not understand what you are saying, and I will tell you this, you get married by early month of Rajab or you will be evicted from the inn. I only had a twenty five days period.

The names of the Islamic months are in order according to the moon movement, they do not increase than 30 days and are not less than 29 days and they are (Muharram, Safar, Rabi' Awal, Jamadah Ula, Jamada Thaniyyah, Rajab, Sha'ban, Ramadan, Shawwal, Dhu Al-Qu'dah, Dhu Al-Hijjah).

Finally, I yield to him, I found a place at a carpenter and I agreed to work with him

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... the conflict in the service of the Great Britain.

We the British cannot lead a happy life, if we did not cause troubles and conflicts among all settlements. We cannot overcome the Ottoman's Sultan if we did not plant troubles and riot among his people. The question is how a small nation can control a larger one, therefore; exert all your efforts to find a gap to get there, and you should know that Turkish authority and Persian authority got weaker. Therefore, you need only to urge the people to rebel, as did the revolutionists against their rulers in order to divide and disunite them and consequently easily conquer them.

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When I reached Al-Basrah, quickly I went to one of the mosques of the Arab Sunnis Shaykh 'Umar Al-Ta'i. I was acquainted with him easily, but, from the very beginning, the man doubted me and started questioning me about my origin, kinship, and about my personal issues. I thought he doubted me because of my color and accent, but I was able to work that situation out by saying that I am from Aghadir in Turkey, and I am one of Shaykh Ahmad's students. Moreover, I told him that I was a carpenter in Khalid's workshop and other information I collected during my stay in Turkey and I even spoke some Turkish sentences. The Shaykh winked to one of the attendees to inquire whether I spoke good Turkish or not. This person winked back to him that I did. I was very happy because I made the Shaykh trust me, but my perception was false. After few days, I noticed the Shaykh suspected that I was an agent and spy to Turkey. At the end, I knew that the Shaykh was in trouble with the Mula; the governor, they accused and mistrusted each other. I did not think of any alternative but to leave Shaykh 'Umar's Mosque and go to an inn where travelers and foreigners stay. Consequently, I rented a room there. The owner of the inn was a stupid man; he used disturb me every morning by fiercely knocking the door of my room to wake me up.

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Wonderfully, I succeeded in learning Turkish and Arabic languages, Quran and religion. However, I did not succeed in providing the Ministry with information about the weak points in the Ottoman state.

The council meeting ended after six hours. The secretary hinted to me that I did not find out the weakest points, yet. Then, I said to him, "My mission was to learn the language, religion and the Quran, then I did not use my whole efforts, and I will be honest and better judged next time if you grant me your trust". The secretary said, "no doubt, you succeeded; I hope you get the point next time. Your mission Himfir next time travel has two purposes:

- 1- Find a weak point in the Muslims, where you can get inside their hearts and tear their nerves, it is very important to achieve victory over the enemy.
- 2- You should start to find a weak point to do it and if you achieve what we need and demonstrate that you are the strongest agent you will be granted the Ministry Badge.

I stayed in London for six months and I got married to my cousin Mary Showy who was one year older than I am. My age at that time was twenty-two and she was twenty-three years old. She was average smart, very beautiful, and average educated girl. Really, I spent my happiest time in my life with her, she was pregnant, and patiently, I was waiting for the new guest but strict orders were issued from the ministry, they asked me to travel to Iraq, one of the Arab countries which was occupied by the Caliphate for a long time. I was very sad for that order because I was waiting my wife to give birth of my son. However, my love to my country and desire to have fame among my colleagues was more than family love. In spite of my wife's insistency to stay until she give birth to the baby, I responded to the orders, and when I said to her good bye both my wife and I wept sadly. She said, "Do not forget to send letters and I will send and tell you about our new golden nest". Her words cut my heart that I thought to postpone my travel, but I controlled my temper at that time and went to the Ministry to take the latest instruction.

Within six months, I was in Al-Basrah, an Iraq governorate. It was a tribal city.

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... in the afternoon, when I finished the afternoon prayer, I go to Al-Shaykh Ahmad's house to spend two hours to learn Quran, Turkish and Arabic. Every Friday, I pay charity of what I gained in a week. In fact, that charity was a kind of bribe in order to continue my relation with him, and he taught me Islam, and the basics of Arabic and Turkish.

When Shaykh Ahmad knew that I was single, he asked me to get marry one of his daughters, but I refused that matter. However, when he insisted as it is one of prophet's orders. I said to him that I am sexually sick and I can not marry. He was disappointed and the relationship was the same as before.

After completing two years in Istanbul, I asked permission to return to my home. But the Shaykh said why you want to return, in Istanbul, you can find anything that you need, God was combined in it both worldly and religious issues at the same time. He added that my father, my mother, brothers, all, were dead, so why I do not make Istanbul a new home. However, my national duty made me return to London to offer a complete report about the situation, there and to get new order for my mission. As usual, when I was in Istanbul, I wrote a monthly report of what I noticed in the settlements. Furthermore, I remembered one of the reports I wrote about the owner of the shop who asked to have homosexual action with me and asked my supervisors what I should do. I was astonished, because the answer was if that deed yields a benefit, it is okay to let him do his desires to reach to the target. I felt that the whole world collapsed upon my head. I was astonished because how my leaders did not feel ashamed of that offensive action. Consequently, I drank tell I was intoxicated in order to keep my position without doing any shameful action.

On the farewell day, the Shaykh wept and said, "God protect you..."

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... some money so I thought of gaining and learn the Koran and the Sunna. I went to the Islam Center to obtain religious and worldly knowledge. The Shaykh welcomed me and told me the following – I wrote it word by word – the duty id to respect you for several reasons:

- 1- You are a Muslim and Muslims are brothers
- 2- You are a guest and the Prophet God blesses him and grants him salvation said (Honor the guest)
- 3- You are a knowledge pursuer and Islam confirms the honoring of the knowledge pursuer.
- 4- You want to gain and it's said that (the gainer is God's beloved)

I liked these issues and I wished if Christianity knows such shining facts. I was astonished how Islam, in its elevation, was afflicted by weakness and deterioration by those deceived rulers and scientists who know nothing about life.

I told the Shaykh that I want to learn the holly Qur'an and he welcomed my request and started to teach me (Al-Hamد) verse and explaining to me the meanings. I found it difficult to pronounce some of the words and sometimes the meaning that made it hard. I remember that I did not learn the pronunciation of one sentence (Wa 'Ala Ummam man Ma'ak) (TC: Nations accompanying you) unless I repeated it tens of times in a week and the Shaykh told me: You should assimilate until (Illegible). However, I read the Qur'an in two complete years from the beginning to its end. Whenever he wants to teach me, I perform the ritual ablution and he told me to perform the ritual ablution the way he does it and to sit at the side of the kiblah (TC: direction to which Moslems turn in prayer).

It is worth mentioning that I remember that (performing the ritual ablution) to Muslims is asset of washing. First, they wash the face, second, the right hand from the fingers to the elbow, third, the left hand from fingers to the elbow, forth, they wipe the head, behind the ears and neck and fifth, they wash the feet. They say, "It is better roll the water in the mouth, push it up to his nose before starting to perform the ritual ablution.

I used to get really annoyed with the Al-Miswak (TC: tooth cleanser) which is a rod that they enter their mouths to clean their teeth before performing the ritual ablution. I used to think that this rod harms the teeth and mouth, it was

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His sovereignty was so generous to purify the sins whether after three hundred years, we should be fortified by rooted faith, and trying all means to preach Christianity among the Muhammadiyyin's people whether it will be after centuries, because the fathers are the one who raise the sons.

One day, there was a conference in the Ministry; it was attended by Great Britain, France, Russia representatives. The conference was in a high level, the attendances were a diplomatic people and clergymen. I was very lucky, because I attended that conference as I have a strong relation with the Minister. Actually, the attendances entirely discussed the problems of Muhammadiyyin. They mentioned the ways of tearing them and the methods of making them apostate of their religion, and letting them back to the faith spot as what happened in Spain after long time of Al-Muhammadiyyin barbaric occupation, but the results were not of a required level. However, I wrote every thing the conference mentioned in my book which was titled on, "To the Jesus Power".

It is very hard to cut down the roots of the tree which its roots extended to the West and the East, but man can do every thing possible whatever that costs. The Christianity was sent to be preached in the earth, and we were back to Jesus. But Muhammad was supported by the decline of the East and the West and if that vanished? He will vanish too. Fortunately, Muhammadiyyin doctrines were declined and Christianity doctrines were raised above. Consequently, the time is coming to revenge over them, and here is Great Britain handle the blessing principles.

The ministry was delegated me in (1710) to Egypt, Iraq, Tehran, Hijaz, and Astana settlements to gather information which help to tear up the Muslims and controlling their countries. At the same time nine of the good, active, and enthusiastic employees in the Ministry were sent to control the Empire and the rest of the Muslims countries. The Ministry provided us by enough money, maps, and names of Governors, scientists, and leaders. However, I did not forget the word of the secretary when he said good bye to us, he said, "Your success is very important for the future of our countries, so do the best of your efforts".

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The man is emitting his last breath in less than century. On the other hand, we held secretly a number of treaties with the Persian Government. Meanwhile, we planted our agencies and spies in these two countries. In spite the fact that these two countries are characterized by the administration, corruption and bribery as well as their kings' occupy with the beautiful women, but we were not sure of the results for a number of reasons, the most important are:

1. The strength of the Islamic believes in our sons, as the Muslim individual trusts in God to the extent that you can see the Islam in his soul, like Christianity in the souls of the priests and monks, they can sacrifices their souls for its seek. On the other hand, the Shi'ah Muslims were considered the most dangerous in the Persian country, as they consider Christianity is impurity and infidelity, according to them the Christian individual is considered a dirty rot that he pays much attention to eliminate him. One time I asked one of them, why do you look to Christianity from the prospects? He said, "The Islamic Prophet was a wise man and he wants to surround every infidel with a circle of ethical pressure, in order to feel suffocated and lonely, which are considered the reasons of his way to God and right religion. Meanwhile, if the Government believes that this individual is dangerous and it surrounds him with a circle of boycott until he returns back to obedience and adherence. On the other hand, I mean by the word impurity, the abstract one not the physical, which is not only existed in the Christian individuals but also include all the infidels, even the Magians , which are originally Persian. I said "yes, but how Christians are impure while they believe in God and Prophets' mission and the judgment day?" He said " for two reasons, First, they deny our Prophet Mohammad, which means that our Prophet is lair, thus, we also in return say that you Christians are impure, as the reason says that who ever hurts you, you have the right to hurt him back. Second, they claims that the God Prophets committee unproper deeds for instance; they claim that the Christ was drinking wine and he was cursed because he was crucified. I said in surprise "but they did not say that", he said," you did not know that their bible said so. Thus, I keep silent and I am sure that the man lied to me in the second one, even if he was right in the first one. Meanwhile, I did not discuss the issue much longer as I was afraid of (Illegible).

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### Document Remarks

CMPC-2003-005626 This 60-page file includes memos dated 2000, from the Head of the 2nd Section to Head of the 16th Directorate of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), regarding the annual report of several projects; that include study of finding explosive combination in form of intensely explosive liquid, effect of "lboxy material" which is used for filling explosive bombs. Also, the file shows projects cover studies to measure the destruction power of every explosive material with different quantities. Moreover, the projects included manufacturing explosive bombs in different sizes and shapes, producing electronic explosion means (remote controls), electronic timers (TCMO2 and TCMO3), constructing weapons and explosives detection devices and vehicles booby-trap for intelligence missions. Explosives treatment training courses and developing the weapons mufflers are included in the file. Those projects were done to benefit the requirements of the IIS, the Special Security Organization and Fedayeen Saddam.

### Batch Information

Batch Number: 000-0

Page 2

Serial Number	The Project Name	The planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
16	Study about producing an explosive mixture in the shape of a very explosive liquid	10	12	M 16	<p>It turned out to be true that there are two uncontrollable postboxes as follows: Russia-Moscow M<sup>40</sup> Greece M<sup>4/2</sup></p> <p>In view of the fact that the number of the investigated addresses are 31 in 16 countries.</p> <p>The theoretical study was made in accordance with definite specifics, and the samples were prepared and put to a field test which provided the following results:</p> <p>a) The liquid is affected by the weather conditions (the temperature degree and the atmospheric pressure) especially in the low temperature degree (less than 25 degrees centigrade) because it causes the precipitation of the explosive substance</p>

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Page 3

Serial Number	The Project Name	The Planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
17	Analyzing the effects of the epoxy types to choose the best type of them which will be used in molding the explosive bombs.	4	4	$M^{16}$	<p>hence the explosive power of the liquid will lessen</p> <p>b) The substance should be used immediately after the preparation because the more time it is left, the less effective it will be.</p> <p>A) Choosing the appropriate type of the epoxy which is used in molding the bombs is considered an important matter because some epoxy types release high heat during the reaction then we must set those types aside because they don't serve our work.</p> <p>B) Four types of the epoxy were examined in accordance with their chemical characteristics, at that time choosing the best type of the epoxy has been achieved and enabled us to prepare</p>

Page 4

Serial Number	The Project Name	The Planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
18	Estimating the destructive power of an explosive substance by using a very developed computer program.		10	M 16	the bombs with a very high explosive power and with high safety during the preparation of the bombs.  A very developed computer program was prepared (it is a part of a master thesis for one of our employees). This program was made to estimate the destructive power of every type and to estimate the quantities of the exploding substances therefore the quantities of the explosive substances, that they will be used in the bombs, can be estimated accurately to destroy the required targets.
19	Preparing and developing mufflers for weapons of different types and calibers.	25	79	M 4/ M 6/ M 16	A) Forty four (44) mufflers have been manufactured for 9 mm pistols of type Brita and they all were given to the special work team/ M 4.

(9)

Page 5

Serial Number	The Project Name	The Planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
					B) Seven mufflers have been manufactured for 9 mm pistols of Brita type for M 6/ Al-Mashjab. C) A muffler of a sniper rifle has been manufactured for M 6. D) many mufflers have manufactured as follows: Firstly: two mufflers for 7 mm pistols. Secondly: two mufflers for 9 mm pistols of Brita type. Thirdly: a muffler for a pistol of Tutu type. Fourthly: camouflaged mufflers in the shape of oil filters for weapons of types (Kalashnikov, 9 mm and 7 mm pistols). E) Modifications have been carried out on 15 pistols of 9 mm (Brita type). F) Making modifications on 3 pistols of 7 mm caliber.

(10)

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Serial Number	The Project Name	The Planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
20	Improving the laser indicators for rifles and pistols.	4	4	M 16	A. Four laser indicators have been prepared for rifles of Kalashnikov type and 9 mm pistols. B. A new laser indicator has been manufactured to be used with the mufflers based on new designs were prepared for that purpose.
21	Preparing an armored bag for the security of the very important people.	1	1	M 16	A. Theoretical designs have been made to prepare a diplomatic armored bag after preparing the appropriate raw materials. B. Field tests have been done on an armored material but it was found improper for the required purpose.

(11)

Serial Number	The Project Name	The Planned Projects	The Achieved Projects	The Beneficiary	Remarks
22	Preparing a pliable explosive substance with a high possibility to be plated (camouflaged) and controllable.			M 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>C. In the future, there will have been new searches for another armored material in order to resume the tests by the next year.</li> <li>A. Practical and theoretical studies have been done about preparing a plated and pliable explosive substance which has possibility to camouflage the explosives inside the pages and the books as different explosive bombs.</li> <li>B. The capability of controlling the pliability of the prepared material in accordance with limit and chosen proportions.</li> <li>C. Some colored oxides have been used beside the prepared substance to achieve two goals as follows:            The first one is to give the prepared substance the required color (high camouflage).            The second is to add oxygen to the substance from the oxides.</li> </ul>

(12)

Top secret

The Annual Report for M16/ Section 2 (Developing Side) For Year 2000

The Planned projects				The Achieved Projects			
No	Type	Quantity	Days	Quantity	Days	The Beneficiary	Remarks
1	Study about producing an explosive mixture in the shape of a very explosive liquid.	10	360	12	360	M 16	<p>The theoretical study was made in accordance with definite specifics, and the samples were prepared and put to a field test which provided the following results:</p> <p>a) The liquid is affected by the weather conditions (the temperature degree and the atmospheric pressure) especially in the low temperature degree (less than 25 degrees centigrade) because it causes the precipitation of the explosive substance, hence the explosive power of the liquid will lessen.</p> <p>b) The substance should be used immediately after the preparation because the more time it is left, the less effective it will be.</p>

(1-6)

The Planned projects				The Achieved Projects			
No	Type	Quantity	Days	Quantity	Days	The Beneficiary	Remarks
2.	Analyzing the effects of the epoxy types to choose the best type of them which will be used in molding the explosive bombs.	4	360	4	360	M 16	A) Choosing the appropriate type of the epoxy which is used in molding the bombs is considered an important matter because some epoxy types release high heat during the reaction then we must set those types aside because they don't serve our work.  B) Four types of the epoxy were examined in accordance with their chemical characteristics, at that time choosing the best type of the epoxy has been achieved and enabled us to prepare the bombs with a very high explosive power and

(2)

The Planned projects				The Achieved Projects			
No	Type	Quantity	Days	Quantity	Days	The Beneficiary	Remarks
3	Estimating the destructive power of an explosive substance by using a very developed computer program.	10	360	10	360	M 16	<p>with high safety during the preparation of the bombs.</p> <p>A very developed computer program was prepared (it is a part of a master thesis for one of our employees). This program was made to estimate the destructive power of every type and to estimate the quantities of the exploding substances therefore the quantities of the explosive substances, that they will be used in the bombs, can be estimated accurately to destroy the required targets.</p>

(3)

**Top Secret**

Planning				Achieved			
Serial	Type	Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary	Remarks
4	Preparing and developing mufflers for various type gunshot	25	360	79	360	Directorate 4, Directorate 6, Directorate 16	A. 44 mufflers were made of 9mm Beretta gunshot and delivered to the special work team / Directorate 4 B. 7 mufflers were being made of 9mm Beretta gunshot for Directorate 6/ Al-Mashjab C. One special shotgun mufflers was made for Directorate 6 D. Developing and manufacturing the following mufflers: First: 2 mufflers of 7mm gunshot Second: 2 mufflers of 9mm Beretta gunshot Third: One muffler of Tutu gunshot Forth: Camouflaging of mufflers as Painting filters for Kalashnikov, 9mm gunshot, 7mm gunshot

(4)

Top Secret

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved				Remarks
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary		
5	Developing laser binoculars for gunshot	4	360	4	360	Directorate 16	E. Developing and changing 15 mufflers for 9mm Beretta gunshot F. Developing and changing 3 mufflers for 7mm gunshot  A. 4 Laser binoculars were made for Kalashnikov and 9mm gunshot B. Laser binoculars were made to be used with mufflers according to new design.	

(5)

Top Secret

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved				Remarks
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary		
6	Setting up an armored bag for protecting personage	1	180	1	180	Directorate 16		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Theoretical designs was drafted to setting up an armored bag after preparing the raw materials which used in armored</li> <li>B. Field experiment was done on sample prepared for this purpose from various angels and distances, during this experiment the material used in armored bag was not fit requirement.</li> <li>C. Looking forward for new replacement material for reiteration the experiment next year.</li> </ul>

(6-6)

Top Secret

Development Projects out of Directorate 16 / Section 2 work plan  
For the year 2000

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved				Remarks
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary		
1	Setting up Plastic bombs with high capability in camouflaging and plasticity	--	--	8	180	Directorate 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>A. Theoretical designs was drafted to setting up an Plastic bombs with high camouflaging capability and various use inside bags and books</li><li>B. The ability of Controlling the plasticity of manufactured material according to specific chosen rates</li><li>C. Some colored oxides were used with material which serve this work from tow sides, first: which provide required color and second: adding oxygen to material which increasing temperature produced and result in increasing the bombs power.</li><li>D. Development process was made for this material by adding some sensors such as Aluminum powder</li></ul>	

(1-2)

Top Secret

Planning				Achieved			
Serial	Type	Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary	Remarks
							E. Development process was made for this material by adding some sensors such as Aluminum powder which serve the work where the powder pull up the Oxygen from the surrounding area which result in increasing Oxygen rate in the material and increasing the bomb power.

(2-2)

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Top Secret

Annual report of Directorate 16 / Section 2 (Executive side)  
For the year 2000

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved			
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary	Remarks
1	Setting up various shapes and sizes of Plastic bombs and bombing methods and inserting created works in preparing plastic bombs according to intelligence situation and need.	100	360	92	360	Directorate 40, Directorate 57, Fedayeen Saddam, Directorate 16/ Section 2	A. 24 cast, pasted and camouflaged bombs inside books, diplomatic bags were made and supplied to Fedayeen Saddam B. Camouflaged bomb inside caved gas cylinder as a created work to be used as gas cylinder bomb or to be used as outside the gas cylinder at the same time giving the choice to the intelligence operation. C. 9 remote bombs were made 2 of them were executed successfully

(1-14)

Top secret

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved				Remarks
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary		
2	Processing and disassembly various shapes, sources and sizes of bombs	25	360	10	360	Directorate 57		6 bombs without bombing methods, while the remaining one it was experimented at Directorate 14 field before deliver to them. D. 58 cast, pasted and camouflaged bombs inside books, diplomatic bags were made and supplied to related authority.
3	Preparing various electronic bombing methods according to required and duty needed	100	360	93	360	Directorate 40, Directorate 57, Fedayeen Saddam, Directorate 16		Processing and disassembly various shapes, sources and sizes of bombs such as (bags, books, washing powder, radio) which works with deferent methods where bomb methods was pulled out and spoil the remaining with the approval of Iraqi Intelligence Services Director.  A. 92 electronic exploding methods was made and used in exploding armed bombs. B. New remote control wireless bombing method was used in one mission for Directorate 40/Section 5

(3)

Top secret

Serial	Type	Planning		Achieved				Remarks
		Quantity	Time/Days	Quantity	Time/Days	Beneficiary		
4	Produce electronic timers of type (TCMO2, TCMO3) used in explosives	200	360	200	360	Directorate 16	Electronic timers were made used and to be used as exploding methods with time controlled by us.	
5	Study and research methods of wireless electronic exploding and developing distance transmitter (HUKI-TUKI) to be used in explosives blasting						A. Study, Develop and improvise tools like (remote control) which is small with high camouflaging capability  B. Produce and develop 10 transmitter	

(4)

Top Secret

Planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
6	sitting up and maintenance protection devises of modern cars (Remote control)	350	360	275	360	Different directorates of Organization	<p>Two of them were used in two missions, one for directorate 40, to explode a booby-trapped car and another one for directorate 66 to explode a camouflaged bomb inside a book for a training program.</p> <p>A. 175 hundred and seventy five modern equipment was installed for protecting the cars from theft.</p> <p>B. 100 hundred equipment was maintained to protect the cars from theft for different directorates of Organization.</p>

(5)

Top Secret

Planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
7	Sitting up and maintenance the devices of detection and processing bombs and weapons detection.	10	360	17	360	M1, M57, M56, M27, M51, M16, Special Security Directorate	(17) Seventeen devices for detecting explosives and weapons were installed and maintained for directorates of Organization and Special Security Organization.

(TC: M refer to Directorate.)

(6)

**Top Secret**

planned				achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
8	Booby-trapped of vehicles for the different Intelligence duties.  Preparing wooden molds for using them in the preparation of explosives charge.	5  50	360  360	1  80	360  360	M40  M40, M57, Fedayee Saddam, M16	a camouflaged explosive charge (booby-trapped car) was prepared inside car, Brazilian type working by wireless electronic explosive (Remote control) and electronic timer in the same time it is possible that using the two devices in same time, or one of them which suitable for the intelligence operation during the duty.  (80) Different kinds and sizes of wooden molds were used as molds to cast the explosives material as adhesive and cast bombs. And preparing a sheet shape plastic explosive.

(7)

Top Secret

planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
10	Maintenance and blacken of different pistols and rifles.	45	360	9	360	M6, Mr. Deputy Office	This used as developing work planned for the year 2000.  A. (7) Different pistols were maintained for M6/ weapons depot B. (2) Pistols type Bronek was blackened.
11	Preparing containers for detonators devices and covers for cars devices protection.	100	360	100	360	M40, M14, M16	100 metal containers with different sizes used to hide detonators devices during casting and preparing for different duties. Also it used as metal containers for modern cars protection devices from stealing and old cars.

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**Top Secret**

planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
12	Preparing methods for protecting the theft of car tires.	50	360	20	360	Different directorate of Headquarter	Modern devices were manufactured to protect the tires of cars from stealing according with new designs.
13	Review accidents from explosives and processing some explode bombs.	20	360	23	360	M6, M4, M5, M56, M57	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>A. Review explosion of mortar bombs (60) mm in 7 Nissan area close to the General Security.</li><li>B. Review missile explosion (107) mm in the complex of Palestinians residence close to the General Security.</li><li>C. Review explosion of a missile (107) mm in Iranian Mujahidin Khaliq camp / Al-Kut</li><li>D. Implementing of missiles duties with M57</li><li>E. Review site of missile explosion.</li></ul>

(9)

Top Secret

Planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
14	Testing and protection the cars from sabotage act by explosives.	3000	360	5000	360	M1, M6, the Presidency Palace	(122) mm in Al-Karradah area.  F. Review explosion site M56 G. Reviews some of emergency cases which are suspected (explosive bombs).  The cars of Organization employees which are entering the Headquarter site were tested during the duties of the morning and evening shifts.
15	Protection the halls and buildings from risks of threat by explosives	10	360	8	360	M1, M6	The important building and halls were checked and detected for protecting from the risks of sabotage by explosives.

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planned				Achieved			
	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	
16	Testing the posted, packages and the gifts which receiving to the General Director of Organization and formations from sabotage.	6000	360	5500	360	M1, M2, formations of Organization	All the packages, posted and gifts coming into the Headquarter site (General Director office and another directorates) were tested from sabotage acts and threatening by explosives.
17	Courses and training courses in the field of detection and processing explosives.	4	360	6	360	M4, M16, M23	Development courses were opened specifically for the detection and processing explosives - including practical and theoretical lectures.
18	Follow the publications and periodicals and study the catalogs and offers.	5	360	12	360	M4, M16	The catalogs, offers and publications which pertain to devices of detection and explosives were studied for utilizing our work

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Planned				achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
19	Training the officers and sources on the manufactured bombs in our formations.	50	360	50	360	M14, M40, 57, Fedayee Saddam	A. Officers of the beneficiary bodies were trained on using (93) ninety three explosive bomb, which prepared in our formation of theoretical and practical steps and method of implementation. B. One source of directorate 40 was trained on using camouflaged explosive bomb inside cars (booby-trapped car) prepared in directorate 16. C. The representative of Fedayee Saddam was trained on usage. Storage and transport of bombs which were delivered to them.

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Planned				Achieved			
S	Type	Quantity	Time in days	Quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
20	Quality Control procedures from tests and experimentations on the bombs which were manufactured.	100	360	93	360	M14, M40, M57, Fedayee Saddam	And the training was in the site of Fedayee Saddam. The control and testing were done on what was prepared from different types of explosive bombs before delivery to the beneficiary bodies.
21	Procedures of testing and experimenting on silencers and the camouflaged weapons manufactured in our formation.	25	360	79	360	M6, M	The control and testing were done on what was prepared from developed silencers for M16 and other silencers which were delivered for use in special duties.

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(SATT)	Planned			Accomplished			
	Type	Quantity	Time By days	Quantity	Time By days	Beneficiary Party	Notes
22	Preparing a theoretical and practical study on the improvised explosives	1	120	1	120	Directorate 16	The theoretical and practical study was prepared by our formation which is specialized in the field of improvised explosives and which through it can be made explosive materials from the materials in the current market.
23	Settling courses specialized in explosives	1	90	1	90	Directorate 14	A special course in explosives was settled and it was for two affiliated of (Directorate 14) and for a period of three months which through it theoretical and practical studies were done for whatever that is related to explosives and samples were prepared and then exploded on field.

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Comparison of the accomplished of the working plan of Directorate 16/ Section 2 for the year 1999 and 2000

(SATTI)	Type	Year 1999		Year 2000		Notes
		Quantity	Time By days	Quantity	Time By days	
1.	Prepare bombs from different types and ways of explosion.	122	360	93	360	
2.	Treat and disassemble bombs from different types and sources.	14	360	10	360	
3.	Prepare different electronic explosion ways for the bombs depending on the duties	101	360	94	360	
4.	Manufacture electronic timers from different types and times	80	360	275	360	
5.	Install and maintain cars alarm systems.	165	360	1	360	
6.	Booby-trap vehicles to be used in different duties.	3	360	1	360	
7.	Prepare and develop mufflers for different kinds of weapons and shots.	32	360	79	360	
8.	Prepare wooden frames to be used in the preparation of bombs.	99	360	80	360	

(1-3)

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
(SALIS)	Type	Year 1999		Year 2000		Notes
		Quantity	Time By days	Quantity	Time By days	
9.	Maintain and blackening different kinds of rifles and guns.	17	360	9	360	
10.	Prepare containers in order to explode bombs with covers to protect the cars from robbery.	232	360	100	360	The difference in the metal containers quantity between the year 1999 and the year 2000 due to the dispense with the use of metal containers for the systems of car robbery protection.
11.		48	360	20	360	
12.	Prepare tools to protect the cars' wheel from robbery.	14	360	17	360	
13.	<del>Install and maintain the explosions' detection and treatment systems, and weapon detection systems.</del>	20	360	23	360	
14.	Exploration of explosions accidents, and treatment of unexploded bombs.  Examination and insuring the cars from the explosions sabotage.	910	360	5000	360	

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
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
(S A T T S T)	Type	Year 1999		Year 2000		Notes
		Quantit y	Ti me By day s	Quanti ty	Ti me By day s	
15 .	Secure the halls and buildings from the danger of bombs threatening.	15	360	8	360	
16 .	Examine the mail, envelops, and presents incoming to Mr. director of the destined services and the services formations from sabotage.	6150	360	5500	360	
17 .	Training sessions and conferences in the field of explosives discovery and treating.	5	360	5	360	
		19	360	12	360	
18 .	Follow up the publications and studying the catalogues and shows.	153	360	50	360	
19 .	Training the officers and sources on the bombs manufactured in the formation.	154	360	93	360	
20 .	Quality control procedures such as tests and experiments on local produced bombs.					


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


A chart to compare what was  
accomplished during the years  
1999 and 2000  
The numbers represent the  
projects succession in the  
comparing schedule.











The Development Part (Explosives Section)

(SATTs T)	Type	1998	1999	2000	Notes
		Quantity	Quantity	Quantity	
1.	Manufacturing and updating different types and calibers of weapon silencers.	12	15		
2.	Studying and executing the preparation of mobile rubber and metal molds for use in explosive devices.		9	10	
3.	Manufacturing and updating different types and calibers of weapon silencers.		32	25	
4.	Researching an explosive mixture in the liquid form which explodes intensively.			12	10
5.	Study the type of epoxy in the buildup of explosions and its effect on the explosive force.			4	4
6.	Studying and calculating the destructive force of any explosive substance of different particles via a general computer program.			10	10
7.	Developing the laser aiming device for rifles and pistols.			4	4
8.	Preparing soft explosive materials extremely concealable and soft.			8	1
9.	Developing different kinds and calibers of weapon silencers.	12	32	79	
10.	Preparing a bulletproof suitcase for personage protection.			1	
11.	Studying and modifying wireless and electronic explosive devices for remote detonation.			10	


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


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Explosions/ Executive

(SATS T)	Type	1998 Quantity	1999 Quantity	2000 Quantity	Notes
	1.	8	52	40	
	2.	29	41	30	
	3.	10	47	43	
	4.	22	22	56	
	5.	19	31	50	
	6.	20	60	20	
	7.	10	26	64	
	8.	31	38	31	
	9.	49	33	18	
	10.	48	37	15	
	11.	25	47	28	
	12.	32	30	38	
	13.	20	37	43	
	14.	8	2	90	
	15.	18	54	28	
	16.	38	33	29	
	17.	39	28	33	

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Comparative Achievement Chart of the Plan of the 16<sup>th</sup> Directorate/ 2<sup>nd</sup> Section for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000

(SATTST)	Type	1998	1999	2000	Notes
		Quantity	Quantity	Quantity	
1.	Preparing explosive devices of different types and detonation methods.	18	22	93	
2.	Treating and disabling bombs of different types and origins.	10	14	10	
3.	Preparing various electronic detonating methods for bombs as duty requires.	21	101	94	
4.	Manufacturing various electronic timers of different types and durations.	80	80	200	
5.	Installing and servicing car alarms for protection from theft.	100	165	275	
6.	Booby-trapping vehicles for various duty reasons.	1	3	1	
7.	Preparing and developing silencers for different weapon types and calibers.	12	32	79	(Illegible) <i>M</i>
8.	Preparing wooden molds for their use in explosions.	82	99	80	
9.	Servicing and blackening different types of rifles and pistols	25	17	9	
10.	Preparing methods to protect car tires from theft.	62	48	20	
11.	Quality control and experimentation on locally manufactured bombs.	81	154	93	

(SATTI ST)	Type	1998	1999	2000	Notes
		Quantity	Quantity	Quantity	
12	Installation and maintenance of detectors and disablers of explosives as well as weapon detectors.	15	14	17	
13	Surveying explosion incidents and treating unexploded devices.	11	20	23	54
14	Examining and safeguarding vehicles from booby-trapping.	4500	910	50000	55410
15	Securing halls and buildings from the risks of explosion threats.	5	15	8	
16	Checking mail, packages, and gifts delivered to the honorable service director and formations for sabotage devices.	7241	6150	5500	18891
17	Training sessions and conferences in the field of detection and treatment of explosives.	7	5	6	

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Executive Party

(SATT T)	Project's Name	Planner	Accomplished	Beneficiary Party	Notes
17	Reading carbon papers, printing tapes, and forensic filming.		216	5 <sup>th</sup> Directorate, 16 <sup>th</sup> Directorate	Filming (17) forensic cases for the 16 <sup>th</sup> Directorate 1 <sup>st</sup> Section, regarding theft and filming missile launchers which were used in a treachery attack, along with the extraction of information from a fax role transferred from the 5 <sup>th</sup> Directorate containing 199 documents.
18	Preparing explosives of different shapes, sizes, and means of detonation, in addition to involving the creative work in explosive preparation according to the intelligence status.		92	4 <sup>th</sup> Directorate, 57 <sup>th</sup> Directorate, Fedayeen Saddam, Directorate 16/2	1- Preparation of (24) twenty four molded, adhesive, and camouflaged explosives inside books and diplomatic suitcases delivered to Fedayeen Saddam. 2- Preparation of an explosive camouflaged in a gas cylinder (it's a creative work) transformed in a way which allows it to be used as an explosive gas cylinder or as an explosive without the cylinder.

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S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
19	disposing and disassembling various types of explosive bombs-		10	D57	<p>at the same time and which one used in the intelligence operation.</p> <p>3. Nine guided bombs were prepared, two of them work electronically and they successfully did the wanted (illegible) and six bombs without explosion devices and the last bomb was tested on field in D14 before delivery.</p> <p>4. Prepared (58) fifty eight explosive bombs of different forms, sizes and camouflages (plastic molded camouflaged inside bags, books and radio recorder) all delivered to destination.</p> <p>The disposing and disassembling various types and sizes of explosive bombs were done</p>

(31)

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
	types and sources.				(Bags, books, washing powder, radio recorder) work by various explosion devices (illegible) its explosion devices and spoiling the remains by approval the Intelligence Service Director.
20	Preparing various electronic explosion devices for bombs, and according to the tasks requirements		93	D40, D57, Fedayeen Saddam D16/2	1. Ninety two (92) electronic explosion devices were prepared and all of them were used in exploding the bombs sent to beneficiary bodies. 2. A modern wireless (remote control) explosion device was prepared and used in performing a duty for D40/5.
21	Manufacturing electronic timers of type (TCMO3, TCMO2) which used for bombs exploding		200	D16	Electronic timers were manufactured, used and will be used as electronic exploding devices can be modified by us.

(32)

Page 49

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
22	Studying wireless electronic explosion devices, and modifying the remote control sets (walky talky) to use them in the explosion.		10	D40, D16	<p>1. Studying, improving and modifying the transmitting sets to use them as tele-explosion sets(remote controls) were completed, and it has good specifications since it has small size and can be camouflaged by the smallest size of explosive material, in addition, the transmitting device can be camouflaged in various ways.</p> <p>2. the modification and manufacturing of ten transmitting sets were done, two of them were used in performing two duties; one of them for D40 to explode a trapped car, and the other for D16 to explode a camouflaged bomb inside a course book</p>

(33)

Page 50

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
23	Installation and maintenance the new brand of car protection sets (remote control)		275	Various headquarters	1. (175) one hundred seventy five new brand sets were installed to prevent stealing cars 2. (100) a hundred car-protection sets were maintained for various headquarters
24	Installation and maintenance of explosives and weapons detection sets		17	D1, D57, D56, D23, D51, D16 and the special Security Organization (SSO)	(17) seventeen explosives and weapons detectors were installed and maintained for the benefit of the headquarters and the SSO
25	Trapping tires for various intelligence duties.		1	D40	A camouflaged explosive bomb (trapped car) was prepared inside a Brazilian-type car; the bomb works by wireless electronic explosion device (remote control) and also by

(34)

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S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
26	Preparing wooden molds to use in preparing the explosive bombs		80	D40, D57, Fedayeen Saddam, D16	electronic timing at the same time, or which one more suitable while carrying out.  (80) Eighty wooden molds of various types and sizes were prepared and used to cast the explosive materials as molded and sticky bombs, and preparing explosive materials
27	Maintaining and blackening various types of rifles and pistols		9	D6, aide office	1. (7) Seven pistols were maintained for D6/armory 2. (2) Browning pistols were blackened.
28	Preparing containers for bombs explosion devices with shells for car protection sets		100	D40, D14, D16	A hundred metallic containers of various sizes were prepared

(35)

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S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
29	Preparing cars' tires protection from stealing devices		20	All headquarters	used to conceal the bombs' explosion devices during casting and preparing for tasks, also represent metal containers for the car protection sets, and old type of some cars.  New cars' tires protection devices were manufactured according to new designs
30	Reconnaissance the explosion accidents and disposing the unexploded bombs		23	D6, D4, D5, D56, D57	1. Reconnaissance the explosion of (60) mm mortar bombs in April 7th, nearby the General Security. 2. Reconnaissance the explosion of (107) mm missile in the Palestinian house-complex nearby the General Security

(36)

Page 53

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
31	testing and securing the cars from explosive demolition devices		50000	D1, D6, the presidential palace	<p>3. Disposing and disassembling a trapped car.</p> <p>4. Reconnaissance the explosion of (107) mm missile in Mujahedin-e Khalq camp/Al-Kut.</p> <p>5. performing missiles duties with D57</p> <p>6. Reconnaissance the exploding location of (122) mm missiles in Al-Kararah</p> <p>7. Reconnaissance an explosion location D56</p> <p>8. Reconnaissance some urgent and doubtful cases (existence of explosive bombs).</p> <p>Directorates' personnel cars that entered the headquarter were checked up during morning and evening working hours.</p>

(37)

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
32	Securing halls and buildings from explosive bombs threats		8	D1, D6	Testing and detecting significant buildings and halls were done, in order to secure them from explosion threats.
33	Inspecting the incoming post, parcels and gifts to the director and the organization formations		5500	D1, D2, organization formations	All parcels and gifts entered to the headquarter (the director office and other directorates) were inspected and secured from explosion threats.
34	Courses and training lectures in the field of concealing and disposing bombs		6	D4, D16, D23	Development courses were opened in the field of concealing and disposing explosive bombs, the courses include theoretical and practical lectures
35	Watching brochures and periodicals, and studying catalogues and offers		12	D4, D16	Catalogues, offers and brochures related to concealing and disposing of explosive bombs were studied to use them in our job field

(38)

Page 55

S	Project Name	Planned	Completed	Beneficiary headquarter	Remarks
36	Training officers and sources on the bombs made in our formation		50	D14, D40, D57, Fedayeen Saddam	<p>1. The beneficiary headquarter officers were trained on using (93) ninety three explosive bombs that prepared in our formation according to theoretical and practical steps, also carrying out techniques.</p> <p>2. One of D40 sources was trained on using camouflaged inside car explosive bomb (trapped) prepared in D16.</p> <p>3. Fedayeen Saddam representative was trained on using bombs delivered to them in terms of using, storing and transferring, the training was in Fedayeen Saddam site.</p>

(39)

S	Project name	Planning	Achieved	Beneficiary body	Remarks
37	Quality control procedures that include checks and tests on the bombs manufactured by us		93	M14, M40,M57, Fedayeen Saddam	Quality and test were done on what were prepared of explosives of different types and forms, before they were delivered to beneficiary bodies concerned
38	Tests and check ups procedures on mufflers and camouflaged weapons manufactured by our formation		79	M6, M14	Quality and test were done on the advanced mufflers prepared for M16 and other armed mufflers to be used in special tasks
39	Preparation of practical and theoretical study on impromptu explosives		1	M16	The practical and theoretical study prepared by our formation, is pertaining to impromptu explosives in which explosive materials could be manufactured from material circulated in the local markets

(40)

S	Project name	Planned	Achieved	Beneficiary body	Remarks
40	Conducting special courses on explosives		1	M14	A three month Special course on explosive was conducted to two associates of M14, where practical and theoretical studies were conducted on everything related to explosives, also prototype that was tested in the field was prepared through the course
41	Designing and manufacturing of stands for the wheels testing device cameras in the organization quarter		2	M16	stands were designed and manufactured for the cameras that would be used in explosives detection machines in the organization quarter ( main door)
42	Manufacturing of stands for the Door way devises		4	M16	Four stands were manufactured used in the Door way devices
43	Erasing rifle number marks		5	M14	All numbers and marking letters were erased from 27

(41)

Page 58

S	Project name	Planned	Achieved	Beneficiary body	Remarks
					Rifles for M14 2. all numbers and marking letters were erased from (15) fifteen Beretta pistols for M14 3.all numbers and marking letters were erased from eight (RBG) launchers for M14

(42)

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Top secret

Executive projects outside work plan of M16/Sec2

Year 2000

S	Type	Planned			Accomplished		
		quantity	Time in days	quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
1	Designing and manufacturing stands for the wheels testing device cameras in the organization quarter	-	-	2	60	M16	stands were designed and manufactured for the cameras that would be used in explosives detection machines in the organization quarter ( main door)
2	Manufacturing stands for the Door way devises	-	-	4	60	M16	Four stands were manufactured used in the Door way devices
3	Erasing rifles number marks.	-	-	50	90	M14	A-All numbers and marking letters were erased from 27 Rifles for M14  B- all numbers and marking letters were erased from (15) fifteen Beretta pistols for M14  C- all numbers and marking letters were erased

(1-2)

Page 60

Top secret

Planned					Accomplished		
S	Type	quantity	Time in days	quantity	Time in days	Beneficiary body	Remarks
							from eight (RBG) launchers to be used in tasks for M14

(2-2)

Previous

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### Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-005749

Classification: [REDACTED]

English Title: Iraqi Intelligence Service Comparison of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) for 2000/2001 [REDACTED]

Language: ARABIC

Document Date: 20020000	Total Pages: 4	Inclusive Pages:	Oversized Pages:
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Document Type: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORT, ORGANIZATIONAL CHART/CHARTER, SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM	Format:
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### Keyword Categories

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SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES; EQUIPMENT; IIS - IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; CFLCC PIR; TERRORISM; THREATS TO MILITARY SECURITY - IEDS; EXPLOSIVES - IEDS; THREAT INFORMATION - IEDS; IEDS (IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES)

Document Remarks

[REDACTED] This file contains an Iraqi Intelligence Service list of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) for the years 2000/2001. The file also contains charts and diagrams. Originator classification is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Batch Information

Batch Number: 3232-1	Boxes in Batch: 42
Capture Information	Date/Time of Capture:20030806 Identity of Source:IISbuilding
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Secret and Confidential

Completion comparison of the working plan SH<sup>2</sup> for the years of 2000, 2001(Q<sub>1</sub>) + (Q<sub>2</sub>)


No.	Type	Completed	Completed	Completion	Completion
		Year 2000	Year 2001	Comparison Year 2000	Comparison Year 2001
1	Preparing explosive devices of different types	93	35	73	27
2	Handling and disassembly of different (incoming) packages	10	3	76	24
3	Programming electronic timers to be used for detonation of various explosives	94	76	55	45
4	Manufacturing of different electronic timers	200	35	85	15
5	Booby-trapping cars for various missions	1	1	50	50
6	Installing and maintaining anti theft equipment for cars (modern type)	275	520	35	65
7	Preparing and developing silencers for weapons of varying types and calibers	79	35	69	31
8	Manufacturing molds of different types and sizes for the use in making explosive containers	80	92	46	54
9	Maintenance of different types of weapons	9	6	60	40
10	Improving methods of electronic explosive detonation (remote control)	10	7	58	42
11	Studies in making a powerful mixture of liquid explosives	12	9	57	43
12	Duties of manipulation and reconnaissance	23	10	69	31
13	Installment and maintenance of equipment for the detection and handling of explosives and weapons detection	17	57	22	78

(1-2)

#	Type	Completed Year 2000	Completed Year 2001	2000 Completion Comparison	2001 Completion Comparison
14	Protecting buildings and conferences halls from the danger of sabotage by explosives	8	4	66	34
15	Examination of the incoming mail packages and gifts to the organization director for sabotage	5500	4500	55	55
16	Lectures and training courses on the field of detecting and handling explosives	6	9	40	60
17	Follow up on publications, catalog studies and exhibitions	12	30	28	72

(2-2)

Graphical plan for comparison of what was completed from the working plan SH<sup>2</sup> during 2000 and 2001 by percentage.



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### Original Document Information

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Intelligence Information Report		[REDACTED]

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#### Keywords

IIS - IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE - M8 DIVISION; SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

### Document Remarks

[REDACTED] Index on a yearly report on intelligence collection, recruitment, and dissemination by the Iraqi Intelligence Service's M8 division. Discusses intelligence issues, handicaps, and failures; travel payments; visas; financial allowances for Palestinians and Ahwazis; and meetings with field elements.

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[All translator comments are in "[ ]" square brackets.]

**Annual  
Special Report  
With /M8 for the Year 2002**

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## In the Name of Allah the Most Gracious and Merciful

### Annual Report from M8 for the Year 2002

#### 1. Annual Report Details for the Year 2002

##### a. In the Area of Information Collection

Information of all types and from the lowest level is reported. It has been collected and prepared in response to the concerns and plans of the intelligence departments M4, M5, and other departments of the Service, and likewise for whatever facilitates their work, as well as serves the interest of the Office [probably means Tariq Aziz's office]. 954 pieces of information were distributed to the main areas of intelligence collection as follows:- (The number of pieces of political information reached its lowest level of 441, and intelligence information reached 465 pieces and military information reached 48 pieces.) The details are listed below:-

##### First. Political Information:-

###### Political Information to M4:-

1. Information about statements from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
2. Information about statements from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
3. Information about statements from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
4. Information about a press statement by Dr. George Habash, founder of the Popular Front.
5. Information about a statement from the Popular Front calling for Ahmad Sa'adat's arrest.
6. Information about groups from the Palestinian Liberation Organization on the occasion of the Um Al-Mu'arak [Mother of All Battles].
7. Information about a discussion with Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zuhar spokesperson for the Hamas.
8. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Legislative Council supporting Yasser Arafat.
9. Information about statements from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
10. Information about statements from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
11. Information about a press meeting with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
12. Information about a press statement from Abu Abbas.

13. Information about a press meeting with Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader for Hamas.
14. Information about a newspaper article for the Israeli Knesset president.

15. Information about statements from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
16. Information about the monthly political analysis of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
17. Information about a statement from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
18. Information about a press article in the newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Qatariyya.
19. Information about a press article in the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
20. Information about the status of the Intifadah in the second week of January according to side of the director on our reading of 34 on 23 January.
21. Information about the status of the Intifadah in the fourth week of January according to the side of the Service director on our reading of 34 on 30 January.
22. Information about the status of the Intifadah in the first week of February according to the side of the Service director on our reading 39 on 6 February.
23. Information about the status of the Intifadah in the second week of February according to the side of the Service director on our reading 45 on 16 February.
24. Information about the statues of the Intifadah in the third week of February according to the side of the Service director on our reading 51 on 21 February.
25. Information about the status of the Intifadah in the second week of March according to the side of the Service director on our reading 65 on 17 March.
26. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Resistance Brigades/the Military Wing for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
27. Information about statements from the Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
28. Information about a statement from the Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
29. Information about a press article in the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
30. Information about a press statement from the Popular Struggle Front.
31. Information about a call from the Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
32. Information about a statement from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
33. Information about a statement from Palestinian Tiysir Qaba'a, vice president of the Palestinian National Council.
34. Information about a press meeting with Abu Al-Abbas.
35. Information about a press article in an Israeli newspaper.



36. Information about the position and vision of the Democratic Front about the internal Palestinian situation.
37. Information about a statement from the Committee of the Workers' Struggle Union in Palestine on the anniversary for the establishment of the party.
38. Information about a statement from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
39. Information about a message from the Popular Struggle Front.
40. Information about a statement for the Palestinian Resistance Brigades announcing the death of the martyr Mustafa Al-Shabali.
41. Information about a statement to the organized unified operations compartment from the Palestinian squads.
42. Information about a statement of an Israeli officer that Palestinians refuse to surrender.
43. Information about a call from the High Succession Committee for the Palestinian National Authority.
44. Information about a statement from the Arab Liberation Front praising the Iraqi position.
45. Information about a statement from the Palestinian National Authority in Khan Yunis.
46. Information the Palestinian command issued about Colin Powell's visit to the Arabic region.
47. Media information about the International Conference on Islam.
48. Information about a telegram from the Commander in Chief to the Palestinian Khalid Abdel-Majid.
49. Information about Bush's new plan to resolve the Palestinian issue.
50. Information about a press statement of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
51. Information about a press statement the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
52. Information about a statement of the Popular Front condemning all types of detainment operations.
53. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front about the Church of Al-Mahd.
54. Information about a press statement from the Islamic and National Forces.
55. Information about an article in the Israeli newspaper titled "Measuring Islam."
56. Information about a statement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
57. Information about a press statement from Abu Al-Abbas about Palestinian situations.
58. Information about press articles in Israeli newspapers.
59. Information about a statement from Brigades of the Palestinian Resistance.
60. Information about press articles in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahr Wanut.

61. Information about the official Palestinian position from the peace process.
62. Information about a message from deputy prime minister Tujan Al-Faisal to the King of Jordan.
63. Information about a political statement for the Palestinian Liberation Front.

64. Information about a newspaper article in the Zionist newspaper Haris.
65. Information about the internal Palestinian situation.
66. Information about an article in an Israeli newspaper about the struggle over Palestinian control.
67. Information about a media discussion with the director general for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
68. Information about a statement from the Popular Front (change and reform in authority).
69. Information about the PLF [Palestinian Liberation Front] about not participating in formation of the Ministry.
70. Information about a paper of national discussion from the PLF to unity of the Palestinian class.
71. Information about a press article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.
72. Information of an article in the newspaper, Arab Times, about the Bahrain popular position against America.
73. Information about a political statement from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
74. Information about a decision from the International Court of Justice.
75. Information about an article in the newspaper Haris titled (passport in the service of a terrorist).
76. Information about a newspaper article about political reforms in Bahrain.
77. Information about a call from the Fatah Movement to stop operations inside the green line.
78. Information about the confessions of former American intelligence agent [REDACTED].
79. Information about Palestinian Syrian relations.
80. Information about a newspaper article about Israel continuing its policy of penetration and destruction.
81. Information about an article in the Emirate newspaper Al-Bayan about Jordanian Saudi talks.
82. Information about a press article in the newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.
83. Information about a newspaper article about the sensitivity of Syrian-Iraqi relations.
84. Information about the conflicts between Yasser Arafat and Al-Tayyib Abdel-Rahim.
85. Information about [REDACTED] in America.
86. Information about an annual report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies regarding the American Policy.
87. Information about daily Israeli violations against the Palestinian people.
88. Information about the results of Sharon's latest visit to America.
89. Information for an article in the newspaper, Arab Times, about the war of conflict starting in Kuwait.
90. Information about reviewing immigration to Israel because of the Palestinian Intifadah.



[Underlining indicates that some of the topics had been underlined in pencil.]

91. Information about Jewish individuals living in South Africa criticizing Israel.
92. Information about diplomatic communication between Morocco and the Zionist entity [Israel].
93. Information about a study of national events in Israel.
94. Information of the summary of the Judaism book between the cultural cultivation of the East and the political cultivation of the West.
95. Information about Iraqi aid to Palestinian areas.
96. Information about a press interview between an American newspaper and president Khatami.
97. Information about an article of the British Prime Minister (political victory in Afghanistan).
98. Information about a statement from the Islamic and national force in Palestine.
99. Information about scandals of the ruling family in Qatar.
100. Information about daily Israeli violations against the Palestinian people.
101. Information an article in the newspaper Haris Egypt's ability to production a nuclear weapon.
102. Information about the national reformation project and the change in the Democratic Front.
103. Information about an article in a Turkish newspaper about Turkish support to American in Afghanistan.
104. Information about internet sites which Jews run, deriding Islam.
105. Information about an article in the newspaper Al-Bayan about suggestions of the Israeli defense minister.
106. Information about the [REDACTED] in the United States.
107. Information about an article in the Jordanian newspaper, Al-Dustoor written by Prince Al-Hassan Ibn Tilal.
108. Information about attendance of a meeting from groups from the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon.
109. Information about the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi about Jordan's role in the expected American attack.
110. Information about a study around the future of Pakistani nuclear establishments.
111. Information about a statement from the Union of the Workers of Palestine/Iraq Branch.
112. Information about an article in the Al-Huriyya newspaper published by the Democratic Front, about Syrian authorities closing down newspapers connected to Iraqi opposition.
113. Information about a message to Mr. Tariq Aziz from Abu Al-Abbas.
114. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front regarding American threats against Iraq.

115. Information in the magazine Al-Safir at American insinuation to Jordan and Egypt that it will stop assistance.
116. Information about a statement from the Fatah Movement in the Gaza Strip warning the Israeli Government.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

117. Information about an article in the Al-Bayan newspaper concerning the intentions of the American administration toward Iraq.
118. Press information about the visit of the American Secretary of State to the Arab region.
119. Press information about President Arafat's intention to create a committee to choose prime minister.
120. Information about Palestinian public opinion regarding the anticipated American aggression.
121. Information about an article in Al-Bayan newspaper regarding American threats to strike Iraq.
122. Information about a press article in the newspaper Haris about American threats to Iraq.
123. Information about the political analysis for the speech of American President, Bush the Younger.
124. Information about a press announce from the Jordanian foreign minister.
125. Information about the intention of the American administration to provide financial assistance to Turkey as a bribe to buy its support for a strike on Iraq.
126. Information about the assassination of the leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade in Gaza.
127. Information about a military statement from the Palestinian Resistance Brigade, the military wing of the Democratic Front.
128. Information about a press article about the effect of martyrdom operations on Zionists.
129. Information about President Arafat losing control over the Fatah house.
130. Information about an article for the Israeli newspaper to create a new Palestinian security agency.
131. Information about the Jewish role in American elections.
132. Information about the Israeli American Committee for Public Affairs.
133. Information about a statement from the Sultanate of Oman in America, Sadiq Juwad Suleiman.
134. Information about the Center for the Equity of Human Rights criticizing Zionist crimes.
135. Information about a message from the Public Information Agency in Gaza to the secretary of the Journalists without Borders Organization.
136. Information about statements from the Zionist finance minister regarding the Israeli economy.
137. Information about Faris Hassuna from the Fatah ranks nominating himself for the Palestinian presidential elections.
138. Information about a statement from American Alice Daras, the economic consul in Saudi Arabia.
139. Information about a discussion with the president of the political director of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.



140. Information about a statement from the Palestinian justice minister regarding the arrest of Ahmad Sa'adat.
141. Information about statements from Taysir Khalid, member of the Executive Council of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
142. Information about programs for peace in the Middle East calling for a Palestinian state.
143. Information in the newspaper, Al-Safir, about negotiations failing between Iraq and the United Nations.
144. Information about the political analysis of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
145. Information which the newspaper, Haris, published regarding Israel and Jordan extending pipeline to take water from the Red Sea.
146. Information about an article in the Israeli newspaper Haris titled The End of the Promise of Discussions.
147. Information about an article published in the newspaper, Al-Quds Al-Arabi regarding American officials taking a message from Prince Abdullah to Sharon.
148. Information in an article in the newspaper, Ma'arif, (The Ceasefire between the Palestinians and the Israelis.)
149. Information about the call for a united of the health care committees in Palestine.
150. Information about statements from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
151. Information about Palestinian statements of Badil Jabril Al-Rajub of the Preventive Safety.
152. Information about an Algerian delegation visiting Israel secretly.
153. Information of an announcement from Palestinian Bassam Abu Sharif to form a new party.
154. Information published in the Israeli newspaper, Ma'arif, about Iraq developing weapons.
155. Information published in the Israeli newspaper, Ma'arif, about the American president, Clinton.
156. Information about Jewish rabbis issuing a verdict depriving Arab workers employment.
157. Information about the American president's speech before the American Congress.
158. Information about an article titled The American War on Iraq Waits for the Moment of Emptiness.
159. Information that Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper published about the criminal Bush studying a priority plan for aggression on Iraq.
160. Information about a press interview which the newspaper, Haris, had with Palestinian Hussam Nizal.
161. Information about an article in the newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, for Palestinian Bassam Abu Sharif.
162. Information about an article in the Ma'arif newspaper about the Israeli army stumbling over documents showing that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority.

163. Information in an article in the Yediot newspaper "Fear of a Cruel War with Many Victims".

164. Information about an newspaper article from writer Ghazi Al-Sa'adi.
165. Information about an article in the Haris newspaper "The War against Saddam as an Israeli Interest."
166. Information about a statement from the Democratic Front about the Gaza project and security solutions.
167. Information about a newspaper article regarding the American people responding to support the criminal Bush.
168. Information about an article in the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper regarding a hostile American statement.
169. Information in the Haris newspaper "The Estimation in America, is that Israel will Respond with a Nuclear Weapon."
170. Information from an article in Haris newspaper titled "Israel under America to Work Quickly."
171. Information from the Yediot Newspaper about the Arab world standing on the side of Iraq.
172. Information about an article in the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper, about the matter of a targeted campaign against Iraq.
173. Information about a press article regarding the end of work for the Israeli Mossad chief.
174. Information about news of Jordan Israeli intentions to put Jordanian workers in the place of Asian workers.
175. Information about an article in the Haaretz Newspaper titled "In the Worst Case Scenario."
176. Information about a report from Al-Huriyya Newspaper about the deaths of 583 Israelis during the Intifadah.
177. Information about transferring a copy of the magazine Al-Masira which the Palestinian Liberation Front publishes.
178. Information about transferring a copy of Al-Hadaf Magazine which is published by the Popular Front.
179. Information about a statement from the two Democratic and Popular Fronts regarding developing their relations.
180. Information about the Israeli Haris Newspaper "Israel Does Not Restrain Itself Again."
181. Information about an article in the Al-Rai' Newspaper "An American Israeli Design to Change the Maps of the Region."
182. Information in an article in the Yediot Newspaper about negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.
183. Information about a report in the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper "The Israeli Economy is Many Times Bigger than The Arab Countries."
184. Information about an article in the Lebanese Al-Safir Newspaper about Farouk Al-Qadumi.
185. Information published in the Ma'arif Israeli Newspaper stating that Iran has began to build producers to manufacture nuclear fuel.
186. Information in the Haris Newspaper regarding equipped F-16's to carry nuclear weapons.

187. Information about a statement in the Ma'arif Israeli Newspaper from the Israeli foreign minister.
188. Information from the Yediot newspaper regarding Yasser Arafat's worry over Juwad Al-Ghassin fleeing.

189. Information in the Al-Safir Newspaper regarding rumors in Iran to impose a state of emergency.
190. Information in the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper "Rumsfeld an Intermediary of the Biological Weapon for Iraq."
191. Information about the reality of the condition of Palestinian cells on Yemeni territory.
192. Information about the arrest of an agent results in assassination operations against Palestinian leadership.
193. Information about the Jewish organization sending a message to the European Union.
194. Information about a newspaper article by Palestinian Nayif Huwatima, titled "What is after the Gaza Bomb?"
195. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Popular Resistance, Khalid Ibn Al-Walid Brigade [or Brigadier General Khalid Ibn Al-Walid].
196. Information about a decrease in the trade balance between Saudi and America.
197. Information about the Palestinian National Council participating in emergency sessions for the Arab Parliament in Baghdad.
198. Information about an article from Al-Mushir Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala "America in a World Confrontation."
199. Information about a report of Iraq efforts to isolate President Bush by sending delegations.
200. Information about a report from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].
201. Information about Zionist settlers in the West Bank.
202. Information about the visit of a delegation from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to the country.
203. Information about the Israeli government building settlements inside the green line.
204. Information on news reported in Jordanian periodicals.
205. Information about official Egyptian periodicals about the American Attack.
206. Information about a statement from Al-Muhandis [the engineer] Leith Shabilat, president of the Zionist Opposition League.
207. Information about a press article criticizing Iran's opportunistic position.
208. Information about an article in The Times Newspaper concerning President Bush's estimations.
209. Information about an interview which the Al-Quds Newspaper held with American General Scowcroft.
210. Information about a news article of protocols of Zionist doctors [PhD's].
211. Information about an article in the Al-Rai' Newspaper about building an enclosure in the West Bank.
212. Information from an article in the Ma'arif Newspaper titled "After That We Will Attack Qaddafi."
213. Information about an article in the Al-Itihad Newspaper "Arab National Security and the Israeli Spy Satellite."

214. Information about an article in the Haris Newspaper "Sharon's Strategy for a Long Extended War."
215. Information about a statement in the Israeli Ma'arif Newspaper of the Israeli defense minister.

216. Information about an article titled "Saudi Wealth Fleeing America."
217. Information about an article in the Haris Newspaper titled "The Jordanian Nightmare Scenario."
218. Information about news from a group of Saudi investors starting to withdrawal their money from American banks.
219. Information about a political analysis of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
220. Information about an article for the Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper regarding Swiss banks blocking Arab bank accounts.
221. Information about sending a copy of the Al-Huriyya Newspaper which the Democratic Front publishes.
222. Information about the increase of the position between Brussels and Washington because of Bush's policy.
223. Information about an article in Al-Dustoor Newspaper titled "NATO in Iraq."
224. Information about an article in the Al-Rai' titled "The Economic Downfall in Israel."
225. Information about an article in a British newspaper concerning a statement from Bush's deputy.
226. Information about an article dealing with corruption in the Palestinian Authority.
227. Information about an article in Al-Itihad regarding a call for Israeli rabbis to purge the Al-Aqsa Mosque of Arabs.
228. Information about the Al-Hayat Newspaper "The Dreams of Washington and Tel Aviv to Set up a New Regional System."
229. Information about a report in the Al-Rai' Newspaper about Washington's hostile policy.
230. Information about a report in the Al-Itihad Newspaper "What is Behind the Political Decision to Strike Iraq."
231. Information about statements from a member of the American senate accusing Saudi Arabia of spreading hostile feelings toward Americans.
232. Information about a report from the Haris Newspaper about a decrease in Jewish immigration to Israel.
233. Information about a statement from the Fatah Movement criticizing the Gaza project first.
234. Information in an article from the Al-Khaleej Newspaper on the Turkey's dreams to control Kirkuk and Mosul.
235. Information in the Al-Watan Al-Arabi Magazine regarding the existence of tensions between Ankara and the Al-Barzani Group.
236. Information about a statement from the Fatah Movement demanding the international society's quick intervention for pressure on Zionism.
237. Information about a report in the Haris Newspaper about the future of the international forces in the Sinai.
238. Information about conflicts between the American and British positions.



239. Information about a television interview held
240. Information about an analysis in the Haris Newspaper regarding control over the Middle East.
241. Information about a report in the Al-Rai' Newspaper regarding the economic disintegration in Israel.
242. Information about a speech from Doctor George Habash, founder of the Popular Front.
243. Information about a report in the Al-Rai' Newspaper regarding Israel's demographic apprehensions.
244. Information about news regarding a popular conference held to support Iraq.
245. Information about a statement from the Arab Liberation Front regarding the Zionist massacres.
246. Information about an article from Palestinian Nayif Huwatima titled "The Catastrophic September 11th Event."
247. Information about a statement for the Democratic Front for the Detainment of Abdel-Hamid Mohammad.
248. Information about a statement Information about a statement from the deputy vice president of the Palestinian National Council.
249. Information about a statement from the Arab Liberation Front criticizing Sharon's hostile statements.
250. Information about an article in the Haris Newspaper titled "Israel Practicing the Role of Occupation."
251. Information about a political analysis from a Zionist expert in strategy.
252. Information about a statement from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade refusing to stop fedai'i operations.
253. Information about American Saudi Relations.
254. Information about a statement from the Zionist chief of the Staff Agency.
255. Information about a statement from the deputy general advisor for the Muslim Brotherhood.
256. Information about a cultural picture from Professor Martin Van Carnfield.
257. Information about the transfer of a copy of the Al-Masira Magazine published by the Palestinian Liberation Front.
258. Information about an article regarding the case of Egyptian minister, Yusef Wali.
259. Information about an article in the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper in the matter of a strike on Iraq.
260. Information about an article from reporter Fahmi Huwaidi. "American Specialized Studies."
261. Information about statements from the Saudi foreign minister.
262. Information about a call from the Egyptian Popular Committee to support the Palestinian Intifadah.
263. Information about a press statement concerning the Zionist occupation.
264. Information about an article in the Haris Newspaper indicating that America is studying all ways to prevent Syria from stopping the American campaign against Iraq.

265. Information about a speech from Farouk Qadumi gave at the United Nations.

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266. Information about an article in the Ma'arif Newspaper stating that Iraq is able to produce a nuclear weapon.
267. Information from a press statement in Al-Bayan Newspaper made by the Palestinian interior minister.
268. Information about statements concerning the Saudi urge for peace in the Middle East.
269. Information about a French intelligence report indicating that a war council has been convened in Turkey.
270. Information about American pundits repudiating the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq.
271. Information about a meeting of the Palestinian Legislative Council.
272. Information about the three stages to set up a Palestinian state.
273. Information about Al-Watan Newspaper concerning American strategy in the Middle East.
274. Information about an Israeli newspaper indicating that gas mask factories are operating through the day.
275. Information about statements from a Russian military expert concerning the possible American hostilities.
276. Information about a poll on Israeli public opinion pointing to a decrease in Sharon's popularity.
277. Information about a political statement from the Arab Liberation Front concerning Arabic positions.
278. Information about a Haris Newspaper article titled "Israel Does Not Intend to Withdrawal to Former Lines."
279. Information about a press interview with Al-Haj Abu Ahmad, founder of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Palestine.
280. Information about the Times Newspaper concerning Israeli Democratic Council neighborhoods.
281. Information about an article in the Washington Post newspaper "The War with Iraq Will Never End."
282. Information about an article including the scenario from the Israeli Defense Ministry.
283. Information about a report talking about economic decline for the second Gulf War.
284. Information about an article in Al-Arab Newspaper "The American Strategy against Iraq."
285. Information about an article in the Jordanian newspaper, Al-Dustoor "A Reading into Bush's Speech."
286. Information in Al-Safir Newspaper uncovering the American plan of attack on Iraq.
287. Information about Moscow Times Newspaper concerning an article "Russia's Interest from Iraq."
288. Information about a statement from the PLF [Palestinian Liberation Front] calling for Arabic countries to put pressure on the Americans.

289. Information in an Israeli newspaper about Jewish terrorist cells conducting terrorist operations.
290. Information in the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat concerning Iraqis fleeing Baghdad.
291. Information about a press article about the White House demand to start the war.
292. Newspaper information about Iraq's relations with the Al-Qaida Organization.
293. Information about settling the conflicts between the Pentagon and the American State Department.

294. Information about a study called American imperialism is about to be started.
295. Information about a newspaper article "Russian Interests and Iraq."
296. Information about an article concerning Iraq and the news strategy.
297. Information about statements from former American generals.
298. Information about a document from the political directorate of the (MTF) [Palestinian Liberation Organization]] concerning the Israeli Knesset.
299. Information in the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat concerning the international inspectors return to Iraq.
300. Information about a report concerning the Intifadah and its effect on the Israeli economy.
301. Information about a report in the Washington Post concerning the military campaign against Iraq.
302. Information in Al-Ahli Newspaper concerning a statement from the Opposition Parties Organization Committee.
303. Information in Al-Ahli Newspaper about the goals in the American plan against Iraq.
304. Information about Sharon information the White House that he will strike Iraq.
305. Information about Congress voting on a proposal to use force against Iraq.
306. Information about a document of the political directorate of the (MTF) [Palestinian Liberation Organization] concerning a strike on Iraq.
307. Information about a document of the political directorate (MTF) [Palestinian Liberation Organization] toward incentives to strike Iraq.
308. Information of an article in Haris Newspaper "Even If an Iraqi Missile Falls in the Desert."
309. Information about the European plan to set up a Palestinian State.
310. Information from a study about the Islamic Jihad Movement.
311. Information from a study about Israeli Chinese relations.
312. Information from a study about Israeli Indian relations.
313. Information about a statement from the Fatah Movement.
314. Information of an article titled "Sharon Wants to Replace Arafat with the Help a Gulf Country."
315. Information about an article "Ankara Establishes the Largest Deal with Israel."
316. Information about a study concerning Palestinian Gulf Trade.
317. Information about the statistics of martyrs from blessed Al-Aqsa Intifadah.
318. Information about documents from the Popular Struggle Front].
319. Information about an article called "A Few Words about Responsibility."
320. Information about an article "About the American European Conflict in the Iraq Issue."
321. Information about an article "Secrets of the American War."

322. Information about a meeting with Nayif Huwatima the director general for the Democratic Front.
323. Information about Zionism intensifying the blockade on the Gaza Strip.
324. Information in Newsweek Magazine about the Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat.
325. Information about a newspaper article "Sharon in the Road between Baghdad and Washington."
326. Information about an interview held over satellite TV with Farouk Qadumi.
327. Information about the Israeli Knesset president criticizing the Bush administration.
328. Information about a Palestinian economic report.
329. Information about ruling national party in Egypt.
330. Information about Brigadier General Ghazi Kana'an the Syrian intelligence official in Lebanon.
331. Information about statements from Iranian parliament members for the Iraqi foreign minister's visit.
332. Information about Saudi Arabi starting to impose limits on Americans entering it.
333. Information about an article "The Pentagon doubles Its Troop Strength around Iraq."
334. Information about a statement from the Fatah Movement calling for an end to Israeli hostilities.
335. Information about a chill in American Egyptian relations.
336. Information about an interview with Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign minister.
337. Information about the blockade intensifying the blockade on President Arafat's headquarters.
338. Information about a statement from Palestinian groups in the country on the anniversary of the Intifada.
339. Information about rumors to nominate Mubarak's son for the president of Egypt.
340. Information about an assassination attempt on Hassan Nasrallah the director general for the Hizballah.
341. Information about Palestinian officials being injured during the blockade on Arafat's headquarters.
342. Information about an order from the mujahid martyr to execute [U/I possibly the name Fayluka] operation against Americans.
343. Information about a meeting with Abdel-Aziz Al-Rantisi one of the Hamas leaders.
344. Information from a document from the [Palestinian] Liberation Organization concerning the American Iranian conspiracy against Iraq.
345. Information about the anticipated American war machine and its use against Iraq.

346. Information about a decreasing in the attempt to appoint Abu Mazen president of the Palestinian government.
347. Information about the Zionist entity seizing documents during Operation Protective Wall.
348. Information about an article in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper of a statement from the American defense secretary.
349. Information about Israeli support for the John Karnack Separatist Movement in the Sudan.

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350. Information about appointing Hani Al-Hassan, Interior Minister, in the Palestinian Authority.
351. Information from Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper about Al-Aqsa Brigade starting to threaten to kill whoever tries to find a replacement for the Palestinian president.
352. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Works Minister about reinstating ages.
353. Information about a document from the Palestinian Liberation Organization concerning Israel's nuclear bombs.
354. Information from an article about Iran's role in the American military campaign on Iraq.
355. Information about a statement from Al-Azhar Al-Sharif [possibly the honorable Al-Azhar University in Egypt] in the matter of the hostile media campaign against Islam.
356. Information about a British newspaper concerning Abu Masa'b's Al-Zarqawi's visit to the country.
357. Information about a news article concerning American support for Israel.
358. Information from a news article about Eritrea's preparation for an American base.
359. Information from an article in Kehan Newspaper about the Iranian position toward Iraq.
360. Information about a study from the Palestinian Liberation Organization on various issues.
361. Information from Al-Safir Lebanese newspaper about Turkish Israeli relations.
362. Information about a news publication from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
363. Information from Palestinian Nayif Huatima's visit to China.
364. Information about a publication from the Popular Front titled "Iraq, Talks and Washington."
365. Information of the facts the daily about Zionist hostilities on Palestinians.
366. Information about a discussion between the Fatah and Hamas Movements in Cairo.
367. Information about Turkey's wide aspirations in northern Iraq.
368. Information about an article in the Israeli Yediot Newspaper by Shimon Peres.
369. Information from an article titled "The Social Chasms in Israel."
370. Information about Hizballah and Al-Qaida testing chemical weapons.
371. Information about a news interview which the Iraqi newspaper Babil held with Abu Al-Abbas.
372. Information about a gathering for the death of Zionist Mayer Kahana, founder of the Kakh Movement.
373. Information about monies given to the Palestinian Authority.
374. Information about a speech given by Abu Mazen in the Palestinian Intelligence Headquarters.

375. Information about the Islamic Jihad Movement in Syria.

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376. Information about a document from a document from the political directorate of the Palestinian Liberation Organization concerning Palestinian elections.
377. Information about an article in the Saudi Riyadh Newspaper "Six Main Ideas to Move American Foreign Policy."
378. Information from an article concerning the American deputy Secretary of State with advice for Prince Abdullah, the Saudi crown prince, concerning the Iraq issue.
379. Information about a document from the political directorate of the Palestinian Liberation Organization concerning Israel's demand to attack Iran.
380. Information about the activities of the Al-Ahwaz Liberation Front on the Great Homage Day [unsure of correct English name].
381. Information about historical documents for the Al-Ahwaz region which the Kuwaiti Nation Newspaper published.
382. Information about the presidency Al-Ahwaz Woman's Union participating in the Arab Woman's Conference.
383. Information about editions of Al-Ahwaz Magazine entering deep within Iran.
384. Information about the Al-Ahwaz Liberation Organization participating in the Popular Islamic Conference.
385. Information about activities of the president of the Al-Ahwaz General Student Union during his trip to Syria.
386. Information about Al-Ahwazi groups not attending the commencement of Walid, Iranian defense minister.

**Political Information to M4:-**

387. Information regarding statements from the Popular Front criticizing the continual Zionist aggression.
388. Information about a statement from the Democratic Front concerning ways to confront Sharon's plans.
389. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front concerning developments in the Palestinian territories.
390. Information about a statement of the Popular Front condemning the brutal Zionist hostilities.
391. Information about a speech given by groups of the Palestinian Liberation Organization on the occasion of Um Al-Mua'rak [Mother of All Battles].
392. Information about a statement from Abu Al-Abbas condemning the American position.
393. Information about the transfer of Al-Masira publication, published by the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
394. Information about statements from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
395. Information about the Palestinian Liberation Front's position on decision 1397 of the Security Council.



396. Information from a news statement from the Popular Struggle Front].
397. Information about a call from the Palestinian Liberation Front regarding the Zionist invasion.
398. Information from a news statement issued by the Popular Front concerning the Arab Summit's decisions.
399. Information about a statement from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
400. Information from a statement made by the Palestinian Resistance battalion announcing the death of martyr Mustafa Al-Shababi.
401. Information from a statement made by Unified Operations Group formed from the Palestinian powers.
402. Information about a table of losses for the Israeli occupation forces during the Intifadah.
403. Information about a call coming from the Islamic and national forces to the committee of the High Command.
404. Information about a statement from the Arab Liberation Front building the Iraqi position to support the Palestinian Intifadah.
405. Information about a statement made by the Palestinian leadership in light of Colin Powell's visit.
406. Information from a press statement from Palestinian groups in Syria.
407. Information about a press statement from Dr. George Habash, founder of the Popular Front.
408. Information about a news statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
409. Information about a statement from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
410. Information about transferring a copy of Al-Hadaf Magazine which the Popular Front publishes.
411. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front in memory of The Disaster.
412. Information about the Jordanian Masonic gathering.
413. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front concerning not participating in any ministerial creation.
414. Information about a paper of the national discussion which the Palestinian Liberation Front presented to the unifying of the Palestinian class.
414. [sic] Information about a news statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
415. Information about a statement from the director general
416. Information about an article in the Israeli Haaretz Newspaper.
417. Information about a statement from the Palestinian Liberation Front regarding American threats toward Iraq.
418. Information of a statement from the Democratic Front regarding the Gaza Project.

419. Information about the transfer of the Al-Masira Magazine published by the Palestinian Liberation Front.
420. Information about financial support being offered to Palestinian students from Al-Sheikh Zayid.
421. Information about a call from the Union of Health Care Committees in Palestine.
422. Information about an article from Palestinian Nayif Huatima "What is after the Ghaza Bomb First."
423. Information about the Palestinian National Council participating in the Parliamentary Conference in Baghdad.
424. Information about the transfer of Al-Huriyya Newspaper which is published by the Democratic Front.
425. Information a statement from the Fatah Movement / Gaza demanding that the international community quickly intervene and put pressure on Israel.
426. Information about the visit in the country of Palestinian Tilal Naji from the ranks of National Front.
427. Information of a statement from the JTF [PLO] about a call for Arab countries to put pressure on the American administration.
428. Information of a statement from Palestinian Fahd Suleiman one of the leaders of the Democratic Front.
429. Information on the internal situation Information of the internal situation in Turkey.
430. Information on the Popular Front's celebration on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Abu Ali Mustafa, the director general of the Front.
431. Information about a journalist [sic, probably newspaper] about the Egyptian minister Yusef Wali connected to Zionism.
432. Information about the transfer of Al-Masira Magazine published by the Palestinian Liberation Front.
433. Information on a statement from JTA' [Arab Liberation Front] about Sharon's hostile statements.
434. Information on a statement from the JTF [Palestine Liberation Front] criticizing the arrest of Palestinian Abdel-Hamid Mohammad.
435. Information about a statement from JTA' [Arab Liberation Front] criticizing the Zionist massacres of Palestinians.
436. Information on a festival of solidarity with Iraq organized by the Arab Liberation Front.
437. Information on a speech given by Dr. George Habash, founder of the Popular Front.
438. Information on the desire of Palestinian Prisoner of War Club in Janin to visit the country.
439. Information on the approval of the Service Director for the delegation of the Union of Al-Ahwaz Students.
440. Information on the Al-Ahwaz Liberation Front about an interview on satellite TV.

441. Information on Al-Ahwazi tribes boycotting the commencement council for Walid the Iranian defense minister.

[Underlining indicates that some of topics had been underlined in pencil.]

## Second. Intelligence Information:

### Intelligence Information for M4:-

1. Information about the memorandum of understanding between Ahmad Qaria', president of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Israeli foreign minister.
2. Information on the ship which passed with Israeli forces.
3. Information on an article in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat concerning changing the regime in Iraq.
4. Information on Palestinians wanted by the Zionist entity [Israel].
5. Information on the criminal Abdel-Amir A'bis with a message to Yasser Arafat.
6. Information published in the Tashriin Newspaper on the American TV station, Fox, starting an investigation that the Zionist Mossad had knowledge of the September events.
7. Information on Iraq Abbas Karim Ali Al-Matiri.
8. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Mahmoud Malhim.
9. Information concerning American threats on Iraq.
10. Information on Palestinian Mona Hussein.
11. Information on phone and fax numbers for the Palestinian embassies around the world.
12. Information that the legal counselor for the Zionist government has started to accuse Mufti Al-Quds.
13. Information on the amount of Palestinian losses reaching 2.4 billion dollars.
14. Information on a sharp decrease in the rate of settlers in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
15. Information on Sharon's announcement to not allow Yasser Arafat to leave Ramallah.
16. Information on the weapons ship "Karen A" which the Israeli navy restricted.
17. Information on Doctor Siri Nasiba.
18. Information on 'Azam Al-Ahmad to the country carrying a message for the Commander in Chief, may Allah preserve him.
19. Information on American National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.
20. Information on Sharon's intention to change the Zionist Mossad chief.
21. Information on a meet with Palestinian A'rif A'rif.
22. Information on Palestinian Maher Fahim.

23. Information of introduction of Palestinian Iyman Mohammad.
24. Information on an introduction from Palestinian Fadhil Daoud Mahmoud about his trip to Jordan.
25. Information one of the individuals in the Palestinian police regarding Israeli nuclear reactors.
26. Information on an introduction of Sudanese Dr. Mahmoud Sha'rani.
27. Information on the intelligence director approving assistance for the Iraqi Palestinian Brotherhood League.
28. Information on the Arab Popular Force Conference held in Baghdad.
29. Information on financial distributions to Palestinian families in Baghdad through the Abu Nidal Group.
30. Information on Palestinian companies and individuals participating in Performance of the Umra Exhibition [Umra is a "mini" Haj performed at any time during the year] in Baghdad.
31. Information on Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
32. Information on Syrian Palestinian relations.
33. Information on participants in the Palestinian Made Goods Exhibition in Baghdad.
34. Information whose source is one of the friends about a network of Iraqis fleeing in Lebanon.
35. Information on Palestinian Suleiman Mohammad Suleiman.
36. Information on the Zionist brigadier general, Moshe Ya'lon, the Zionist chief of staff.
37. Information on the weekly position of the Intifadah our study 73 on 27 March.
38. Information whose source is Palestinian ██████████.
39. Information on activities of the Palestinian Iraqi Brotherhood League.
40. Information on a meeting between President Arafat and the Islamic National Forces representatives.
41. Information on a meeting of Israeli military intelligence chief, Brigadier General Auri Saaghi.
42. Information on an introduction of Iraqi Tilal Al-Sa'di.
43. Information on Palestinian Abbas Zaki.
44. Information on some of the cadre of Palestinian groups in the matter of granting them travel visas.
45. Information on Zionist military aggression on the Palestinian lands.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

46. Information on the American suggestion offered during negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.
47. Information on Palestinian Manif Khalil Nayif.
48. Information on an article written by Israeli Zalif Shayif in the Israeli Haaretz Newspaper.
49. Information concerning the delegation from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
50. Information on Palestinian Nabila Talab Mahmoud.
51. Information on Yugoslavian [female] Malichi Janimita [spelled phonetically] for approval granting her permission to stay in the country.
52. Information on Palestinian Abbas Zaki.
53. Information on Colin Powell's meeting with Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat.
54. Information on the American administration targeting Iraq.
55. Information on the results of a visit from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to Iraq.
56. Information on distribution of publications in the Al-Baladiyyat area, in the name of the Al-Battalion of the Martyrs of the Jubairain People.
57. Information on a press interview with Israeli chief of staff.
58. Information on Palestinians Mohanad Kadthim and Bishar Arafat.  
[REDACTED]
60. Information on Palestinian Hina Mahmoud Omar.
61. Information on financial assistance to Palestinian groups.
62. Information on American preparations to direct a military strike on Iraq.
63. Information on the amount of Iranian financial assistance to Palestinian groups.
64. Information on the Popular Struggle Front on catalogues for machines that test for explosives.
65. Information on the candidates to battle Yasser Arafat.
66. Information on a message from Palestinian Abu Musa one of the Fatah leaders to the Iraq leadership.
67. Information on Palestinian Adnan Abdel-Rahman.
68. Information on Syrian Hissam Al-Din Bedawi.
69. Information on Palestinian Ma'an Dhib Nuwar.
70. Information on a message to the Commander in Chief from the Egyptian citizen, Mohammad Abdullah.
71. Information on Palestinian Tiysir Qaba'a.

(21)

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

72. Information on Palestinian groups in Syria.
73. Information on a chart concerning the route of the wall which could surround Jerusalem.
74. Information on a plan to organization sectors in the area.
75. Information on the Palestinian author Miriam Al-Sifi.
76. Information on Palestinian of origin and American citizenship [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
77. Information on the Jordanian engineer Musa, president of the Council to Resist the Naturalization of Zionism.
78. Information on a meeting of the Iraq ambassador in Jordan with Palestinian Abbas Zaki.
79. Information on Palestinian Bilal Qasim, an official for foreign relations in the Palestinian Liberation Front.
80. Information on the economic advisor to the Palestinian president, Al-Mada'u Mohammad Rashid.
81. Information on the present of US troops in southern Jordan.
82. Information on Palestinian Father Dr. Atta Allah Hina.
83. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Rahim Maluh one of the leaders of the Popular Front.
84. Information on Syrian Al-Maba'd Naasir Mawfiq Rafia'.
85. Information on Egyptian Mohammad Abdullah frequently going to the office and his allegations that he is sent from the Iraqi consulate in Egypt.
86. Information on a meeting held in Britain including 70 officers from Iraqi opposition.
87. Information on the Jordanian role in the event Iraq is exposed to an American attack.
88. Information on Jordanian intelligence calling back Palestinian and Jordanian students studying in Iraqi universities.
89. Information on the Palestine embassy starting to distribution forms for work as teachers in Yemen.
90. Information on the Iraqi Christian nun Naqiyya Mati.
91. Information from Service friend [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
92. Information on Palestinian Rukad Saalim, the director general for the Arab Liberation Front.
93. Information on Palestinian Miriam Hussein Ali.
94. Information on the anticipated American strike on Iraq.
95. Information on Palestinian Haytham Hussein Salim.
96. Information on Palestinian Zahir Al-Munasira.

99. [sic] Information on a meeting between Jordanian Mohammad Himasha and the criminal Jilal Al-Talibani.
100. Information on the assassination of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade leader in Gaza.
101. Information on Israel using planes to assassination Yusef Abdel-Wihab from the Izzadiin Al-Qisaam wing.
102. Information on the Arab delegations participating in the Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Global Championship in Baghdad.
103. Information on invitations for Palestinian individuals to attend the parliamentary conference in Baghdad.
104. Information on Jordanian Hissam Al-Din Mohammad.
105. Information on Syrian Ahmad Mohammad Ahmad.
106. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Khalid Al-Rihal.
107. Information on Palestinian Imad Jihad.
108. Information on Palestinian Haythem Al-Mila Hassan.
109. Information on Palestinian journalist Abdel-Bari A'twan [possibly Antoine].
110. Information on the visit of Palestinian Tilal Naji from the Popular Front.
111. Information on Jordanian Ya'qub Suleiman Al-Kaswani.
112. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Ibrahim Aliyan.
113. Information on Palestinian Rakad Saalim secretary for the Arab Liberation Front.
114. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Hakim Ahmad Ala' Al-Din.
115. Information on a meeting with Palestinian Ahmad Adnan Ishaq, a representative from the Islamic Jihad Movement.
116. Information on Palestinian Naasir Mahmoud Abdel-Qadir.
117. Information on Palestinians Ghassan Lutfi and Ahmad Ramadan.
118. Information on a list of names of Palestinian teachers on loan to Yemen.
119. Information on the Revolutionary Committees Movement to continue in Palestine.
120. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Nadim Shokri.
121. Information on Palestinian Wisam Mohammad Shiri.
122. Information on Palestinian Yassin Ma'tuq from one of the separatists from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
123. Information on the file of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
124. Information on the Lebanese representative Naasir Qandil.
125. Information on names of members from the Palestinian delegation who participate in the International Baghdad Exposition.

126. Information on the Zionist Mossad chief.
127. Information on the Islamic Jihad Movement.
128. Information on indictment of three Egyptians in spying on Israel.
129. Information on a new Palestinian organization called the Revolutionary Intifadah Movement.
130. Information on documents from the [REDACTED] foreign ministry.
131. Information on [U/I] the Iranian Karim Hamdi Al-Ka'bi.
132. Information on Al-Ahwazi Khalid Saleh Mushatit.
133. Information on Information on Al-Ahwazi Shaghi Jabbar Shalash.
134. Information on pieces of Iranian intelligence on Al-Ahwaziyyin.
135. Information on a meeting of the Iranian delegation with Al-Ahwaziyyin in the two sectors Waasit and Misaan.
136. Information on two Ahwazis entering Khimas Saba' and Karim Saalim into the country.
137. Information on a Semitic legation making a list and taking pictures of Ahwazis who live there.
138. Information on Ahwazis who fill out forms to return voluntarily by selling their goods.
139. Information on groups from Mujaheddin Al-Khalq kidnapping someone named Ali A'asi.
140. Information on names of Ahwazi families from the sects of young men.
141. Information from a source about Voice of American regarding broadcasts on the situation in Iran.
142. Information about the withdrawal of the Badr Al-Amala Corps within Iran.
143. Information about invitations for Ihwazi individuals to attend the Popular Force Conference.
144. Information on Al-Ahwazi National Liberation Movement.
145. Information on the Ahwazi Hassan Aboud Za'lan.
146. Information on the Ahwazi Abdel-Ridha Rahim.
147. Information from one of our sources about the Iraqi Suleiman A'thab sneaking into Iran to meet with Iranian officials.
148. Information on the Ahwazi Jamil Daoud Qaasim.
149. Information on the Ahwazi Hadi Abbas.
150. Information on the Ahwazi Suleiman Dawla.
151. Information on the Ahwazi Majut Hilu.
152. Information on the Ahwazi Naasir Abd Ali.

153. Information about the Service director approving to grant the Ahwazi [REDACTED] a passport to work in the Emirates.
154. Information about the Ahwazi Haji Rafrat.
155. Information on the National Council for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz.
156. Information on a delegation from the Al-Ahwazi Liberation Front participating in the Popular Force Conference.
157. Information on the arrest of the Ahwazi Raadhi Hamd Matrud.
158. Information on Ahwazi sending Tariq Abdel-Karim to Jordan to attend a conference.
159. Information on Ahwazi [REDACTED] to work as a translator with the Iranian delegations.
160. Information on the Service director's approval to send [REDACTED] to the Emirates.
161. Information on Ahwazi Nirur Mohammad Shifati from a source who works as a translator for Iranian delegations.
162. Information on the Iranian regime arresting Ahwazis returning to Iran.
163. Information on a broadcast sent organized in the name of Al-Ahwaz which broadcasts to the city of Al-Felahiyya, the source of the transmission is believed to be Kuwait.
164. Information whose source is one of the Ahwazis who works as a translator for Iranian delegations.
165. Information whose source is one of the Ahwazis who works as a translator for Iranian delegations.
166. Information about Ahwazi Ali Jaasim Aziz.
167. Information on Iraqi Rahim Fayruz who lives in the Misaan province and smuggles people to Iran.
168. Information on the Iranian [U/I spelled phonetically Al-Hamaldar] Haj Ali Nadthri.
169. Information on Ahwazi Malek Saleh Mashit.
170. Information on Palestinian Adil Judit Ali Abdel-Rahim.
171. Information on Ahwazi Siyyid Tahir Al Na'ma.
172. Information on Ahwazi Hussein Zaamil informing the Semitic legation about a number of Ahwazis sentenced to death.
173. Information on Ahwazis Niruz Mohammad and Hani Yaaza'.
174. Information on Iran holding a trial inside the Ahwazi regiments.
175. Information of 25 Ahwazi families leaving Iran.
176. Information on Ahwazi Ali Hussein Jaasib.

177. Information on the Semitic Legation for Refugee Affairs distributing posters in Al-Dajila.
178. Information on Ahwazi Fuad Salsabil.
179. Information on the agent Fakhir Al-Zarkani of the Commencement [Fatiha] Council frequently visiting the Al-Zarkan tribe in the Emirates.
180. Information on Ahwazi Warda Abdel-Karim Jaber.
181. Information Iranian Siyyid Abu Al-Fadhl Siyyid Hussein from Iranian intelligence.
182. Information on an Iranian delegation from Iranian tourism groups.
183. Information on Iranian persons within the Iranian tourism delegations.
184. Information on Ahwazi Ali Hussein Jaasim about his relatives in the Emirates.
185. Information about Ahwazi Jamil Sa'dun.
186. Information on unusual movements for the Iranian forces in the Al-Kut province.
187. Information on Iranian authorities calling back Ahwazis returning to Iran.
188. Information on cooperation between the Iranian government and the Hamas Movement.
189. Information on Palestinians Salah al-Din Mohammad Falah Mohammad and Amal Mohammad.
190. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Karim Salim Khalil Al-Bana.
191. Information on documents concerning the Islamic Jihad Movement and Palestinian security agencies.
192. Information on Palestinian Linda Tilal.
193. Information on the Palestinian economic crisis.
194. Information on the performance review of the Zionist Mossad Agency.
195. Information on Jordanian Zionist security cooperation.
196. Information on the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
197. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Ahmad Salim.
198. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Rishad to start frauds and scams.
199. Information on the Palestinian colonel Abu Aayid Mohammad Abu Samra.
200. Information on Palestinians Mohammad Ibrahim and Mohammad Adnan.
201. Information on Palestinian Saalim Mohammad Salaama.
202. Information from Palestinian friend Walid Al-Khatib...

**Intelligence Information to M5:-**

203. Information about working with the Palestinian Authority after the peace treaties.

- 204. Information on Palestinian Kamaal Hassan Hussein.
- 205. Information on Palestinian Mahir Hassan Saleh.
- 206. Information on Palestinian Fuad Al-Shubki, the finance official for the Fatah Movement.
- 207. Information on Palestinian Jihad Mohammad Khalil.
- 208. Information on members of the Palestine Student Union in Baghdad and the provinces.
- 209. Information on Palestinian Khadr Mahmoud Hamdan.
- 210. Information on the Palestine embassy in Baghdad distributing amounts of money to some Palestinian families in the areas of Al-Dura and Al-Za'franiyya.
- 211. Information on Palestinian Yunis Yunis.
- 212. Information on the meeting with Iraq Isma'il Khalil Ibrahim.
- 213. Information on Palestinian A'ida Ali Marshid about her travels to the Palestinian Liberation Organization office in Baghdad.
- 214. Information on Iraqi Nabil Abdel-Raziq who wants to his Iraqi passport.
- 215. Information on Palestinian Suleiman Salman Awda.
- 216. Information on Palestinian Iman Mahmoud.
- 217. Information on Palestinian Haythem Isma'il.
- 218. Information on Abu Nidal distributing pieces of paper and monies in the Al-Dura area for some of the Palestinian families.
- 219. Information on Palestinians individuals participating in the Iraq's Umra.
- 220. Information on the names of Palestinians participating in the Palestinian Made Goods Exhibition.
- 221. Information on Palestinian of origin, Jordanian citizenship Hissam Yassin Al-Tabrawi.
- 222. Information on the so named Rashid Al-Maghrebi who works in the French embassy in Baghdad.
- 223. Information on Palestinian Ali Mohammad Khalil Jabril.
- 224. Information on Iraqi Tilal Al-Sa'di.
- 225. Information on a meeting with the Jordanian cultural attaché in Baghdad with Jordanian students.
- 226. Information on a meeting with Palestinian Jamal Fatahi.
- 227. Information about Palestinian Othman Ahmad.

- 228. Information on Palestinian Hala Ali Mohammad.
- 229. Information on Palestinian Mu'ayid Al-Barghouti.
- 230. Information on the distribution of publications in the Al-Balidiyyat area carrying the name of the Al-Jabarin People's Brigade.
- 231. Information on an introduction from Palestinians Mohanad Kadthim and Bishar Arafat.
- 232. Information on Jordanian intelligence interrogating Jordanian student Baasil Mohammad.
- 233. Information on Palestinian Najah Abdel-Rahman the charges d' affaires for the Palestine embassy in Baghdad.
- 234. Information on Jordanian Ahmad Yusef Ahmad.
- 235. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Thiyab Salaama.
- 236. Information on Palestinian Ziyad Al-Amr.
- 237. Information on Palestinian students studying at Iraqi universities.
- 238. Information on Syrian Manthir Al-Kisaar.
- 239. Information on the Palestinian Haifa Club.
- 240. Information on a publication distributed in the Al-Baladiyyat areas by Palestinian Mahmoud Abdel-Fatah.
- 241. Information on the Palestinian High Council for Youth and Sports.
- 242. Information on Jordanian Doctor Fakhri Ibrahim Raashid.
- 243. Information on Palestinian Huda Mahmoud Hamuda.
- 244. Information on Palestinian Adil Ali Hussein.
- 245. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Hassan Ali.
- 246. Information on workings in the Popular Struggle Front in Baghdad.
- 247. Information on the Palestinian Children's House and the Haifa Kindergarten in Baghdad.
- 248. Information on Palestinian Saahirah Ahmad Hassan.
- 249. Information on a visit of a delegation from the World Health Organization to Baghdad.
- 250. Information on Jordanian Mohammad Hamaasha meeting with the criminal Jilal Al-Talibani.
- 251. Information on Palestinian Fatahi Khataab Hassan.
- 252. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Mahmoud Ali.
- 253. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Salaam Yusef Othman.
- 254. Information on Palestinian Sifa' Ahmad for his attack on the Commander in Chief, may Allah preserve him.
- 255. Information on Palestinian Hussein Abdel-Karim Shubaab.

256. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Abdullah from the Fatah Movement.
257. Information on the director general for the Palestinian Liberation Front.
258. Information on Palestinian Judat Ali Abdel-Rahman.
259. Information on names of Palestinian students studying at Iraqi universities.
260. Information on Palestinian Nuwaf Abu Al-Hija'.
261. Information on the wife of the director general for the Palestinian Liberation Front.
262. Information on Palestinian Qasi Al-Maadi, president of the Haifa Club.
263. Information on Arab delegations participating in the Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Global Championship in Baghdad.
264. Information on Palestinian Qaasim Ahmad.
265. Information on an introduction from Palestinian Saleh Mohammad (Abu George).
266. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Fawzi Khalid.
267. Information on Iraqi Mubarak A'mir Al-Bandar.
268. Information on Iraq Haidar Malek Dohan.
269. Information on Palestinian Hissam Al-Din Mohammad Khalil.
270. Information on Palestinian Tahsiin Raaghib Shaakir.
271. Information on Palestinian Imad Jihad.
272. Information on Palestinian Haythem Al-Mala Hassan.
273. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Ghafaar Zakriya Mahmoud.
274. Information on Palestinian Khalid Ahmad Al-Rihal.
275. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Abdel-Wahid.
276. Information on a list of members for the Palestinian Liberation Front present in Iraq.
277. Information on a list of workers in the Fatah office in Baghdad.
278. Information on Palestinian Ma'an Thiyab Isma'il.
279. Information on Yemeni Al-Mab'ad Abdel-Salaam Ali Mohammad.
280. Information on Palestinian Mazen Dib Khalil.
281. Information on Syrian Ahmad Al-Abras.
282. Information on Palestinian Rakad Saalim, the director general for the Arab Liberation Front.
283. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Ramadan Hassan.

284. Information on Palestinians Mohammad Ibrahim and Mohammad Adnan.
285. Information about the continuation of the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Palestine.
286. Information on Palestinian Mohanad Daoud.
287. Information on Palestinian Mazen Dib Khalil.
288. Information on Yemeni Al-Maba'd Abdel-Salaam Ali Mohammad.
289. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Rishad Alyan.
290. Information on Palestinian Tilal Naji one of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine leaders.
291. Information on the Saudi of origin and Kuwaiti citizenship Imad Abdel-Hassan Al-Dthifiri.
292. Information on Palestinian Hussein Mohammad Abdel-Majeed.
293. Information on Palestinians Najah Abdel-Rahman and Mahmoud Abd.
294. Information on the special establishment ticket for the Fatah office in Baghdad.
295. Information on a list of names of Palestinian teachers on loan to Yemen.
296. Information on the Ahwazi Shaaghi Jabbar Shalash.
297. Information on Ahwazi Farid Abdel-Karim selling athletic equipment on the local market.
298. Information on Ahwazi Muftaa Hassan Haatif.
299. Information on Ahwazi Khalil Isma'il living in Al-Ahwazi.
300. Information on Ahwazis Khamaas Saba' and Karim Saalim entering the country.
301. Information on a meeting of Ahwazi Halil Wish Itisal in Al-Ahwaz.
302. Information on the Semitic Legation for Refugees starting a list of Ahwazis living in the country.
303. Information on Ahwazis who filled out forms to voluntarily return, selling their personal belongings.
304. Information on Ahwazi Shuja'a Ali Al-Zaamil frequently visiting the house of the accused Mohi Alwan.
305. Information on Ahwazi Sabaah Al-Musawi.
306. Information on frequent visitors from the Ahwazis to visit the holy places in the country.
307. Information on Ahwazis Ali Haashim and Mansour Haashim [U/I] N. M 14.
308. Information on Ahwazi Khadija Mohammad Saddam.
309. Information on an Iraqi who enters Iranian lands and meets Iranian officials.
310. Information on discussions between Ahwazis who own cattle

- and Iraq not allowing them to take their cattle with them.
311. Information about the Al-Amala Badr Corps withdrawal further into Iran.
312. Information on fishermen in Misaan.
313. Information on Ahwazi Ali Hussein Jaasib.
314. Information on the arrest of Ahwazi Raadhi Hamd Matrud.
315. Information on Ahwazi who works as a translator [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for an Iranian delegation.
316. Information on an Ahwazi who works as a translator for [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for an Iranian delegation.
317. Information on the return of Ahwazi Abdel-A'yilan to the country.
318. Information on a meeting between Iranian intelligence and the director general for the Ahwaz Liberation Front.
319. Information an introduction from an Ahwazi who works as a translator with Iranian delegations.
320. Information on Ahwazis Juwad Hamd and Awid Yassin.
321. Information on Ahwazis Jabbar Fahid and Hanun Ma'idi.
322. Information on Ahwazi Sa'id Mustafa.
323. Information an introduction from an Ahwazi who works as a translator with Iranian delegations.
324. Information on the mother of Ahwazi Abdel-Amir Siyhudali entering the country.
325. Information on the Iranian regime arresting Ahwazis in the Ahwaz area.
326. Information on an Ahwazi who saw Saa'a Judaariyya in one of the coffee shops [U/I].
327. Information from one of the Ahwazis who works as a translator with Iranian delegations.
328. Information from an Ahwazi translator for Iranian delegations about the advisor to the Iranian president.
329. Information on Ahwazi Hussein Matrud who tries to do sell drugs.
330. Information on Iraqi Rahim Fayrouz about smuggling Ahwazis for money.
331. Information on Iranian Al-Hamildar [possible Persian title] Haj Ali Nadthri.
332. Information on Ahwazis Niruz Mohammad and Hani Bazi'a.
333. Information on the intention of the Semitic Legation for refugees to degrees the number of Iraqi employees.
334. Information on Iran holding a trial on Ahwazis who were in Ahwazi divisions.
335. Information on 25 Ahwazi families leaving for Iran.
336. Information on Ahwazi Majeed Hadi Musa.
337. Information on Information on the intention of Ahwazi Ali Hussein Jaasib visiting one of the prisoners.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

338. Information about Iraq Abu Malek wearing military clothes and collection cash.
339. Information on Ahwazis Qaasim Abdel-Hussein Khadr Kana'an.
340. Information on Information on telephone communication from Iran to Ahwazis living in Iraq.
341. Information concerning Ahwazi Abdel-Amir Sahyud Kadthim.
342. Information on one of the Iranian religious delegations.
343. Information it's source is Ahwazi ██████████.
344. Information concerning the misuse of power from an employee [female] from the Semitic Committee for Refugee Affairs.
345. Information on Iranians in the religious tourism delegations.
346. Information on the Iranian regime's suspected movements in the border territories.
347. Information on Ahwazi Abboud Za'lan.
348. Information on Ahwazi Nissar Ahmad Faisal.
349. Information on Ahwazi Ali Hadi the director general for the Ahwaz Liberation Front.
350. Information on Ahwazi Abdel-Amir Abdel-Karim.
351. Information on Iraqi Abdel-Zahra smuggling messages and goods into Iran.
352. Information on some of the Ahwazis selling arms.
353. Information on Iraqis from the residential province of Al-Muthanna and smuggling activities.
354. Information on responses from postal messages from Iran to Ahwazi Khadr Kana'an.
355. Information on disappearance of Ahwazi Hadi Abbas.
356. Information some of the Ahwazis traveling to Iran and meeting Ahwazi Fayrouz Mohammad.
357. Information on the disappearance of Ahwazi Karim Awda Bati.
358. Information on Ahwazi Ra'd Wahid Radhi unofficially entering the country.
359. Information on Ahwazis A'jim Muslim and Mahdi Mohammad traveling to one of the Mujaheddin Al-Khalq's military bases.
361. [sic] Information on Iraq Naasir Ridaa.
362. Information on Ahwazis Fu'ad and Samia' Yusef Ridaa.
363. Information on a number of Ahwazis.
364. Information on the presence of a number of saboteurs who own light weapons in Ahwar Al-Hawiza.
365. Information on Iraqi Mohammad Haashim Qaasim who works at the Semitic Legation's headquarters.

- 366. Information on Ahwazi Qaasim Shilal.
- 367. Information on Ahwazi Majid Maza'l.
- 368. Information on Information on Ahwazi Aziz Khalf.
- 369. Information on Ahwazi Nisaar Ahmad Faisal.
- 370. Information on the director general for the Ahwazi Liberation Front.
- 371. Information on Ahwazi Khalid Saleh Mashtat.
- 372. Information on Iranian authorities calling back Ahwazis returning.
- 373. Information on Ahwazi Ahlam Abdullah Hamid [female].
- 374. Information on Ahwazi Jaabar Naasir.
- 375. Information on Ahwazis Kamal, Hussein, Khalid and the children of Abdel-Karim Na'ma Al-Tarfi.
- 376. Information on the Iranian Al-Hamlidar Karim Hamdi Al-Ka'bi.
- 377. Information on Jabbar Muhassan and his family.
- 378. Information on the names of a Palestinian delegation participating in the International Baghdad Exposition.
- 379. Information on Jordanian Ibrahim Musa.
- 380. Information on Iraqi Abdel-Jabbar Wahid Al-Muhami.
- 381. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in the occupied territories.
- 382. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in the occupied territories.
- 383. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in the occupied territories.
- 384. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in the occupied territories.
- 385. Information on Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in the occupied territories.
- 386. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in Palestine.
- 387. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in Palestine.
- 388. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in Palestine.
- 389. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in Palestine.
- 390. Information from Palestinian ██████████ returning from visiting his family in Palestine.
- 391. Information on Palestinian Saleh Hassan Saleh.
- 392. Information whose source is the ██████████ during her trip outside the country.
- 393. Information on Palestinian Qusai Rafa't, president of the Palestinian Haifa Club.

394. Information on conflicts between members of the Palestinian embassy in Baghdad.
395. Information on a Palestinian kicked out of Kuwait, Rami Haamid.
396. Information on Palestinian Ziyad Abdel-Fataah.
397. Information on documents from Palestinian intelligence and the Islamic Jihad Movement.
398. Information on Palestinian [female] Linda Tilal.
399. Information on a group which trades in body parts.
400. Information on Palestinian Libiyya Sa'id Mahmoud [female].
401. Information the source is the confessions of American intelligence agent [REDACTED]
402. Information Information on Palestinian Naasir Khalil Mohammad.
403. Information on Palestinian [female] A'taaf Nayif for the purpose of allow her to enter the country.
404. Information on Syrian expelled from Kuwait Thaamir Mawfiq Rafa' Mara'i.
405. Information on Palestinian Jamaal Sa'dat.
406. Information on Palestinian Nayif Yusef.
407. Information on Palestinian Qusay Rafa't exploiting his position.
408. Information on Palestinian Ma'n Theeb Isma'il.
409. Information on Jordanian citizen, Palestinian of origin Mahmoud Muslim.
410. Information on lists of names of Arabs expelled from Kuwait.
411. Information on Egyptian Mohammad Abdulla traveling to the office [possibly the Office of the Presidency of Iraq] saying he has been sent by the Iraqi consulate in Cairo.
412. Information on Palestinian of origin, Jordanian national Rashid Mohammad.
413. Information on a Palestinian embassy distributing forms to work as teachers in Yemen.
414. Information on a Jordanian person an associate of Mohammad Taher from the Palestinian Organization.
415. Information on Jordanian intelligence calling back Jordanian and Palestinian students studying in Iraq.
416. Information some elements of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
417. Information on Iraqi Ra'd Hamid Suleiman.
418. Information on Palestinian A'qil Abdel-Qadir Mohammad.
419. Information on Palestinian [U/I] in Abu Gharyeb Prison.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

Intelligence Information for the Departments:-

420. Information about a meeting with the criminal Adnan Al-Mufti.
421. Information about a network of fleeing and hostile Iraqis in Lebanon.
422. Information about the scandals of Iraqi opposition abroad.
423. Information about the economic advisor to Yasser Arafat, called Mohammad Rashid.
424. Information on confessions of American intelligence agent [REDACTED].
425. Information on the husband of citizen Leila Fadhil called Faisal Yusef, joining Iraqi opposition.
426. Information about the United States targeting Iraq.
427. Information on so-named Mohammad Sa'd Khalil and his capability in parapsychology.
428. Information and catalogues from the Popular Struggle Front about machines which test for explosives.
429. Information on the visit of A'zam Al-Ahmad, ambassador of Palestine, to the country.
430. Information on the review of Palestinian A'aida Ali of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Baghdad.
431. Information on a newspaper article about the military plan which the criminal Ahmad Chalabi presented to the American administration in order to change the governing regime in Iraq.
432. Information on a summary of the book "Judaism between the Cultural Cultivation of the East and Political Cultivation of the West."
433. Information on Kuwaiti Saalim Hamdan Al-Dhifri.
434. Information on Palestinian Samir Hassan Musa Al-Nabhani.
435. Information on some of the Ahwazis selling arms.
436. Information on a meeting held in Britain by fleeing Iraqi officers.
437. Information on a group from Cautions to Protect Computers from Viruses.
438. Information on the transfer of a copy of the Al-Masira Magazine which the JTF [Palestinian Liberation Front] publishes.
439. Information on Ahwazi Khalil Ta'ma.
440. Information on Syrian authorities closing magazines controlled by Iraqi opposition.
441. Information on a technical farming job in one of the residential houses.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

442. Information from ██████████ living in Germany about the presence of the criminal Nizar Al-Khzraji.
443. Information on the security plan to train Palestinian elements in the occupied territories.
444. Information on the presence of some saboteurs from the Badr Al-A'mil Corps [sic] in Ahwar Al-Hawiza.
445. Information about persons from Iraqi opposition who have organized cells in Mosul.
446. Information on a report for citizen Ahwazi ██████████.
447. Information the Wahabi Movement in the Arab Emirates.
448. Information about the presence of a number of Iraqis living in the Emirates and tied to what is called the High Council for the Islamic Revolution.
449. Information on a meet between Jordanian Mohammad Hamasha and the criminal Jilal Al-Talibani.
450. Information about news from Al-Huriyya newspaper published by the Democratic Front about preparing agent Nizar Al-Khzraji to establish a political organization.
451. Information on a report from Al-Watan Al-Arabi Magazine regarding conflicts between Ankara and the Al-Barzani Group.
452. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Mahmoud Ali.
453. Information on assistant Secretary of State, Crocker, visiting Lebanon.
454. Information on an article in an Israeli newspaper "A Probable and Logical Pictures for the New Iraq."
455. Information on Iraqi Mohammad Rashid, financial advisor to President Yasser Arafat.
456. Information on a study on Israeli Indian relations.
457. Information on a study on Israeli Chinese relations.
458. Information on Jordanian Hassan Abdel-Rahman Eissa.
459. Information on Iraqi Nuriyya Abdel-Saada Habib.
460. Information on a study for the Democratic Front "After the Destruction, Targeting Elements of the Palestinian Force."
461. Information on a discussion with agent Ali Ibn Al-Hussein.
462. Information on a news article on Iraqi Aziz Al-Haj.
463. Information on a plan to protect the Al-Dajila sector.
464. Information on agent Ahmad Al-Chalabi visiting Israel.
465. Information on Iraqi Ahmad Hadi A'lwi in Jordan and working against the country.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

**Second. Military Information:-**

1. Information about Israel and American conducting joint maneuvers for a network of [U/I type of missile] missiles.
2. Information about the developments of the military aggression on the Palestinian people.
3. Information on American experts arriving at three military bases in Israel to prepare for their anticipated hostilities.
4. Information on a report from the Lebanese Al-Safir Newspaper about a project to develop Turkish helicopters in Israel.
5. Information about a report to uncover defects in the Challenger tanks.
6. Information on a document from the Palestinian Liberation Organization to study American Special Forces and their extremist role for America controlling the world.
7. Information on Americans preparing their bases in Qatar.
8. Information in the Haaretz Newspaper of Israel's intention to use nuclear weapons against Iraq.
9. Information on a meet with the president of the work force department in the Zionist army.
10. Information on training fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Front at Al-Quds military base.
11. Information on the withdrawal of 900 American soldiers from the Sinai.
10. [sic] Information on the joint American staff command.
11. [sic] Information on the American administration's demand that Gulf countries guarantee logistic support
12. Information on the Zionist chief of staff preparing the Israeli army for war, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.
13. Information on the anticipated American military job against Iraq.
14. Information on Palestinian Mohammad Ibrahim A'lyan.
15. Information on Palestinian fighter Samir Hassan Musa Al-Nabhani.
16. Information on Iran deploying military units from the Khomeini Guard and spreading out along the Iranian Iraqi border.
17. Information on Palestinian fighter Hisham Sakhinini.
18. Information on names of Palestinian officers.
19. Information on revealing the names of fighters of Al-Quds military base.
20. Information on the Palestinian fighter Khalid Mohammad Saleh Al-Wehesh.

21. Information on Palestinian fighter Safut Anis Abdel-Hafith.
22. Information on revealing the names of Palestinian fighters in Iraqi territory.
23. Information on revealing names of officers and ranks JTF [Palestinian Liberation Front] in Iraqi territory.
24. Information on Palestinian fighter Abdel-Karim Salim Khalil.
25. Information on Palestinian fighter Walid Abdel-Rahman Abdullah.
26. Information on Palestinian fighter Fa'iz Mohammad Hassan.
27. Information on Palestinian fighter Nafith Mohammad Faaris.
28. Information on Palestinian fighter Mohammad Rishaad Mohammad.
29. Information on Palestinian fighter Nayil Musa A'bada.
30. Information on Palestinian fighters of the Al-Aziziyya military base.
31. Information on Palestinian fighter Samir Nimr Hamdan.
32. Information on Palestinian fighter Nabil Taher Khadr.
33. Information on Palestinian Hussein Salim
34. Information on Palestinian fighter Huseif Musa
35. Information on Palestinian fighter Khalid Mohammad Saleh.
36. Information on Palestinian fighter Lu'i Mohammad Khalid Eissa.
37. Information on Palestinian fighter Naasir Salah.
38. Information on Palestinian fighter Sa'id Mahmoud.
39. Information on Palestinian fighter Dthafir Farid.
40. Information on Palestinian fighter Tiysir Mahmoud.
41. Information on Palestinian fighter Khalid Khalil Al-Zir.
42. Information on Palestinian fighter Mohammad Abdel-Rahman.
43. Information on Palestinian fighter Tareq Hamdan Ibrahim.
44. Information on Palestinian fighter Khalil Qaasim.
45. Information on Palestinian fighter Khalid Mahmoud Sarur.
46. Information on Palestinian fighter Khalid Ahmad Khalid.
47. Information on Palestinian fighter Mohammad Rishaad Mahmoud Alyan.
48. Information about the formation of brigade 32 to guard the Iraqi Iranian border.

**B. In the Area of Intelligence Opportunities and Recruitment:-**

**First. In the Area of Intelligence Opportunities:-**

The number of intelligence opportunities, prepared for the intelligence departments, needs of the Office, and its work plan, were 102 opportunities. 23 opportunities were distributed to M4, 12 to M5, 15 to other departments, and 25 to the Office. They are stated in detail below:-

**Opportunities Transferred to M4**

1. Palestinian [REDACTED]
2. Palestinian [REDACTED]
3. Palestinian [REDACTED]
4. Palestinian [REDACTED]
5. Palestinian [REDACTED]
6. Palestinian [REDACTED]
7. Palestinian [REDACTED]
8. Palestinian [REDACTED]
9. Palestinian [REDACTED]
10. Palestinian [REDACTED]
11. Palestinian [REDACTED]
12. Palestinian [REDACTED]
13. Palestinian [REDACTED]
14. Palestinian [REDACTED]
15. Palestinian [REDACTED]
16. Iraqi [REDACTED]
17. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
18. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
19. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
20. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
21. Iraqi [REDACTED]

22. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
23. Ahwazi [REDACTED].

**Opportunities Transferred to M5.**

1. Palestinian [REDACTED].
2. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
3. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
4. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
5. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
6. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
7. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
8. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
9. Iraqi [REDACTED].
10. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
11. Ahwazi [REDACTED].
12. Ahwazi [REDACTED].

**Opportunities Transferred to Other Departments.**

1. Sudanese [REDACTED] to M1.
2. Palestinian [REDACTED] to M10.
3. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
4. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
5. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
6. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M1.
7. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
8. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
9. Iraqi [REDACTED].
10. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
11. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
12. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.

13. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
14. Iraqi [REDACTED] to M14.
15. Ahwazi [REDACTED] to M40.

#### **Opportunities Which Serves the Work for the Office**

1. Palestinian [REDACTED]
2. Palestinian [REDACTED]
3. Palestinian [REDACTED]
4. Palestinian [REDACTED]
5. Palestinian [REDACTED]
6. Palestinian [REDACTED]
7. Palestinian [REDACTED]
8. Lebanese [REDACTED]
9. Palestinian [REDACTED]
10. Palestinian [REDACTED]
11. Palestinian [REDACTED]
12. Palestinian [REDACTED]
13. Palestinian [REDACTED]
14. Palestinian [REDACTED]
15. Palestinian [REDACTED]
16. Palestinian [REDACTED]
17. Palestinian [REDACTED]
18. Palestinian [REDACTED]
19. Palestinian [REDACTED]
20. Palestinian [REDACTED]
21. Iraqi [REDACTED]
22. Palestinian [REDACTED]
23. Palestinian [REDACTED]
24. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 25. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 26. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 27. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 28. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 29. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 30. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 31. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 32. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 33. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 34. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 35. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 36. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 37. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 38. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 39. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 40. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 41. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 42. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 43. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 44. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 45. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 46. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 47. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 48. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 49. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 50. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 51. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 52. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

**Second. In the Area of Intelligence Meets Which the Office Prepared to Cover with its Other Departments.**

The number of intelligence opportunities, prepared for the intelligence departments, the needs of the Office [probably Office of the Presidency], and its work plan, were 297 meets. They were distributed; 10 to M4, 9 M5, 5 to other directorates and 274 for the use in work for the Office. They are stated in detail below:-

For the Needs of M4:-

1. Sudanese [REDACTED]
2. Palestinian [REDACTED]
3. Palestinian [REDACTED]
4. Iraqi [REDACTED]
5. Palestinian [REDACTED]
6. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
7. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
8. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
9. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
10. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

For the Needs of M5:-

11. Palestinian [REDACTED]
12. Palestinian [REDACTED]
13. Palestinian [REDACTED]
14. Palestinian [REDACTED]
15. Palestinian [REDACTED]
16. Palestinian [REDACTED]
17. Palestinian [REDACTED]
18. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
19. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

**Meets for the Needs of Other Departments**

- 20. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 21. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

**Meets for the Needs of M40:-**

- 22. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 23. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 24. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

**Meets the Office Set up for Its Work Needs:**

The number of meets the Office set up for its work reached 274 meets and they are as follows:

- 1. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 2. Iraqi [REDACTED]
- 3. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 4. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 5. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 6. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 7. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 8. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 9. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 10. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 11. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 12. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 13. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 14. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 15. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 16. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 17. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 18. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 19. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 20. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 21. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 22. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 23. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 24. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 25. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 26. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 27. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 28. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 29. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 30. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 31. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 32. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 33. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 34. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 35. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 36. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 37. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 38. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 39. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 40. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 41. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 42. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 43. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 44. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 45. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 46. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 47. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 48. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 49. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 50. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 51. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 52. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 53. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 54. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 55. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 56. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 57. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 58. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 59. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 60. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 61. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 62. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 63. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 64. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 65. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 66. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 67. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 68. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 69. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 70. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 71. Yemeni [REDACTED]
- 72. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 73. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 74. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 75. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 76. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 77. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 78. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 79. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 80. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 81. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 82. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 83. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 84. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 85. Sudanese [REDACTED]
- 86. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 87. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 88. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 89. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 90. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 91. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 92. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 93. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 94. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 95. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 96. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 97. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 98. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 99. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 100. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 101. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 102. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 103. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 104. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 105. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 106. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 107. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 108. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 109. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 110. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 111. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 112. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 113. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 114. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 115. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 116. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 117. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 118. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 119. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 120. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 121. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 122. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 123. Iraqi [REDACTED]
- 124. Jordanian [REDACTED]
- 125. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 126. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 127. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 128. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 129. Palestinian [REDACTED]

- 130. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 131. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 132. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 133. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 134. Yemeni [REDACTED]
- 135. Iraqi [REDACTED]
- 136. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 137. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 138. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 139. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 140. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 141. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 142. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 143. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 144. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 145. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 146. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 147. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 148. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 149. Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 150. Syrian [REDACTED]
- 151. Members of the Arab Front to Liberation Al-Ahwaz.  
[REDACTED]
- 152. [REDACTED]
- 153. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 154. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 155. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 156. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 157. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

- 158. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 159. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 160. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 161. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 162. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 163. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 164. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 165. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 166. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 167. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 168. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 169. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 170. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 171. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 172. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 173. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 174. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 175. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 176. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 177. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 178. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 179. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 180. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 181. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 182. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 183. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 184. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 185. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

- 186. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 187. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 188. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 189. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 190. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 191. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 192. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 193. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 194. Union of Ahwazi Women.
- 195. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 196. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 197. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 198. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 199. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 200. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 201. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 202. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 203. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 204. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 205. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 206. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 207. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 208. [REDACTED]
- 209. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 210. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 211. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 212. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 213. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

- 214. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 215. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 216. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 217. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 218. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 219. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 220. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 221. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 222. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 223. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 224. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 225. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 226. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 227. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 228. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 229. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 230. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 231. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 232. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 233. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 234. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 235. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 236. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 237. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 238. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 239. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 240. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 241. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

242. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
243. Ahwazi [REDACTED] i.  
244. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
245. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
246. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
247. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
248. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
249. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
250. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
251. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
252. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
253. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
254. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
255. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
256. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
257. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
258. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
259. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
260. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
261. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
262. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
263. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
264. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
265. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
266. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
267. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
268. Ahwazi [REDACTED]  
269. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

- 270. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 271. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 272. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 273. Ahwazi [REDACTED]
- 274. Ahwazi [REDACTED]

**Meets for the Office outside the Country:**

The Office met with individuals from the leadership representing Palestinian movements. There were 16 instances of meets outside the country. They are as follow:-

- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED]
- 3. [REDACTED]
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. [REDACTED]
- 6. [REDACTED]
- 7. [REDACTED]
- 8. [REDACTED]
- 9. [REDACTED]
- 10. [REDACTED]
- 11. [REDACTED]
- 12. [REDACTED]
- 13. [REDACTED]
- 14. [REDACTED]
- 15. [REDACTED]
- 16. [REDACTED]

Meets with Palestinian and Ahwazi Officials inside the Country:-

The job of the Office is for stabilizing and perpetuating relations with Palestinian and Ahwazi groups inside and outside the country. Likewise to perpetuate and continue relations with influential persons in Ahwazi and Palestinian circles by meeting them and extending the political and intelligence channels for contact with them. They numbered 27 cases and they are as follows:-

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]
10. [REDACTED]
11. [REDACTED]
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]
16. [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED]
18. [REDACTED]
19. [REDACTED]



20. [piece of page torn off]
21. [piece of page torn off]
22. Ahwazi [female] [piece of page torn off]
23. Ahwazi [piece of page torn off]
24. Ahwazi [U/I piece of page torn off]
25. Ahwazi
26. Ahwazi
27. Ahwazi

Third. Events to Host Delegations:

The job of the Office is to host Palestinian and Ahwazi delegations and individuals at invitation from the Office after taking fundamental approval to participate in conferences which were held in the country. There were thirteen of these occasions and they are as follows:-

1. A delegation from the Democratic Front
2. Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party
3. A delegation from the Popular Struggle Front (splinter group)
4. A delegation from the Islamic Jihad Movement
5. A delegation from the Popular Front (a number of times).
6. A delegation from the Popular Struggle Front
7. A delegation from the Popular Front
8. A delegation from the Palestinian Liberation Front
9. A delegation from the Arabi Revolutionary Committees Movement
10. A delegation from the Popular Front-General Command,

11. [REDACTED] the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz in Libya).
12. [REDACTED] (Ahwazi individual who lives in the Emirates).
13. [REDACTED] (Ahwazi individual who lives in the Emirates).

**C. Information Sent for Higher Review.**

The number of conversations which contained information sent for higher review totals 65. They were distributed to the following (37 to the respected Presidency of the Republic and the Cabinet, 22 to the official in charge of the Office, Mr. Tariq Aziz, 6 to the official in charge of the Palestine Office, Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadan). The details are as follows:-

First. To the Presidency of the Republic-the Secretary and Presidential Cabinet. The number of conversations with the respected presidency reached 37 letters, including books containing information. Some of them were telegrams sent to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, to congratulate him on his birthday, national holidays sent from Palestinian and Ahwazi groups. They state the position of these groups toward the mentioned occasions as follows:-

1. Information on non Iraqis granted Iraqi passports.
2. About the guaranteeing the needs of the special Al-Quds Military Base returning to the front for the purpose of perpetuating the base and continuing training.
3. Request for the opening of the Ministry of Health by equipping our Services with an ambulance.
4. A telegram to congratulate the Commander in Chief Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz on the fifty fifth anniversary of the ruling party.
5. A telegram congratulating the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from (Abu Al-Abbas) the director general for the Palestinian Liberation Front on the fifty fifth anniversary of the ruling party.

6. A telegram congratulating the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Doctor Samir Ghawsha, the director general of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front on the occasion of the fifty fifth anniversary of the founding of the ruling party.
7. A telegram of absolute support to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from the political office for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, regarding the courageous and exemplary decision to stop oil exports starting on 7 April 2002.
8. To the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Doctor Samir Ghawsha-director general of the Popular Palestinian Struggle Front, a telegram of recognition and affection for Iraq's positions and the decision of the great leader, to halt oil exports.
9. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from the Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz on the occasion of his auspicious birthday.
10. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Mr. Mohammad Abbas (Abu Al-Abbas) on the auspicious occasion of his birthday.
11. A telegram to Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz on the seventy seventh grievous anniversary of the occupation of Arab Ahwaz by the Persians.
12. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Doctor Samir Ghawsha-director general for the Popular Struggle Front on the auspicious occasion of his birthday.
13. Information about Palestinian [REDACTED] and the subject of honoring him.
14. Support for the suggestion of the Transportation and Communication Ministry on the matter to forgive the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front from paying their national and international telephone payments.
15. Information about the consultation meeting in the Arabic University.
16. Removal of a document composed of nine pages with its translation. It is a piece of a report from the Israeli prime minister consisting of 108 pages for the American president.
17. Information and a letter of three pages which Palestinian personality Abdullah AL-Hurani presented to the Commander in Chief, may Allah protect and preserve him.
18. Information about the Palestinian ministerial formation.

19. Information about passports granted to non Iraqis (Palestinians and Ahwazis).
20. Information whose source is a Palestinian [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
21. Information about Palestinian [REDACTED] and a message directed to the Commander in Chief, may Allah protect and preserve him.
22. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Mohammad Abbas (Abu Al-Abbas) on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
23. Information about Kuwaiti [REDACTED].
24. Information about another statistic regarding the number of Palestinian martyrs and Zionists killed.
25. Information about Iraqi assistance to Palestinian areas.
26. A telegram to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Doctor Walid Al-Hamami, president of the Palestinian Iraqi Brotherhood League, on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
27. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
28. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Gaza Strip Command, on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
29. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz on the occasion of 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
30. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him, from Doctor Samir Ghawsha-the director general for the Palestinian Popular Struggle front on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
31. A telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him from Mr. Nayif Huwatima, the director general for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the 17th to 30th Revolution of illustrious July.
32. Information on the behaviors of Ahwazi [REDACTED].
33. Information pertaining to the request for military equipment.

- 34. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
- 35. Information on [U/I] Palestinians in Abu Gharyeb Prison.
- 36. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED]
- 37. Information about residential apartments for the Arab Liberation Front.

Second. Information Sent to the Office Official [probably Tareq Aziz]:

- 1. Information on the delegation from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
- 2. Information on the desire of a delegation from Palestinian unions to visit the country.
- 3. Information on the arrest of Ahmad Sa'dat the director general for the Popular Front.
- 4. Information on an invitation from Rafat Saleh, the director general for the Palestinian Democratic Union.
- 5. A message from Palestinian Juwad Aqil, editor in chief for Al-Hadaf Magazine, published by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
- 6. A message from Doctor Samir Ghawsha, director general for the Popular Struggle Front.
- 7. A message from the families of martyred and injured Palestinians in the Gaza strip asking for help from the Commander in Chief, may Allah protect him.
- 8. Information about a meeting with A'arif A'rif, member of the political office for the Popular Front.
- 9. Information on the desire for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to send a delegation to visit Iraq.
- 10. Information on a message from Abu Al-Abbas concerning the visit of a Belgian delegation.
- 11. Information on the Islamic Jihad Movement.
- 12. Information about statements from the Palestinian Organization in Iraq.
- 13. Information about a Yasser Arafat's message to the Palestinian Organization on the occasion of the founding of the Arab Liberation Front.
- 14. Information on the Intifadah Fatah Movement-Abu Musa.
- 15. Information on volunteers for martyrdom [suicide] operations.
- 16. Information on Abu Abbas's message to Mr. Tare Aziz about the Front's financial status.
- 17. Information on a message from the Democratic Front about verifying their former demands.
- 18. Information on Palestinian Tilal Naji from the ranks of the Popular Front.

19. Information on providing financial assistance to the Popular Front.
20. Information on a message from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
21. Information on the discussion between the Hamas and Fatah Movements in Cairo.
22. Information on the American peace proposal (the American road map).

**Third. Information sent to the Palestine Office official, Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadan:**

1. A message from families of Palestinians wounded and martyred in the Gaza Strip, asking for help from the great Arab leader, Saddam Hussein, may Allah protect and preserve him.
2. Conveying declarations from inside the occupied territories from the Palestinian Organization and the Arab Liberation Front.
3. A message from Mr. Yasser Arafat to the Palestinian Organization leadership on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the Arab Liberation Front.
4. Information about volunteer fighters for martyrdom [suicide] operations.
5. Information on Palestinian groups and support to deliver an amount of assistance.
6. Information in a message from the Front's General Commander to the office official.

**D. Information sent to the deputy official of the Office -Director of the Intelligence Services:**

1. Information about a proposed project between Palestinians and Israelis.
2. Information about the meeting with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
3. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED]
4. Information on the weekly status of the Intifadah on 7 January.
5. Information on a list containing names of Palestinians wanted by the Zionist entity.
6. Information on the plan to assassinate the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein (may Allah prevent this).
7. Information on Zionist activity in northern Iraq.
8. Information on elements which have a relationship with Israeli security agencies.
9. Information on the Israeli navy detaining a ship carrying weapons.
10. Information on the criminal Eissa Al-Rukabi.
11. Information on the desire for Palestinian unions to visit the country.

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12. Information on the weekly status of the Intifadah on 16 January.
13. Information on the arrest of the director general for the Popular Front by the Palestinian Authority.
14. Information about American threats to Iraq.
15. Information about a message from Yasser Arafat to the Commander in Chief, carried by A'zam Al-Ahmad, ambassador of Palestine.
16. Information on Bush giving orders to American intelligence and the army command to come up with a plan of attack for Iraq.
17. Information the press published [U/I] Abu Al-Abbas behind the arms ship which Israeli forces detained.
18. Information about a message from the Palestinian Engineers Union to the Commander in Chief.
19. The weekly status of the Intifadah on 24 January.
20. Information on a message to the Commander in Chief from Palestinian Fayiz Ibrahim.
21. Information about the proposed American strike on Iraq.
22. Information on Syrian Palestinian relations.
23. Information on the reoccupation of Palestinian lands by the Zionists.
24. Information an invitation to Palestinian [REDACTED].
25. Information on the weekly status of the Intifadah on 4 February.
26. Information on the Iraqi Palestinian Brotherhood League.
27. Information on the weekly position of the Intifadah on 16 February.
28. Information on a meeting with Palestinian [REDACTED].
29. Information on the weekly position of the Intifadah on 21 February.
30. Information on the weekly position for the Intifadah on 10 March.
31. Information on a meeting with the Palestinian delegation headed by Farouk Qadumi.
32. Information on the Iraqi Palestinian Brotherhood League.
33. Information on Palestinian Abbas Zaki, member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement.
34. Information on a meeting with Sudanese [REDACTED].

35. Information on the results of the Arab Popular Forces Conference.
36. Information on Palestinian Ahmad Suleiman Abdullah.
37. Information on the weekly status of the Intifadah on 20 March.
38. Information on Brigadier General Moshe Ya'lun, new Zionist chief of staff.
39. Information on the weekly position of the Intifadah on 27 March.
40. Information on the meeting of Yasser Arafat with representatives from Palestinian groups.
41. Information on a meeting with the Israeli military intelligence chief.
42. Information on issuing travel passports to Palestinians.
43. Information on a message from Doctor Samir Ghawsha to Mr. Tareq Aziz.
44. Information on the Zionist military aggression on Palestine.
45. Information on statement from Tiysir Qaba'a, deputy president of the Palestinian National Council.
46. Information on the position and vision of the Democratic Front for the situations in Palestine.
47. Information on the desire of a delegation from the Democratic Front to visit Iraq.
48. Information on a press article titled "What is Preventing Saddam Hussein?"
49. Information on a telegram of congratulations to the Commander in Chief from Palestinian Khalid Abdel-Majeed.
50. Information on the Zionist military aggression on our Palestinian people.
51. Information on a telegram of congratulations for the Commander in Chief from the Popular Struggle Front.
52. Information on a call from the Continuation Committee to Palestinian powers.
53. Information on a statement made from the Palestinian National Power.
54. Information on a phone call with Palestinian [REDACTED].
55. Information about Yugoslavian [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
56. Information on the results of a visit from a delegation from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to the country.
57. Information on a statement from the Palestinian leadership.
58. Information on extending bridges with Palestinian associates from the Palestinian Organization.
59. Information on an interview with the Israeli chief of staff.
60. Information on the International Conference on Islam.
61. Information on Sudanese [REDACTED].

62. Information on 3 scenarios for American operations against Iraq.
63. Information on a press meeting with Abu Al-Abbas.
64. Information on Bush's new plan for peace.
65. Information on granting a diplomatic passport to Mr. Abu Al-Abbas and his family.
66. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
67. Information on the Islamic Jihad Movement.
68. Information on helping Palestinian delegations which visited the country.
69. Information on Palestinian organizations which accept assistance from Iran.
70. Information on forgiving a debt of the Palestinian Liberation Front to the Ministry of Trade.
71. Information on Palestinian friend [REDACTED].
72. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
73. Information on support of Palestinian groups.
74. Information on the circulation of a book from the Presidency of the Republic about the phone of the Popular Struggle Front.
75. Information on Palestinian groups in Syria.
76. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
77. Information on Lebanese representative [REDACTED].
78. Information on a news article concerning Yasser Arafat.
79. Information on the Intifadah Fatah Movement.
80. Information on known Palestinian personality Abdullah Al-Hurani.
81. Information on a message from [REDACTED] concerning the meeting between Prince Abdullah and Bush.
82. Information on a telegram of condolences to Mr. Ahmad Jabril, director general for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, because of the martyrdom of his son, Jihad.
83. Information on the consultation meeting with the Arabic University.
84. Information on a document A'zam Al-Ahmad, ambassador of Palestine, supplied us.
85. Information on a message to the Commander in Chief, may Allah preserve him, from Palestinian Abdullah AL-Hurani.
86. Information on new ministerial formations for the Palestinian Authority.

[Underlining indicates that some topics had been underlined in pencil.]

87. Information on Israeli violations on Palestinian lands.
88. Information on the presence of American military units in Jordan and wearing Jordanian military clothing.
89. Information on academic chairs [slots for studying] at Saddam University for Islamic Sciences.
90. Information on journalist [REDACTED].
91. Information on Palestinian Abdel-Rahim Maluh from the Popular Front leadership.
92. Information on Palestinian friend [REDACTED].
93. Information on peace plan of the American intelligence chief, George Tenet.
94. Information on statistics of the number of Israelis killed and Palestinian martyrs.
95. Information on Iraq assistance to Palestinian areas.
96. Information on a meeting held by the European Union ministry of foreign affairs.
97. Information on the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
98. Information on training associates from the Palestinian Organization and the Arab Liberation Front.
99. Information on Palestinian Akram Abdel-Latif.
100. Information on a meeting with Palestinian groups present in Damascus.
101. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
102. Information on a message to Mr. Tareq Aziz from Abu Al-Abbas.
103. Information on the message of Nayif Huwatima, director general from the Democratic Front.
104. Information on a news article in the Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper.
105. Information on the possible plan of attack on Iraq.
106. Information on an article in the Haris Newspaper concerning Zionist president Shabak's visit to Europe.
107. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
108. Information on granting a passport to Palestinian [REDACTED].
109. Information on Palestinians [REDACTED].
110. Information on the request from Palestinian Liberation Organization to release Palestinian prisoners.

111. Information on the arrival of Mr. Farouk Qadumi to the country.
112. Information on Palestinian Hisham Khalid who was expelled from Kuwait.
113. Information on the request of Palestinian students to exempt them from exit fees.
114. Information on the associates in the Palestinian Workers Party Organization in Yemen.
115. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
116. Information on exploiting the relationship with the Palestinian Organization.
117. Information on the entry of a number of elements to Palestinian Authority lands according to the Palestinian, American and Israeli plan.
118. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED]
119. Information on Palestinian Tilal Naji from the cadre of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
120. Information on the Arab Revolutionary Committees Movement in Palestine.
121. Information on Palestinian [U/I] in Abu Ghurayeb Prison.
122. Information on the arrest of associate Rakad Saalim, secretary of the Arab Liberation Front.
123. Information on providing quick material assistance to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
124. Information on the political discussion between the Hamas and Fatah Movement in Cairo.
125. Information on the peace plan called the "American Roadmap."
126. Information on the new Palestinian ministerial formation.
127. Information on the visit of A'zam Al-Ahmad, ambassador of Palestine, in Iraq.
128. Information on some members of the Ahwaz Liberation Front voluntarily returning to Iran.
129. Information on the amount paid to treat the director general for the Ahwaz Liberation Front.
130. Information on encouraging the General Union of Ahwaz Women to work.
131. Information on the travel approval for Ahwazi [REDACTED] to the Emirates.
132. Information on a political statement from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

133. Information on a political article by Ahwazi Sayyid Taher Al Na'ma.
134. Information on the activities of the president of the Ahwaz General Union for Students and Youth in Jordan.
135. Information on the activities of the Ahwaz Liberation Front at the Popular Islamic Conference.
136. Information on Al-Dijila Irrigation Project.
137. Information on the General Union for Ahwaz Women.
138. Information on setting a plan for celebration on the anniversary of the Ahwaz Occupation.
139. Information on Ahwazi [REDACTED].
140. Information on Ahwazi hujaj [those who perform the Haj].
141. Information on the Permanent Committee for Victims of the Iran Iraq War.
142. Information on the attendance of the International Conference in Jordan regarding the blockade.
143. Information on the visit of the Office Director to the Ahwazi sectors.
144. Information on the plan of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz.
145. Information on the Ahwazi Liberation Movement.
146. Information on the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz attending the Popular Forces Conference.
147. Information on verdicts of execution for a number of Ahwazis.
148. Information on Ahwazi [REDACTED] and the ability to benefit from him for work with the Front.
149. Information on the approval to send [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].
150. Information on Information on a celebration held by the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz.
151. Information on Ahwazi [REDACTED].
152. Information on the work plan of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz.
153. Information on the voluntary return of Ahwazi nationals.
154. Information on the Ahwaz Day of the Martyr.
155. Information on the Ahwaz Liberation Front's activities during the first half of the year 2002.
156. Information on the Services director approving the invitation of the Lebanese Women Union.

157. Information on fighter [REDACTED].
158. Information on an introduction of Palestinian [REDACTED].
159. Information on Zionists intelligence agencies means of assassination.
160. Information on Jordanian Zionist security cooperation.
161. Information on the Mossad agency's performance review.
162. Information on the Palestinian economic crisis.
163. Information on the training rotations in the Al-Quds Special Military Base.
164. Information on the circulation of the Republican Presidency's letter concerning the request for military equipment.
165. Information on the Palestinian vision for peace.
166. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
167. Information on Palestinian Islamic Movements.
168. Information on a message to the Commander in Chief from Abu Al-Abbas.
169. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
170. Information on equipping of Al-Quds Special Military Base.
171. Information on the security plane of the Palestinian Liberation Front.
172. Information on paying an amount to the Abu Al-Abbas Group.
173. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
174. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
175. Information on the specialized explosives course.
176. Information on the rotation of Fedayiin of Janin Al-Samoud.
177. Information Palestinian fighter [REDACTED].
178. Information on the Palestinian Liberation Front's equipment.
179. Information on Palestinian friend [REDACTED].
180. Information on training fighters of the occupied territories.
181. Information on the meeting of the Palestinian Legislative Council.

182. Information on the JTF's [Palestinian Liberation Front] enterprise to put its cadre under the Iraqi command's administration.
183. Information on financial assistance to the Palestinian Liberation Front.
184. Information on Palestinian colonel Abu Samra.
185. Information on the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution (Al-Aqsa Forces) in Al-A'ziza.
186. Information on Palestinian friend [REDACTED].
187. Information whose source is Palestinian [REDACTED].
188. Information on Zionist Shabak arresting Palestinians who received military training in Iraq.

#### **E. Conversations with State Agencies and Other Security Agencies:**

The number of Office conversations with state directorates, their establishments and other security agencies reached 462 reports including the Office carrying out all administrative requests from Palestinian groups, unions, the Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz and its unions with directorates previously.

These conversations do have intelligence information which the Continuation Office uses toward Palestinians and Ahwazis. We state their importance as follows:

1. Information to the associate, director of the Palestine Office, about Iraqi assistance to the Palestinian people.
2. Information for the associate, director of the Palestine Office, about a message which arrived from a person within the occupied territories.
3. Information for the associate, director of the Palestine Office, about a Colin Powell's meeting with Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat.
4. Information for the associated, director of the Palestine Office regarding a message from the associate Rukad Salim, secretary for the Arab Liberation Front.
5. Information for the National Council regarding the Lebanese representative Naasir Qandil.
6. A number of letters supporting Palestinians to state establishments in order to circulate their administrative demands.

7. A number of telegrams of congratulations from Palestinian groups and the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz to the Iraq command and telegrams supporting the political positions with the request that they be sent to the Iraqi press for publication in local newspapers.
8. A number of gifts for the Commander in Chief from the Palestinians and Ahwazis which are for the appearance of the Commander of Victory [reference to Saddam Hussein].


**F. Administrative and Financial Payments the Office Provides to Palestinian Groups, the Arab Liberation Front of Ahwaz, and unions connected to them.**

Travel, residence and passport information has been accomplished where instances of payments for Palestinians and Ahwazis reached 699 instances including granting of passports, renewals, documents, visas and extensions. The details are as follows:

- First. Granting of exit and return visas numbered 243 passport documents.
- Second. Iraqi documents for extended travel numbered 33 documents.
- Third . Renewal of Iraqi travel documents numbered 62
- Fourth. Instances of entry stamps to the country 6 Palestinians carrying foreign passports.
- Fifth. Issuing of personal identification, Arab affairs identification, transferring stamps of the utmost identification cards to new Arab identification cards, number 182 identification cards.
- Sixth. Issuing new Iraqi travel documents for the first time numbered 10 documents.
- Seventh. Reissuing Arab affairs identification cards numbered 12 cards.
- Eighth. Adding children to Iraqi travel documents granted to their legal guardians numbered 11 instances.
- Ninth. Issuing Iraqi travel passports from the Public Security Directorate number 68 passports.
- Tenth. Renewing and extending Iraqi passports from the Public Security Directorate numbered 40 passports.
- Eleventh. Issuing Iraq passports for the first time from Public Security numbered 18 passports.
- Twelfth. Coordination with first class hotels for the purpose of paying in Iraqi dinars instead of hard currency for Palestinian and Ahwazi delegations coming as guests to the Office numbered three instances.

Thirteenth. Coordination with the Directorate of Delegations and reserving cards for delegations as guests of the Office numbered 3 instances.

**G. In the Area of Joint Issues with Other Departments as a Work Team:**



**H. Financial Payments the Services Allocated as follows:**

First. Financial allotments to Palestinian groups 4,000,000, four million Iraqi dinars.

Second. Financial allotments to the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz 10,000,000, ten million Iraqi dinars.

Third. Financial allotments to the Organization of Arabs Expelled from Kuwait 1000000 one million Iraqi dinars.

Fourth Financial allotments to equip the Al-Quds Special Military Base in the amount of 65,000,000 sixty five million Iraqi dinars, 25,000,000 twenty five million dinars have been paid, the rest is maintained by the Office to complete the requests to equip the base.

### **I. Reports and Studies:**

- First. Study on the essence of the Zionist Arabic Fight which was published in Al-Masira Magazine from the Palestinian Liberation Front.
- Second. Study titled "Israel on the Heights of the 21st Century."
- Third. Study on American, Israeli and Turkish cooperation with the absence of an Arab security organization.
- Fourth. Study about Israeli perpetual historical refusal to attempts to criticize the settlement policy in the occupied territory.
- Fifth. Study about the future of Pakistani nuclear establishments.
- Sixth. Study about Palestinian foreign trade.
- Seventh. Summary of the book "Janin Camp from the Catastrophe to the Intifadah."
- Eighth. Study on the Democratic Front called "After the Annihilation, Targeting Elements of the Force."
- Ninth. Study on the Islamic Jihad Movement "History of the Establishment, Organization and Strategy."
- Tenth. Study on Israeli Chinese relations.
- Eleventh. Study on Israeli Indian relations.
- Twelfth. Study concerning Israeli, American and Turkish cooperation.

### **J. Exemplary Events.**

The Office achieved 27 exemplary events as follows:-

- First. Work on inviting leaders from Palestinian groups to attend the Arab Popular Force Conference, Islamic Conference and Al-Quds Assistance Conference, which were held in Baghdad. Their appearance led to their successes and solidarity with the country.
- Second. Effective participation by the Office in preparing and forming the report offered to the General Secretariat for the Arab Popular Force Conference and achievement of political meetings with Palestinian groups which attended the conference.

- Three. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Popular Front-General Command where meets with Ahmad Jabril, the director general for the Front, and other Political Office members were conducted in Syria.
- Four. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Fatah Movement-Intifadah in Syria.
- Five. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Islamic Jihad Movement in Syria. A discussion to develop relations with them had taken place and the director general had been invited to visit the country.
- Six. Opening political and intelligence channels with the Revolutionary Committees Movement, the director general and his deputy came to the country.
- Seven. Building secret relations with officials from secret wings and special operations of Palestinian groups in Syria (the Popular Front-General Command, Fatah Movement and the Popular Front) through meets with them in Syria and using the military and intelligence information they possess.
- Eight. Movement on Lebanese individual (Naasir Qandil) a mission he has for press influence in Palestinian, Lebanese, and Hizballah circles (representative in the Lebanese parliament) and achieving a petition with him.
- Nine. Opening a special electronic mail account for the Office (e-mail) and using it to exchange information with our sources abroad.
- Ten. Setting up weekly meets with directors of Palestinian organizations and offices in the country.
- Eleven. Setting up weekly meets with the heads of popular and technical unions in the country.
- Twelve. Direct administrative control over the Association of Arabs Expelled from Kuwait.
- Thirteen. Re-equipping and training of Palestinian fighters at the Al-Quds Special Military Base according to approval from the Presidency of the Republic-the Secretary, in accordance with their letter numbered 530 / K on 22 January 2002.
- Fourteen. Organizing courses for Palestinian fighters present in the country at the Al-Quds Special Military Base (Course of the Fedayin of Janin AL-Samoud, and a specialized explosives course) notifying the Services director in according with our announcement 125 on 11 May 2002 about the program for these courses.
- Fifteen. Participation with M14 in implementing a special security plan to train Palestinians coming from the occupied territory and notifying the Services director on this plan, in accordance with our announcement numbered 60 on 14 March 2002.



- Sixteen. A course to train a group of fighters from the Arab Liberation Front on martyrdom [suicide] operations with the coordination of 14 according to approval from the Service director.
- Seventeen. Setting up the first training courses including Arab volunteers and second including Iraqi volunteers at the Al-Quds Special Military Base with the coordination of M14.
- Eighteen. Preparing the Al-Aziziyya Special Military Base for the purpose of training some Iraqi fighters (Basra Branch) and in the interest of M14's work.
- Nineteen. Reestablishing and equipping the military base of the Arab Liberation Front according to approval from the associate Taha Yassin Ramadan, official of the Palestine Office in coordination with the Construction and Housing Ministry for the purpose of equipping the base.
- Twenty. Training a group from the occupied territories on light weapons and tanks for the period of thirty days in one of the secret courses, according to the approval of the Services director.
- Twenty-one. Direct coordination with Services directorates (M6, M2, M4, M5, M40, M14, M9, M13, M12) to succeed with the training course that took place at the bases.
- Twenty-two. Issuing the Al-Ahwaz Magazine after stopping it for a time.
- Twenty-three. Achieving contact with Ahwazis living abroad.
- Twenty-four. The Office taking on the subject of voluntary return in coordination with the Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry and the Semitic Legation for Refugee Affairs in the country and ensuring that Ahwazis are delivered to the Iranian side with ten meals and using the matter for the good of intelligence work.
- Twenty-five. The Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz through its groups at Arab and international conferences outside the country to scan the Ahwazi issue.
- Twenty-six. Using interpreters with the Ahwazi religious delegations to aid us with our information and for the good of the work of fronts.
- Twenty-seven. Working again with the General Union of Ahwazi Women after ending it in 1996.

### **K. Occasions for Thanks and Praise:**

The Office obtained 11 events for thanks and praise from the Service director this year substantiated in writing on the record of announcements which were raised to its directors with different topics and two went to Mr. M. M. 7. The details are below.

First. Announcement number 403 on 31 December 2001, information about a proposed project between Israelis and Palestinians.

Second. Announcement number 2 on 5 January 2002 regarding Palestinian Jamal Al-Dura, father of Palestinian martyr Mohammad Al-Dura.

Third. Announcement number 9 on 10 January 2002 information about the Israeli naval forces seizing a ship carrying weapons.

Fourth. Announcement 47 on 17 February 2002 a meet with Palestinian A'arif A'rif Abu Ali.

Fifth. Announcement 57 on 10 March 2002 a meeting with the Palestinian Delegation headed by Farouk Qadumi.

Sixth. Announcement 129 on 14 May 2002 about the Al-Dajila irrigation project.

Seventh. Announcement 125 on 11 May 2002 about the training course which was executed for Palestinian fighters at the Al-Quds Special Military Base.

Eighth. Administrative order number 3446 on 4 August 2002 about the success of the course for Janin Al-Samoud.

Ninth. Announcement 213 on 26 August 2002 regarding the activities of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz during the first half of 2002.

Tenth. Thanks and appreciation from Mr. M. M. 8 regarding organizing the specific exhibition for the Office.

Eleven. Thanks and appreciation from Mr. M. M. 8 for organizing archives of the military bases.

### **L. Field Meets and Visits:-**

The number of field visits to the Ahwazi areas, headquarters for Palestinian groups, training bases for Palestinians at the Al-Quds Special military base and Al-Aziziyya Special Military Base reached 67 visits and meets through the year. Persons who visited them were the Office director, the intelligence department director and heads of assigned departments.

### **M.Failures.**

No failure took place in the Office work except the matter of Ahwazis voluntarily return to Iran where they could influence the mental and ideological side for Ahwazis like the influence of some thing on the department plans in the renewing its work toward the Ahwazi issue.

### **N. Intelligence Handicaps and Suggestions to Fix It.**

1. Shortage in sedans designated for Continuation officers, ten officers in the office could not obtain cars and they are included on the list to receive them according. According to the order we suggest an increase in the amount of cars for our office in relation to the officers.
2. The Office takes into account an intelligence department. Since its creation in 1994, it works using the precautionary and risky directions. The intelligence directorates work on that basis, including intelligence officers within the intelligence directorate and others. However we find that opportunities to send special delegations to work or humanitarian delegations, some of them were not given permission even on a limited basis from the Office in spite of them being intelligence officers distinguished in their work. Some of them have language, national security and political science degrees.
3. By our Office not participating in the internet site, it led to us missing a lot of statements from Palestinian groups and news of groups which have relations with Arab liberation movements in the world. This made us rely on sources to tell us the news. Our news and information on that was through electronic mail (e-mail). We suggest allocating an internet site for the Office.

[Underlining indicates that some of the topics had been underlined in pencil.]

## 2. Summary of the Annual Report for the Year 2002.

### A. In the Area of Intelligence Collection

The amount of information by type and the lowest level reached 954 pieces of information. The information was collected and prepared as a result of the concerns and plans of intelligence directorates M4 and M5 and other Service directorates which serves there work and also serves the concerns of the Office. Information is distributed to two main intelligence collection areas as follows:- (Political information reached its lowest level of 441 and intelligence information 465 and military 48) The details are also below:-

#### First. Political Information:-

The amount of political information, which was collected and at its lowest level, reached 441. Below is a summary of the most important details:-

1. Information about a discussion with Doctor Mahmoud Al-Zahar, spokesperson for the Hamas Movement.
2. Information about the Intifadah on its weekly status.
3. Information on the status and vision of the Democratic Front about the Palestinian internal situation.
4. Information about a statement from an Israeli office that Palestinians refuse to surrender.
5. Information about Bush's new plan to resolve the Palestinian issue.
6. Information on the Palestinian official position on the peace process.
7. Information on American Saudi relations.
8. Information about a statement from the Coordination Committee for Opposition Parties.
9. Information on the ruling national party in Egypt.
10. Information on Ankara's expanding aspirations in northern Iraq.

#### Second. Intelligence Information:-

The amount of intelligence information collected, which is at its lowest level, reached 465. Below is a summary of the most important details:-

1. Information on confessions of former American intelligence agent [REDACTED].

2. Information on the results of Sharon's visit to America.

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[Underlining indicates that some of the topics had been underlined in pencil.]

3. Information about Iran's role in the American military campaign against Iraq.
4. Information on National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.
5. Information about the ship which Israeli forces seized.
6. Information about the facts of the Zionist aggression.
7. Information about the memorandum of understanding between Ahmad Qari'a, president of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Israeli foreign minister.
8. Information on the ship which Israeli forces seized.
9. Information about the hostile Zionist activity.

**Second. Military Information.**

Intelligence information collected, which was at its lowest level, reached 48. Below is a summary of the most important details:-

1. Information about Israel and America conducting joint maneuvers to form a heets [spelled phonetically] missile network.
2. Information about hostile military developments on the Palestinian people.
3. Information on a report which uncovers defects in the Challenger tanks.
4. Information on Americans preparing their bases in Qatar.
5. Information about Israel's intention to use a nuclear weapon against Iraq.
6. Information about the Zionist chief of staff preparing the Israeli Army for war, to include Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.
7. Information on Iran starting to spread its military units of the Khomeini Guard out along the Iran Iraq border.
8. Discovery of names of Palestinian in Iraqi territories.
9. Discovering the name of an officer and his rank in the Palestinian Liberation Front on Iraqi territory.


**B. In the Area of Recruitment and Intelligence Opportunities:-**

**First. In the Area of Intelligence Opportunities:-**

The number of intelligence opportunities, prepared for the intelligence directorates and for the needs of the Office and its work plan, reached 102 opportunities. The opportunities were distributed 23 to M4, 12 to M5 and 15 for the good of other directorates and 30 for the office. The details are stated below:-


**Opportunities to M4**

23 intelligence opportunities were prepared and transferred for the need of M4's work. Below are the most important examples of these opportunities:-



**Opportunities for M5:**

12 intelligence opportunities were prepared and transferred in the interest of M5's work. Below are the most important examples of these opportunities.




**Opportunities to other directorates:**

15 intelligence opportunities were prepared and transferred in the interest of work for Service directorates. Below are the most important examples of these opportunities:-



**Opportunities Which Serve the Requirements of the Office:-**


Nomination and Exploitation of 25 intelligence opportunities in the interest of the Office's work has been completed. Below are the most important examples of these opportunities:-



**Second. In the Area of Intelligence Meets the Office Prepared as its Cover for Other Directorates.**

The number of intelligence meets, which were prepared for intelligence directorates according to their concerns through the cover of the Office, reached 299 meets. They were distributed 11 to M4, 9 to M5, 5 to other directorates and 274 meets to serve the work of the Office and its concerns. The details are stated below:-

**For M4's Requirements /11 intelligence meets**



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**For M5's Requirements/ 9 intelligence meets.**

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**Use of Directorates / 5 Intelligence Meets.**

[REDACTED]  
**Used for Office Work / 274 intelligence meets:**

[REDACTED]  
**Meets for the Office outside the country**

The Office received leadership individuals representing Palestinian movements. They met with them outside the country 16 times.  
Most important follow:-



**Meets with Palestinian and Ahwazi officials inside the country:-**

The job of the Office is to solidify and perpetuate relations with Palestinian and Ahwazi groups in and outside of Iraq, likewise with influential figures in Palestinian and Ahwazi circles, through meets with them. It is also to extend the political and intelligence channels of communication with them. The number of instances is 27. The most important of them are as follows.

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]
10. [REDACTED]
11. [REDACTED]
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]
16. [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED]

18.

19.

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**Third. Occasions to Host Delegations.**

The work of the Office is to host Palestinian and Ahwazi delegations by invitation by the Office after receiving basic approval to participate in conferences which are held in Iraq. There were 13 events, and they are as follows:-

1. A delegation from the Democratic Front headed by Palestinian Fahd Suleiman, member of the political office and official of foreign relations.
2. A delegation from the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party headed by Arabi Awad, (director general).
3. A delegation from the Popular Struggle Front (splinter group) headed by Khalid Abdel-Majid (director general).
4. A delegation from the Islamic Jihad Movement headed by Palestinian Abu Tareq Ziyad Rashid Hussein, (the military official).
5. A delegation from the Popular Front headed by Palestinian Maher Al-taher, member of the political office (a number of times).
6. A delegation from the Popular Struggle Front, headed by Khalid Fawzi (Political Office member).
7. A delegation from the Popular Front headed by A'arif A'rif Arafat (member of the Political Office).
8. A delegation from the Palestinian Liberation Front (splinter group) headed by Palestinian Yassin Ma'tuq (member of the Political Office).
9. A delegation from the Arab Revolutionary Committees Movement headed by director general Mohammad Badr.
10. A delegation from the Popular Front-General Command headed by the director general's assistant, Tilal Naji.
11. Ahwazi Abdullah Abdel-Zahra Al-Silmi (director general for the Popular Movement to Liberation Ahwaz) in Libya.
12. Ahwazi Ya'qub Hussein Jaasib (Ahwazi personality who lives in the Emirates).
13. Ahwazi Natiq Lufta Jaasib (Ahwazi personality who lives in the Emirates).

**C. Information Sent for Higher Review.**

The number of conversations, containing information sent for higher review, totals 65 reports distributed in the following directions (37 to the respected Presidency of the Republic and the Presidency's Diywan [similar to cabinet], 22 to Office official, Mr. Tareq Aziz, 6 to the Palestinian Office official. The most important are as follows:-

First. To the Presidency of the Republic-Secretary and Diywan of the Presidency:  
The amount of information sent to the respected Republic Presidency-the Secretary  
and the Diywan of the Presidency reached the number 37. Below is a summary of the  
most important:-

1. Information on non Iraqis granted Iraqi travel passports.
2. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED] and the topic  
of honoring him.
3. Transferring a document containing nine pages of translation.
4. Information and a message of three pages.
5. Information regarding the Palestinian ministerial creation.
6. Information whose source is Palestinian [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
7. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED] and a message directed to the  
Commander in Chief, may Allah protect and preserve him.
8. Information about Kuwaiti [REDACTED].

Second. Information sent to the Official in Charge of the Office.

The amount of information sent to the Official in charge of the Office is numbered

22. Below is a summary of the most important:-

1. Information on a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Front.
2. Information on the desire of a delegation from the Palestinian unions to  
visit the country.
3. Information on the arrest of Ahmad Sa'dat, director general for the Popular  
Front.
4. Information on an invitation of Rafat Saleh, director general for the  
Palestinian Democratic Union.
5. Information on the Islamic Jihad Movement.
6. Information on the Fatah Movement-Intifadah-Abu Musa.
7. Information on volunteers for martyrdom [suicide] operations.

Third. Information sent to the Officer in Charge of the Palestine Office, Mr. Taha  
Yassin Ramadan.

The number of conversations sent to the Officer in Charge of the Palestine Office,  
Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadan, amounted to 6. They are as follows:-

1. A message from the families of Palestinian wounded and martyred/Gaza  
Strip asking for help from the great Arab leader Saddam Hussein, may  
Allah protect and preserve him.

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2. Transferring statements from within the occupied territories coming from the Palestinian Organization command and the Arab Liberation Front.
3. Message from Mr. Yasser Arafat to the Palestinian Organization command on the anniversary of the Arab Liberation Front being established.
4. Information about volunteer fighters for martyrdom [suicide] operations.
5. Information on Palestinian groups and support, receiving financial assistance.
6. Information in a message from the Front's General Command to the Office Official.

**D. Deputy Officer in Charge of the Office-Director of Intelligence Services:-**

The number of information reports sent to the Deputy Officer in Charge of the Office is 188. The reason in the decrease of total information sent up this year from 2001 is that the work, according to instructions, is that the information will be transferred to other directorates for the purpose of using it without writing to the Service director and getting approval to transfer it, as was previously done. The most important is as follows:-

1. Information on a proposed project between Israelis and Palestinians.
2. Information on the meet with a delegation from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
3. Information on Palestinian [REDACTED].
4. Information on a list containing names of Palestinians wanted by the Zionist entity.
5. Information on the plan to assassinate the Commander in Chief, Saddam Hussein (May Allah not allow this).
6. Information on associates [REDACTED].
7. Information on Palestinian national, [REDACTED]
8. Information on verdicts of execution for a number of Ahwazis.
9. Information on Ahwazi [REDACTED] and the possibility to use him as an opportunity for Front work [referring to liberation fronts].
10. Information on sending [REDACTED] and approval for his travel.

**E. Discussions with State and Other Security Agencies.**

The number of discussions of the Office with other state agencies and its establishments with other state security agencies number 462 reports. They include the office executing all kinds of administrative demands from Palestinian groups and their unions and the Arab Front

for the Liberation of Ahwaz with the above agencies. These discussions had intelligence information which the Continuation Office used toward Palestinians and Ahwazis. We will mention the most important as follows:

1. Information to the associate Palestine Office Director regarding Iraqi aid to Palestinian people in the occupied territories.
  2. Information to the associate Palestine Office Director regarding Colin Powell's meeting with Palestinian president, Yasser Arafat.
  3. Information to the associate Palestine Office Director, regarding a message from associate Rakad Saalim, secretary of the Arab Liberation Front.
  4. Information to the National Council about the Lebanese representative Naasir Qandil.
  5. A number of reports supporting Palestinians to state institutes to circulate their administrative demands in them.
- E. Administrative and financial assistance office provides to Palestinian groups, the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz and the unions connected to it, they are:-  
travel, residence and visas information was achieved where the number of instances for Palestinians and Ahwazis 299 instances. The assistance consists of granting visas, renewals and extensions, documents and passports. The details are represented below:-

- First. Granting exit and return visas numbered 243 visas and documents.
- Second. Iraqi travel documents extended, numbered 33 documents.
- Third. Iraqi travel documents renewed, numbered 62 documents.
- Fourth. Instances of entry visas to the country, 6 Palestinians carrying foreign passports.
- Fifth. Issued personal identification and identification of Arab concerns and transferring seals from expired passports to new Arab passports numbered 183 identification cards.
- Sixth. Issued Iraqi travel documents for the first time, 10 documents.
- Seventh. Withdrawing identification for Arab affairs, 12 identification cards.
- Eighth. Adding children to Iraqi travel documents granted to their legal guardians, 11 instances.
- Ninth. Issuing Iraqi passports from the Public Security Directorate, numbered 68 passports.
- Tenth. Renewing and extending Iraqi passports from the Public Security Directorate numbered 40 passports.


Eleven. Issuing Iraqi passports for the first time from Public Security, numbered 18 passports.

Twelve. Coordination with first class hotels for the purpose of paying in Iraqi dinars instead of hard currency for Palestinian and Ahwazi delegations coming to the country as guests of the Office, numbered 3 instances.

Thirteen. Coordination with the Delegation Directorate and renting cars for delegations which are guests of the Office numbered 3 times.

Fourteenth. Aiding entry and exit of 8 delegations from different groups with airport and border exits.

F. **In the Area of On Going Intelligence Issues with Other Departments by using a joint Work Group.**



G. **Financial Allocations that the Service Designates. They are as follows:-**

First. Financial allocations for Palestinian groups 40,000,000 forty million Iraqi dinars.

Second. Financial allocations for the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz 10,000,000 Iraqi dinars.

Third. Financial allocations for the Association of Arabs Expelled from Kuwait 1,000,000 million Iraqi dinars.

Fourth. Financial allocations to equip the Al-Quds Special Military Base, its amount is 65,000,000 sixty five million Iraqi dinars. 25,000,000 twenty five million Iraqi dinars has been spent, the remaining amount is still maintained by the Office to complete requests for equipping the base.

**H. Reports and Studies:-**

- First. Study on the future of Pakistani nuclear institutions.
- Second. Study on Palestinian foreign trade.
- Third. Summary of a book "Camp Janin from the Catastrophe to the Intifadah."
- Fourth. Study on the Democratic Front called "After the Annihilation, Targeting Elements of the Force."
- Fifth. Study on the Islamic Jihad "History of its Founding, Organization and Strategy."
- Sixth. Study on Israeli Chinese relations.
- Seventh. Study on Israeli Chinese relations. [sic]
- Eighth. Study on Israeli Indian relations.
- Ninth. Study on the hidden Arab Jew battle.
- Tenth. Study concerning American Israeli and Turkish cooperation.

**I. Exemplary Events.**

- First. Work on inviting some of the leaders from Palestinian groups to attend the Arab Popular Force Conference, the Islamic Conference and the Al-Quds Assistance Conference which were held in Baghdad. Their attending led to its success and solidarity with the country..
- Second. Effective participation by the Office in preparing and forming the report offered to the General Secretariat for the Arab Popular Force Conference and achievement of political meetings with Palestinian groups which attended the conference.
- Third. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Popular Front- General Command where meets with Ahmad Jabril, the director general for the Front, and other Political Office members were conducted in Syria.

- Four. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Fatah Movement-Intifadah ( Abu Musa) in Syria.
- Five. Opening political and intelligence channels of communication with the Islamic Jihad Movement in Syria. A discussion to develop relations with them had taken place and the director general had been invited to visit the country.
- Six. Opening political and intelligence channels with the Revolutionary Committees Movement, the director general and his deputy came to the country.
- Seven. Building secret relations with officials from secret wings and special operations of Palestinian groups in Syria (the Popular Front-General Command, Fatah Movement and the Popular Front) through meets with them in Syria and exploiting the military and intelligence information they possess.
- Eight. Moving on [REDACTED] with a mission, because he has for press influence in Palestinian, Lebanese, and Hizballah circles [REDACTED] and contacting him.
- Nine. Opening a special electronic mail account for the Office (e-mail) and using it to exchange information with our sources abroad.
- Ten. Setting up weekly meets with directors of Palestinian organizations and offices in the country.
- Eleven. Setting up weekly meets with the heads of popular and technical unions in the country.
- Twelve. Direct administrative control over the Association of Arabs Expelled from Kuwait.
- Thirteen. Re-equipping and training of Palestinian fighters at the Al-Quds Special Military Base according to approval from the Presidency of the Republic-the Secretary, in accordance with their letter numbered 530 / K on 22 January 2002.
- Fourteen. Organizing courses for Palestinian fighters present in the country at the Al-Quds Special Military Base (Course of the Fedayiin of Janin AL-Samoud, and a specialized explosives course) notifying the Services director in accordance with our announcement 125 on 11 May 2002 about the program for these courses.
- Fifteen. Participation with M14 in implementing a special security plan to train Palestinians coming from the occupied territory and notifying the Services director on this plan, in accordance with our announcement numbered 60 on 14 March 2002.

- Sixteen. Course to train a group of Palestinian fighters from the Arab Liberation Front in martyrdom [suicide] operations, with the coordination of M14 according to the approval of the Services director.
- Seventeen. Conducting training courses, the first combines volunteer Arabs and the second combines volunteer Iraqis at the Al-Quds Special Military Base, with coordination of M14.
- Eighteen. Preparing Al-Aziziyya Special Military Base for the purpose of training some Iraqi volunteers (Basra Branch) for the good of M14's work.
- Nineteen. Re-establishing and equipping the base of the Arab Liberation Front according to approval from Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Palestine Office Official, with the coordination of the Construction and Housing Ministry for the purpose of equipping the base.
- Twenty. Training a group from the occupied territories on light weapons and tanks for the period of thirty days in one of the secret courses, according to the approval of the Services director.
- Twenty-one. Direct coordination with Services directorates (M6, M2, M4, M5, M40, M14, M9, M13, M12) to succeed with the training course that took place at the bases.
- Twenty-two. Issuing the Al-Ahwaz Magazine after stopping it for a time.
- Twenty-three. Achieving contact with Ahwazis living abroad.
- Twenty-four. The Office taking on the subject of voluntary return in coordination with the Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry and the Semitic Legation for Refugee Affairs in the country and ensuring that Ahwazis are delivered to the Iranian side with ten meals and using the matter for the good of intelligence work.
- Twenty-five. The Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz through its groups at Arab and international conferences outside the country to scan the Ahwazi issue.
- Twenty-six. Using interpreters with the Ahwazi religious delegations to aid us with our information and for the good of the work of fronts.
- Twenty-seven. Working again with the General Union of Ahwazi Women after ending it in 1996.

**K. Occasions for Thanks and Praise.**

The Office obtained 11 events for thanks and praise from the Service director this year, substantiated in writing on the record through announcements which were raised to their directors with different topics and two went to Mr. M. M. 7. The details are below.

- First. Announcement number 403 on 31 December 2001, information about a proposed project between Israelis and Palestinians.
- Second. Announcement number 2 on 5 January 2002 regarding Palestinian Jamal Al-Dura, father of Palestinian martyr Mohammad Al-Dura.
- Third. Announcement number 9 on 10 January 2002 information about the Israeli naval forces seizing a ship carrying weapons.
- Fourth. Announcement 47 on 17 February 2002 a meet with Palestinian [REDACTED]
- Fifth. Announcement 57 on 10 March 2002 a meeting with the Palestinian Delegation headed by [REDACTED]
- Sixth. Announcement 129 on 14 May 2002 about the Al-Dajila irrigation project.
- Seventh. Announcement 125 on 11 May 2002 about the training course which was executed for Palestinian fighters at the Al-Quds Special Military Base.
- Eighth. Administrative order number 3446 on 4 August 2002 about the success of the course for [REDACTED]
- Ninth. Announcement 213 on 26 August 2002 regarding the activities of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz during the first half of 2002.
- Tenth. Thanks and appreciation from Mr. M. M. 8 regarding organizing the specific exhibition for the Office.
- Eleven. Thanks and appreciation from Mr. M. M. 8 for organizing archives of the military bases.

**L. Field Meets and Visits.**

The number of field visits to the Ahwazi areas, headquarters for Palestinian groups, training bases for Palestinians at the Al-Quds Special military base and Al-Aziziyya Special Military Base reached 67 visits and meets through the year. Persons who visited them were the Office director, the intelligence department director and heads of assigned departments.

The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification.

**M. Failures.**

No failure took place in the Office work except the matter of Ahwazis voluntarily return to Iran where they could influence the mental and ideological side for Ahwazis like the influence of some thing on the department plans in the renewing its work toward the Ahwazi issue.

**N. Intelligence Handicaps and Suggestions to Fix It.**


1. Shortage in sedans designated for Continuation officers, ten officers in the office could not obtain cars and they are included on the list to receive them according. According to the order we suggest an increase in the amount of cars for our office in relation to the officers.
2. The Office takes into account an intelligence department. Since its creation in 1994, it works using the precautionary and risky directions. The intelligence directorates work on that basis, including intelligence officers within the intelligence directorate and others. However, we find that opportunities to send special or humanitarian delegations, some of them were not permitted, even on a limited basis from the Office, in spite of them being intelligence officers distinguished in their work. Some of them have language, national security and political science degrees.
3. By our Office not participating in the internet site, it led to us missing a lot of statements from Palestinian groups and news of groups which have relations with Arab liberation movements in the world. This made us rely on sources to tell us the news. Our news and information on that was through electronic mail (e-mail). We suggest allocating an internet site for the Office.

**3. Comparison between the Achievements for the Year 2001 and the Year 2002.**

Item	Field	Year 2001	Year 2002
<b>1.</b>	<b>In the Area of Information Collection</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>954</b>
A.	Political Information	126	441
B.	Intelligence Information	500	465
C.	Military Information	142	48
<b>2.</b>	<b>In the Area of Recruitment</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>102</b>
A	Intelligence opportunities transferred to M4	17	23
	Intelligence opportunities transferred to M5	14	12
	Intelligence opportunities the Office uses	52	52
	Intelligence opportunities for the need of the departments	Not Available	15
B.	Intelligence meets for the good of the directorates and the Office	108	298
C.	Meets for the Office outside the country	Not Available	16
D.	Meets with Palestinian and Ahwazi officials inside the country	Not Available	27
E.	Occasions to Host Delegations inside the Country	Not Available	13
<b>3.</b>	<b>In the Area of Information Sent for Higher Review</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>65</b>
A.	To the Presidency of the Republic-the Secretary and the Diywan of the Presidency.	13	37

B.	The Office Official	33	22
C.	The Palestine Office Official	Not Available	6
4.	<b>Deputy Office Official</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>177</b>
5.	<b>To State Directorates and Other Security Agencies</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>462</b>
6.	<b>Administrative assistance and Achievement of Travel and Resident Matters.</b>	<b>881</b>	<b>699</b>
7.	<b>In the Area of Intelligence Issues</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>
8.	<b>In the Area of Financial Allocations to Palestinians and Ahwazis</b>	<b>11,000,000 million dinar</b>	<b>40,000,000 million dinar</b>
9.	<b>In the Area of Reports and Studies</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>
10.	<b>In the Area of Exemplary Events</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>27</b>
11	<b>In the Area of Thanks and Praise from the Service director and director of the Office</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>11</b>
12	<b>Field Visits and Meetings for the Sectors</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>67</b>

**4. Graph with the Achievements for M8 through the Year 2002  
Compared to the Year 2001**



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### Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-017029

Classification: [REDACTED]

English Title: Memos and correspondence within the Iraqi Intelligence Service about preparing and executing a mission related to blowing up a Turkish School in Northern Iraq [REDACTED]

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**Sex : Male**

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**Photograph Available**

**Sex : Male**

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**Photograph Available**

**Sex :** Male

#### Document Remarks

This 52 page file contains memos and correspondence, dated 1999-2002, within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), about preparing and executing a mission related to blowing up a Turkish School in Northern Iraq, team of experts specialized in explosives to produce and test explosives for Fedayeen Saddam, disassembling a booby-trapped vehicle in Maysan Governorate. The file details are as follows: -Page 2: Contains the Triage sheet. -Pages 3-15, 21: Contain memos, dated Dec 1999- Jan 2000, within the IIS, regarding Al-Ghafqi project, which was related to a task of blowing up a Turkish School in Northern Iraq on 27 Jan 2000. The included memos show that task number is "C12000/001", and information on perpetration of explosives, execution time and training related to the usage of explosives. -Pages 16-19: Contain memos, dated 2002, within the IIS, about the IIS Officer 'Ali Husayn Sarhid who was assigned to the M14 to enroll in a training course for using explosives. -Page 20: Contains a memo, dated 21 October 2001, from the M14 to M16 of the IIS, about manufacturing special boat in coordination with Engineer Nasim, to be used for an IIS directorate purposes. -Pages 22-29: Contain reports, dated 1999, issued by the IIS, regarding disassembling a booby-trapped vehicle in Maysan Governorate, including names of the participants in the disassembling operation. -Pages 30-49: Contain memos, dated Feb 2000, within the IIS, about forming a team of experts specialized in explosives to produce and test ten camouflaged explosives, which camouflaged as books and suitcases, for Fedayeen Saddam. These pages also include correspondence between the Fedayeen Saddam, and the IIS concerning the explosives, awarded bonus by 'Uday Saddam Hussein for the team that produced the explosives, and an inspection certificate for the effectiveness of the explosives. -Page 50-52: Contains memos, dated 2002, within the IIS, regarding approval from the IIS director concerning to execute a target of exploding undefined Mercedes vehicle, the mission was coordinated by the IIS Officer, 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman Makki. The names associated with the file were added to the Named Entities.

#### Batch Information

**Batch Number:** 3232-1

**Boxes in Batch:** 42

**Capture Information** Date/Time of Capture:20030806 Identity of Source:IISbuilding

**Transmittal Information** Date/Time of Arrival:20030820

**Comments** ( [REDACTED] ) Media shipped to Qatar, Pallet #74, 28 Aug 2003. Pallet #76, 03 Sep 03. media sent to qatar # 88. 24oct03. pallet 111 13 Jan 03

## Translation Form

Primary Number: CMPC-2003-017029	Translation Number: CMPC-2003-017029-HT-NMECS	
Title of Document: Making IIS Explosives		
Source Language: Arabic	Target Language: English	
Document Type: Correspondence	Translation Type: Partial	Translation # of Pages: 8
Original # of Pages: 52	Word Count: 2,121	

Country of Publication: Iraq	Author (if known):
Personnel (persons named in the document):	
Facilities (facilities named in the document):	
Keywords: IIS International contacts.	
Remarks:	
Gist: This file contains correspondence of the IIS and Fida'een about Special Operations concerning the planting of car bombs and booby traps inside buildings in the Northern Region, June 2002.	

Linguist Names: █	
Date In: 15 May 2006	Date Out: 16 May 2006
QC Linguist: █	Date: May 17, 2006

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Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus (IIS)

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

To: The Respected Director  
Subject: Assignment C/2000/001

In reference to the approval of the Director of the IIS, as per the letter of M-40 classified Top Secret and Confidential [TC: foreign classification] number 64, dated 11 Jan 2000, the following duties were accomplished as per your orders, task C/2000/001, dated 11 Jan 2000:

1. Two molded and guided explosive bombs have been produced; each weighing 3kg [REDACTED].
2. Each bomb operates by an electronic timer with a (1) one hour delay. The system operates at the designated time after the battery is connected and safety switches are set.
3. The detonator in section (2) was tested several times. The results were accurate, and in each case it took off in one hour.
4. Since this is a guided bomb, the preparation method in terms of operation and the way to position the bomb were explained to the beneficiary's representative, Mr. Sattar Jabr 'Abd al-Hussayn. The methods of transporting and storing the bombs prior to using them were also demonstrated. Delivery of the bombs was accomplished according to a special form attached.

Please review.

Respectfully,

//signed//  
Walid 'Allawi Hamadi  
22 Jan 2000

Attachments:  
All of task C/2000/001 preliminaries

(1-1)

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

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Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus

C/2000/001  
11 Jan 2000

To: The Respected Director  
Subject: Assignment

1. Beneficiary: M-57
2. Beneficiary reference: Top Secret and Confidential (64, dated 11 Jan 2000) [TC: foreign classification]
3. Name or Representative: Mr. Sattar Jabr 'Abd al-Hussayn
4. Brief description of the target: Fixed targets inside buildings. Bombs are placed inside the rooms through or on top of the windows.
5. Type of assignment: Two molded, guided, explosive bombs, detonated electronically (electronic timer) using a one hour timer. Each bomb weighs 3 Kg of molded explosives.
6. Method of transportation: The bombs are delivered by smuggling [TC: smuggled into the region]
7. Executers: Our sources [TC: IIS sources]
8. Remarks:
  - \* The bombs are activated after the predetermined time of one hour (1 hour) by turning on the safety switch and connecting the battery.
  - \* To ensure simultaneous explosions, activate the safety switch on both bombs at the same time.

//signed//  
al-Ghafqi Project Representative  
Walid 'Allawi Hamadi  
Head of Section-1

//signed//  
M-57, Beneficiary Party Rep.  
Sattar Jabr 'Abd al-Hussayn  
11 Jan 2000

(1-1)  
Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

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Republic of Iraq  
Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

Memorandum  
M-14

6 June 2002  
Reference: 1064

To: Section 27

Please register Officer 'Ali Hussayn Sarhid, assigned to M-14, in a Domestic Explosives Course, for the benefit of our directorate's missions. [TC: Domestic Explosives Course in the production and use of Improvised Explosive Devices]

Regards,

Head of Section 14  
6 Jun 2002

[TC: side note] Request an approval from the Director of the Apparatus. //signed//  
[TC: Director's approval is noted on page 18]

(1-1)  
Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

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This page includes a request from the director of M-14 to the M-16 to manufacture a small boat for the M-14 directorate's use.

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Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus

To: The Administrator  
Subject: Execution of an assignment.

1. A combined meeting was held on 6 Nov 1999, with the Director of Section-1, the Director of al-Ghafqi project and other experts from both sides to discuss the procedures of disabling a booby-trapped car.
2. An agreement was reached to send a team of experts to Misan province to investigate the type of car and detonator used, and disable it.

3. Immediately, on the same day of the meeting, a team was dispatched to Misan province; team members: Yahya 'Abdallah, 'Abd-al-Karim Faza', Sa'd Fadil, Rand Mahmud, and two M-5 officers.
4. The team started working the next morning in the presence of the team leader. They discovered that the car was a 1982 Toyota pick-up carrying 250Kg of highly explosive TNT and PEUA.  
[REDACTED]
5. The car was towed to Baghdad after disabling and securing the bomb. The car was driven and parked at a safe location by the same IIS source on 7 Nov 1999.
6. A team of explosives' experts was assigned to the car to determine the work technique and remove the explosive materials and completely secure it...

1-5

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The team consisted of the following personnel: Ziban Hadi, Yihya 'Abdallah, 'Abd-al-Karim Faza', Sa'd Fadil, Ra'id Mahmud, Jasim Kamil accompanied by two photographers from the M-13 and two officers from the M-5. They agreed to start working from the rear of the car without touching any other parts to avoid any traps set by the enemy in front.

7. [REDACTED]
8. In order to avoid dangerous electrical contact, the team didn't use welding machines, grinders or drills to separate the two bays; instead, they used various types of applications to detach the weld holding the secondary bay to the original one and immediately pulled out the explosive material. Upon finishing the first stage, they used...

2-5

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... a manual hydraulic jack to lift the secondary bay, breaking off the weld line without initiating any spark until we located the cortex cord at the rear of the car.  
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]. In order to avoid any complications, work continued, observing extreme caution, by lifting one part at a time while removing the explosive material from this part until the radio receiver that was placed inside the explosive materials along with the detonators was located. Thus, all the explosive material was removed first, then the radio receiver and electrical detonators along with the main wirings between the detonators and lastly the cortex cord that was carefully and safely extracted.
9. After removing the explosives and other related material from the car, a second meeting was held at M-5 building between the director of Section-1 and the

- following personnel: Ziban Hadi, 'Abd-al-Karim Faza' and Yihya 'Abdallah, at 7 pm on Tuesday 9 Nov 1999 to discuss the second stage of the operation. They agreed to allow explosive experts to reset the booby trap in the car using 50Kg of the same explosives in order to completely destroy the car.
10. On Wednesday 10 Nov 1999, booby trapping the car commenced using guided charges, since these have a more destructive effect and are more efficient. The team members for this stage consisted of the following personnel:

3-5

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Ziban Hadi, Maysar Ahmad Muhammad, Walid 'Allawi, Yihya 'Abdallah, Karim Faza' 'Ali, Ra'id Mahmud, Jasim Kamil. The secondary bay was reinstalled and the guided charges and the wiring of the new system with the electrical detonators and cortex cord were installed. Finally, body and paintwork was completed and the car was turned in to M-5 at 2 pm on Thursday, 11 Nov 1999.

11. The mission was executed on 13 Nov 1999, and the results were very good. This time the team was accompanied by Mr. Yahya 'Abdallah.
12. Assessment and Conclusion:

- First: This mission provided us with practical and field experience in the enemy's intellect and techniques concerning such operations.
- Second: Getting acquainted with the techniques used in explosive operations, its source, and the way the radio transmitter was utilized.
- Third: Adding new information to our practical skills to enable us to face this type of operation and be better at countering it.

4-5

Page 26

- Fourth: The work team exerted huge patriotic effort to avoid any sort of complications in such operations; this was accomplished by the help of God.

Please review and advice as you see fit.

With regards,

//signed//  
Ziban Hadi Lyial  
14 Nov 1999

5-5

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Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

To: Director of Intelligence Apparatus  
Subject: Accomplishment of the task of producing and testing of camouflaged bombs

Sir, we would like to present the following:

1. As per your approval noted on both letters of the General Secretariat of Fida'yeen Saddam, numbers 3009/1 dated February 2000 and 3230 dated 10 Apr 1999. Due to the risk involved in the disabling of the 10 camouflaged explosives, a team of explosives experts and workers working under our direct supervision was immediately formed, (two camouflaged diplomatic briefcases, three camouflaged bombs in the form of books, and five adhesive molded bombs) to remove the detonators, electronic timers, and batteries for re-inspection as well as replacement of low batteries, which are all embedded inside the various bombs. Accordingly, work was accomplished in two stages:
  - A. First: removed the decoy from the ten bombs, dismantle and remove the batteries, timers and detonator wires. Inspected them to ensure their safety and operation according to the determined time, then replaced, camouflaged and prepared them for reuse. Attachment (2).
  - B. Produced three adhesive molded magnetic bombs and one camouflaged diplomatic briefcase bomb with predetermined timer according to the request of beneficiary party. Attachment (1).
2. The inspection, preparation, production and readiness were accomplished in record times with high accuracy. The bombs were delivered to Fida'yeen Saddam General Secretariat and turned in to Staff Colonel Qatiba Sa'id Hamu as per the attached special form...

(1-2)

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

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Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

- ...attachment (3), and trained him on using them and identifying the function of each bomb.
3. The work team that accomplished the mission in a timely manner and high accuracy had given the beneficiary party the opportunity to choose the appropriate

time to execute their assigned missions. We list the members before your Excellency:

- A. Maysar Ahmad Muhammad  
Chief of the Technical, Control, and Training Section, Diploma in Explosives
  - B. Walid 'Allawi Hamadi  
Chief of the Chemical Preparation of Explosives Section, Sr. Chemical Engineer, Chief Chemist.
  - C. Ziban Hadi 'Aiyal  
Chief of the Explosives' Mechanical Preparation Section, Technical Manager, Mechanic.
  - D. Khalid Ibrahim Isma'il  
Chief of the Technical, Control, and Training Section, Chemist.
  - E. Ahmad Sa'di Ibrahim  
Officer, Chemical Preparation of Explosives, Masters in Chemical Engineering.
  - F. 'Ala' Hashim 'Anfus  
Officer, Electronic Preparation of Explosives, Diploma in Engineering Drawing
  - G. Haydar Muslim Dawud  
Officer, Electronic Preparation of Explosives, Institute of Technology.
  - H. 'Ali Khalaf Mahmud  
Officer, Chemical Preparation of Explosives, Institute of Chemical Industries.
  - I. Qadduri 'Abd Musa  
Officer, Electronic Preparation of Explosives, Institute of Technology.
  - J. Khalid Khalaf Hamad  
Employee, Mechanical Preparation of Explosives, Technician, Industry.
4. Due to the risk involved, and the significant, accurate and quick effort exerted by these experts and employees without selfishness, who answered the Holy call of duty with pride, which reflected positively on the IIS and its command, I therefore recommend the following in order to encourage them and motivate others:
- A. Presenting the work team with an appreciation letter from your Excellency.
  - B. Rewarding the team members with a suitable financial award that you see fit.

Please review and order as you see fit.

High regards,

Director of al-Ghafqi

//signed//

21 Mar 2000

(2-2)

Top Secret and Confidential  
[TC: foreign classification]

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Presidential Office  
Intelligence Apparatus

...these bombs.

4. Due to the efforts of the explosives' expert team, I recommend your Excellency's approval to distribute the funds between the work team that consists of two groups as follows:

Group A:

1. Mahfuz 'Abd-al-Wahab
2. Maysar Ahmad Muhammad
3. Haydar Muslim Dawud
4. Ahmad Sa'di Ibrahim
5. 'Ala' Hashim 'Anfus.

Group B:

1. 'Ali Khalaf Mahmud
2. Ziban Hadi 'Aiyal
3. Khalid Ibrahim
4. Qadduri Musa
5. Khalid Khalaf Hamad
6. Ra'd Fadil Hassun

Please order as you see fit.

With regards,

//signed//

Director of M-16

19 Jun 2000

Secret and Confidential [TC: foreign classification]

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**Harmony Document Folders  
and Media Files:**

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Previous

Next

Query returned 52 of 927504 total documents.  
Displaying hit: 4

Request Upload

Request Translation

#### Original Document Information

Document #: CMPC-2003-011229

Classification: [REDACTED]

English Title: List of 9 Ba'th Party Suicide Volunteers

Language: ARABIC

Document Date:  
20010922

Total Pages: 2

Inclusive Pages:

Oversized Pages:

Document Type: LETTER

Format: PAPER ORIGINAL

Agency: DIA

Project: IRAQI FREEDOM

Country Of Information: IRAQ

Title:

Country Of Origin:

Originators Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

#### Translation Information

Translation #	Classification	Status	Translating Agency
CMPC-2003-011229-HT	[REDACTED]	PARTIAL COMPLETED	DIA

#### Linked Documents

Original Document	CMPC-2003-011229
Translation	CMPC-2003-011229-HT

#### Related Document Numbers

Document Number	Type	Document Number
Harmony Number		CMPC-2003-011229
Intelligence Information Report		[REDACTED]

#### Document Remarks

[REDACTED] This 2 Page file include Ba'th Party memo attached with a list of 9 suicide volunteers, dated 22 September 2001. The list includes their names, date of birth, party rank, education level and their Branch Command. The Ba'th Party Suicide Volunteers are: -Active Member Fakhri Jasim Tahir Husayn Al-Sa'idi -Trainee Member Muhan 'Abbadhi Muslim 'Abbas Al-Ta'i -Active Member Farqad 'Adnan 'Alwan 'Umran Al-'Ubaydi -Trainee Member Basim Jasim Jadda' Al-Rubay'i -Active Member Ya'qub Illegible Ya'qub -Trainee Member Fandi Rahim Mihaymid Al-Juburi -Trainee Member Hasan Juwad Hasan 'Umran -Active Member Mustafa Ibrahim Mahmud Muhammad Al-'Abbasi -Trainee Member Sabah Ibrahim Ahmad Muhammad Al-Dulaymi

Batch Information

Batch Number: 000-0

**CMPC-2003-011229**

**Full Translation**

**Page 1**

In the Name of God, All Merciful, All Compassionate

Ba'th Party  
Al-Sumud Division

One Arab Nation  
With One Immortal Message


Ref.: 214  
Date: 22 September 2001

To: 17 Tammuz Section's Command  
Subject: Volunteering for Suicide Bombing Operations

Comrades' Greeting,

Hereby attached (8) names of Comrades who volunteered to commit suicide bombing operations as a first group which starts with serial no. (1) Fakhri Jasim and ends with serial no. (8) Sabah Ibrahim.

Be as good as to review...may you last for the struggle



Comrade  
Akram Hammudi Ahmad  
Secretary of Al-Sumud Division's Command  
20 September 2001

**Page 2**

Volunteering for Suicide Bombings' Operations' Form

No.	Full Name and Family Name	Date of Birth	Party Level	Educational Level	Division's Name	Section's Name	Branch's Name
1	Fakhri Jasim Tahir Husayn Al-Sa'idi	1954	Active Member	BA in Law	Al-Sumud	17 Tammuz	Khalid Bin Al-Walid
2	Muhan 'Abbadı Milam 'Abbas Al-Ta'i	1961	Trainee Member	BS Physics	=	=	==
3	Farqad 'Adnan 'Alwan 'Umran Al-'Ubaydi	1966	Active Member	BA	=	=	==
4	Basim Jasim Hasan Jadda' Al-Rubay'i	1964	Trainee Member	Elementary School	=	=	==
5	Ya'qub (Illegible) Ya'qub	1957	Active Member	Administration Diploma	=	=	==
6	Fandi Rahim Mihaymid Al-Juburi	1973	Trainee Member	BS Physics	=	=	==
7	Hasan Juwad Hasan 'Umran	1965	==	Diploma	=	=	==
8	Mustafa Ibrahim Mahmud Muhammad Al-'Abbasi	1978	Active Member	Industrial Elementary	=	=	==
9	Sabah Ibrahim Ahmad Muhammad Al-Dulaymi	1966	Trainee Member	Preparatory School	=	=	==

**ALL THE TEXT ON THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></p>				
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YY)	2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
November 2007	Study (Final)			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5a. CONTRACT NO.	
Iraqi Perspectives Project. Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 2 (Redacted)			DASW01-04-C-0003 and W74V8H-05-C-0042	
			5b. GRANT NO.	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO(S).	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NOS.	
Kevin M. Woods, project leader			5e. TASK NOS.	
			AJ-8-2465 and AJ-8-2743	
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
IDA Paper P-4287 is a REDACTED five-volume set published as part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II series. Volume 1 examines the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global context. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in Volume 1. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.				
14. ABSTRACT				
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist-operatives monitored closely. Because Saddam's security organizations and Osama bin Laden's terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a "de facto" link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam's use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
Al Qaeda, business models, Gulf Wars, Iraq, Saddam Hussein, terrorism.				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NO. OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT U	b. ABSTRACT U	c. THIS PAGE U	UU 560	Brigadier General James Barclay, USA, Director, JCOA-LL, USJFCOM
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (757) 203-7317				

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